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The Somali passport remains among the world’s weakest travel documents. As of 2026, Somalia passport ranks 99th globally on the Henley Passport Index allowing access to only 32 destinations through visa-free or visa-on-arrival arrangements.

But Kenya’s crackdown on illegally obtained identity documents has now turned that long-standing practice into a political crisis, exposing questions about citizenship, corruption and accountability among Somalia’s senior officials.

The controversy erupted after Somalia’s Deputy Prime Minister Jibril Abdirashid Haji was deported on late June from Jomo Kenyatta International Airport (JKIA) in Nairobi after Kenyan authorities questioned the legitimacy of his Kenyan passport. On August 3, he announced that he returned the document, following pressure from Somalia’s leadership.

“I have decided to return my Kenyan passport which I had for over twenty years,” he said defending that he obtained the document “legally” even though Kenyan authorities said he acquired “illegally“.

The incident was followed within weeks by the denial of entry and deportation of another Somali government official, Abshir Ahmed Mohamed, the state minister for presidency, over a disputed Kenyan passport, deepening concerns in Mogadishu.

The two incidents created significant embarrassment for Somalia’s government and forced President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud to address the issue directly.

During a cabinet meeting on Thursday, 30 July, the president reportedly told ministers holding Kenyan passports that they had two choices: surrender the documents or leave the cabinet.

The directive reflected growing frustration inside Villa Somalia over the political damage caused by the deportations and the perception that senior officials were relying on foreign citizenship while representing the Somali state.

A passport more valuable than politics

The roots of the controversy lie in Somalia’s weak international travel position.

The Somali passport remains one of the least powerful travel documents globally, making international travel difficult even for government officials attending diplomatic meetings, regional summits and international conferences.

For many Somali elites, a Kenyan passport has provided a practical solution.

Kenya’s passport offers greater international mobility, easier access to many countries and fewer visa restrictions. For politicians, businessmen and officials with links to Kenya, obtaining Kenyan nationality has often been viewed as a strategic advantage.

But Kenya insists that citizenship documents must only be issued to those legally entitled to them.

Kenyan authorities have warned that passports and national identity cards are reserved for citizens and that individuals who acquired them through fraudulent means will face action.

The crackdown comes amid a wider debate in Kenya over corruption within immigration and registration systems.

For years, Kenyan citizens and politicians have raised concerns that corrupt officials facilitated the illegal issuance of national identity cards and passports to foreigners.

The alleged sale of identity documents has become a major national security concern, with critics warning that weak controls allow non-citizens to obtain official documents that provide access to travel, banking and other state services.

Kenya’s recent immigration reforms are aimed at strengthening verification systems and identifying individuals who may have obtained citizenship documents improperly.

The Somali community has come under particular scrutiny because of the deep historical, economic and family links between the two countries.

Somalia admits there is a passport problem

Somali officials have acknowledged that the controversy has exposed a real challenge.

State Minister for Foreign Affairs Ali Omar recently said the government was aware of the deportations but defended Kenya’s authority to control entry into its territory.

“We are aware that two officials were deported. It is Kenya’s right to reject anyone they do not want to enter their country. The issue of passports is also a problem,” Ali Omar said.

His comments marked one of the rare acknowledgements from Somalia’s government that the issue goes beyond individual cases and reflects a broader challenge involving foreign documents held by Somali officials.

The scale of foreign passport ownership among Somali officials remains unclear.

Estimates circulating among officials and political observers suggest that between 40 and 50 percent of Somali government officials may hold Kenyan passports, although there is no publicly available official register confirming the figure.

Kenyan officials have repeatedly raised concerns that some non-citizens obtained documents through corruption or irregular procedures.

The controversy has now forced Somalia to confront difficult questions: How many government officials hold foreign citizenship? And should senior officials representing Somalia continue holding passports from neighbouring countries?

The debate is unlikely to end with Kenya.

Many Somali politicians and officials are also believed to hold Ethiopian, Djiboutian and Ugandan passports due to decades of migration, business links, education and political relationships.

Ethiopia, which has played a major security and political role in Somalia, could face similar questions if Somali officials possess Ethiopian citizenship without fulfilling legal requirements.

Uganda, another important security partner and long-time contributor to African Union missions in Somalia, could also face scrutiny.

The issue is particularly sensitive because both countries have significant influence in Somalia’s political and security affairs.

“A national embarrassment”

The controversy has also triggered criticism from Somali commentators and analysts.

Abdirashid Jibril, commenting on the issue, said the passport crisis reflects a deeper problem of confidence in Somalia’s own institutions and the reliance of officials on foreign systems.

“I known many Somalis are currently trapped at the Kenyan airports and their documents confiscated. I urge all those who hold Kenyan passports to surrender the document and let’s have confidence in our passport,” he said.

The debate highlights a contradiction at the heart of Somalia’s state-building efforts.

While Somali leaders represent a sovereign country internationally, many rely on foreign passports because their own national travel document remains weak.

The foreign passport controversy is now bigger than immigration.

It has become a question of governance, transparency and trust.

For ordinary Somalis, obtaining passports and travelling internationally remains difficult. Meanwhile, some members of the political elite have found alternative routes through foreign citizenship.

Kenya’s crackdown has therefore exposed a sensitive reality: Somalia’s political class has often relied on foreign passports to overcome the weaknesses of its own state.

The coming months may determine whether the passport controversy becomes a short-lived political embarrassment or a deeper reform moment forcing Somalia to examine citizenship, accountability and the credibility of those who govern.

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Behind the official photographs and carefully worded speeches at last week’s African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) ministerial meeting in Kampala, a deeper disagreement unfolded—one that diplomats and regional officials say prevented the conference from addressing what many believe is the single greatest obstacle to Somalia’s security: its unresolved political crisis.

The two-day meeting, held on 30–31 July, brought together ministers and senior military officials from AUSSOM troop-contributing countries (TCCs), alongside representatives from the African Union, IGAD, the United Nations and international partners. It followed a meeting of Chiefs of Defence on 29 July that focused on the deteriorating security situation and the mission’s worsening financial crisis after the United States withdrew its financial support earlier this year.

The expectation among many delegates was that Kampala would not only discuss military operations but also pave the way for renewed international confidence—and potentially unlock future funding for AUSSOM.

Instead, according to multiple diplomatic sources familiar with the negotiations, the conference became bogged down over a single paragraph in the draft communiqué.

Uganda’s proposal

Uganda, the largest troop contributor to AUSSOM, proposed language calling for an inclusive political dialogue among Somalia’s federal government, regional administrations and other political stakeholders.

Officials present at the meeting say the proposal reflected growing concern that military gains against Al-Shabaab cannot be sustained while Somalia remains politically divided.

The proposal reportedly received backing from representatives of IGAD, Kenya, Ethiopia, the United Nations Transitional Mission in Somalia (UNTMIS), the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) and several AU officials.

But Somalia objected.

During the ministerial session on Friday, outgoing President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud publicly insisted that the paragraph be removed from the final communiqué.

“I cannot accept the communiqué to include that paragraph,” he said during the meeting, according to delegates who attended the session.

The disputed paragraph—Paragraph Four in the draft document—called for political dialogue aimed at restoring consensus between the federal government and Somalia’s federal member states.

Its removal effectively ended hopes that the conference would produce a broader political roadmap alongside its security recommendations.

“The most critical moment”

One senior African Union official described the outcome as a missed opportunity.

“Somalia is facing one of the most critical moments in its recent history,” the official told Kaab TV.

“The AU mission is running out of funding following the U.S. withdrawal. Kampala was intended to help prevent an eventual withdrawal of AU forces that could create conditions for Al-Shabaab to expand. Without political agreement inside Somalia, that objective becomes far more difficult.”

Military officials privately acknowledged that financing was only one part of the crisis.

Several participants argued that donors have become increasingly reluctant to finance a mission operating amid growing political fragmentation in Somalia.

IGAD’s warning

IGAD Deputy Executive Secretary Mohamed Abdi Ware echoed those concerns during his address to delegates, stressing that political reconciliation was essential for lasting security.

His remarks, however, reportedly drew criticism from the Somali delegation.

Days later, Ware defended his position publicly.

2/2https://t.co/df9HExRRpu transition security of Somalia to its indigenous forces in the shortest possible time, and send the men and women of the AUSSOM Mission back to their home countries as the heroes they are. When the mission is successfully completed, They should go back… pic.twitter.com/VRyjJh73QE

— Mohamed Abdi Ware (@MAWareSO) August 3, 2026

Writing on X on Monday, he said the objective was straightforward: to enable Somalia’s own security forces to assume responsibility while allowing AUSSOM peacekeepers to return home “as heroes.”

“When the mission is successfully completed, they should go back to their home countries with their heads held high, and depart Somalia basking in glory and enjoying the undying gratitude of the Somali people,” he wrote.

Responding to criticism from Mogadishu, Ware added:

“I have no clue how such sentiments would offend anyone, let alone the government we are all trying to help avoid a precipitous, premature, and disorderly exit of peacekeepers—an eventuality that, unless avoided, would hand Al-Shabaab an enormous strategic advantage now, and for a long time.”

He also repeated a warning increasingly heard among diplomats involved in Somalia.

“Security without political legitimacy cannot endure. Political progress without security is impossible.”

A political crisis years in the making

The disagreement in Kampala reflected divisions that have been widening since 2024.

The crisis intensified after President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud pushed through amendments to Somalia’s provisional constitution, arguing that the country needed to complete the constitutional review process.

Puntland and Jubaland rejected the amendments, accusing the federal government of acting unilaterally and violating previous political agreements.

Relations between Mogadishu and both regional administrations have remained effectively frozen since then.

The dispute deepened further after the term of the Federal Parliament expired earlier this year. Parliament subsequently extended its own mandate by one year, a move that also effectively prolonged President Mohamud’s tenure until May 2027.

In June, armed clashes erupted in Mogadishu between forces aligned with the federal government and opposition groups, leaving more than ten people dead and forcing civilians to flee parts of the capital. International mediation efforts continued for weeks but failed to produce a lasting political settlement before stalling in late July.

Just before travelling to Kampala, President Mohamud also met senior U.S. AFRICOM and U.S. Embassy officials at Mogadishu’s Aden Adde International Airport. According to officials familiar with the discussions, American representatives again stressed the need for broader political consensus while warning that continued divisions were strengthening Al-Shabaab’s position.

A communiqué missing its central issue

The conference ultimately adopted a 15-point communiqué focused on security cooperation, the threat posed by Al-Shabaab, the gradual transfer of security responsibilities to Somali forces and AUSSOM’s severe funding shortfall.

Absent, however, was any reference to political dialogue between Somalia’s federal leadership and the federal member states—the very issue many delegates had hoped the meeting would confront.

Analyst Hassan Mudey believes that omission undermined the conference’s wider purpose.

“This is one of the reasons international support has weakened,” he told Kaab TV.

“The Kampala conference was supposed to address both the political and security crises. Instead, it concluded without resolving the issue that lies at the centre of Somalia’s instability.”

President Mohamud defended his position after returning to Mogadishu.

Opening Parliament on Saturday, he maintained that Somalia’s political disagreements are domestic matters and reiterated that they should not be internationalised.

“We believe the political matter is an internal issue, and we take that as homework,” he said.

Yet for many diplomats leaving Kampala, the concern was not simply what appeared in the communiqué, but what was left out. As AUSSOM confronts an increasingly uncertain financial future and Al-Shabaab continues to exploit political divisions, the conference underscored a growing consensus among Somalia’s international partners: military operations alone are unlikely to secure lasting stability without an inclusive political settlement at home.

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The regulations were officially signed and launched by the Federal Ministry of Health and Human Services (FMoH), in partnership with the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the World Health Organization (WHO), and other partners during a national event held to commemorate World Breastfeeding Week.

The adoption of the BMS Regulations marks a significant milestone in Somalia’s efforts to promote, protect, and support breastfeeding by regulating the marketing and promotion of breast-milk substitutes in line with international standards.

The new framework seeks to protect families from inappropriate commercial influence and ensure mothers have access to accurate information and support to make informed infant feeding choices.

The launch coincides with the global observance of World Breastfeeding Week, held from 1–7 August under the theme: “Breastfeeding for a Sustainable Start in Life: Strengthen What Works.” The theme highlights the importance of expanding proven interventions, strengthening health systems, and improving community support to help mothers successfully breastfeed.

Breastfeeding is widely recognised as one of the most effective and affordable interventions for improving child survival, nutrition, health, and long-term development. Early initiation of breastfeeding within the first hour after birth, exclusive breastfeeding for the first six months, and continued breastfeeding alongside appropriate complementary feeding up to two years and beyond are proven to reduce child illness and deaths.

However, Somalia continues to face challenges in achieving optimal breastfeeding practices.

Around 60 percent of newborns are breastfed within the first hour of birth, but only 34 percent of infants under six months are exclusively breastfed.

Continued breastfeeding also declines to 49 percent at one year and 40 percent at two years, representing missed opportunities to improve child health and nutrition.

The government and partners said the new regulations build on ongoing efforts to strengthen Infant and Young Child Feeding (IYCF) programmes, train health workers and community health workers, expand breastfeeding counselling services, and support mother-to-mother support groups across Somalia.

They called on government institutions, health professionals, employers, civil society organisations, development partners, community leaders, and families to strengthen efforts to create an environment where mothers can breastfeed successfully.

The priorities include enforcing the new BMS Regulations, expanding quality breastfeeding counselling services, promoting maternity protection and breastfeeding-friendly workplaces, improving monitoring and evidence-based programming, and engaging fathers, families, and communities in supporting breastfeeding.

Speaking at the launch, Somalia’s Minister of Health and Human Services, Dr. Ali Haji Adam, described the regulations as a historic step in protecting children’s health.

“Breastfeeding is one of the most effective interventions for ensuring children survive, grow, and thrive. As we commemorate World Breastfeeding Week 2026, we reaffirm the Government’s commitment to creating an enabling environment where every mother receives the support she needs to breastfeed successfully. The signing of the Breast-milk Substitutes (BMS) Regulations marks a historic milestone in Somalia’s efforts to protect, promote, and support breastfeeding and safeguard every child’s right to the best possible start in life.”

UNICEF Representative in Somalia Sandra Lattouf welcomed the adoption of the regulations, saying effective implementation would now be critical.

“The adoption of Somalia’s Breast-milk Substitutes Regulations is a major step towards protecting breastfeeding, which saves lives by providing infants with vital immunity and optimal nutrition. The priority now is effective implementation, with strong monitoring, enforcement, and support for families to ensure mothers are protected from inappropriate marketing of breast-milk substitutes. UNICEF is committed to supporting the Government of Somalia to put these regulations into practice through stronger health systems, quality counselling, and community-based support so that every child has the opportunity to thrive.”

WHO Representative to Somalia Dr. Kamil Mohamed said breastfeeding remains a key public health priority.

“Breastfeeding is a priority of public health and one of the most cost-effective interventions for improving maternal and child health. WHO remains committed to supporting Somalia in implementing evidence-based policies and strengthening health systems that protect, promote, and support optimal breastfeeding.”

As Somalia marks World Breastfeeding Week 2026, health authorities and partners urged renewed commitment from families, communities, policymakers, and the private sector to ensure every mother receives the information, support, and protection needed to breastfeed successfully, giving every child the healthiest possible start in life.

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Over the past months, senior U.S. officials have intensified contacts with Puntland, Somaliland and Jubaland, focusing on security cooperation, counterterrorism, maritime security and the growing strategic importance of the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea.

The renewed engagement comes at a time when Somalia’s security transition has faced serious setbacks. Despite billions of dollars in international assistance, the Somali Federal Government has struggled to deliver decisive progress against Al-Shabaab, while political disputes between Mogadishu and federal member states have weakened national cohesion and diverted attention from the fight against extremist groups.

For Washington and its allies, the security environment is becoming increasingly complex. The threat is no longer limited to Al-Shabaab. ISIS-linked militants in Puntland, piracy concerns in the Gulf of Aden, instability around the Red Sea, and geopolitical competition among global powers have increased the strategic importance of Somalia’s coastline and regional actors.

U.S. Engagement with Puntland: Counterterrorism and Maritime Security

The latest U.S.-Puntland engagement has been among the most significant.

A U.S. delegation led by Major General Claude K. Tudor Jr., the commander of special operations for U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), met with Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni in Bosaso.

During the visit, Puntland and the United States signed a security cooperation agreement allowing Washington to expand its facility in Bosaso to support counterterrorism operations and maritime security.

The agreement comes after years of U.S. support for Puntland’s campaign against ISIS militants in the Cal Miskaad mountains of Bari region.

From 2024 to 2025, U.S. assistance included airstrikes, intelligence sharing and logistical support to Puntland forces fighting ISIS. Puntland forces later announced that they had recaptured several areas previously controlled by ISIS after months of operations supported by international partners.

The President of the #Puntland State, @HESaidADeni , together with ministers, military officers, and advisors, held a meeting in Bosaso with a delegation from the #USA especially @USAfricaCommand , led by Major General Claude Tudor, Commander of #AFRICOM Special Operations. pic.twitter.com/xC4b63LACx

— Puntland State House (@Plstatehouse) August 2, 2026

The U.S. focus on Puntland reflects the region’s strategic importance. Puntland sits along the Gulf of Aden, close to one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints, the Bab al-Mandab Strait, where instability could affect global shipping and energy supplies.

Somaliland: Strategic Maritime Partnership

Major General Tudor also met Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi (Irro) during his Horn of Africa tour.

The discussions focused on security cooperation, maritime security and shared strategic interests in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.

Somaliland emphasized its more than 850-kilometer coastline and the strategic importance of Berbera, which sits near major international shipping routes.

The engagement highlights Somaliland’s growing importance in regional security calculations. While Somaliland remains internationally unrecognized as an independent state, its geographic position and relative stability have made it increasingly relevant to discussions about maritime security, counterterrorism and regional stability.

The United States has previously assessed the strategic value of Berbera as part of broader efforts to improve maritime awareness and monitor threats in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab.

Jubaland and the Return of Regional Security Partnerships

Jubaland has also remained an important security partner for the United States due to its location along the Kenyan border and its role in countering Al-Shabaab.

The region has historically been a frontline in Somalia’s fight against the militant group, particularly in areas around Lower Juba and Kismayo.

U.S. engagement with Jubaland has traditionally focused on security cooperation, including support for local forces fighting Al-Shabaab and efforts to prevent extremist networks from exploiting border areas.

As Al-Shabaab continues to adapt its strategy, maintaining relationships with capable regional security actors has become increasingly important.

Why a Dual-Track Approach Could Be Necessary

For years, international partners have invested heavily in strengthening Somalia’s Federal Government as the central authority responsible for defeating Al-Shabaab and rebuilding state institutions.

However, the results have been disappointing.

Al-Shabaab remains a powerful insurgency with significant territorial influence, taxation networks and the ability to carry out major attacks. Somalia’s national security forces have struggled with coordination problems, political interference and limited operational capacity.

At the same time, relations between Mogadishu and federal member states have deteriorated. Political disputes over constitutional reforms, elections and resource-sharing have weakened cooperation between the federal and regional levels.

The result has been a security strategy built around a government that has not yet developed the political and institutional capacity required to manage Somalia’s complex security environment.

This reality has forced international partners to reconsider whether a Mogadishu-only approach is sufficient.

The emerging pattern of U.S. engagement has led some analysts to argue that Washington is once again embracing a dual-track approach in Somalia.

As Nairobi-based analyst Rashid Abdi noted, “The U.S. military is actively stepping up ‘dual-track diplomacy’ to deepen cooperation with strategic Somali territories — Somaliland, Puntland and Jubaland.”

The three are crucial US partners and deemed more active in the fight against terrorist groups in the Horn,” Rashid wrote.

Puntland has been at the forefront of operations against ISIS-linked militants in the Cal Miskaad mountains, while Jubaland remains a key frontline region in the fight against Al-Shabaab due to its location along Somalia’s southern border. Somaliland, meanwhile, has gained strategic importance because of its long coastline, the port of Berbera and its proximity to the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab maritime corridor.

The growing U.S. focus on these regions reflects a broader security calculation: defeating terrorist networks and protecting strategic waterways requires cooperation with actors that have operational presence on the ground.

Rather than replacing engagement with Mogadishu, a renewed dual-track model would acknowledge Somalia’s federal reality and allow Washington to work simultaneously with national and regional institutions to address increasingly complex threats.

The dual-track approach is not a rejection of Somalia’s federal government. Instead, it recognizes the reality that Somalia’s regions possess different security capabilities, political dynamics and strategic importance.

During previous years, the United States engaged directly with regional administrations while maintaining relations with Mogadishu. That approach allowed Washington to support security actors on the ground while encouraging Somalia’s federal system to develop.

A renewed dual-track model could provide several advantages

First, it could strengthen counterterrorism operations.

Regional forces in Puntland, Jubaland and other areas have direct knowledge of local terrain, communities and militant networks. Supporting capable local partners could improve the fight against Al-Shabaab and ISIS.

Second, it could improve maritime security.

With piracy risks returning and instability spreading around the Red Sea, coastal regions such as Puntland and Somaliland have become critical partners in protecting international shipping routes.

Third, it could respond faster to emerging threats.

The Horn of Africa is increasingly affected by competition involving regional and global powers, arms trafficking, extremist networks and instability linked to the Red Sea crisis.

A New Reality in the Horn of Africa

The Horn of Africa is entering a new strategic era. The Red Sea has become a major arena of geopolitical competition, while extremist groups continue exploiting weak governance and security gaps.

The international community cannot afford a security strategy based only on political preferences in Mogadishu while ignoring realities on the ground.

A balanced dual-track approach could allow the United States and its partners to work with all capable Somali actors while continuing to support Somalia’s federal institutions.

The goal should not be to weaken Somalia’s national government, but to strengthen the country’s ability to confront threats that no single institution can defeat alone.

The recent U.S. engagements with Puntland, Somaliland and Jubaland suggest a recognition that Somalia’s security future depends on broader partnerships. After years of limited progress against terrorism and growing instability around the Red Sea, revisiting a dual-track approach may no longer be a political choice — it may be a strategic necessity.

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According to Somalia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the two ministers reviewed the longstanding ties between Mogadishu and Cairo and discussed the evolving political and security situation in the Horn of Africa.

The conversation also focused on strengthening diplomatic coordination and expanding cooperation on issues of mutual interest.

Minister Abdisalam thanked Egypt for its continued political, development, and security assistance, reaffirming Somalia’s commitment to further enhancing bilateral relations.

“Somalia highly values Egypt’s continued political, development, and security support, and remains committed to strengthening bilateral cooperation and coordination on issues of common interest,” Abdisalam said.

For his part, Dr. Abdelatty reiterated Egypt’s unwavering support for Somalia’s sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity, and national institutions, stressing that Cairo remains firmly opposed to any action that undermines Somalia’s internationally recognized borders.

“Egypt remains steadfast in its support for Somalia’s sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity, and national institutions. We reject any attempt by Israel to recognize the northwestern region of Somalia as an independent entity in violation of Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity,” Abdelatty said.

The phone call reflects the increasingly close strategic relationship between Somalia and Egypt, which has expanded in recent years through cooperation in diplomacy, security, defense, education, and development.

Cairo has consistently backed Somalia’s unity and state-building efforts in regional and international forums, while both governments continue to coordinate closely on security challenges and political developments across the Horn of Africa.

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Government and aviation officials told Hiiraan Online that the flights mark the initial phase of a broader pullout of UAE equipment from the capital, following Somalia’s decision earlier this week to cancel security and defense agreements linked to the Emirates.

Two additional aircraft are expected to arrive in Mogadishu on Friday to complete the removal, the sources said.

Officials briefed on the process said the withdrawal followed disputes between Somali and Emirati authorities over procedures, including documentation and authorization requirements.

UAE officials initially resisted directives from the Somali government, the sources said, but later complied by submitting flight manifests and other required paperwork before clearance was granted.

The drawdown comes days after Somalia’s federal Cabinet voted to annul all security, defense, and cooperative agreements connected to the ports of Berbera, Bosaso, and Kismayo, citing what it described as serious violations of Somalia’s sovereignty, national unity, and political independence.

The decision followed an investigation by Somalia’s Immigration and Citizenship Agency into the alleged unauthorized use of Somali airspace and territory related to the movements of Aidarous al-Zubaidi, head of Yemen’s Southern Transitional Council, a UAE-backed separatist group.

The Saudi-led coalition fighting in Yemen has accused al-Zubaidi of defying orders to travel to Riyadh for talks and instead mobilizing forces toward Al-Dhale in southwestern Yemen.

Coalition spokesperson Maj. Gen. Turki al-Maliki later alleged that al-Zubaidi fled the southern Yemeni city of Aden by sea before leaving the region by air, with Abu Dhabi facilitating his transit through Somali territory.

According to al-Maliki, al-Zubaidi boarded a flight accompanied by aides “under the supervision of UAE officers.” The Southern Transitional Council has denied the allegation, insisting its leader remains in Aden.

Strains in relations are also unfolding amid a broader diplomatic context. Last month, Israel became the first country to formally recognize Somaliland as an independent state—a move Somalia strongly rejected.

Reports citing Israeli officials said the recognition was facilitated by Abu Dhabi, further heightening tensions between Mogadishu and the UAE.

The Emirates has long maintained close economic and security ties with Somaliland, including a $442 million investment by Dubai-based logistics firm DP World to develop and operate the Port of Berbera.

Somalia’s federal government considers Somaliland part of its internationally recognized territory and has repeatedly opposed foreign agreements concluded without its consent.

The visible withdrawal of UAE equipment from Mogadishu underscores a sharp escalation in tensions between the two governments and signals a possible recalibration of the Emirates’ on-the-ground presence in federal Somalia, even as its influence remains strong within regional administrations.

Somali officials say the government remains open to international cooperation, but only under arrangements that fully respect Somalia’s unity, sovereignty, and constitutional authority—a stance now being tested as one of Mogadishu’s most influential foreign partners scales back its presence.

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U.S. forces work alongside the Somali Federal Government’s security forces, carrying out special operations, providing military advice, and conducting airstrikes.

However, the United States does not regularly disclose information about casualties, targets, or the actual impact of its operations, raising questions about the level of transparency surrounding military activities in Somalia.

A report published by Fox News indicated that Somalia is among the locations where the United States is waging one of its quietest wars, as information about airstrikes and operations against Al-Shabaab and ISIS is often released only after the fact or not disclosed at all.

The U.S. presence in Somalia began in the 1990s but intensified after 2017, when the United States increased airstrikes and deployed special forces to support the fight against terrorist groups. Although most U.S. troops were ordered to withdraw in 2020, hundreds of soldiers were redeployed in 2022.

In early 2025, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth stated that Africa, particularly Somalia, remains an important battleground, though the United States is reviewing its military presence.

As the fight against Al-Shabaab and ISIS continues, the lack of official information regarding casualties and the outcomes of U.S. operations continues to fuel debate over transparency and accountability in military operations in Somalia.

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These missions are smaller and quieter than the post-9/11 wars that once defined U.S. foreign policy. There are no troop surges, no primetime addresses. Yet American service members continue to conduct raids, launch airstrikes, and intercept enemy fire under war authorities passed more than two decades ago — long after public attention has moved on. The wars did not end; they simply faded from view.

As of June, some 40,000 U.S. troops remain stationed in the Middle East, a reminder that America’s military footprint has shrunk but never disappeared.

Syria: The war that never formally ended

About 900 U.S. troops remain in eastern Syria, conducting counterterrorism operations against the Islamic State and defending themselves against Iranian-backed militias.

Officially, the mission is a stabilization effort following ISIS’ territorial defeat. In reality, U.S. forces still face rocket, drone, and indirect-fire attacks, especially as regional tensions rise. Working alongside the Syrian Democratic Forces, they target ISIS cells responsible for assassinations, ambushes, and prison breaks.

The mission drew attention in December when two National Guardsmen and one American contractor were killed by a suspected ISIS fighter. U.S. airstrikes and special operations raids continue even as Syria has largely disappeared from the national conversation.

There is no declared war, no defined end state — yet American troops operate in an active combat environment.

The U.S. military entered Syria in 2014, launching airstrikes and deploying special operations forces to support local partners against ISIS. U.S. forces expanded alongside Kurdish-led units in eastern Syria during the fight to dismantle ISIS’ caliphate.

After ISIS lost its territory in 2019, Washington reduced its presence but retained several hundred troops to prevent a resurgence and counter Iranian-backed militias. Despite repeated calls for withdrawal, U.S. forces have remained for more than a decade, operating under post-9/11 authorities never formally repealed.

Iraq: A war winding down, but not finished

Under a 2024 agreement with Baghdad, Washington has begun drawing down forces and transferring responsibility for countering ISIS to Iraqi security forces. The coalition plans to reduce its footprint by roughly 20% of the remaining 900 troops, consolidate forces mainly in the Kurdish region, and conclude its mission by September.

Even amid the drawdown, U.S. forces face threats from Iranian-backed militias, retaining authority to defend themselves and strike ISIS targets if necessary.

The Iraq war no longer resembles the conflict of the 2000s. But American troops remain deployed, armed, and active in a country where risk persists. U.S. forces initially entered Iraq in 2003, toppling Saddam Hussein and fighting through years of counterinsurgency before formally ending combat operations in 2011. They returned in 2014 to counter ISIS, gradually narrowing their mission from combat to advisory roles.

Somalia: America’s quietest war

Few Americans realize the U.S. is still conducting one of its most persistent counterterrorism campaigns in Somalia.

U.S. special operations forces assist Somali troops against al-Shabab, an al Qaeda-linked terrorist group, with airstrikes regularly conducted, though often underreported. There is no large troop presence and little media coverage, but the fighting continues.

U.S. military involvement dates to the early 1990s humanitarian intervention. After the 1994 “Black Hawk Down” incident, forces withdrew, only to return in the 2000s through counterterrorism strikes and advisory roles. The presence expanded after 2017, shifted to an “over-the-horizon” posture in 2020, then partially redeployed in 2022 under the Biden administration. Today, roughly 500 U.S. troops remain in Somalia, maintaining an ongoing counterterrorism mission.

Yemen: A war Americans are fighting without realizing it

The U.S. has no base presence in Yemen but frequently engages with Iran-backed Houthi rebels. Naval and air forces intercept missiles and drones targeting Red Sea and Gulf of Aden shipping lanes, putting American personnel in direct combat.

In spring 2025, U.S. forces launched a weekslong campaign against Houthi targets, striking over 1,000 sites linked to missile, drone, and weapons infrastructure to protect trade and deter escalation.

Operation Southern Spear: Counter-narcotics in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific

The U.S. has conducted 28 strikes on alleged narco-trafficking boats near Venezuela, killing 103 people. South and Central America now host the largest U.S. military buildup in decades, including 15% of naval assets and the USS Gerald R. Ford. While operations have avoided strikes on Venezuelan soil, the scale of forces underscores how quickly a counter-narcotics mission could escalate into a more overt confrontation.

None of these conflicts were formally concluded by Congress. Most continue under post-9/11 authorizations passed more than two decades ago.

While Washington has signaled potential changes, as long as Iran remains a threat, a broad U.S. withdrawal from the Middle East is unlikely.

“The days in which the Middle East dominated American foreign policy are thankfully over — not because the region no longer matters, but because it is no longer the constant source of imminent catastrophe it once was,” said the White House national security strategy in December. “It is emerging as a place of partnership, friendship, and investment — a trend that should be welcomed and encouraged.”

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