Regional countries and international partners maintain diverse interests related to security, ports, trade, and military cooperation.

Foreign power competition further complicates the political situation in Somalia, while escalating the risk that internal disputes could mutate into active conflicts.

It is critical for Somalia to safeguard its decision-making sovereignty and avoid having internal friction leveraged in rivalries between external states.

This can be achieved through a foreign policy rooted in national interests, internal consultation, and transparent agreements aligned with international law.

The developments in South West State present Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and the federal government with a heavy burden regarding securing safety, defending sovereignty, and resolving political disputes.

Shifts across the Bay region demonstrate that the situation demands a balanced response addressing security, political, and humanitarian dimensions simultaneously.

The government is required to establish a clear strategy to protect civilians and reinforce security institutions, while opening channels of dialogue for political stakeholders to achieve a sustainable agreement.

Furthermore, relations with Ethiopia and other regional nations must be managed through diplomacy and mutual respect for Somalia’s sovereignty.

Ultimately, national defense is not confined to military power alone. It demands robust governance, credible institutions, political cohesion, and a citizenry that feels its rights and security are protected.

If these priorities are emphasized, the tension in South West State can be steered toward a durable political resolution, preventing internal conflict and external competition from further damaging Somalia’s stability.

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A segment of political analysts contends that Somalia’s persistent political friction, power-sharing disputes, and allegations of clan patronage continue to impede the establishment of a unified state structure.

Critics holding this view also raise fundamental questions regarding President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s administration of federal authority and his broader management of political alignments.

Detractors of the federal executive maintain that executive overreach, constitutional disputes, and political rivalries risk further eroding public trust unless sustainable resolutions are reached to address the ongoing stalemates.

However, the assertion that Somaliland’s progress is directly attributable to Hassan Sheikh’s leadership or internal federal policies remains independently unverified.

This comparative dynamic must be evaluated through the distinct historical trajectories, administrative institutions, security architectures, and economic realities of both jurisdictions.

Since declaring its separation from Somalia in 1991, Somaliland has developed independent administrative institutions, establishing democratic frameworks, multi-party electoral cycles, and an economic system sustained by domestic revenue generation and commerce.

The Port of Berbera, livestock exports, private enterprise, and diaspora remittances serve as primary drivers of Somaliland’s economy.

A report published by the Financial Times in March 2026 highlighted the strategic role of Berbera Port, private commercial investment, and diaspora capital flows in driving the regional economy.

On the other hand, research conducted by scholars affiliated with Oxford University demonstrates that Somaliland possesses long-standing administrative and political progress, though persistent challenges remain regarding internal disputes, social representation, and territorial conflicts.

These dynamics illustrate that Somaliland’s progress is not attributable to a single leader or isolated policy, but rather to a convergence of factors including social pacts, commercial activity, institutional development, and security conditions.

Debates concerning the leadership of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud have focused on constitutional revisions, term lengths for state institutions, and friction between the federal government and several federal member states.

A report published by the European Union Asylum Agency EUAA in June 2026 stated that disputes over constitutional reviews and the extension of presidential and parliamentary mandates have contributed to political divisions in Somalia.

The report also noted that sections of the political opposition rejected term extensions, while friction between the federal government and member states affected the country’s broader political relationships.

Critics of these measures argue that political disagreement delays agreed-upon electoral processes and complicates operational cooperation among state institutions.

Conversely, the federal government and its supporters characterize constitutional reforms as an essential component of finalizing the state-building architecture.

Consequently, debates over the legitimacy and procedural execution of these changes remain a key political issue requiring broad-based consensus.

A primary critique frequently directed at Somali politics is that clan-based power-sharing influences official appointments, resource management, and strategic policy decisions.

Proponents of this view maintain that government institutions should operate on the basis of statutory law, meritocracy, and institutional accountability, rather than having critical decisions tied to political alignments or clan interests.

The BTI 2026 Country Report for Somalia highlights that power networks and clan-based affiliations continue to exert strong influence over the country’s governance, alongside ongoing challenges in enforcing the separation of powers and adhering to the rule of law.

However, allegations that the current administration operates solely in pursuit of particularistic clan interests must be evaluated against empirical evidence regarding executive appointments, budget allocations, public service delivery, and dispute-resolution mechanics.

Is there an imminent risk of Mogadishu descending into armed political conflict?

A cross-section of political analysts and concerned stakeholders warn that political disputes between the federal executive and opposition factions could degenerate into armed confrontations if inclusive dialogue and political consensus are not achieved.

Mogadishu has historically endured devastating urban warfare and political instability that inflicted catastrophic impacts on civilians.

Consequently, any security concerns regarding political gridlock escalating into kinetic violence warrant serious strategic assessment.

Nevertheless, there is currently insufficient empirical evidence to conclude that renewed armed conflict in Mogadishu is inevitable or imminent.

It remains essential to distinguish between political posturing/warnings and verified intelligence indicating an immediate operational security threat.

Averting such a contingency depends on sustained political dialogue between the federal government and opposition caucuses, strict adherence to constitutional legality, mitigating inflammatory rhetoric, and resolving institutional disputes through negotiated political frameworks.

Ultimately, the comparative assessment between Somalia and Somaliland underscores several vital imperatives: establishing functional state institutions, building durable social pacts, maintaining public security, supporting private enterprise, and securing genuine public trust.

Somaliland faces its own distinct set of challenges, including territorial disputes, investment limitations, and the ongoing need to further strengthen social representation.

Meanwhile, the rest of Somalia confronts multifaceted hurdles relating to security, power-sharing frameworks, constitutional disputes, and the task of building state institutions that operate uniformly across the entire national territory.

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The shootout allegedly resulted in the death of a civilian and the injury of a Gorgor soldier, after which military officials intervened between the conflicting parties, and the situation is said to have calmed down.

According to information from the area, the conflict stems from a prior incident a few days ago at a checkpoint in Buufow Bacaad, where Gorgor soldiers encountered individuals transporting khat.

A similar dispute recurred in the area today and reportedly escalated into gunfire.

This incident comes at a time when Gorgor forces were recently deployed to Marka district and other parts of the Lower Shabelle region, highlighting the importance of maintaining relations between the military and the local community.

The Buufow Bacaad area is located in the Lower Shabelle region of southern Somalia, near the outskirts of Marka district, the regional capital.

Lower Shabelle is a region vital for agriculture, commerce, and the movement of people and vehicles.

The areas surrounding Marka also possess security significance as they feature connecting roads linking various parts of the region.

The geographic location of Buufow Bacaad means that local security conditions can directly impact residents, business owners, and traffic traveling between nearby areas.

The reported clash has therefore drawn public attention, particularly given that the dispute—which reportedly arose from a commercial issue involving khat—escalated into an armed incident.

Information from Buufow Bacaad indicates that days prior to the latest event, Gorgor soldiers stationed at the area’s checkpoint encountered a location through which khat was being transported.

According to local reports, the soldiers allegedly intended to take the khat, but were told that was not possible.

A similar dispute recurred in the area today, according to available data, and this misunderstanding reportedly escalated into an exchange of gunfire between Gorgor forces and the local side.

Reports from Buufow Bacaad state that the situation in the area later calmed down after commanding officers intervened between the conflicting parties.

This step reportedly helped de-escalate the tension and halt the clash, with the situation at the scene described as calm when that information was received.

However, it remains unknown whether a formal investigation was conducted to determine the direct cause of the clash or if measures were taken against those involved.

Likewise, it has not yet been announced whether the parties reached a formal agreement to prevent a similar dispute from happening again in the area.

Local residents may consider it important for the administration and security officials to clarify what happened and take measures to protect civilian lives and property.

This incident comes at a time when Gorgor forces were recently deployed to Marka district and other surrounding areas in the Lower Shabelle region, according to information from the area.

Gorgor forces are among the units of the Somali National Army and are utilized for various security operations.

The presence of government forces in regional areas is vital for security efforts.

However, the relationship between the forces and the local community also plays a major role in stability and public trust.

Any incident involving disputes between soldiers and civilians can raise concerns regarding military conduct, especially when events pertain to commerce, transportation, and goods moving along roadways or checkpoints.

Nonetheless, a general conclusion regarding all Gorgor forces cannot be drawn from this single incident.

It is important that what occurred is specifically investigated and the responsibility of the involved parties is clarified.

Security checkpoints manned by security forces are essential for maintaining security and safeguarding the movement of people and transport.

Therefore, the protocols governing goods and vehicles passing through those areas must be clear and avoid unnecessary disputes.

It is also important that commanding officers ensure that grievances and conflicts arising at checkpoints are handled in accordance with the law, avoiding the use of unnecessary force.

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Although Somalia has a federal government, parliament, security institutions, federal member states, and an evolving political system, significant obstacles still prevent the government from functioning uniformly across the entire nation.

Among the greatest challenges are Al-Shabaab, which still holds power and influence in many parts of the country; Somaliland, which has declared independence; disputes between the federal government and federal member states; and the 4.5 power-sharing system that has long served as the foundation of Somali politics.

These issues are interconnected, and sometimes a crisis arising from one exacerbates the others.

Al-Shabaab remains the primary security challenge obstructing Somalia’s statehood.

Even though Somali government forces and international partners have conducted operations in many areas, the group still maintains power and influence in parts of southern and central Somalia.

A report issued by the European Union Agency for Asylum stated that Somalia’s security situation remains mixed, with Al-Shabaab maintaining influence in parts of the countryside, vital roads, and areas where the federal government cannot fully govern.

The problem with Al-Shabaab is not merely the attacks it carries out in cities.

The greater challenge is that areas recaptured by the government from the group do not always quickly transition into permanent administrative governance.

When the government expels Al-Shabaab from an area, it is required to introduce military forces, police, courts, local administration, and public services for the community.

If this is not done, it is possible for the group to return to the area or maintain its influence over the population.

Reports on Somalia’s situation also indicate that political division and internal disputes can provide Al-Shabaab with opportunities to exploit areas where the government is weak.

Somaliland has claimed independence from Somalia since 1991, establishing its own administrative institutions, military, parliament, and unique political system.

The Federal Government of Somalia and the vast majority of national politics view Somaliland as part of the Federal Republic of Somalia, whereas Somaliland maintains that it is an independent state.

This means the federal government does not directly govern the territory administered by Somaliland.

The issue is not confined solely to domestic politics; it also impacts Somalia’s relations with neighboring countries and global powers.

The dispute between Somaliland and Somalia became particularly sensitive following the 2024 Ethiopia-Somaliland memorandum of understanding (MoU), which the Somali government strongly opposed.

Consequently, if Somalia desires a government that exercises full authority over the territory it claims, the Somaliland issue requires a long-term political resolution.

The Conflict Between the Federal Government and Federal Member States: Federalism was chosen in Somalia as a system to distribute power between the central government and federal member states.

However, the major challenge has been that the parties have not yet fully agreed on where the powers of the federal government end and where the powers of the federal member states begin.

Many contentious issues have arisen, such as elections, security, military forces, revenue, resources, regional administration, and foreign relations.

The EUAA stated that relations between the federal government and some federal member states have entered difficult phases, with Puntland and Jubbaland notably distancing themselves from the federal government, while relations between the central administration and certain other regional states have fluctuated.

When the central government and a federal member state dispute jurisdiction over a crucial matter, national state capacity is weakened.

Moreover, political disputes can escalate into security conflicts, further complicating the establishment of unified national institutions in the country.

Puntland and Jubbaland are among the regional administrations that hold starkly different views from the federal government.

The dispute between Puntland and Mogadishu intensified following controversies over the constitution and electoral processes.

Puntland adopted a stance of not recognizing certain federal government measures until a political agreement is reached regarding constitutional affairs.

Jubbaland has also experienced intense conflicts with the federal government, particularly regarding electoral matters and security administration.

The EUAA stated that relations between the federal government, Puntland, and Jubbaland have reached a very difficult stage, with certain political disputes even resulting in armed clashes.

This situation highlights the challenges Somalia faces in building a federal system agreed upon by all parties.

Another challenge that has long impacted Somali politics is the 4.5 system. This system structured Somali politics on clan-based power-sharing, allocating comparable shares to the four major clans, while assigning a 0.5 share to minority groups.

The 4.5 system is not enshrined in the Provisional Constitution, but it has long served as the method for distributing parliamentary seats and other political positions.

The system has its supporters. Many believe that the 4.5 system contributed to ensuring that various clans remained included within the political framework, particularly during periods when Somalia was recovering from civil war.

Critics argue that the system reduces politics to clan affiliation rather than citizenship, individual votes, and merit.

The U.S. Department of State has also documented that civil society actors, certain minority clans, and politicians have called for the elimination of the 4.5 system, arguing that it unequally represents certain segments of society.

The greatest dilemma is that there is no consensus on what should replace 4.5.

Some favor a universal suffrage (one-person, one-vote) election, which gives every citizen the opportunity to vote for the candidate of their choice.

Others fear that if the clan system is transitioned away from too quickly, major political groups or dominant clans could secure more power than they currently hold.

Therefore, 4.5 is not merely a mechanism for seat allocation; it has become a sensitive political agreement tied to inter-clan trust and how the nation’s power is shared.

Another ongoing problem facing Somalia is the lack of a comprehensive political agreement regarding constitutional issues and the state-building framework.

The 2012 Provisional Constitution has long served as the legal foundation of the government, but critical components concerning federalism, power-sharing, and elections have remained contentious.

Constitutional disputes sometimes turn into major political conflicts. A new report on Somalia’s situation stated that political friction has intensified as the federal government and the opposition disagree on constitutional amendments and the electoral process.

When the country’s supreme law is not mutually agreed upon, it becomes difficult for state institutions to possess authority and legitimacy accepted by all parties.

Somalia’s problem is not Al-Shabaab alone, nor is it merely the 4.5 system. All of these challenges are interconnected.

When the federal government and federal member states disagree, it becomes difficult to establish a fully unified national army.

When politicians are preoccupied with power struggles, the opportunity to unify counter-insurgency efforts against Al-Shabaab diminishes.

When 4.5 remains the primary foundation of politics, transitioning the country to a one-person, one-vote system becomes difficult.

When Somaliland and the federal government fail to reach an agreement, achieving a government that all Somalis equally embrace remains complex.

Consequently, Somalia faces simultaneous challenges spanning security, politics, constitutional affairs, and national unity.

If Somalia desires a government that genuinely functions across the entire country, a broad political agreement is required.

The federal government and federal member states must resolve their division of powers, security forces, finances, resources, elections, and national administration.

It is also essential that the constitution becomes an agreement embraced by all political actors rather than a perpetual source of conflict.

The war against Al-Shabaab must be accompanied by the establishment of functioning administration.

Where the group is expelled, if local governance, police, judiciary, and public services are not instituted, security victories cannot become sustainable.

Furthermore, the Somaliland issue requires sustained political dialogue, working toward a solution where Somalis can negotiate peacefully.

The post The Obstacles Preventing Somalia from Having a Government That Exercises Full Authority Across the Country appeared first on Kaab TV.

This development has sparked numerous questions regarding the reasons behind the demolition, the authority that issued the clearance order, and the intended future use of the land.

The National Insurance company was among the state institutions established during Somalia’s central government era, and the buildings situated on that site long constituted a prominent part of public assets located in Mogadishu.

Observers addressing the matter note that the location holds immense economic value, given its prime positioning within the capital.

Consequently, questions have arisen regarding the valuation of the demolished land and buildings, and whether a formal appraisal was conducted prior to executing the demolition.

There are also allegations suggesting that the land is being transferred or sold below market value.

Some commentators argue that if the land and former properties were disposed of at a fraction of their true worth, the public deserves a clear, transparent explanation.

Reports circulating regarding the issue have additionally referenced an alleged document bearing the signatures of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and former Minister of Public Works Ayuub Ismail Yusuf, which is reportedly linked to the decision governing the National Insurance land and properties.

Should that document prove authentic, it is imperative to clarify its issuance date, the authority behind it, and its precise scope of authorization.

It is likewise crucial to ascertain whether it constituted a directive for structural demolition, land transfer, or an alternate governmental plan.

The central debate currently prevailing concerns the ultimate disposition of the National Insurance land and who retains administrative custody over it.

Should the land have been sold or reassigned to a private entity, the public possesses a fundamental right to transparency regarding valuation and the contractual procedures followed.

Furthermore, if the government maintains that the structures were razed due to technical or developmental imperatives, it remains essential to publish engineering assessments alongside the site’s master redevelopment plan.

This matter holds profound significance for safeguarding public assets, particularly at a juncture when the Federal Government has asserted an ongoing initiative to register and recover state properties distributed throughout Mogadishu.

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The summit, held on October 4, 2026, was attended by Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki, and the Chairman of Sudan’s Transitional Sovereignty Council, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan.

During their meeting, the leaders emphasized the critical importance of preserving the sovereignty, stability, and territorial integrity of regional states, while also stressing the necessity of avoiding internal interference in national affairs.

A key provision of the communiqué focused specifically on Somalia, with the four nations reiterating their support for the unity and sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Somalia.

They also rejected any measures undermining Somalia’s unity and sovereignty, specifically noting the issue of Somaliland’s recognition.

This outcome stands as a major diplomatic milestone for Somalia, as the Federal Government has consistently cautioned against any actions it views as infringing upon the nation’s unity and territorial integrity.

Meanwhile, the leaders of the four countries specifically addressed the situation in Sudan, affirming their support for the country’s unity, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national institutions.

They further rejected the creation of parallel entities running counter to Sudan’s official state institutions, called for the resumption of a Sudanese-led political process, and rejected any foreign support extended to mercenaries.

The summit also focused heavily on the situation in the Red Sea, with the four nations emphasizing the principle of freedom of navigation for commercial vessels.

The leaders stated that the administration and security of the Red Sea constitute a shared responsibility exclusive to its littoral states, underscoring the vital role the four nations assign to regional coastal governments in Red Sea affairs.

The issue of the Nile River was also extensively addressed.

Somalia, Egypt, Eritrea, and Sudan agreed on the critical importance of adhering to international law governing transboundary rivers.

They specifically stressed the principles of avoiding harm to other nations and managing water resources through cooperation, prior notification, consultation, and consensus.

Furthermore, the four countries rejected any unilateral actions that they stated could negatively impact downstream water utilization, a provision specifically concerning Egypt and Sudan.

This point carries particular significance given the longstanding dispute surrounding Nile water utilization and water infrastructure projects between upstream and downstream riparian states.

Beyond security and political matters, the leaders also agreed to strengthen economic, trade, and cultural cooperation among the four nations.

They noted that such collaboration can contribute to regional economic integration, sustainable development, and the deepening of ties among the peoples of the four countries.

Additionally, the leaders concurred on intensifying consultations and policy coordination between Somalia, Egypt, Eritrea, and Sudan, particularly regarding regional developments impacting peace and stability.

This summit coincides with a period during which the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa represent theaters of overlapping security and political complexities, while longstanding disputes concerning the Nile River continue to shape regional geopolitics.

Consequently, the official communiqué issued from the summit places primary emphasis on three major pillars: safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of regional states, consolidating the role of littoral countries in Red Sea governance, and resolving Nile water disputes through dialogue rooted in international law.

Ultimately, the four nations concurred on maintaining ongoing consultation and mutual coordination, underlining that quadrilateral cooperation remains essential for addressing the region’s interlocking security, political, and economic challenges.

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The commander was temporarily replaced by his deputy, Ayub Said Ali Dheeg, who is currently serving as the acting Mudug Regional Police Commander.

This measure followed an incident on September 26, when prisoners detained during the rescue operation of the vessel SIBU 1 were being transferred from the Garacad area to holding facilities.

During transit, some of the prisoners reportedly attempted to escape, triggering an altercation at the scene that resulted in the death of one prisoner and injuries to another.

Several other prisoners managed to flee, raising critical questions regarding the security protocols and management procedures implemented during the transport of suspects captured in the operation.

The vessel SIBU 1 was among the ships hijacked by pirate groups, prompting Puntland security forces to execute an operation that successfully ended the hijacking.

The operation successfully recovered the vessel and rescued its crew members. During the mission, security forces also detained individuals suspected of involvement in the hijacking.

The prisoners were subsequently prepared for transfer to Puntland security and detention facilities; however, the breakout occurred while they were being transported.

This incident has become a major subject of discussion, particularly given that the individuals detained were prisoners linked to pirate groups that have recently re-emerged along the Somali coastline.

During the escape incident, an armed confrontation reportedly erupted between security forces and certain prisoners.

One prisoner died in the incident, while another sustained injuries. Several others managed to evade security custody.

Official details regarding how the confrontation unfolded, who initiated it, and the current status of the escaped prisoners have not yet been fully disclosed.

This event has heightened concerns regarding the security protocols implemented for guarding pirate prisoners, especially during transit from coastal areas where they were captured to formal detention facilities.

The suspension of Mahmud Muse Bile marks the initial administrative measure taken by the Puntland administration against security officials following the incident.

It is also anticipated whether further investigations will be conducted regarding other officers and personnel involved in the security detail and prisoner transport.

The prisoner breakout has raised critical questions concerning the security framework utilized during their transport.

Among the questions being raised are who held direct responsibility for the prisoners upon departure from Garacad, the size of the security escort, the type of transport vehicles deployed, and the specific factors that enabled the prisoners to overcome security custody.

It is likewise essential to determine whether security negligence or procedural errors occurred during the transfer plan.

The Puntland administration is expected to provide further details regarding the incident and the findings of any formal investigation.

This incident coincides with a period in which Puntland has intensified its operations targeting piracy networks operating along the Somali coastline.

In recent months, a series of developments has indicated that pirate factions retain the capability to attack or hijack commercial vessels navigating regional waters.

Puntland has played a pivotal role in executing operations to rescue hijacked ships and apprehend individuals suspected of involvement in maritime abductions.

The immediate action taken to suspend the Mudug Regional Police Commander may serve as the precursor to a broader investigation into the incident.

Furthermore, it is critical for Puntland security forces to reinforce the security protocols governing remaining prisoners still in custody to prevent any recurrence of such breaches.

The administration also faces the imperative of transparently informing the public regarding the whereabouts of the escaped prisoners and the measures deployed to effect their recapture.

This event places Puntland in a position requiring the simultaneous handling of two distinct fronts: prosecuting the campaign against piracy and securing prisoners captured from these syndicates.

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This position was outlined in a statement issued on October 3, 2026, by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Somaliland, which also served as a response to ongoing discussions and debates regarding relations between Somalia, Somaliland, and Ethiopia.

Dawan Africa media broadcast details of the statement, reporting that Hargeysa maintained its firm stance on its foreign relations and agreements entered into with other parties.

The Somaliland Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that it has long supported negotiated agreements granting Ethiopia maritime access, emphasizing that such pacts must be anchored in shared interests and mutual benefit.

Somaliland’s position is rooted in the perspective that landlocked Ethiopia requires a reliable corridor to import and export its goods through a regional port.

Somaliland’s statement further indicates that Hargeysa does not view Ethiopia’s acquisition of maritime access as something that should be universally blocked, but rather as a matter resolvable through direct bilateral negotiations among the concerned parties.

This development reignites the intense diplomatic friction sparked by the January 1, 2024 Memorandum of Understanding between Ethiopia and Somaliland.

That memorandum triggered severe diplomatic tensions, as Somalia insisted that Somaliland constitutes part of its sovereign territory and rejected any external agreements independently concluded by Hargeysa concerning coastal access or territories claimed by Mogadishu.

That friction ultimately formed part of the Turkish-mediated efforts that culminated in the Ankara Declaration of December 2024.

The Ankara Declaration explicitly stated that Somalia and Ethiopia respect each other’s sovereignty, unity, and political and territorial independence. At the same time, that same document acknowledged the potential benefits of Ethiopia securing reliable maritime access through commercial arrangements operating under Somalia’s sovereign authority.

The core pillar of the Ankara Declaration was the endeavor to decouple two distinct issues: Ethiopia’s need for maritime access and Somalia’s territorial sovereignty.

According to the declaration, Somalia and Ethiopia agreed to formulate mutually beneficial commercial frameworks—such as contracts, lease agreements, or alternative modalities—providing Ethiopia with secure, continuous access to the sea.

However, it was stipulated that such maritime access would function under the sovereign jurisdiction of the Federal Republic of Somalia.

Somaliland maintains that it possesses the sovereign right to enter into agreements with external partners, whereas Somalia insists that territorial matters and such compacts fall exclusively under the purview of the federal government’s sovereignty.

Hargeisa’s recent statement also carried a direct political message: Somaliland stated that it will not accept interference in the agreements it concludes with other entities.

The Somaliland Ministry of Foreign Affairs asserted its intent to continue pursuing agreements it deems respectful of its self-governance and conducive to regional development and prosperity.

Hargeysa specifically linked this stance to the 2024 agreement with Ethiopia, which Mogadishu strongly opposed.

A report published on October 3 indicated that Somaliland also rejected the assertion that Mogadishu holds the authority to dictate its external relations or arbitrate the agreements Somaliland enters into with foreign states.

From Somalia’s perspective, the position remains grounded in the constitutional principle that Somaliland constitutes an integral part of Somalia; consequently, any agreement concerning territory, coastline, or ports located within that region cannot be independently contracted by Hargeysa with a foreign government.

This stance formed the core of Somalia’s rejection of the 2024 Ethiopia-Somaliland agreement.

Nevertheless, the current dynamic indicates that Mogadishu is attempting to present Ethiopia with an alternative pathway to secure maritime access, anchored in an agreement in which Somalia participates.

The Ankara Declaration previously established this framework, with both nations agreeing that Ethiopia could secure sea access while upholding Somalia’s sovereignty.

Ethiopia maintains an overriding strategic need for maritime access, given that it is one of the most populous landlocked nations in Africa.

Consequently, acquiring a reliable port and commercial transit corridor is vital for the country’s import and export sectors, especially as Ethiopia’s economy relies heavily on regional trade integration.

The Ankara Declaration formally acknowledged that Ethiopia could derive significant benefits from dependable maritime access, with Somalia and Ethiopia agreeing to resolve the matter through commercial contracts. At the time, the United States government welcomed the agreement, stating that Ethiopia’s maritime access could be advanced while fully respecting Somalia’s territorial integrity.

The Port of Berbera is situated on the Gulf of Aden, occupying a strategic nexus linking the commercial shipping lanes of the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Indian Ocean.

This geography renders Somaliland a central focal point in the debate over how Ethiopia can secure sea access.

The 2024 Memorandum of Understanding specifically tied Berbera to Ethiopia’s maritime strategy, a pact that subsequently triggered profound diplomatic friction between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa.

Somaliland’s stance coincides with a period in which the Horn of Africa is once again navigating shifting political and security dynamics.

This context renders the issue of Ethiopia’s maritime access far more than a matter of simple commerce; it is intimately linked to regional politics, security architectures, and the broader strategic competition unfolding across the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa.

Although Somalia and Ethiopia agreed in 2024 to pursue a commercial framework granting Ethiopia sea access, it remains essential to distinguish between the foundational principle of the agreement and the actual implementation of a functioning port accord.

The Ankara Declaration established a framework for dialogue and commercial compacts, but the technical specifics regarding port selection, duration, tariff structures, administration, security protocols, and operational implementation necessitate separate, detailed agreements. The formal declaration mandated the launch of technical negotiations facilitated by Turkey.

Consequently, Somaliland’s reiteration of support for Ethiopia’s maritime access transcends economics; it intersects directly with the overarching debate over which entity holds the legitimate legal and political authority to contract agreements concerning Somaliland’s coastline.

The first tier of the conflict centers on the political dispute over Somaliland’s status and Somalia’s assertion of territorial unity.

The second tier involves Ethiopia’s strategic imperative for sea access and the pursuit of a corridor acceptable to all relevant stakeholders.

Combined, these dual dimensions ensure that any formal port or coastal agreement remains inextricably tied to the fundamental question of who possesses the sovereign mandate to execute such pacts.

This is precisely why the 2024 agreement proved so combustible, while the Ankara Declaration subsequently attempted to anchor Ethiopia’s maritime access within commercial frameworks operating under Somalia’s sovereign authority.

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