The reported withdrawal of Ethiopian forces, the advances made by forces loyal to former South West State President Abdiaziz Hassan Mohamed ‘Laftagareen,’ and the movements of Al-Shabaab have raised questions about who will fill the vacuum left by departing troops and how to prevent the political volatility from creating opportunities for armed groups.

Reports published on October 17, 2026, indicated that forces loyal to Laftagareen entered the Bardale district of Bay region after troops stationed there pulled back.

These reports also noted that shifts in territorial control occurred days earlier in Qansaxdheere and Burhakaba.

Meanwhile, other reports outlined allegations that Ethiopian troops withdrew from bases they previously occupied in parts of southern Somalia, sparking concerns over the potential for Al-Shabaab to exploit the resulting security void.

Ethiopia has long been one of the key actors supporting anti-Al-Shabaab counter-terrorism operations in southern Somalia, particularly in the Bay and Bakool regions and areas adjacent to the bilateral border.

The presence of Ethiopian troops is predicated on fighting Al-Shabaab, securing border corridors, and preventing armed groups from establishing operational bases near Ethiopian territory.

Al-Shabaab has long maintained a significant presence in parts of the Bay and Bakool regions, occasionally controlling rural areas and critical transit routes vital to civilian movement and commercial transport.

A situational report updated in October 2026 and published on ECOI indicates that Al-Shabaab still controls parts of South West State, while the government and supporting forces control major towns and key urban centers.

The report also noted the importance of Ethiopian forces to security in parts of the Bakool region.

This intelligence demonstrates that the security situation in the region remains mixed, and cannot be generalized as a single faction exercising complete control over all areas.

It is possible that when troops withdraw from forward positions in vulnerable areas, Al-Shabaab will attempt to expand its operational footprint there.

However, this possibility does not mean that every area vacated by troops automatically falls directly into the hands of the group.

Waajid district in Bakool region is among the critical hubs for the security situation in South West State.

It holds strategic importance regarding transit logistics, connectivity with surrounding localities, and anti-Al-Shabaab military operations.

Available security reports indicate that Waajid previously hosted a military presence comprising Somali government forces and Ethiopian troops.

Consequently, any alteration in troop strength or stationing could have a pronounced operational impact.

Claims have also surfaced alleging that a plan regarding the troop withdrawal and control of Waajid was halted.

However, available intelligence remains insufficient to independently verify who spearheaded this plan, why it was suspended, or whether there was a deliberate attempt to hand the district over to Al-Shabaab.

The security situation in Bay and Bakool cannot be decoupled from the political conflict between the Federal Government of Somalia and the factions competing for leadership in South West State.

Troop movements and shifts in territorial control come at a time of intense rivalry over regional administration, institutional authority, and control of the political order in South West State.

Any nation may harbor security, economic, and strategic interests in Somalia. However, weaponizing those interests into allegations of supporting Al-Shabaab requires specific evidence detailing the actor, the exact actions taken, and a direct link to the group.

Turkey has in recent years strengthened its security and military partnership with the Federal Government of Somalia, contributing to troop training and enhancing national defense capabilities.

The Federal Government of Somalia has an opportunity to reassess the security landscape in Bay and Bakool, particularly in light of shifts in the Ethiopian military footprint.

If foreign forces withdraw from areas they have occupied for extended periods, the federal government requires a clear contingency plan to secure critical infrastructure, key transit corridors connecting towns, and civilian population centers.

Such a strategy necessitates effective coordination among the Somali National Army, South West State security forces, AUSSOM, and international partners.

It is equally essential to ensure reliable intelligence, adequate logistics support, unified command structures, and the re-establishment of civilian administration in areas liberated from Al-Shabaab.

Security success cannot be measured solely by driving an armed group out of a town. It is equally critical to prevent insurgent re-entry, ensure access to basic public services, and enable state institutions to maintain a durable presence.

If the federal government succeeds in strengthening security in South West State, it could impact the country’s political balance and its relations with other regional administrations.

Jubbaland, led by Ahmed Mohamed Islam ‘Ahmed Madobe,’ is among the regional administrations maintaining political disputes with the federal government.

Any shift in the central government’s power dynamic could influence negotiations surrounding the federal framework and the future of power-sharing.

Political analyses suggest that developments in South West State could reopen debate regarding the leadership of Jubbaland and its relationship with the central government.

However, notions suggesting that Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre could lead Jubbaland in the future remain political speculation unsupported by official verification.

Therefore, the Jubbaland matter should be viewed as a potential political ripple effect stemming from the national situation, rather than a confirmed plan.

Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and the federal government face two major imperatives: safeguarding public security and managing internal political disputes within the country.

If Al-Shabaab exploits troop withdrawals or political friction among stakeholders, the government bears the responsibility to prevent the group from gaining additional power in new areas.

On the other hand, the war against Al-Shabaab must not be used as a pretext to further fuel political conflict or weaken local administrative institutions.

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This issue has raised questions about freedom of expression, political rights, and how the law should be applied when a person is suspected of involvement in security offences.

Every government bears the responsibility of safeguarding national security and public safety.

In Somalia, which has been fighting Al-Shabaab for a long time, it is vital that security agencies thoroughly investigate any intelligence indicating that an individual or group is involved in terrorist activities.

However, safeguarding national security must be rooted in law and evidence, rather than political disputes or opinions differing from those of the government.

A person who criticizes the government, opposes its decisions, or supports the opposition cannot automatically be categorized as having ties to Al-Shabaab.

Political criticism and terrorist acts are two distinct matters.

An individual has the right to question the decisions of leaders, speak out about national challenges, and oppose policies they perceive as flawed, provided they act within the framework of the law.

The Provisional Constitution of Somalia recognizes freedom of speech, peaceful assembly, and political participation.

These rights are essential for the existence of statehood grounded in rule of law, accountability, and political competition.

Similarly, the law permits the government to take action against individuals suspected of criminal acts, but those measures must proceed through a fair legal process.

When a government official accuses someone of having ties to Al-Shabaab, that allegation alone does not constitute legal evidence.

It requires credible intelligence, an independent investigation, and a judicial process that affords the individual an opportunity to defend themselves.

If evidence demonstrates an individual’s involvement in terrorist acts, legal institutions can proceed through appropriate judicial channels.

Conversely, if such accusations are weaponized to silence opposition politicians, journalists, or critics of the government, they can erode public trust in state institutions.

They can also engender fear, discouraging citizens from engaging in discussions on national politics, security, and governance.

Another critical question is whether foreign governments and the international community can designate an individual as a member of Al-Shabaab solely because a Somali official level such an accusation.

The answer is no. Statement by a government official alone does not constitute an international determination designating a person or organization as affiliated with terrorism.

Relevant international bodies and foreign governments maintain independent legal procedures and evidentiary standards upon which they base their determinations.

It is also vital to distinguish between a political critic, a suspect under investigation, and an individual lawfully convicted of a criminal offense.

Political allegations, an ongoing investigation, and a judicial verdict are not synonymous.

Conflating them infringes upon individual rights and exacerbates existing political divisions in the country.

Somalia confronts severe security challenges, making it imperative for the government, opposition, and all political stakeholders to refrain from rhetoric that further polarizes society.

The government bears the duty to maintain security while respecting the constitutional rights of citizens.

Similarly, the opposition holds the responsibility to resolve political disputes through peaceful dialogue and lawful procedures.

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He argued that recognizing Somaliland could prompt Somalia to demand the expulsion of Ethiopian troops from its territory, creating an opportunity for Al-Shabaab to launch attacks against both Somaliland and Ethiopia.

However, Somaliland’s representative to Israel, Mohamed Omar Haji Mohamoud, rejected this perspective, asserting that recognizing Somaliland would yield significant security, economic, and regional strategic benefits for Ethiopia, rather than posing a security risk.

In an interview with the Israeli media outlet i24NEWS, the Ethiopian ambassador addressed the obstacles hindering Ethiopia’s recognition of Somaliland, expressing concern over the potential impact such a move would have on relations between Addis Ababa and Mogadishu, as well as the future of Ethiopian forces deployed in Somalia.

He contended that if Ethiopia were to recognize Somaliland at this junction, Somalia might choose to demand the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops—a scenario he warned would generate a security vacuum that Al-Shabaab could exploit to threaten both Somaliland and Ethiopia.

On his part, Somaliland’s envoy to Israel, Mohamed Haji, maintained that recognizing Somaliland would bring strategic and security advantages to Ethiopia rather than creating new hazards.

‘I am convinced that the opposite is true. Ethiopia stands to gain immense strategic, economic, and security benefits from recognizing Somaliland, without incurring any security risks,’ said Mohamed Haji.

He added that Somalia’s retaliatory measures against Ethiopia are more detrimental than Somaliland’s recognition, arguing that Mogadishu is strengthening ties with nations rivaling Ethiopia and providing them with opportunities to advance their interests in the region.

The Somaliland ambassador stated that recognizing Somaliland would enable Ethiopia to strengthen its regional influence and secure a reliable strategic ally in the Horn of Africa.

He also argued that Somaliland has long demonstrated resilience and the capacity to prevent Al-Shabaab and pirates from establishing safe havens, noting that Somaliland’s local administration and security efforts make it a strategic ally that can benefit Ethiopia rather than pose a security burden.

Mohamed Haji further stated that African forces stationed in Somalia cannot be expected to remain indefinitely, calling for advanced planning for the scenario that will arise once those forces depart.

He contended that recognizing Somaliland would reinforce Ethiopia’s security, accelerate economic growth, and enhance Ethiopia’s geopolitical leverage in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region.

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The caretaker Prime Minister addressed politicians, traditional elders, and other influential community figures, warning that entering into agreements or engaging in operational collaboration with Al-Shabaab poses a direct threat to national security.

These statements have ignited heated debate over the distinction between individual responsibility, political leadership, and entire Somali clan communities, particularly within the context of the counter-insurgency campaign against Al-Shabaab.

The circulated commentary indicates that the caretaker Prime Minister drew a direct parallel between the Xawaadle clan and President Laftagareen, alleging that both have entered into pacts with Al-Shabaab.

These allegations carry severe ramifications, as they directly touch upon national security, the offensive against Al-Shabaab, and the fragile political relationships connecting the federal government, regional state administrations, and local communities.

In Somali customary tradition, traditional elders and peacekeepers play a vital role in conflict resolution, mediating between opposing factions, and maintaining social harmony.

Conversely, the federal government has consistently reiterated the imperative of intensifying the military campaign against Al-Shabaab.

Consequently, any discourse concerning alleged pacts with the insurgent group must be grounded in concrete evidence, ensuring that the peace-building authority of traditional elders is not undermined and unverified accusations are not leveled against entire communities.

The Xawaadle clan community includes individuals and groups in the Hiiraan region who have long actively participated in the offensive against Al-Shabaab, particularly through operational cooperation between local community forces [Macaw’isley] and federal armed forces deployed in the region.

The counter-insurgency campaign against Al-Shabaab in Hiiraan has formed a core component of national security efforts aimed at liberating territories long dominated by the insurgent group.

If new allegations are leveled against specific individuals or community leaders within that society, it remains imperative to clearly specify the accused parties, the explicit acts attributed to them, and the supporting evidence corroborating such claims.

Doing so is critical to preventing political disputes from degenerating into inter-clan conflict.

The Federal Government of Somalia and national security agencies hold the sole statutory responsibility to conduct formal investigations into such allegations, where they exist, and to take decisive legal action against any party verified to be involved in aiding or collaborating with Al-Shabaab.

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Among the individuals whose names were published is the former President of the South West State administration, Abdiaziz Hassan Laftagareen, alongside the former Commander of the Somali Correctional Forces, General Mahad Shubka.

The directive, issued today, mandates the freezing of assets belonging to those listed, prohibits financial transactions with them, and requires that any financial activities linked to them be reported immediately to the Financial Reporting Center of Somalia.

The committee stated that the measure is grounded in intelligence and evidence evaluated regarding suspected financial support for Al-Shabaab.

However, the published document did not detail the specific evidence pertaining to each individual upon which the decision was based.

Laftagareen was first elected to the leadership of South West State in 2018 and held office until late March 2026, when the Federal Government forcibly stripped him of power and established a new administration in South West State.

Since being ousted from power, President Laftagareen has maintained an offensive posture targeting Baidoa, launching approximately four armed incursions that resulted in significant casualties. Forces loyal to him are currently stationed on the outskirts of Baidoa.

According to the document, financial institutions and other entities governed by the law are prohibited from conducting transactions with the individuals on the list.

They are also legally mandated to freeze any assets owned by them and submit immediate reports to the Financial Reporting Center regarding any associated financial movements.

The Committee added that any financial relationship or facilitation provided to the listed individuals is strictly prohibited, emphasizing that anyone violating the decision will face legal prosecution under applicable counter-terrorism laws.

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State security forces were recently deployed adjacent to the residences of prominent opposition leaders, including former President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and former Prime Minister Hassan Ali Khaire.

The National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) accused certain opposition figures of involvement in recent security incidents, while opposition leadership warned that troop movements risk provoking armed conflict.

The claims made by both sides have not been independently verified.

The primary strategic question is whether a politically and operationally viable disarmament framework can be executed at this time, given that Al-Shabaab maintains an active presence across parts of Somalia and numerous armed formations and security details remain aligned with various political factions.

Disarmament represents a formal security process aimed at reducing or collecting weapons held by civilians, informal militias, and non-state actors operating outside legal security structures.

It frequently serves as a component of broader Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) initiatives designed to register weapons, disband irregular militias, integrate eligible fighters into formal state armed forces, or provide viable economic alternatives.

However, in the Somali operational context, disarmament extends beyond the technical recovery of arms from specific groups.

It is intrinsically tied to state capacity, public trust, central-regional federal dynamics, and mechanisms for political dispute resolution.

If a disarmament campaign is perceived as an impartial rule-of-law measure applied uniformly across all illegal weapons holders, it can strengthen state consolidation.

Conversely, if opposition factions perceive disarmament as a selective effort targeting them exclusively while leaving other armed entities intact, building trust and cross-factional cooperation becomes exceptionally difficult.

This dynamic is particularly critical in Mogadishu, where political-military friction directly impacts civilian security, commercial transportation, trade, and daily life.

A primary structural obstacle hindering a nation-wide disarmament campaign is the ongoing counter-insurgency effort against Al-Shabaab.

A report published by the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) in May 2026—evaluating security conditions between April 2025 and March 2026—noted that Al-Shabaab continues to control or exert significant operational influence across wide swathes of southern and central Somalia, retaining the capability to execute asymmetric attacks beyond its core areas of control.

This situation illustrates that the Somali government faces a dual operational challenge. On one front lies the ongoing war against Al-Shabaab, while on the other are internal security and political disputes among Somali factions. If state security resources and capabilities become consumed by internal political confrontations, serious concerns arise regarding the ability to secure territories liberated from Al-Shabaab and maintain security along critical transit corridors and major urban centers.

Conversely, the persistence of Al-Shabaab does not inherently mean that incremental disarmament measures are impossible.

The government can pursue lawful measures to regulate illegal arms within the capital while simultaneously sustaining counter-insurgency operations against the militant group.

The vital imperative is ensuring that such enforcement measures do not trigger fresh armed conflict that diverts security forces from primary operational mandates.

The June 2026 events in Mogadishu offer a clear example of the complexity surrounding this issue.

A report published by Reuters on June 5 indicated that clashes between state forces and armed groups aligned with the opposition caused gridlock and widespread disruption across parts of the capital.

The government subsequently stated that it had restored public order and disarmed the opposition-aligned groups involved.

The fundamental lesson derived from those events is that a ceasefire and a disarmament program are not synonymous.

Halting active hostilities can mitigate immediate casualties; however, unless underlying political disputes are resolved, standardized security protocols established, and a clear consensus reached on arms management, underlying tensions inevitably resurface.

Furthermore, disarming a specific faction outside the framework of a broad agreement trusted by all stakeholders raises serious concerns regarding impartiality and operational intent.

Such perceived selectivity heightens opposition resistance and severely complicates efforts to conduct peaceful arms collection.

The state bears the primary responsibility for protecting public safety, enforcing the law, and preventing illicit arms proliferation from disrupting national peace.

Where weapons are stockpiled outside legal authorization or an armed group poses an active threat to civilians, state security agencies possess a lawful mandate to intervene.

However, a strict distinction must be drawn between illicit weapons, standard arms held by state armed forces, and weapons deployed for the personal protection details of political figures.

Each category possesses a distinct legal status. The arms assigned to political protection details cannot be addressed without evaluating statutory provisions, threat levels, licensing frameworks, and the security rights of protected persons.

Consequently, disarmament measures executed against political opposition groups must not stem solely from political alignment or disagreement with the administration.

Any such program requires a transparent, codified legal framework applied impartially and subject to institutional oversight by competent regulatory bodies.

Should the government characterize an initiative as a public safety operation, it remains essential to provide public clarity regarding its legal foundation, scope, weapons registration procedures, and safeguards preventing the operation from degenerating into political intimidation.

Conversely, opposition leadership must clearly articulate protocols governing their security details and ensure those arms present no threat to the civilian population.

The foundational requirement is for the administration and opposition factions to convene a dedicated security dialogue isolated from broader electoral disputes.

This dialogue must explicitly define authorized weapon types, personnel entitled to carry firearms, permissible storage parameters, and the specific agency empowered to seize illicit arms.

The second step entails establishing a comprehensive arms registration system that categorizes official state military inventory, licensed VIP protection details, and weapons held by non-state entities.

Such a framework mitigates operational misunderstandings and prevents indiscriminate weapon seizures.

The third step mandates rigorous oversight and institutional accountability.

Disarmament operations must adhere strictly to statutory law, human rights standards, and civilian protection protocols.

Allegations involving operational abuse, property destruction, or unlawful detention require transparent, independent investigation.

Furthermore, national security strategy must not remain confined strictly to Mogadishu.

Given that Al-Shabaab maintains operational capabilities across broad swathes of the country, the government requires an integrated strategy linking urban center stabilization, transit route security, force augmentation, and administrative consolidation in newly liberated territories.

Without securing these areas, military gains cannot be translated into enduring national stability.

This imperative is reinforced by ongoing United Nations operations in Somalia addressing disarmament, demobilization, and community reintegration.

UNTMIS notes that it continues to support the Federal Government in formulating and executing an inclusive, human rights-compliant framework—specifically regarding the management of defectors from non-state armed groups, as well as Small Arms and Light Weapons and ammunition control.

If a disarmament operation is initiated during a period characterized by a mutual deficit of trust between the government and the opposition, several major risks emerge.

The respective sides may accuse one another of breaching agreements or weaponizing state security institutions to exert political pressure.

Should armed confrontations erupt, civilians bear the primary burden of casualties, particularly if engagements occur within densely populated urban quarters.

Another critical risk is the spillover of political friction into state security institutions.

National armed forces are required to operate strictly in accordance with statutory law, rather than fracturing along partisan lines to support competing political figures.

Should public and institutional confidence in their political neutrality erode, mounting a unified response to the nation’s primary security threats becomes severely compromised.

Conversely, if the government refrains entirely from enforcing measures to curb illicit arms, risks surrounding factional clashes and unregulated weapons employment will persist.

Therefore, the strategic imperative is neither to abandon arms control altogether nor to resort to force, but rather to establish a codified legal mechanism that reinforces security without provoking political instability.

Within the Somali context, localized or phased disarmament measures remain achievable in select sectors; however, comprehensive nationwide disarmament encompassing all armed entities presents an exceptionally complex challenge.

The persistent threat posed by Al-Shabaab, the proliferation of armed formations, ongoing friction between the administration and opposition factions, and the paramount necessity of protecting civilian populations collectively dictate that disarmament must be approached as a structured, long-term strategic endeavor.

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According to details released regarding the operation, Abdullahi Yarow—identified as a senior member of the group—was killed, while Abdifataah Mohamed, reported to be an Al-Shabaab operative active in the western areas of Lower Juba, was captured alive.

This operation forms part of ongoing efforts by Somali security forces to degrade Al-Shabaab’s operational capacity, particularly across the rural hinterlands of the Lower Juba region.

The raid took place in the village of Yaaq-Shabeel, situated approximately 13 kilometers from Kam-Jaroon in Lower Juba.

Danab forces targeted a facility that intelligence reports indicated was serving as a base or gathering point for Al-Shabaab personnel.

Information provided on the mission reveals that troops targeted individuals suspected of orchestrating the group’s operations across the region’s western sector.

While full operational details regarding the exact duration of the assault were not disclosed, official briefings confirm that Abdullahi Yarow was eliminated while Abdifataah Mohamed was taken into custody.

To date, available operational updates do not include further specifics regarding seized weaponry, the total number of other militants present at the site, or additional casualties resulting from the operation.

The name Abdullahi Yarow was cited in operational reports detailing the raid, identifying him as among the senior Al-Shabaab figures operating across the rural hinterlands of western Lower Juba.

According to official briefings, his elimination was among the primary objectives achieved in the operation.

However, independent details confirming his precise rank within the group’s leadership hierarchy, his specific operational responsibilities, and the duration of his tenure in the area have not yet been established.

Should additional official updates emerge from military command or security agencies, further specifics regarding his exact operational role and the strategic impact of his death on the group’s regional footprint may become clear.

Meanwhile, Danab forces reportedly captured Abdifataah Mohamed during the raid, describing him as an Al-Shabaab operative who functioned in the western sector of Lower Juba.

His capture was presented as a key result of the mission.

Nevertheless, released information does not specify his exact position within the militant network, the specific operations he is accused of orchestrating, or whether post-apprehension interrogations have been conducted.

The Lower Juba region remains among the key zones in southern Somalia where government forces are actively conducting counter-insurgency operations against Al-Shabaab.

Government troops across the region and adjacent southern territories continue to execute targeted strikes aimed at eliminating militant operatives and degrading the group’s mobility and organizational capacity.

A previous operation in Harbole reportedly resulted in the capture of an operative named Adan Mohamed Adan by Danab forces, as reported by the news agency SONNA on June 20, 2026.

While distinct from the Yaaq-Shabeel raid, that mission highlights the ongoing pace of counter-terrorism operations across the region.

Every targeted strike directed at locations where armed groups operate can significantly impact the local security climate, the movement of civilians and transport, and the operational capability of insurgent factions across rural areas.

If details surrounding the Yaaq-Shabeel raid are confirmed, the elimination of the individual identified as a senior commander and the apprehension of another suspected operative could represent concrete steps toward disrupting the group’s regional networks.

However, assessing the true strategic impact of the operation requires further intelligence regarding the exact functions of the eliminated or captured operatives, the status of the operational site, and whether security forces have sustained follow-up operations in the area.

Furthermore, obtaining actionable data on the status of local civilian populations remains critical, given that safeguarding non-combatants and protecting property are essential components of long-term security stabilization efforts.

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Local sources said government troops and Al-Shabaab fighters exchanged fire using light and heavy weapons in the area between Xaanshigadafer and Hees.

The fighting reportedly followed the deployment of government forces to positions in Hees in recent days as they sought to strengthen their military presence.

Preliminary reports indicate that the latest clashes caused deaths and injuries among the warring sides. However, no independently verified casualty figures were immediately available.

The fighting comes amid continued military activity across parts of Hiiraan, where government forces and Al-Shabaab remain engaged in a prolonged conflict over control of territory.

The latest confrontation follows heavy fighting in Tardo village on Thursday, which reportedly disrupted daily life and left civilians dead.

According to information from the area, the violence began when Al-Shabaab militants allegedly attempted to seize a weapon from a civilian described as a pastoralist.

Residents reportedly came to the man’s assistance, triggering an armed confrontation between local people and the militants.

Osman Dheere, Tardo’s local administrator, said the fighting lasted for several hours and the security situation deteriorated after Al-Shabaab fighters surrounded the village.

He said civilians were killed and other residents fled their homes to escape gunfire and violence. Some displaced families reportedly travelled between 40 and 80 kilometres in search of safer locations.

The fighting also disrupted local commerce and routine movement. Residents who had left home for markets and workplaces reportedly returned or fled the area after the clashes began.

Communities in rural Hiiraan depend heavily on livestock, small-scale trade and movement between neighbouring settlements.

Continued insecurity threatens these livelihoods and can make it difficult for injured people to reach medical facilities when roads and transport links are disrupted.

The displacement has raised concerns about the need for emergency assistance, including shelter, food, clean water and healthcare, particularly if families remain unable to return home.

The fighting in Tardo has also raised questions about recent claims that Al-Shabaab reached a peace agreement with members of the Xawaadle clan in Hiiraan.

The group reportedly circulated claims of an agreement intended to resolve a longstanding dispute with sections of the community. However, Osman Dheere expressed doubts about whether such an agreement had genuinely been reached.

He also questioned videos shared on social media in connection with the alleged deal, suggesting that some could have been fabricated or altered using artificial intelligence (AI).

These claims have not been independently verified. There is currently insufficient confirmed information to establish whether a formal agreement was reached or whether the videos were manipulated using AI.

The reported violence in Tardo underscores the need for reliable information about local reconciliation efforts and the security situation, particularly as communities continue to face the consequences of the conflict.

Osman Dheere has urged Somalia’s federal government and the Hirshabelle administration to respond urgently to the security and humanitarian situation in Tardo.

He called for measures to protect residents and prevent repeated clashes from further worsening living conditions in the area.

The situation could leave displaced families in need of emergency shelter, food, clean water and medical services. Humanitarian access and the protection of civilians are likely to become increasingly important if insecurity persists.

As of the latest available information, comprehensive official figures on deaths and injuries in Tardo, the number of displaced residents and the response from federal and Hirshabelle authorities had not been confirmed.

The clashes near Mahas and the violence in Tardo highlight the continuing security challenges in Hiiraan.

While the fighting near Hees reflects direct confrontations between government forces and Al-Shabaab, the events in Tardo demonstrate how local communities can also become caught up in the violence, with serious consequences for civilian safety, livelihoods and movement.

The situation in the region remains uncertain, and further information is needed to establish the full extent of the casualties, the status of the forces involved and whether additional clashes are likely.

Protecting civilians, verifying reports and ensuring that displaced families can access humanitarian assistance remain urgent concerns.

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The operations were specifically conducted in the areas of Carfuuda, Bilcil-jabane, and Wadaariq, where local forces executed military maneuvers and screening procedures aimed at restricting the transit routes utilized by Al-Shabaab militants.

Reports from the area indicate that the forces blocked or severed several routes previously used by the militants for transit and cross-movement across rural settlements.

This measure has been described as an effort to stall the group’s mobility and prevent fighters from easily crossing between their strongholds.

The operational sectors occupy terrain crucial to southern Mudug transit networks, traversed by roadways connecting settlements such as Caad, Jowle, and Dabagalo.

Consequently, seizing control of these corridors remains vital for forces seeking to diminish the footprint of rural-based insurgents.

Prior reporting from the region demonstrates that Caad, Carfuuda, and Dabagalo have historically served as focal points for security incidents and clashes involving Al-Shabaab.

Somali ACLED data has documented numerous security occurrences throughout Mudug, prominently listing Caad, Carfuuda, and Dabagalo among them.

The Jowle area has likewise served as a theater for anti-Al-Shabaab operations over recent periods.

In May 2025, local forces in Harardhere district carried out an operation in Jowle, during which four Al-Shabaab members were reportedly killed, and several bases maintained by the group in the area were destroyed.

This indicates that the roads and settlements connecting Jowle, Caad, Dabagalo, and other parts of southern Mudug have long served as vital focal points for the movements of both sides. Forces attempting to secure the roadways

The ongoing operation appears to place primary emphasis on controlling transit routes rather than launching localized assaults against specific fortified positions.

Should the local forces sustain their presence in these newly secured areas, road blockades could severely restrict militant mobility and supply lines, especially if alternate rural pathways fall under government or allied control.

Southern Mudug has recently remained one of the critical theaters in the conflict pitting state and local forces against Al-Shabaab.

The European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) has noted that southern Mudug continues to serve as a pivotal zone for anti-Al-Shabaab operations, with state-allied troops and insurgents vying for control across the region.

The ongoing fighting and military maneuvers across rural Mudug have similarly impacted civilian populations, particularly pastoralist communities residing near Caad and Camaara.

In May 2026, local forces executed an operation in Borey, situated between Dabagalo and Warshubo.

Reports covering that operation stated that six Al-Shabaab members were killed, with local forces indicating that the offensive was launched following actionable intelligence regarding the group’s movements.

The newly launched operation in Carfuuda, Bilcil-jabane, and Wadaariq unfolds as anti-Al-Shabaab campaigns persist across sectors of Mudug.

Preliminary reports indicate that local forces aim to seize control of key roadways linking Caad, Jowle, and Dabagalo, in order to curtail the militants’ capacity to traverse these territories.

The operations are expected to continue as local forces attempt to solidify their footprint in the area, while Al-Shabaab retains a notable presence across parts of rural southern Mudug.

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According to reports, the meeting was attended by Hawadle elders and members of Al-Shabaab. Footage from the meeting has also been circulated by media outlets affiliated with Al-Shabaab.

In 2022, the Macawiisley forces, largely drawn from the Hawadle community, played a major role in driving Al-Shabaab out of large parts of Hiiraan.

These operations were backed by the Somali government and U.S. airstrikes.

The early victories of that offensive, however, did not last long.

Al-Shabaab recaptured much of the territory it had lost, and throughout 2025 and beyond, the group carried out attacks and staged a resurgence in parts of central Somalia.

The EUAA documented that between April 2025 and March 2026, Al-Shabaab was involved in numerous security incidents across Hiiraan, including attacks targeting security forces and Hawadle militias.

Maxaas itself was seized by Al-Shabaab in July 2025 following a heavy assault, according to available reports.

That event dealt a severe blow to local and government forces, as Maxaas had served as a vital operational hub for government troops and the Macaw’isley.

Rural communities in Hiiraan have long endured warfare, displacement, economic collapse, and security fears.

The local Macaw’isley fighters suffered heavy losses while fighting Al-Shabaab, whereas government support for the local forces became a matter of intense controversy.

Recent reports indicate that some former members of the Macaw’isley described the war during the Maxaas meeting as one that brought heavy losses, stressing the necessity of prioritizing the safety of the populace and the future of the region.

This may signify that a segment of the local population is now prioritizing physical security and daily livelihoods, even if doing so compels them to engage with a faction they have fought against for years.

Should the reported agreement prove genuine and effective, it could fundamentally alter the security landscape of Hiiraan.

The immediate consequence could be a significant decrease in hostilities between Al-Shabaab and the Hawadle militias, potentially affording the community an opportunity to resume freedom of movement, commerce, and daily life.

Conversely, if the Macaw’isley and other armed groups halt their campaign, Al-Shabaab could secure an opening to solidify its presence across rural Hiiraan.

This is precisely why this development is viewed as a security concern transcending a mere localized clan pact.

Horn Review assessed this development as a limited, localized understanding that remains vulnerable to shifts in political or military dynamics.

The Federal Government of Somalia faces a difficult dilemma: how will it respond to an arrangement struck between a faction of local elders and Al-Shabaab, should the pact be substantiated?

If the government forcefully opposes the agreement, certain local residents may perceive that Mogadishu fails to account for their acute security and political grievances.

Should the government accept or overlook it, Al-Shabaab could exploit the situation to demonstrate that the state lacks the capacity to resolve conflicts or protect the territories it claims to govern.

Therefore, the government’s response will need to combine security measures, political engagement, and community reconciliation.

This development occurred amid political friction between certain Hawadle leaders and the Federal Government concerning the political architecture of Hirshabelle.

Recent reports indicate that factions of Hawadle politicians and elders sought prior agreement regarding power-sharing and the leadership of Hirshabelle, whereas the federal government and other stakeholders were pushing forward with the electoral process.

This renders the Maxaas incident far more than a purely military matter. It represents an intersection of three core elements: security, Hirshabelle’s internal politics, and the relationship between the Federal Government and the Hawadle community.

Yet another risk persists. If Al-Shabaab exploits the agreement to expand its governance, taxation, and security dominance, the community could find itself trapped in an environment with severely constrained political and security options.

Internal divisions may likewise emerge. Some may support the agreement viewing it as a pathway to peace, while others reject it out of the conviction that the pact grants Al-Shabaab undue leverage.

Such a scenario could prove even more volatile than before, as mutual trust collapses and armed factions vie to recapture strategic territories or positions.

It is also possible that political friction between the government and segments of the Hawadle community could intensify if the arrangement with Al-Shabaab is perceived as a direct consequence of unaddressed political grievances.

Should the Somali government wish to prevent the proliferation of such agreements across central Somalia, the response cannot rely on military operations alone.

It is vital that local forces receive consistent support, salaries, logistics, and a formalized institutional framework under which they operate.

It is equally essential to resolve Hirshabelle’s political disputes through dialogue, particularly concerning matters of power-sharing and representation.

Ultimately, local populations require sustainable government services, security, and administrative presence.

If territory is liberated from Al-Shabaab but lacks enduring governance and security structures, the risk remains that the group will stage a comeback.

The EUAA has previously documented how Al-Shabaab successfully recaptured portions of territory it had lost.

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