Mogadishu (Kaab TV) – Seven civilians, including two young girls, a pregnant woman, and an elderly grandmother, were killed during an early morning security operation carried out by Somali special forces trained and supported by the United States in the Dhiigta Margoos area west of Kismayo in Jubbaland, according to relatives, local residents, and regional officials.

The victims were identified as Ahmed Salad Hassan, 45; his pregnant wife Bishaaro Osman Ibrahim, 39; their daughters Jecela Ahmed Salad, 14, and Hamdi Ahmed Salad, 12; their son Osman Ahmed Salad, 15; their relative Abdow Osman Omar, 36; and their 95-year-old grandmother Habibo Osman Mahmoud.

Family members said the victims were inside their home when the operation took place before dawn on Wednesday. Relatives alleged that all seven victims were shot in the head during the raid, while another family member, 17-year-old Mohamed Ahmed Salad, survived with serious injuries and was later transported to Mogadishu for treatment.

Kaab TV reporters visited Mohamed Ahmed Salad at Digfeer Hospital, where he remains hospitalized with critical injuries sustained during the incident.

According to relatives, the family had previously fled drought-hit areas in the Juba Valley after years of severe water shortages, livestock losses, and worsening humanitarian conditions. They reportedly settled in the Dhiigta Margoos area seeking access to water and humanitarian aid.

Residents said the operation caused panic among nearby communities, with many families fleeing the area out of fear of further violence. Local elders and community leaders have demanded an independent investigation into the killings, arguing that civilians continue to bear the consequences of military operations conducted in conflict-affected regions.

The incident comes amid intensified counterterrorism operations across southern Somalia targeting Al-Shabaab militants, particularly in the regions surrounding Kismayo and the Lower Juba area. Somali government forces, alongside international partners including the United States, have increased raids and air-supported operations in recent months as part of efforts to weaken the armed group’s presence in rural areas.

However, human rights organizations and local communities have repeatedly raised concerns over civilian casualties linked to military operations and airstrikes conducted in southern Somalia. Critics argue that poor intelligence, lack of accountability, and limited transparency surrounding security operations continue to place civilians at risk.

The Somali federal government and U.S. officials have not yet released a detailed statement addressing the allegations surrounding the deaths of the civilians or explaining the circumstances of the operation.

The killings have renewed debate over the conduct of counterterrorism operations in Somalia and the growing humanitarian impact of ongoing conflict in rural communities already affected by drought, displacement, and insecurity.

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Speaking during the 87th Ordinary Session of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) in Banjul on May 12, Esther Waweru, Associate Director for Legal Equality at Equality Now, called on African Union member states to take stronger action against sexual violence, female genital mutilation (FGM), discriminatory family laws, and online gender-based violence.

“Millions of women and girls across Africa live under laws and systems that fail to uphold their human rights,” Waweru said, urging governments to move beyond rhetoric and implement meaningful legal reforms and protections.

Equality Now said rape laws in many African countries still fail survivors because they require proof of physical force or violence, placing heavy burdens on victims and ignoring situations involving coercion, intimidation, or abuse of power.

The organisation also criticised failures by authorities to properly investigate and prosecute rape cases, while highlighting how harmful gender stereotypes continue to influence judicial decisions.

According to the group, some rape cases are informally settled through community mediation, often pressuring survivors into silence.

Kenya was specifically criticised for maintaining a marital rape exemption that prevents husbands from being prosecuted for raping their wives.

Calls to Protect Reproductive Rights

Equality Now also raised concerns over restrictions on sexual and reproductive health services, particularly affecting rape survivors.

The organisation welcomed a 2025 ruling by the High Court of Malawi, which found that denying a 14-year-old rape survivor access to a safe abortion violated her rights.

The group urged African governments to adopt survivor-centred approaches that include compensation, medical care, psychosocial support, and legal assistance.

Equality Now said women across Africa continue to face discrimination in matrimonial property rights, particularly after separation or divorce.

The organisation noted that in countries such as Nigeria, property division is often based only on direct financial contributions, leaving many women with little protection despite years of unpaid domestic and caregiving work.

It called for laws recognising both financial and non-financial contributions within marriage.

FGM and Online Abuse

The organisation urged lawmakers in Liberia to criminalise FGM by passing pending legislation protecting women and girls.

In The Gambia, Equality Now called on authorities to defend the country’s 2015 law banning FGM amid a Supreme Court challenge seeking to overturn it on cultural and religious grounds.

Equality Now also warned about rising online gender-based violence across Africa, saying weak digital governance laws leave women vulnerable to online harassment, exploitation, and abuse.

The organisation called for stronger regulation of technology companies, gender-responsive digital protections, and improved support for survivors of online harm.

Equality Now further urged South Sudan to fully implement the Maputo Protocol, which it ratified in 2023.

The group said women and girls in South Sudan continue to face conflict-related sexual violence, harmful traditional practices, and weak legal protections, adding that the country’s constitution-making process presents an opportunity to strengthen gender equality protections.

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The federal government in Mogadishu could clear roads, retake towns and deploy soldiers into formerly militant-held districts. But across large parts of central and southern Somalia, it still struggled to convince local communities that state authority would endure after the security operations ended.

That contradiction increasingly sits at the center of Somalia’s war against insurgency.

For years, international strategy toward Somalia followed a familiar formula: strengthen the Somali National Army, expand intelligence coordination with foreign partners and gradually extend state authority into rural areas dominated by al-Shabab.

The model appeared to gain momentum during the 2022 and 2023 offensives, when clan militias known as Macawisley, backed by federal troops and international support, pushed militants from significant territory in central Somalia.

Somali officials described the campaign as a historic turning point, while Western diplomats cautiously spoke of renewed optimism.

But the advances concealed deeper structural weaknesses that became increasingly visible through 2024, 2025 and into 2026.

The Somali state expanded militarily faster than it reconciled politically.

Reciprocal Fragility and Layered Sovereignty

In many districts, neither the federal government nor the al-Qaeda affiliate group achieved decisive authority.

Instead, Somalia drifted into what some Somali analysts described as “reciprocal fragility”, a condition in which competing actors retain enough coercive power to block stabilization without fully controlling the political landscape.

The result was layered sovereignty.

Government officials administered district headquarters by day. Militants collected taxes at night. Clan elders mediated disputes outside both systems. Businesses paid multiple authorities simultaneously to ensure protection and commercial access.

Increasingly, international analysts warned that the insurgency was feeding less on military weakness than on political fragmentation.

Matt Bryden, a senior regional analyst and co-founder of the Sahan Research think tank, argued in late-2025 assessments that deteriorating relations between Mogadishu and Somalia’s federal member states were creating openings al-Shabab could exploit more effectively than direct battlefield confrontation.

Resistance to meaningful power-sharing, he warned, risked pushing Somalia toward a dangerous tipping point.

The broader concern emerging among researchers and diplomats was that Somalia’s conflict was becoming increasingly regionalized.

Federal authorities, regional administrations, Gulf-backed actors, clan networks and local militias were operating according to separate political and security calculations rather than a unified national strategy.

That fragmentation became especially visible in the government’s dependence on Macawisley militias.

The clan-based fighters became indispensable during the anti militants offensives because they possessed something the regular army often lacked: local legitimacy, clan trust networks and detailed territorial knowledge.

But by 2026, many of those same militias had become entangled in unresolved land disputes, revenge killings and inter-clan competition.

Analysts at the Rift Valley Institute described the Macawisley phenomenon as a “double-edged sword.” The militias emerged organically from local frustration with al-Shabab taxation, extortion and forced recruitment.

Yet the same clan structures that made them effective against militants also risked deepening local fragmentation once communities became rearmed.

In Somali political culture, disarmament is rarely viewed simply as a security issue. It is tied directly to communal survival.

Across much of rural Somalia, the state is often perceived not as a neutral institution but as an extension of whichever clan or sub-clan dominates local administration. The appointment of a district commissioner, deployment of a military commander or establishment of a checkpoint can quickly alter local power balances.

When one community feels excluded, al-Shabab has repeatedly shown an ability to exploit the resulting grievances.

The group’s resilience has long depended on more than ideology alone.

In many areas, it functions as an alternative governance structure capable of arbitrating disputes, regulating transport routes and enforcing commercial agreements across clan boundaries.

That reality increasingly led analysts to frame Somalia’s conflict less as a conventional counterterrorism campaign than as a competition over who could provide predictable order.

For traders moving goods through insecure territory, predictability often outweighs ideology.

That helps explain why many businesses in Mogadishu and the sprawling Bakara Market continue operating within a system of dual taxation, paying official state taxes while also transferring “security fees” to al-Shabab networks controlling rural corridors.

Among Somali transporters and traders, frustration over the arrangement has become increasingly visible in public debate. Yet the system also highlights a broader reality: many commercial actors do not necessarily support al-Shabab politically. They simply regard it as an unavoidable coercive authority.

This is not always ideological loyalty. Often, it is economic adaptation.

The same logic shapes local neutrality arrangements in rural districts, where communities sometimes negotiate informal understandings with militants to protect grazing access, water points or transport routes.

Certain counterterrorism frameworks frequently interpret such arrangements as collaboration with insurgents. Many Somali communities instead see them as pragmatic survival strategies in an environment where state protection remains inconsistent.

The gap between those interpretations has become one of the central weaknesses in international policy.

The transition from the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia to the newer African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia framework exposed those vulnerabilities further.

As African Union forces reduced their footprint during 2024 and 2025, Al-Shabab adapted strategically rather than confronting stronger military positions directly.

Regional analysts increasingly described the shift as a “wait-and-bleed” strategy.

Instead of focusing primarily on territorial battles, militants intensified assassinations, intimidation campaigns and targeted killings aimed at clan elders, mediators and local officials aligned with the federal government.

The objective was less about immediate territorial conquest than about weakening trust inside the political alliances supporting the counterinsurgency campaign.

The message delivered to communities was simple: governments may withdraw, but clans remain.

Versions of that sentiment spread widely across Somali social media during 2025 and 2026.

One phrase captured the skepticism especially clearly: “Dowladdu waa ku-meel-gaar, laakiin beeluhu waa weligood”, meaning that while the government is seen as temporary, the clan remains enduring and permanent.

The phrase reflected more than cynicism. It reflected political memory shaped by decades of state collapse and insecurity.

Since 1991, many Somali communities have relied on lineage networks, compensation systems and clan protection mechanisms more consistently than formal state institutions.

This is where counterterrorism operations often collide with older grievance structures.

When civilians from one clan are killed during operations associated with forces linked to another clan, the violence can quickly become absorbed into cycles of revenge and retaliation that predate the insurgency itself.

Several confrontations in parts of Hiraan, Gedo and Lower Shabelle during 2025 and early 2026 illustrated that dynamic, as disputes over checkpoints, territory and political influence increasingly blurred the line between counterinsurgency and clan competition.

Researchers at the Institute for Security Studies warned repeatedly that “disunity is Al-Shabaab’s greatest weapon.” Their argument was that military gains repeatedly eroded whenever Somali political actors shifted attention toward election disputes and internal rivalries.

The fragmentation also deepened tensions within Somalia’s federal structure.

Operations conducted by Puntland Security Forces against Islamic State Somalia Province between late 2024 and 2025 demonstrated that regional administrations could sometimes conduct more coherent campaigns than the federal center.

But the operations also reinforced a more uncomfortable reality: Somalia’s security architecture was gradually evolving into parallel regional systems with varying loyalties and levels of coordination.

Analysts at the Hiraal Institute described the trend as the “federalization of security.”

That development poses difficult questions for the future cohesion of the Somali state.

Because Somalia’s central challenge is no longer simply about military capability. It is about legitimacy.

International partners have often treated legitimacy as something derived from constitutions, elections and formal institutions. In much of Somalia, legitimacy is still negotiated through clan balance, mediation systems and the management of coexistence between rival communities.

Al-Shabaab understands that reality well.

Its intelligence wing, the Amniyat, increasingly operates not only as a clandestine security apparatus but also as a political pressure network capable of exploiting local disputes over land, water and clan representation.

The danger for Mogadishu is that military operations conducted without parallel reconciliation efforts risk reproducing the instability they are intended to eliminate.

A state that enters territory without resolving local grievances can easily appear less like a national authority than another armed actor competing within clan space.

The lesson emerging from Somalia’s conflict by 2026 is not that military pressure is unnecessary. Al-Shabab remains capable of major attacks, extortion and coercion across large areas of the country.

But force alone cannot resolve a conflict whose roots are political and social before they are ideological.

In Somalia, the battlefield is increasingly defined not simply by who controls territory, but by who communities believe will still remain after the next withdrawal, the next election and the next clan dispute.

Abdi Guled is a Horn of Africa analyst and journalist focusing on political risk, armed groups and geostrategic competition in the region.

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“We call on you and your government to immediately and unconditionally release Sadia Moalim Ali, who has been detained solely for peacefully exercising her human rights,” Amnesty International said in a letter addressed to Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud.

Sadia Bajaj was arrested on 12 April after being detained by officers of Somalia’s National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) in central Mogadishu.

Known for her work as a female Bajaj (three-wheeler taxi) driver, Sadia has been an outspoken critic of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s administration, particularly on issues of corruption, nepotism, rising fuel prices, and the increasing cost of living. Through videos shared on social media, she highlighted grievances that also sparked protests by Bajaj drivers in Mogadishu in March this year.

Sadia Moalim Ali, 27, a Bajaj driver and social activist, was arrested in the Hodan district of Mogadishu by NISA officers on 12 April. She was initially held at Hamar Jajab Police Station before being transferred on 14 April to Mogadishu Central Prison, where she remains detained.

She has not been granted access to legal representation, and her family is unaware of any formal charges filed against her. However, informed sources told Amnesty International that police brought her before the Banadir Regional Court, which authorized her detention for up to 90 days pending investigation.

“Her detention stems solely from her peaceful expression of views shared on social media, particularly Facebook and TikTok,” Amnesty said. “She spoke about government criticism, alleged corruption within state institutions, youth unemployment, accusations of favoritism among senior officials, high taxation, and rising fuel prices. In one of her videos, she stated that the President of Somalia would be responsible for any harm that might come to her.”

Allegations of torture

Sources who spoke to Kaab TV, including members of Sadia’s family, said she faced harsh punishment after giving an audio interview to a local Mogadishu radio station in which she stated she had not eaten for four days while in detention at Mogadishu Central Prison.

The audio, broadcast on 20 April, quickly spread across social media platforms.

Following the broadcast, Sadia was reportedly subjected to further punishment and transferred to a disciplinary cell inside the prison, commonly referred to by detainees as the “death room,” where inmates are subjected to severe treatment.

The sources confirmed that she was held in that cell for 48 hours, stripped of her clothing. The punishment was allegedly carried out by prison guards and criminal investigation officers, who also threatened her inside the facility.

This is not the first time Sadia Moalim Ali has been detained over her activism. She was previously arrested on 12 March after participating in a protest against rising fuel prices. She was brought before a court and released four days later. The pattern suggests she has been repeatedly targeted for peacefully exercising her human rights.

Since President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud returned to office in mid-2022, Somalia has witnessed a series of human rights violations, particularly affecting freedom of expression, association, and peaceful assembly. Authorities have used arbitrary arrests, unfair trials, detention, threats, and intimidation to silence journalists and activists.

Since 2025, the government has intensified efforts to restrict and censor journalists reporting on public interest issues, particularly security operations and forced evictions in Mogadishu. On 16 March 2025, the Minister of Information issued a directive prohibiting the dissemination of “negative reporting” on government security operations or what authorities described as “false information” regarding such operations.

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CCTV footage obtained by Kaab TV shows two airport employees directly handing bags to passengers in the arrivals area, instead of allowing passengers to collect their own luggage.

Sources inside the airport told us that covert drug smuggling operations have been ongoing at the airport for a long time.

In September, Somali police seized up to 189 cartons of various types of drugs — including dangerous narcotics — that were being smuggled into Mogadishu at Aden Adde International Airport.

Police spokesperson Sadiq Dodishe stated that the drugs were concealed inside cartons disguised as ordinary goods and had been brought from Kenya.

Police said the seized drugs were burned and destroyed. However, no arrests were made of those who carried them.

CCTV FOOTAGE

The CCTV footage shows airport workers wearing yellow vests — the standard uniform used to identify staff — handling two bags, one a backpack and the other a hand-carried bag.

Sources say these bags were sent from Kenya, and upon arrival at the airport, airport workers were assigned to pass them through.

Senior airport security officials, including NISA Commander Col. Hamdi Hassan, have been accused of overseeing this criminal network involved in organised crime.

The police spokesperson also stated that organised criminal groups are facilitating human trafficking through the airport, charging thousands of dollars per person.

In December 2025, Somali immigration officials announced the arrest of airport employees involved in illegal human trafficking.

Officials said they seized fraudulent passports from European countries, the UK, and the United States, which were being used to illegally smuggle people out of the country.

To date, the group has not been brought before a court.

There is growing concern among regional security agencies about Mogadishu’s airport — the largest international departure point in the country — following the emergence of information indicating that members of terrorist groups have departed through Mogadishu airport.

Additionally, Mogadishu police today arrested two officers from Turkish company Favori LLC, which manages Mogadishu’s airport and seaport, on charges of corruption and negligence, according to security sources who spoke to Kaab TV.

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From January to December 2025, SJS documented 148 cases of media freedom violations during the year, marking a significant rise compared to 31 cases in 2024 and 25 in 2023. Out of these, 148 journalists were arrested or arbitrarily detained. Mogadishu recorded the highest number, with 118 cases of violations, mainly carried out by the police followed by the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA).

In Somaliland, 36 journalists were detained, particularly in regions such as Erigabo, Sanaag, and Awdal, where inter-clan tensions were high. At least five cases involved kidnappings.

In Mogadishu, the police chief Mahdi Omar Mumin (Moalim Mahdi) and district police commanders are repeatedly implicated in orchestrating, ordering, and, in some cases, directly carrying out unlawful arrests, detentions, and the confiscation of journalists’ equipment.

Nearly 90% of those arrested were never brought before a court and were released without charge after spending hours or days in detention. Additionally, over 10% of the violations affected women journalists, highlighting a concerning gender dimension to the abuses.

Despite these trends, both Somalia and Somaliland constitutions guarantee freedom of expression and media independence, including the right to speak, publish, and access information, with limitations only under the law.

However, the data clearly shows that police forces were the primary perpetrators, responsible for approximately 91.2% of all recorded violations in 2025.

The pattern of violations indicates that authorities in both Somalia and Somaliland are primarily motivated by efforts to control narratives around insecurity, avoid public embarrassment, and conceal security weaknesses amid Al-Shabaab’s terror attacks. Journalists were also targeted to limit debate on politically sensitive issues, including constitutional changes and contested election model and policies in Mogadishu.

Furthermore, these actions appear aimed at discouraging public mobilization, particularly around protests and social issues, while also concealing human rights abuses and misconduct by authorities or allied actors. In many cases, the violations serve to intimidate the media and enforce self-censorship across the sector.

In response, SJS calls for an immediate end to arbitrary arrests, physical assaults, equipment confiscation, and forced deletion of journalistic material. The organization also urges that police officers and security personnel be held accountable for violations against journalists, including targeted attacks on women journalists.

SJS further recommends urgent human rights training for police and other security forces in both Somalia and Somaliland to ensure respect for constitutional rights and press freedom.

Finally, SJS expresses serious concern over the lack of judicial independence in both Somalia and Somaliland. Judges and court officials are often political appointees, which undermines their ability to uphold constitutional rights and contributes to a climate of impunity for violations against journalists.

“Both Somalia and Somaliland are at a critical juncture where media freedom and open reporting are vital to keeping the public informed. However, we are deeply concerned that if these attacks continue with impunity, they will lead to widespread self-censorship, leaving journalists and local media unable to report on what is happening. We are already witnessing journalists leaving the country out of fear,” said SJS Secretary General Abdalle Mumin.

“We call for an immediate end to these attacks and full accountability for all officers involved,” Mr. Mumin added.

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President Laftagareen secured 66 votes, while his opponent received 13 votes, according to the South West State Electoral Commission.

The presidential vote took place less than an hour after the same parliament elected its new Speaker, Dr. Ali Said Fiqi, and his deputies, making it one of the fastest electoral processes in Somalia, with both the legislative and executive leadership established within hours.

The re-elected president was immediately sworn in and delivered a speech criticizing the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), stating that the country’s political direction is not on the right track.

“The election we held today was forced upon us by the federal government, which for a long time opposed the holding of elections in South West State. We have not understood the agenda or direction it is pursuing,” said President Laftagareen.

He denied claims that he had entered into any agreement with President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud regarding one-person, one-vote elections or constitutional changes.

“There is no such agreement that I have entered into,” he said, defending the right of federal member states to hold similar elections, citing Jubaland, which held elections at the end of 2024 despite opposition from the federal government.

Laftagareen also criticized remarks made earlier by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, who said significant funds had been spent on preparing the election.

“President Hassan Sheikh should not tell the Somali people that he spent money. Where did the money come from? Was it his personal money?” Laftagareen said.

However, opposition figures in South West State had previously rejected the election, describing it as lacking full legitimacy and characterizing it as a “self-extension of power.”

Meanwhile, former Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo congratulated Laftagareen, stating that his election is important for political stability in South West State.

Farmaajo called on the new leadership to accelerate community reconciliation, liberate areas controlled by armed groups, and improve public services.

Similarly, former President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed also congratulated the re-elected leadership and praised the newly sworn-in MPs, urging other administrations whose terms have expired to hold timely elections to avoid a political vacuum that could threaten national security.

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The regional MPs, most of whom are returning members, represent various clans from across the regions of South West State.

This new parliament, the third since the establishment of the South West State administration, will serve a term from 2026 to 2030.

The new assembly includes only 12 women, representing approximately 12.6% of the House of Representatives.

The MPs were sworn in today, Saturday (28 March 2026), and promptly re-elected Dr. Ali Said Fiqi as Speaker of Parliament, with Shamsa Mohamed Yarow as Deputy Speaker. Abdiaziz Hassan Mohamed (Laftagareen) was also elected President of South West State, securing 66 votes.

Both Ali Fiqi and Shamsa Yarow held these positions during the past term of the regional parliament.

The elections took place in Baydhabo amid rising tensions, as forces and militias reportedly backed by the Federal Government of Somalia moved from Buurhakaba, stating their opposition to the electoral process and advancing toward Baydhabo. Meanwhile, South West State forces remain positioned on the outskirts of the city in a defensive posture.

The full list of newly elected MPs, as announced by the electoral commission, is as follows:

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The commission consists of eight men and one woman, all from Southwest State.

Officials in Baidoa told Kaab TV that the electoral process is expected to be completed within 10 days starting from today.

Southwest State based its decision on Article 142 of the Federal Constitution, as well as its own regional constitution.

The move signals that SWS has charted its own path and eased the deadlock surrounding Somalia’s 2026 federal electoral process, which has been marked by uncertainty and disputes.

The Federal Government of Somalia has been pushing to centralize the elections under a commission previously appointed by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, who has 53 days remaining in his term and is seeking re-election.

Federal Member States, particularly Jubaland and Puntland, have rejected this approach, opposing both the president’s unilateral electoral commission and recent constitutional changes, arguing that they lack broad consensus.

Regional administrations say the federal government’s efforts are aimed at extending its mandate and legitimizing constitutional amendments and electoral arrangements without agreement.

Somalia’s federal system comprises five Federal Member States and the Banaadir region. Southwest has now joined the ranks of Puntland and Jubaland in rejecting the constitutional amendments and any election process not based on consensus.

By appointing its own electoral commission, Southwest State has reinforced the likelihood that Somalia’s 2026 elections will follow an indirect model agreed upon by stakeholders—a path now clearly adopted by SWS.

Puntland held its elections in 2023, while Jubaland conducted its vote in 2024, both despite opposition from the federal government.

Meanwhile, the Federal Government, according to a directive issued by Interior Minister Ali Yusuf Hosh, has also rejected SWS move. Reports indicate that Mogadishu may attempt to organize a parallel election in Baraawe, where federal forces, including Haramcad and Gorgor units, were recently deployed after SWS troops withdrew.

If the Federal Government takes the parallel election route, it will not only risk undermining Baydhabo’s authority but could also trigger a backlash against its own legitimacy. Opposition figures in Mogadishu may respond by declaring themselves “president” after May 15, when the current term ends—effectively creating parallel leadership in the capital.

Galmudug, which has not endorsed the March 4, 2026 constitutional changes, and Hirshabelle, reportedly facing political and security pressure from Villa Somalia, have yet to clarify their positions.

With Southwest, Jubaland, and Puntland forming a majority among Federal Member States, their continued adherence to the 2012 Provisional Constitution and preference for indirect elections suggests that Somalia’s 2026 polls are likely to be based on a clan-delegate selection model.

Given that Somalia’s power-sharing system still follows the 4.5 formula, and no alternative has yet been agreed upon, many believe that the indirect, clan-based electoral model remains the only viable framework for maintaining political balance—one that continues to give a central role to traditional elders.

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