Africa’s population grew by 24 per cent between 2016 and 2025, while the number of emigrants increased by almost 32 per cent to nearly 46 million.

Remittances, however, grew almost three times faster than population growth, underscoring their rising role as a source of household income, resilience and investment.

The report, Sending Money Home 2026: Beyond remittances: From lifeline to resilience – one family at a time, finds that remittances to low- and middle-income countries reached US$728.6 billion in 2025—more than four times global official development assistance and greater than foreign direct investment to those countries.

Across Africa, the flows are concentrated in a handful of major receiving markets.

Egypt, Nigeria, Morocco, Ethiopia and Kenya received a combined US$90.1 billion in 2025, representing approximately 73 per cent of all remittances to the continent.

Egypt alone accounted for about one-third of Africa’s total.

Ethiopia and Kenya entered the continent’s five largest receiving markets, replacing Ghana and Algeria, reflecting shifts in the region’s migration and remittance landscape.

“Remittances help families meet their basic needs, but they are also building financial growth and resilience to shocks,” said Alvaro Lario, President of IFAD. “Their potential benefits are greatest when families have access to affordable and trusted financial services, together with the knowledge, freedom and appropriate options to use their resources according to their own needs and aspirations.”

A largely African migration story

More than half of African emigrants live within the continent, making intra-African migration a major driver of the region’s remittance economy.

For migrants living outside Africa, Europe remains the main destination, followed by Asia and North America. Long-established migration corridors between North Africa and Europe continue to reflect geographic proximity, labour demand and historical ties, while migration to Gulf countries has also expanded.

The growth in remittances comes despite the challenges facing migrants and their families, including high transfer costs, limited access to financial services and economic and climate-related shocks.

Globally, almost one in three dollars sent home by migrants—an estimated US$233 billion—reached rural areas in 2025.

These flows can be particularly significant in places where formal employment, financial services and public infrastructure are weakest.

IFAD estimates that remittance-receiving families invest around US$22 billion annually in rural agrifood systems, supporting agricultural production, rural businesses and employment.

“The impact of remittances in rural areas extends beyond recipient households into surrounding economies, supporting local businesses, jobs and food systems,” Lario said.

For rural families, remittances can provide a first opportunity to build savings, access insurance or obtain appropriate credit.

They can also help households withstand economic and climate-related shocks and create opportunities that may make migration more of a choice than a necessity.

Digital transfers growing, but gaps remain

More than half of remittances globally now begin through a digital channel, contributing to lower transfer costs. Yet cash remains widely used in many corridors, and only 35 per cent of services measured in 2025 were fully digital at both the sending and receiving ends.

The report calls on governments, regulators, financial institutions and development partners to make remittance transfers more affordable and transparent, improve services in rural areas and strengthen financial and digital capabilities.

It also urges greater access for remittance-receiving families to savings, insurance, appropriate credit and investment opportunities.

While remittances can strengthen household resilience and contribute to local economic development, IFAD stresses that these private flows cannot substitute for public investment, social protection or climate finance.

For Africa, the findings underline the growing economic importance of migration—not simply as a movement of people, but as a financial lifeline connecting millions of households across borders and increasingly supporting the resilience and development of communities at home.

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The lawmakers focused on three main issues: Thursday’s airstrike in Doolow district, Gedo region; allegations against Southwest State forces; and the ongoing political tensions in Southwest State.

The MPs strongly condemned Thursday’s strike in Doolow, accusing the Turkish government of targeting General Mahad Abdirahman “Shubka,” who commands Southwest State forces fighting troops aligned with Speaker of Parliament Adan Madobe and the federal government.

“We urgently call on the Turkish government to stop the airstrikes it is carrying out in areas of Southwest Somalia,” the lawmakers said in their statement.

The statement was read by MP Hassan Abdinuur, a member of parliament representing Southwest State.

The lawmakers also directly accused President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and the Turkish government of being, in their words, the two biggest threats facing Somalia today.

“Therefore, if there is a danger today threatening Somalia’s security and politics, there is one threat: the president whose term has expired and the Turkish government,” the statement said.

The statement also expressed support for protests against Turkey’s presence and what the lawmakers described as Turkish interference in Somalia’s internal affairs.

“If Turkey does not stop its interference, it will face resistance greater than what it has encountered so far,” the Nairobi statement said.

Allegations of Links to Al-Shabaab

The lawmakers also rejected allegations against Southwest State forces led by President Abdiaziz Hassan Mohamed Laftagareen, whom the federal government has previously accused of having links or cooperating with Al-Shabaab.

They said the allegations were baseless, pointing to heavy fighting in recent months in Baidoa and other parts of Southwest State.

The fighting has pitted Laftagareen-aligned Southwest State forces against troops supporting Adan Madobe and the federal government, which the lawmakers said were receiving support from Turkey.

The MPs also referred to protests against Turkey that have taken place in parts of Jubaland.

The fighting in Baidoa has resulted in civilian deaths and injuries, while political and security tensions remain high.

Elections and Extension of the Presidential Term

The lawmakers also said the public uprising and political mobilization taking place in Southwest State were part of broader efforts against any extension of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s term. They called for democratic elections to be held in the country.

They urged the people of Southwest State and Somalia more broadly to support popular movements calling for inclusive and democratic elections.

The Nairobi press conference came days after what the lawmakers described as a Turkish drone carried out an airstrike in Doolow district, Gedo region, on Thursday.

The strike reportedly injured General Mahad Abdirahman, his wife and members of his security detail. Southwest State officials accused the Turkish government of being behind the attack, describing it as an attempted assassination targeting General Mahad.

General Mahad Abdirahman commands Southwest State forces fighting troops aligned with Adan Madobe and the federal government.

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Barre is visiting Las Anod to mark the first anniversary of the SSC-Khaatumo administration’s recognition as Somalia’s Northeastern State.

On Monday night, he attended anniversary celebrations and delivered a speech highlighting Mogadishu’s political backing for the administration, describing it as a symbol of Somalia’s unity.

“We have a longer ambition here. The reason we support you and stand with you is that we have a longer-term plan here,” Barre said during his roughly 30-minute address.

Despite the significance of the prisoner issue, the prime minister made no public reference during his speech to the estimated 300 Somaliland-born prisoners being held in Las Anod.

His visit comes at a time of growing frustration among Northeastern State politicians, who have complained that Mogadishu has failed to deliver on promises of financial support.

Local leaders have criticized the federal government for excluding the administration from Somalia’s 2026 national budget and for failing to provide sustained funding for its security forces despite repeated commitments.

Barre sought to reassure local leaders that federal assistance would eventually arrive, arguing that financial constraints had prevented the government from fulfilling earlier promises.

On Monday, the outgoing prime minister also met with traditional clan elders in Las Anod.

However, the meeting was notable for the absence of Chief Garad Jama Garad Ali, the most senior traditional leader of the Dhulbahante community.

According to sources familiar with the discussions, Barre privately urged the elders to release prisoners captured from Somaliland during the 2023 conflict.

The request was reportedly rejected, leaving the prisoner issue deadlocked.

Both Somaliland and Northeastern State continue to hold prisoners captured during the eight-month conflict over Las Anod in 2023, when Dhulbahante fighters battled Somaliland forces for control of the city.

A prisoner exchange agreement brokered last year with mediation from the Federal Government of Somalia and Puntland resulted in the release of up to 25 detainees from each side.

However, negotiations over the remaining prisoners have since stalled.

Sources say Northeastern State has insisted that Somaliland must first acknowledge the administration as a federal member state of Somalia before any broader prisoner release can take place.

Somaliland, however, continues to regard Las Anod as part of its Sool region and rejects the area’s incorporation into Somalia’s federal system.

Last month Las Anod-based Northeastern Assembly called for the prosecution of the Somaliland prisoners.

That call contradicted a previous statement by the Speaker of the Northeastern Assembly, Aden Abdullahi, who said that prisoners to be freed once a peace deal is reached.

As of Tuesday evening, the Prime Minister’s Office had not publicly commented on the reported request or the outcome of the discussions.

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The Somali passport remains among the world’s weakest travel documents. As of 2026, Somalia passport ranks 99th globally on the Henley Passport Index allowing access to only 32 destinations through visa-free or visa-on-arrival arrangements.

But Kenya’s crackdown on illegally obtained identity documents has now turned that long-standing practice into a political crisis, exposing questions about citizenship, corruption and accountability among Somalia’s senior officials.

The controversy erupted after Somalia’s Deputy Prime Minister Jibril Abdirashid Haji was deported on late June from Jomo Kenyatta International Airport (JKIA) in Nairobi after Kenyan authorities questioned the legitimacy of his Kenyan passport. On August 3, he announced that he returned the document, following pressure from Somalia’s leadership.

“I have decided to return my Kenyan passport which I had for over twenty years,” he said defending that he obtained the document “legally” even though Kenyan authorities said he acquired “illegally“.

The incident was followed within weeks by the denial of entry and deportation of another Somali government official, Abshir Ahmed Mohamed, the state minister for presidency, over a disputed Kenyan passport, deepening concerns in Mogadishu.

The two incidents created significant embarrassment for Somalia’s government and forced President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud to address the issue directly.

During a cabinet meeting on Thursday, 30 July, the president reportedly told ministers holding Kenyan passports that they had two choices: surrender the documents or leave the cabinet.

The directive reflected growing frustration inside Villa Somalia over the political damage caused by the deportations and the perception that senior officials were relying on foreign citizenship while representing the Somali state.

A passport more valuable than politics

The roots of the controversy lie in Somalia’s weak international travel position.

The Somali passport remains one of the least powerful travel documents globally, making international travel difficult even for government officials attending diplomatic meetings, regional summits and international conferences.

For many Somali elites, a Kenyan passport has provided a practical solution.

Kenya’s passport offers greater international mobility, easier access to many countries and fewer visa restrictions. For politicians, businessmen and officials with links to Kenya, obtaining Kenyan nationality has often been viewed as a strategic advantage.

But Kenya insists that citizenship documents must only be issued to those legally entitled to them.

Kenyan authorities have warned that passports and national identity cards are reserved for citizens and that individuals who acquired them through fraudulent means will face action.

The crackdown comes amid a wider debate in Kenya over corruption within immigration and registration systems.

For years, Kenyan citizens and politicians have raised concerns that corrupt officials facilitated the illegal issuance of national identity cards and passports to foreigners.

The alleged sale of identity documents has become a major national security concern, with critics warning that weak controls allow non-citizens to obtain official documents that provide access to travel, banking and other state services.

Kenya’s recent immigration reforms are aimed at strengthening verification systems and identifying individuals who may have obtained citizenship documents improperly.

The Somali community has come under particular scrutiny because of the deep historical, economic and family links between the two countries.

Somalia admits there is a passport problem

Somali officials have acknowledged that the controversy has exposed a real challenge.

State Minister for Foreign Affairs Ali Omar recently said the government was aware of the deportations but defended Kenya’s authority to control entry into its territory.

“We are aware that two officials were deported. It is Kenya’s right to reject anyone they do not want to enter their country. The issue of passports is also a problem,” Ali Omar said.

His comments marked one of the rare acknowledgements from Somalia’s government that the issue goes beyond individual cases and reflects a broader challenge involving foreign documents held by Somali officials.

The scale of foreign passport ownership among Somali officials remains unclear.

Estimates circulating among officials and political observers suggest that between 40 and 50 percent of Somali government officials may hold Kenyan passports, although there is no publicly available official register confirming the figure.

Kenyan officials have repeatedly raised concerns that some non-citizens obtained documents through corruption or irregular procedures.

The controversy has now forced Somalia to confront difficult questions: How many government officials hold foreign citizenship? And should senior officials representing Somalia continue holding passports from neighbouring countries?

The debate is unlikely to end with Kenya.

Many Somali politicians and officials are also believed to hold Ethiopian, Djiboutian and Ugandan passports due to decades of migration, business links, education and political relationships.

Ethiopia, which has played a major security and political role in Somalia, could face similar questions if Somali officials possess Ethiopian citizenship without fulfilling legal requirements.

Uganda, another important security partner and long-time contributor to African Union missions in Somalia, could also face scrutiny.

The issue is particularly sensitive because both countries have significant influence in Somalia’s political and security affairs.

“A national embarrassment”

The controversy has also triggered criticism from Somali commentators and analysts.

Abdirashid Jibril, commenting on the issue, said the passport crisis reflects a deeper problem of confidence in Somalia’s own institutions and the reliance of officials on foreign systems.

“I known many Somalis are currently trapped at the Kenyan airports and their documents confiscated. I urge all those who hold Kenyan passports to surrender the document and let’s have confidence in our passport,” he said.

The debate highlights a contradiction at the heart of Somalia’s state-building efforts.

While Somali leaders represent a sovereign country internationally, many rely on foreign passports because their own national travel document remains weak.

The foreign passport controversy is now bigger than immigration.

It has become a question of governance, transparency and trust.

For ordinary Somalis, obtaining passports and travelling internationally remains difficult. Meanwhile, some members of the political elite have found alternative routes through foreign citizenship.

Kenya’s crackdown has therefore exposed a sensitive reality: Somalia’s political class has often relied on foreign passports to overcome the weaknesses of its own state.

The coming months may determine whether the passport controversy becomes a short-lived political embarrassment or a deeper reform moment forcing Somalia to examine citizenship, accountability and the credibility of those who govern.

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Behind the official photographs and carefully worded speeches at last week’s African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) ministerial meeting in Kampala, a deeper disagreement unfolded—one that diplomats and regional officials say prevented the conference from addressing what many believe is the single greatest obstacle to Somalia’s security: its unresolved political crisis.

The two-day meeting, held on 30–31 July, brought together ministers and senior military officials from AUSSOM troop-contributing countries (TCCs), alongside representatives from the African Union, IGAD, the United Nations and international partners. It followed a meeting of Chiefs of Defence on 29 July that focused on the deteriorating security situation and the mission’s worsening financial crisis after the United States withdrew its financial support earlier this year.

The expectation among many delegates was that Kampala would not only discuss military operations but also pave the way for renewed international confidence—and potentially unlock future funding for AUSSOM.

Instead, according to multiple diplomatic sources familiar with the negotiations, the conference became bogged down over a single paragraph in the draft communiqué.

Uganda’s proposal

Uganda, the largest troop contributor to AUSSOM, proposed language calling for an inclusive political dialogue among Somalia’s federal government, regional administrations and other political stakeholders.

Officials present at the meeting say the proposal reflected growing concern that military gains against Al-Shabaab cannot be sustained while Somalia remains politically divided.

The proposal reportedly received backing from representatives of IGAD, Kenya, Ethiopia, the United Nations Transitional Mission in Somalia (UNTMIS), the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) and several AU officials.

But Somalia objected.

During the ministerial session on Friday, outgoing President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud publicly insisted that the paragraph be removed from the final communiqué.

“I cannot accept the communiqué to include that paragraph,” he said during the meeting, according to delegates who attended the session.

The disputed paragraph—Paragraph Four in the draft document—called for political dialogue aimed at restoring consensus between the federal government and Somalia’s federal member states.

Its removal effectively ended hopes that the conference would produce a broader political roadmap alongside its security recommendations.

“The most critical moment”

One senior African Union official described the outcome as a missed opportunity.

“Somalia is facing one of the most critical moments in its recent history,” the official told Kaab TV.

“The AU mission is running out of funding following the U.S. withdrawal. Kampala was intended to help prevent an eventual withdrawal of AU forces that could create conditions for Al-Shabaab to expand. Without political agreement inside Somalia, that objective becomes far more difficult.”

Military officials privately acknowledged that financing was only one part of the crisis.

Several participants argued that donors have become increasingly reluctant to finance a mission operating amid growing political fragmentation in Somalia.

IGAD’s warning

IGAD Deputy Executive Secretary Mohamed Abdi Ware echoed those concerns during his address to delegates, stressing that political reconciliation was essential for lasting security.

His remarks, however, reportedly drew criticism from the Somali delegation.

Days later, Ware defended his position publicly.

2/2https://t.co/df9HExRRpu transition security of Somalia to its indigenous forces in the shortest possible time, and send the men and women of the AUSSOM Mission back to their home countries as the heroes they are. When the mission is successfully completed, They should go back… pic.twitter.com/VRyjJh73QE

— Mohamed Abdi Ware (@MAWareSO) August 3, 2026

Writing on X on Monday, he said the objective was straightforward: to enable Somalia’s own security forces to assume responsibility while allowing AUSSOM peacekeepers to return home “as heroes.”

“When the mission is successfully completed, they should go back to their home countries with their heads held high, and depart Somalia basking in glory and enjoying the undying gratitude of the Somali people,” he wrote.

Responding to criticism from Mogadishu, Ware added:

“I have no clue how such sentiments would offend anyone, let alone the government we are all trying to help avoid a precipitous, premature, and disorderly exit of peacekeepers—an eventuality that, unless avoided, would hand Al-Shabaab an enormous strategic advantage now, and for a long time.”

He also repeated a warning increasingly heard among diplomats involved in Somalia.

“Security without political legitimacy cannot endure. Political progress without security is impossible.”

A political crisis years in the making

The disagreement in Kampala reflected divisions that have been widening since 2024.

The crisis intensified after President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud pushed through amendments to Somalia’s provisional constitution, arguing that the country needed to complete the constitutional review process.

Puntland and Jubaland rejected the amendments, accusing the federal government of acting unilaterally and violating previous political agreements.

Relations between Mogadishu and both regional administrations have remained effectively frozen since then.

The dispute deepened further after the term of the Federal Parliament expired earlier this year. Parliament subsequently extended its own mandate by one year, a move that also effectively prolonged President Mohamud’s tenure until May 2027.

In June, armed clashes erupted in Mogadishu between forces aligned with the federal government and opposition groups, leaving more than ten people dead and forcing civilians to flee parts of the capital. International mediation efforts continued for weeks but failed to produce a lasting political settlement before stalling in late July.

Just before travelling to Kampala, President Mohamud also met senior U.S. AFRICOM and U.S. Embassy officials at Mogadishu’s Aden Adde International Airport. According to officials familiar with the discussions, American representatives again stressed the need for broader political consensus while warning that continued divisions were strengthening Al-Shabaab’s position.

A communiqué missing its central issue

The conference ultimately adopted a 15-point communiqué focused on security cooperation, the threat posed by Al-Shabaab, the gradual transfer of security responsibilities to Somali forces and AUSSOM’s severe funding shortfall.

Absent, however, was any reference to political dialogue between Somalia’s federal leadership and the federal member states—the very issue many delegates had hoped the meeting would confront.

Analyst Hassan Mudey believes that omission undermined the conference’s wider purpose.

“This is one of the reasons international support has weakened,” he told Kaab TV.

“The Kampala conference was supposed to address both the political and security crises. Instead, it concluded without resolving the issue that lies at the centre of Somalia’s instability.”

President Mohamud defended his position after returning to Mogadishu.

Opening Parliament on Saturday, he maintained that Somalia’s political disagreements are domestic matters and reiterated that they should not be internationalised.

“We believe the political matter is an internal issue, and we take that as homework,” he said.

Yet for many diplomats leaving Kampala, the concern was not simply what appeared in the communiqué, but what was left out. As AUSSOM confronts an increasingly uncertain financial future and Al-Shabaab continues to exploit political divisions, the conference underscored a growing consensus among Somalia’s international partners: military operations alone are unlikely to secure lasting stability without an inclusive political settlement at home.

The post How Kampala AUSSOM Talks Fell Short on Somalia Crisis appeared first on Kaab TV.

Over the past months, senior U.S. officials have intensified contacts with Puntland, Somaliland and Jubaland, focusing on security cooperation, counterterrorism, maritime security and the growing strategic importance of the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea.

The renewed engagement comes at a time when Somalia’s security transition has faced serious setbacks. Despite billions of dollars in international assistance, the Somali Federal Government has struggled to deliver decisive progress against Al-Shabaab, while political disputes between Mogadishu and federal member states have weakened national cohesion and diverted attention from the fight against extremist groups.

For Washington and its allies, the security environment is becoming increasingly complex. The threat is no longer limited to Al-Shabaab. ISIS-linked militants in Puntland, piracy concerns in the Gulf of Aden, instability around the Red Sea, and geopolitical competition among global powers have increased the strategic importance of Somalia’s coastline and regional actors.

U.S. Engagement with Puntland: Counterterrorism and Maritime Security

The latest U.S.-Puntland engagement has been among the most significant.

A U.S. delegation led by Major General Claude K. Tudor Jr., the commander of special operations for U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), met with Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni in Bosaso.

During the visit, Puntland and the United States signed a security cooperation agreement allowing Washington to expand its facility in Bosaso to support counterterrorism operations and maritime security.

The agreement comes after years of U.S. support for Puntland’s campaign against ISIS militants in the Cal Miskaad mountains of Bari region.

From 2024 to 2025, U.S. assistance included airstrikes, intelligence sharing and logistical support to Puntland forces fighting ISIS. Puntland forces later announced that they had recaptured several areas previously controlled by ISIS after months of operations supported by international partners.

The President of the #Puntland State, @HESaidADeni , together with ministers, military officers, and advisors, held a meeting in Bosaso with a delegation from the #USA especially @USAfricaCommand , led by Major General Claude Tudor, Commander of #AFRICOM Special Operations. pic.twitter.com/xC4b63LACx

— Puntland State House (@Plstatehouse) August 2, 2026

The U.S. focus on Puntland reflects the region’s strategic importance. Puntland sits along the Gulf of Aden, close to one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints, the Bab al-Mandab Strait, where instability could affect global shipping and energy supplies.

Somaliland: Strategic Maritime Partnership

Major General Tudor also met Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi (Irro) during his Horn of Africa tour.

The discussions focused on security cooperation, maritime security and shared strategic interests in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.

Somaliland emphasized its more than 850-kilometer coastline and the strategic importance of Berbera, which sits near major international shipping routes.

The engagement highlights Somaliland’s growing importance in regional security calculations. While Somaliland remains internationally unrecognized as an independent state, its geographic position and relative stability have made it increasingly relevant to discussions about maritime security, counterterrorism and regional stability.

The United States has previously assessed the strategic value of Berbera as part of broader efforts to improve maritime awareness and monitor threats in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab.

Jubaland and the Return of Regional Security Partnerships

Jubaland has also remained an important security partner for the United States due to its location along the Kenyan border and its role in countering Al-Shabaab.

The region has historically been a frontline in Somalia’s fight against the militant group, particularly in areas around Lower Juba and Kismayo.

U.S. engagement with Jubaland has traditionally focused on security cooperation, including support for local forces fighting Al-Shabaab and efforts to prevent extremist networks from exploiting border areas.

As Al-Shabaab continues to adapt its strategy, maintaining relationships with capable regional security actors has become increasingly important.

Why a Dual-Track Approach Could Be Necessary

For years, international partners have invested heavily in strengthening Somalia’s Federal Government as the central authority responsible for defeating Al-Shabaab and rebuilding state institutions.

However, the results have been disappointing.

Al-Shabaab remains a powerful insurgency with significant territorial influence, taxation networks and the ability to carry out major attacks. Somalia’s national security forces have struggled with coordination problems, political interference and limited operational capacity.

At the same time, relations between Mogadishu and federal member states have deteriorated. Political disputes over constitutional reforms, elections and resource-sharing have weakened cooperation between the federal and regional levels.

The result has been a security strategy built around a government that has not yet developed the political and institutional capacity required to manage Somalia’s complex security environment.

This reality has forced international partners to reconsider whether a Mogadishu-only approach is sufficient.

The emerging pattern of U.S. engagement has led some analysts to argue that Washington is once again embracing a dual-track approach in Somalia.

As Nairobi-based analyst Rashid Abdi noted, “The U.S. military is actively stepping up ‘dual-track diplomacy’ to deepen cooperation with strategic Somali territories — Somaliland, Puntland and Jubaland.”

The three are crucial US partners and deemed more active in the fight against terrorist groups in the Horn,” Rashid wrote.

Puntland has been at the forefront of operations against ISIS-linked militants in the Cal Miskaad mountains, while Jubaland remains a key frontline region in the fight against Al-Shabaab due to its location along Somalia’s southern border. Somaliland, meanwhile, has gained strategic importance because of its long coastline, the port of Berbera and its proximity to the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab maritime corridor.

The growing U.S. focus on these regions reflects a broader security calculation: defeating terrorist networks and protecting strategic waterways requires cooperation with actors that have operational presence on the ground.

Rather than replacing engagement with Mogadishu, a renewed dual-track model would acknowledge Somalia’s federal reality and allow Washington to work simultaneously with national and regional institutions to address increasingly complex threats.

The dual-track approach is not a rejection of Somalia’s federal government. Instead, it recognizes the reality that Somalia’s regions possess different security capabilities, political dynamics and strategic importance.

During previous years, the United States engaged directly with regional administrations while maintaining relations with Mogadishu. That approach allowed Washington to support security actors on the ground while encouraging Somalia’s federal system to develop.

A renewed dual-track model could provide several advantages

First, it could strengthen counterterrorism operations.

Regional forces in Puntland, Jubaland and other areas have direct knowledge of local terrain, communities and militant networks. Supporting capable local partners could improve the fight against Al-Shabaab and ISIS.

Second, it could improve maritime security.

With piracy risks returning and instability spreading around the Red Sea, coastal regions such as Puntland and Somaliland have become critical partners in protecting international shipping routes.

Third, it could respond faster to emerging threats.

The Horn of Africa is increasingly affected by competition involving regional and global powers, arms trafficking, extremist networks and instability linked to the Red Sea crisis.

A New Reality in the Horn of Africa

The Horn of Africa is entering a new strategic era. The Red Sea has become a major arena of geopolitical competition, while extremist groups continue exploiting weak governance and security gaps.

The international community cannot afford a security strategy based only on political preferences in Mogadishu while ignoring realities on the ground.

A balanced dual-track approach could allow the United States and its partners to work with all capable Somali actors while continuing to support Somalia’s federal institutions.

The goal should not be to weaken Somalia’s national government, but to strengthen the country’s ability to confront threats that no single institution can defeat alone.

The recent U.S. engagements with Puntland, Somaliland and Jubaland suggest a recognition that Somalia’s security future depends on broader partnerships. After years of limited progress against terrorism and growing instability around the Red Sea, revisiting a dual-track approach may no longer be a political choice — it may be a strategic necessity.

The post Why U.S. Is Rebuilding Somalia’s Dual-Track Model? appeared first on Kaab TV.

It literally translates as “A man who counted the trees but left out the acacia tree did not count trees at all.”

It was a simple phrase, but it carried a profound lesson. It described the danger of focusing only on what is visible — numbers, names, reports, and events — while missing the deeper reality that gives meaning to everything else.

It was a reminder that sometimes the most important thing is not what attracts immediate attention, but the foundation that quietly provides shelter and stability — like the acacia tree whose shade protects everything around it.

Over the years, I have read thousands of articles by others. I had also written many myself. Yet that Kaaha Bari article and its title have remained in my memory. The phrase returns whenever I reflect on Somalia’s long and painful search for statehood and the way we measure political progress.

Twenty-eight years ago, few Somalis could have imagined that a functioning system of governance could emerge from a country that had lost its central state, where violence had become normal, and where armed factions competed for control.

The idea that a political order could be built away from the traditional centres of power — even beginning under the shade of a tree — seemed almost impossible.

Hope was fragile. Doubt was overwhelming.

Somalia was living through one of the darkest periods in its modern history. Mogadishu was devastated by conflict. My family had to flee several times from the capital due to the endless clashes that turned to ruthless and bloody.

That was following the civil war that began in 1990. The national government had collapsed and militias ruled the streets, towns and cities including Mogadishu. Institutions had disappeared. Militias and warlords shaped daily life. For many, the idea of rebuilding a state seemed like a distant dream.

That is why many had lost hope. With the exception of those who fled to refugee camps in Kenya, Ethiopia, and elsewhere, many others sought safety and stability in regional towns and cities such as Garowe, Bosaso, and Galkayo.

Two years later, in 1991, Somaliland announced its withdrawal from the rest of Somalia and began pursuing a separate political path.

Yet on 1 August 1998, Puntland declared its formation and began an ambitious experiment: rebuilding governance from within Somali society through consensus, local legitimacy, traditional structures, and emerging institutions.

The region laid the foundation for a new model of governance built around a localised political system, clan consensus, and institutional structures. It adopted a constitution, established a parliament selected through clan-based representation, and created a process through which a regional president could be elected.

Unlike Somaliland, which declared its separation from the rest of Somalia, Puntland’s founding vision was different. Its constitution clearly advocated for a federal Somalia and positioned Puntland as part of a united Somali state based on power-sharing, decentralisation, and regional autonomy.

Wait and see

Puntland did not seek secession. Instead, it presented itself as an experiment in rebuilding Somali statehood from the ground up — creating functioning institutions at the regional level while working toward the restoration of a federal national government.

It was an experiment that few believed could succeed.

At the time, many observers responded with a simple phrase: “Let us wait and see.”

Few could predict whether such an experiment would survive. There were no guarantees that a regional administration born amid insecurity and uncertainty could establish institutions, maintain order, and develop a political identity over decades.

But that is precisely what made Puntland’s journey significant.

Today, Puntland marks its 28th anniversary — the fruit of a journey that began under the shade of a tree, built through local consensus, and shaped by the people whose lives it was created to serve.

While much of Somalia continued to struggle with lawlessness, political fragmentation, corruption, and weak institutions, Puntland gradually developed a functioning system of administration. It built security structures, established government institutions, created a legal framework, conducted political processes, and for the first implemented a local government election based on direct vote by its people in 2023, and developed a level of continuity rarely seen elsewhere in Somalia.

Its achievements were not perfect, and Puntland has faced its own internal challenges, including political disputes, security threats, governance shortcomings, and debates over democracy and representation.

But history must be judged by comparison with the reality from which it emerged.

Ignoring Puntland’s experience would be a mistake

The question is not whether Puntland became an ideal state. The question is whether it demonstrated that Somalis could rebuild institutions after state collapse — and whether it provided lessons for the rest of the country.

In many ways, Puntland became a living example that Somalia was not incapable of governance. It challenged the assumption that state failure was permanent. It showed that political order could be rebuilt through Somali-led solutions, local ownership, and gradual institution-building.

The contrast with the wider Somali landscape remains difficult to ignore.

Decades after the collapse of the central government, many parts of Somalia continue to face insecurity, corruption, weak rule of law, political instability, and institutions that struggle to deliver basic services. Despite billions of dollars in international support and repeated attempts at national reconstruction, the country continues to wrestle with questions that Puntland confronted at its birth.

This does not mean Puntland holds all the answers, nor that its experience can simply be copied across Somalia. Every region has its own history, challenges, and political realities.

But ignoring Puntland’s experience would be a mistake.

Anyone trying to understand state-building in Somalia and the wider Horn of Africa without seriously examining Puntland’s 28-year journey is overlooking one of the most important chapters of the story.

They risk becoming the person who counted the trees but failed to see the acacia tree.

Because sometimes, the true measure of progress is not found in grand declarations or international conferences. It is found in the quiet growth of institutions — in places where people began with almost nothing and proved that rebuilding was possible.

The post Reflection on Puntland’s State-Building Legacy and Somalia’s Unfinished Journey appeared first on Kaab TV.

Family members said Egal died early Friday, 31 July 2026, after spending the past week in hospital.

“He fell ill about a week ago and had been receiving treatment,” his nephew, Mohamed Abdulkadir, said. “He died early Friday morning.”

With his passing, Somalia loses far more than one of its greatest singers. It loses a voice that accompanied generations through love and longing, joy and grief, peace and war. For millions of Somalis at home and scattered across the world, Ahmed Ali Egal was not merely an artist. He was memory itself, carried in melody.

His songs drifted through family homes, wedding halls and tea shops.

They travelled on dusty cassette tapes, over crackling radio broadcasts and, later, across YouTube and smartphones, following Somalis wherever conflict and exile forced them to rebuild their lives. Long after listeners forgot where they first heard them, his songs remained—a bridge to places left behind and people dearly missed.

As a young boy, I remember hearing Egal’s songs playing on my father’s cassette recorder, long before the digital age. One song that always captured my imagination was his famous tribute to Boodhari:

“Are you not aware that the sea is made of dark water,
and that Boodhari died of love,
buried in Batalaale,
where his grave is visited in remembrance?”

Those worn cassette tapes carried more than music—they carried memories, emotions and a connection to a Somalia many people held in their hearts. For my generation, Egal’s voice was often introduced through our parents, becoming one of those rare sounds that never faded.

Often called the King of Somali Music, Ahmed Ali Egal helped shape the sound of modern Somali music during its golden age. Reflecting on his generation’s role, Egal said in an interview recorded three years ago: “We inherited a responsibility to create music that would be loved by the people.”

He also spoke about experimenting with new sounds, including the influence of rap and other emerging Western musical styles during the early 1980s, when the global rise of hip-hop was transforming from a local street movement into a major cultural and commercial force.

Egal’s rich, unmistakable voice, combined with poetry of extraordinary tenderness, transformed deeply personal emotions into songs that felt universal. He sang of love without sentimentality, heartbreak without bitterness, and hope without illusion.

Life in music

His life in music began almost by accident.

In 1964, while still a secondary school student, the shy 16-year-old stepped onto a stage and revealed a voice that immediately captivated teachers, classmates and audiences alike.

Born in 1948 into a modest rural family in what is now Somaliland, he had travelled to Hargeisa for his education. Few could have imagined that the boy singing in school performances would one day become one of the defining voices of Somali culture.

His breakthrough arrived in 1980 at a national music competition in Mogadishu, where his performance earned him a place in the legendary Waaberi troupe, Somalia’s state ensemble that stood at the heart of the country’s flourishing theatre and music scene.

There, alongside some of Somalia’s finest musicians, poets and composers, Egal helped create songs that would become woven into the country’s cultural identity.

Throughout a career spanning more than five decades, he collaborated with many of Somalia’s greatest artists, blending traditional melodies with modern orchestration while remaining deeply faithful to the poetic elegance of the Somali language.

Renowned singer Hibo Nura, who shared the stage with him for many years, remembered both his artistry and his quiet humanity.

“He was young and exceptionally talented when he started singing,” she said. “He was always calm, patient and respectful. His voice carried emotion in a way very few singers could. He made an extraordinary contribution to Somali theatre and modern music.”

Those who knew him often remarked on the simplicity of his life. Unlike many artists who pursued business or public office, Egal devoted himself almost entirely to music. Singing was not simply his profession—it was the work of his life.

After the civil war 

Then came the war.

Like millions of Somalis, he watched the country that had nurtured his art collapse into violence. Mogadishu’s street clashes in 1990 forced concert halls emptied. Musicians scattered. Friends were separated by borders and oceans. Eventually, exile claimed him too.

For the last two decades, he lived in the United States as a refugee, carrying with him memories of the homeland that never stopped finding its way into his music.

In an interview in May 2023 with prominent journalist Abdisalan Hereri, his voice softened as he spoke not about fame or achievement, but about ordinary moments that conflict had stolen.

“I miss the good old days of peaceful Somalia, when I could drive my own car while listening to music without anyone bothering me,” Egal said.

That quiet longing—for home, for peace, for a life interrupted—had always lived beneath his songs.

Among his most cherished works is “Garqaado Jacayl Yahow,” a timeless ballad whose opening verses have become part of Somalia’s shared cultural memory.

Be understanding toward me, O love,

Leave me alone so I can take a nap,

Do not bind me with chains upon my back,

Remove the arrow from me,

Or convey my suffering to the woman I believed was my beloved.

Ahmed Ali Egal’s songs became companions to broken hearts, to lovers separated by oceans, to refugees remembering home, and to families gathering to celebrate life despite hardship.

His own family story was inseparable from Somali music. He performed alongside many of the country’s most celebrated female artists, including Maryan Mursal, whom he later married. He also married the renowned singer Khadra Dahir Ige.

News of his death spread quickly across Somalia, Somaliland and Somali communities around the world, prompting an outpouring of tributes from fellow musicians, writers, journalists and ordinary listeners. Many did not simply mourn the loss of a singer. They mourned the passing of a generation whose music preserved a country’s soul through decades of upheaval.

Ahmed Ali Egal belonged to a rare class of artists who carried the ancient tradition of Somali oral poetry into the modern age without diminishing its beauty. His voice endured military rule, civil war, displacement and exile. Through every chapter of Somalia’s history, it remained recognisable, reassuring and profoundly human.

The man who once filled theatres with song has now fallen silent.

But as long as Somalis gather for weddings or evenings of remembrance, as long as old cassette recordings are replayed, as long as someone far from home searches for comfort in a familiar melody, Ahmed Ali Egal’s voice will rise again—gentle, unmistakable and timeless.

For some singers entertain a generation.

Ahmed Ali Egal helped a nation remember itself.

The post Ahmed Ali Egal, the Voice That Followed Somalis Through War, Exile and Home, Dies at 78 appeared first on Kaab TV.

The future of the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) has become one of the most critical security issues facing Somalia in 2026. The main question is no longer whether AUSSOM is necessary; most international partners recognise that Somalia is not yet ready for a complete withdrawal of external security support.

The debate has shifted to three key issues: who will finance the mission, how the transition will be managed, and whether Somalia can gradually assume greater responsibility for its own security while navigating a contested political environment.

The African Union’s military presence in Somalia began in 2007 following the collapse of the Islamic Courts Union and the emergence of the Al-Shabaab insurgency.

The AU deployed AMISOM (African Union Mission in Somalia) to support the Transitional Federal Government, protect state institutions, and conduct operations against armed groups threatening the Somali state. The mission later transitioned into ATMIS (2022–2024) and then AUSSOM in January 2025, with an expanded focus on supporting Somali security forces and preparing for the eventual transfer of full security responsibility to Somalia.

Over nearly two decades, the AU mission has achieved significant strategic gains. It helped prevent the collapse of the Somali government, pushed Al-Shabaab out of major urban centres including Mogadishu, Marka, Kismayo and Baidoa, protected key government institutions, and created space for political reconstruction and state-building. Troops from contributing countries including Uganda, Burundi, Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti absorbed major battlefield risks and played a central role in containing Al-Shabaab’s territorial expansion.

The AUSSOM military component consisted of 12,626 troops as of June 2025. According to the mission’s Concept of Operations (CONOPs), AUSSOM’s transition and drawdown plan envisages a gradual reduction of forces toward a planned final exit in December 2029. The pace of the drawdown is expected to depend on Somalia’s security conditions and will be guided by regular joint technical assessments involving relevant stakeholders.

Despite these achievements, the AU mission has faced significant challenges. Al-Shabaab has not been defeated and remains capable of controlling rural areas, collecting taxation, operating parallel governance structures, and carrying out complex attacks. Somali security forces continue to rely heavily on international support for logistics, training, financing, intelligence and operational capabilities. Furthermore, military gains have often been difficult to sustain due to weak local governance, political disputes, limited state presence, and challenges in holding areas recovered from Al-Shabaab.

AUSSOM now faces a decisive transition period. The AU, European Union and United Kingdom continue to support sustained international engagement, while the United States has raised concerns about the long-term sustainability of external assistance and Somalia’s slow progress toward security self-reliance. The central challenge is whether Somalia can use this remaining period of international support to build a capable, unified and accountable security sector before any significant reduction of AU forces creates new opportunities for Al-Shabaab to expand its influence.

The Emerging Divide:

• African Union (AU): Wants AUSSOM preserved and demands sustainable international financing while increasing African ownership.
• European Union (EU): Remains the strongest financial supporter but expects gradual Somali responsibility.
• United States (US): Increasingly argues that Somalia has received billions in support but has not delivered sufficient security-sector progress; Washington is challenging continued UN logistical financing.
• United Kingdom (UK): Supports maintaining the international security architecture and UN logistical support while pushing Somali-led transition.
• The biggest risk now is a dangerous overlap between AUSSOM financial uncertainty, Somalia’s unresolved political transition and Al-Shabaab’s ability to exploit the divisions.
  

The post A Critical Juncture: AUSSOM’s Future and Somalia’s Search for Sustainable Security appeared first on Kaab TV.

The incident occurred on 1 June 2026.

The South African police arrested the suspect, who remains in custody, and seized eight firearms and 557 rounds of ammunition during the operation.

According to South African police, the suspect is believed to have been involved in illegal arms trafficking, allegedly supplying weapons to criminal groups involved in drug trafficking and armed robberies.

Mustafe Shirwa, chairman of the Somali diaspora community in South Africa, said community representatives visited the scene after the incident and met with police officers.

“We arrived at the scene and met the police and members of the community. We told the police that despite having Somali documents, the man is an Ethiopian national,” Shirwa said.

South African police are investigating an Ethiopian national who allegedly attacked and injured a police officer in the city of Spring, Gauteng province and was later found to be carrying a Somali passport reportedly issued by the Somali Embassy in South Africa.

The incident… pic.twitter.com/FttfeEw80E

— Kaab TV (@KaabTV) July 22, 2026

Shirwa said the suspect was carrying an authentic Somali passport, which he believes may have been obtained fraudulently.

He added that the Somali community has been in contact with the Somali Embassy in Pretoria regarding the incident.

The Somali Embassy in Pretoria did not respond to Kaab TV’s request for comment.

South African authorities have not publicly explained how the suspect obtained the Somali passport, and investigations into the circumstances surrounding its issuance are continuing.

The incident comes amid heightened anti-immigrant sentiment in South Africa following the expiry of a 30 June deadline set by some groups calling for undocumented migrants to leave the country.

The case has drawn additional public attention as authorities continue efforts to combat organized crime and illegal firearms trafficking.

The incident has also renewed concerns over the integrity of Somali travel documents and allegations that Somali passports have, in some cases, been fraudulently obtained by foreign nationals.

Somali authorities have previously said they are working to strengthen passport issuance and verification systems, while allegations of document fraud have surfaced in several cases over the years.

The post South African Police Probe Officer Shooting as Suspect Found With Somali Passport appeared first on Kaab TV.