Somalia continues to face an ongoing political debate regarding the 4.5 clan power-sharing system, which has long served as the foundation for state-building and the allocation of political offices.
Although the country is discussing upcoming elections, political parties, and moving beyond the previous model, the manner in which major clans secure top leadership positions demonstrates that clan power-sharing still exerts a profound influence on national politics.
This dynamic is particularly visible within the regional member states of Galmudug and Hirshabelle, where debate has emerged over how various clans secured the positions of president, vice president, and parliamentary speaker.
The Galmudug State administration is led by Liibaan Axmed Xasan (Liibaan Shuluq), while Cabdiweli Ibraahim Aadan (Garyare) was elected vice president.
Xuseen Maxamed Nuur was elected Speaker of the Galmudug Parliament, with other leadership posts distributed among various officials.
The allocation of these positions has reignited the debate over clan quotas within the Galmudug administration.
Political analysts note that top offices were distributed along clan lines, linking the president and vice president to the Habar Gidir and Murusade clans.
This raises the fundamental question of whether recent elections genuinely foster a political system built on votes and policy platforms, or if they remain reliant on legacy clan power-sharing agreements.
Hirshabelle provides another clear example of the debate surrounding clan power-sharing.
The administration is led by President Cali Cabdullaahi Xuseen Guudlaawe, with Cabdifataax Xasan Afrax serving as vice president.
The Speaker of the Hirshabelle Parliament is Cabdixakiin Luqmaan Xaaji Maxamed.
The leadership structure of Hirshabelle is frequently analyzed based on the quotas assigned to various clans. Political commentaries associate these leadership posts with the Abgaal, Xawaadle, and Gaaljecel clans.
This dynamic is especially critical in the Hiiraan region, where long-standing grievances persist regarding political representation, equity, and power-sharing within the Hirshabelle administration.
Critics of the current structure argue that as long as regional leadership continues to be formed through clan compromises, it remains difficult to claim that the country has transcended the 4.5 system.
The 4.5 formula was introduced in Somalia during early state-building phases to ensure that both major clans and minority groups secured political representation.
This system has long dictated the distribution of parliamentary seats, cabinet posts, ministerial appointments, and high-level political agreements.
While initially viewed as a pragmatic solution to manage political conflict, criticism has mounted over time, with many arguing that it hinders the establishment of a state rooted in citizenship, meritocracy, and universal direct suffrage (‘one-person, one-vote’).
Advocates for phasing out 4.5 maintain that citizens have the right to elect leaders based on competence and policy platforms rather than pre-allocated clan quotas.
The Federal Government of Somalia and various political actors have recently advocated for universal direct suffrage and a multi-party system.
However, questions remain regarding how such a new framework can function effectively within regional states if local political arrangements remain dependent on clan quotas.
Critics question why new electoral processes have not yet fundamentally altered how political offices are acquired.
They further emphasize that party names and formal electoral procedures alone are insufficient to prove the nation has moved past legacy power-sharing, so long as actual political practices remain grounded in clan pacts.
To transition away from clan power-sharing, Somalia requires an inclusive political framework where citizens participate equally, built upon political parties competing on policy platforms and transparent, democratic elections.