The delegation was led by General Dagvin Anderson, Commander of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), and Ambassador Justin Davis, Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy.

Their visit was described as “strategic,” as U.S. officials increasingly view Somaliland as a potential partner in safeguarding Red Sea and Horn of Africa security.

General Anderson emphasized Somaliland’s importance, noting its position near key maritime routes.

He highlighted that closer collaboration would support broader regional stability efforts.

According to a statement from the Somaliland presidency, President Abdirahman Abdillahi Irro told the delegation that Somaliland is prepared to “fully cooperate with the U.S. Government to strengthen regional security and enhance the prevention of growing threats,” including major-power competition in the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea, as well as the activities of destabilizing armed groups.

After meeting with President Irro in Hargeisa, the U.S. delegation inspected Berbera Airport, Berbera International Port, and the coastal areas around the port city.

Despite operating as a de facto independent state for more than three decades, Somaliland remains internationally unrecognized.

Washington has long viewed access to Berbera as strategically valuable, particularly amid concerns about Chinese intelligence activities in Djibouti, where the U.S. maintains its only permanent military base in Africa.

Somaliland has repeatedly invited the U.S. to establish a presence at the Berbera military base in hopes of strengthening ties and advancing its push for international recognition.

Wednesday’s statement from Hargeisa reiterated that link.

“The President of Somaliland noted that the security and strategic interests of the United States in East Africa are genuinely tied to the recognition of Somaliland, given that Somaliland is a country with a functioning democratic system, national forces that have secured its borders for more than 30 years, and a location vital to the American strategy of regional stability,” the presidency said.

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Announced by State Minister for Foreign Affairs Ali Omar, the move was couched in the language of sovereignty. He described the C6+ as an “obsolete structure,” no longer aligned with Somalia’s needs or aspirations.

But strip away the diplomatic varnish, and a far more troubling reality emerges.

This is not about independence. It’s about insulation.

A Dangerous Message at a Dangerous Time

The decision comes at a perilous moment: less than a year before Somalia’s 2026 elections, with the country divided over how those elections should be conducted—and by whom.

At the center of the storm is the long-promised but still elusive shift to a one-person, one-vote system. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s administration claims to champion this model, but critics accuse it of bulldozing ahead without consensus, sidelining opposition leaders, and ignoring regional concerns.

The national dialogue meant to resolve these differences has stalled. Trust has evaporated. And now, the one international platform still capable of mediating across the divide—the C6+—has been ejected from the room.

“This isn’t reform. It’s retreat,” said a senior opposition figure. “The government is not just rejecting outside interference—it’s dismantling the last guardrails of accountability.”

In the absence of strong domestic institutions, the C6+ played an imperfect but essential role: applying pressure, facilitating mediation, and serving as a diplomatic conscience in Somalia’s fragile political landscape.

During the 2021–2022 electoral crisis, it was this bloc that helped force a return to dialogue. Its statements, visits, and joint positions mattered—not because they imposed decisions, but because they provided balance in a country where politics too often tips toward brinkmanship.

Now, with that structure cast aside, Somalia risks heading into its most consequential election in years without a neutral referee.

It’s like pulling the fire alarm out of the wall while the building is still on fire.

Sovereignty vs. Spin

Supporters of Villa Somalia frame the decision as a bold stand for Somali sovereignty. They argue the C6+ imposes foreign agendas and that Somalia must now walk its own path.

But critics—at home and abroad—see it differently.

“Sovereignty is not an excuse for power hoarding,” says Hodan Ahmed, a democracy activist in Mogadishu. “If the government truly respected the Somali people’s right to choose, it would build inclusive processes—not dismantle the only external mechanisms capable of encouraging that inclusion.”

In truth, the timing of this move is revealing. With pressure mounting over constitutional changes and increasing questions about whether the upcoming elections will be free and fair, Villa Somalia has chosen to shut out scrutiny rather than engage with it.

This isn’t just about one coordination group. It’s about the kind of country Somalia is becoming—and what kind of leadership it wants to project.

Across the Horn of Africa, democratic backsliding is becoming a trend. From Ethiopia’s shrinking civic space to Sudan’s total collapse, the region is watching as strongmen close ranks and institutions decay.

Somalia is at a crossroads

This government could choose to lead by example—building consensus, inviting oversight, and showing the world that fragile states can still produce strong democracies.

Or it can keep dismantling every mechanism that questions its authority and drift further into isolation, repression, and instability. 

Somalia’s international partners now face a dilemma: step back and risk being sidelined—or recalibrate, double down on principled engagement, and find new ways to support civil society, local peacebuilders, and inclusive dialogue.

Meanwhile, domestic actors must ask hard questions. If this government can unilaterally kick out the C6+ today, what—or who—gets sidelined tomorrow?

This is not just a test of diplomacy. It’s a test of democracy. Somalia’s future cannot be built on exclusion. The country needs bridges, not barricades. Dialogue, not decrees. Oversight, not opacity.

The rejection of the C6+ might bring short-term political relief for Villa Somalia. But it risks ushering in a long-term crisis—a vacuum of trust, a collapse of dialogue, and the unraveling of the fragile gains made over the past decade.

The question now isn’t just who will stand with Somalia. It’s whether Somalia’s leaders will stand with their own people. Because if no one’s left at the table, everyone pays the price.

———

Abdirahman Jeylani Mohamed is a journalist and the Director of Arlaadi Media Network. You can reach him on X (Twitter) @JaylaaniJr.

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Djibouti’s government has described the visit as a reflection of shared goals and longstanding friendship between the two sides.

President Irro was welcomed at Djibouti’s international airport by Prime Minister Abdoulkader Kamil Mohamed, who praised the visit as a gesture of goodwill and mutual interest.

“On behalf of President Ismaïl Omar Guelleh, this visit symbolizes trust and friendship,” said Prime Minister Kamil. “In a world filled with uncertainty, this meeting reflects both sides’ commitment to building bridges, enhancing dialogue, and promoting peace.”

Irro then met president Guelleh in the presidential palace.

During the three-day visit, President Irro is scheduled to hold talks with President Guelleh, following an official invitation extended by Djibouti.

The agenda is expected to focus on repairing ties that soured after Somaliland signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Ethiopia in January 2024.

READ MORE: Somaliland protests against Djibouti’s alleged sabotage of Ethiopia MOU

That deal, signed under former President Muse Bihi Abdi, offered Ethiopia port access and potentially a naval presence along Somaliland’s coast—moves Djibouti strongly opposed.

Djiboutian officials saw the MoU as a threat to their economic lifeline.

Nearly 95% of Ethiopia’s imports and exports pass through Djibouti’s ports, especially the Port of Doraleh, making Ethiopia its largest customer and a pillar of the country’s economy.

Somaliland, strategically located next to both Djibouti and Ethiopia, offers a shorter route to the Red Sea via the ports of Berbera and Zeila.

Over the past several years, Somaliland has invested heavily in modernizing its Berbera Port, positioning it as a viable alternative for Ethiopia’s trade needs.

While in Djibouti, President Irro is also expected to discuss cross-border security cooperation, trade integration, and the possible revival of the stalled talks between Somaliland and Somalia, which Hargeisa suspended earlier this year.

Both Djibouti and Somaliland are competing to serve Ethiopia’s growing trade demands. Ethiopia, in turn, has been actively pursuing a port under its full control and is reportedly interested in establishing a military base on the Red Sea.

President Irro has signaled that Somaliland is prepared to finalize a comprehensive trade agreement with Ethiopia later this year.

Following his visit to Djibouti, he is expected to travel to Addis Ababa for an official visit, where discussions will likely focus on security and economic cooperation.

Despite Somaliland’s lack of international recognition, President Irrojust last week emphasized that his administration remains open to forging strong bilateral ties.

“I thank the countries that have maintained security and economic relations with us, including Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and Taiwan,” he said.

The post From Tension to Talks: Irro Visits Djibouti After Ethiopia Port Fallout appeared first on Kaab TV.

This has drawn increasing interest from global powers, including the United States. As regional dynamics shift and great-power competition intensifies, Somaliland’s bid for recognition is gaining new currency. Aleksi Ylönen has studied politics in the Horn of Africa and Somaliland’s quest for recognition. He unpacks what’s at play.

What legal and historical arguments does Somaliland use?

The Somali National Movement is one of the main clan-based insurgent movements responsible for the collapse of the central government in Somalia. It claims the territory of the former British protectorate of Somaliland. The UK had granted Somaliland sovereign status on 26 June 1960.

The Somali government tried to stomp out calls for secession. It orchestrated the brutal killing of hundreds of thousands of people in northern Somalia between 1987 and 1989.

But the Somali National Movement declared unilateral independence on 18 May 1991 and separated from Somalia.

With the collapse of the Somali regime in 1991, the movement’s main enemy was gone. This led to a violent power struggle between various militias.

This subsided only after the politician Mohamed Egal consolidated power. He was elected president of Somaliland in May 1993.

Egal made deals with merchants and businessmen, giving them tax and commercial incentives to accept his patronage. As a result, he obtained the economic means to consolidate political power and to pursue peace and state-building. It’s something his successors have kept up with since his death in 2002.

What has Somaliland done to push for recognition?

Successive Somaliland governments continue to engage in informal diplomacy. They have aligned with the west, particularly the US, which was the dominant power after the cold war, and the former colonial master, the UK. Both countries host significant Somaliland diaspora communities.

The US and the UK have for decades flirted with the idea of recognising Somaliland, which they consider a strategic partner. However, they have been repeatedly thrown back by their respective Somalia policies. These have favoured empowering the widely supported Mogadishu government to reassert its authority and control over Somali territories.

This Somalia policy has been increasingly questioned in recent years, in part due to Mogadishu’s security challenges. In contrast, the Hargeisa government of Somaliland has largely shown it can provide security and stability. It has held elections and survived as a state for the last three decades, though it has faced political resistance and armed opposition.

As new global powers rise, Somaliland administrations have pursued an increasingly diverse foreign policy, with one goal: international recognition.

Hargeisa hosts consulates and representative offices of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Taiwan, the UK and the European Union, among others.

The government has also engaged in informal foreign relations with the United Arab Emirates. The Middle Eastern monarchy serves as a business hub and a destination of livestock exports. Many Somalilanders migrate there.

Somaliland maintains representative offices in several countries. These include Canada, the US, Norway, Sweden, the UK, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Taiwan. Hargeisa has alienated China because it has collaborated with Taiwan since 2020. Taiwan is a self-ruled island claimed by China.

On 1 January 2024, Somaliland’s outgoing president Muse Bihi signed a memorandum of understanding with Ethiopian prime minister Abiy Ahmed for increased cooperation. Bihi implied that Ethiopia would be the first country to formally recognise Somaliland. The deal caused a sharp deterioration of relations between Addis Ababa and Mogadishu.

Abiy later moderated his position and, with Turkish mediation, reconciled with his Somalia counterpart, President Hassan Mohamud.

What’s behind US interest in Somaliland?

The US, like other great powers, has been interested in Somaliland because of its strategic location. It is on the African shores of the Gulf of Aden, across from the Arabian Peninsula. Its geographical position has gained currency recently as Yemeni Houthi rebels strike maritime traffic in the busy shipping lanes. Somaliland is also well located to curb piracy and smuggling on this global trade route.

The US Africa Command set up its main Horn of Africa base at Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti in 2002. This followed the 11 September 2001 attacks.

In 2017, China, which had become the main foreign economic power in the Horn of Africa, set up a navy support facility in Djibouti. This encouraged closer collaboration between American and Somaliland authorities. The US played with the idea of establishing a base in Berbera, which hosts Somaliland’s largest port.

With Donald Trump winning the US presidential election in 2024, there were reports of an increased push for US recognition of Somaliland. This would allow the US to deepen its trade and security partnerships in the volatile Horn of Africa region.

Since March 2025, representatives of the Trump administration have engaged in talks with Somaliland officials to establish a US military base near Berbera. This would be in exchange for a formal but partial recognition of Somaliland.

What are the risks of US recognition of Somaliland?

Stronger US engagement with Somaliland risks neglecting Somalia.

Mogadishu depends on external military assistance in its battle against the advancing violent Islamist extremist group, Al-Shabaab. It also faces increasing defiance from two federal regions, Puntland and Jubaland.

US recognition would reward Hargeisa for its persistent effort to maintain stability and promote democracy. However, it could encourage other nations to recognise Somaliland. This would deliver a blow to Somali nationalists who want one state for all Somalis.

The post Somaliland’s 30-Year Quest for Recognition: Could US Interests Make The Difference? appeared first on Kaab TV.

The visit marked the culmination of a year of heightened tensions and diplomatic friction between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa, triggered by Ethiopia’s controversial Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Somaliland.

The 1 January 2024 deal, which grants Ethiopia sea access and a military base in the breakaway region, was strongly opposed by the Somali government, which considers Somaliland an integral part of Somalia.

Shortly after the Ethiopian Airlines plane carrying Prime Minister Abiy landed at Aden Adde International Airport on Thursday mid day, suspected militants launched a mortar attack on the airport compound.

No casualties were reported, but residents in a nearby neighborhood stated that at least one person was injured when a shell fell short of the airport, striking an open area near residential homes.

Meanwhile, early on Thursday, Al-Shabaab militants seized Balcad, a town only 30 km north of Mogadishu despite they retreated later.

Lido Beach visit: the symbolic gesture of improving relations

Abiy was escorted to Lido Beach in what was described as a symbolic gesture of improving relations with Mogadishu following last year’s tensions over Ethiopia’s attempts to secure sea access.

Abiy was then swiftly transported to Villa Somalia, where he held bilateral talks with Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and members of the Somali cabinet.

“The meeting between the President and the Prime Minister focused on strengthening cooperation in the areas of security, economy, and social affairs. They emphasized the historical ties and longstanding neighborly relations between the two nations, which are founded on mutual respect for sovereignty and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs,” read a statement from Villa Somalia.

Abiy’s visit followed a series of diplomatic engagements, including a December 2024 meeting between President Mohamud and Ethiopian officials in Turkey, aimed at easing tensions between the two nations.

During Abiy’s visit, Mogadishu was placed under a strict lockdown, with thousands of security personnel blocking roads and restricting movement for civilians, including vehicles and pedestrians.

At Lido Beach, a protest erupted as young men and women denounced Ethiopia’s aspirations for Somali maritime access. Somali security forces quickly dispersed the demonstration, reportedly opening fire and fatally shooting a young boy.

The incident further fueled public anger, with citizens taking to social media to condemn the killing and demand accountability.

The Somali presidency has yet to issue a statement on the shooting.

#SOMALIA: A young boy was shot and killed by Somali security forces while swimming at Liido Beach on Thursday, as the city remained under lockdown during the visit of #Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed.

Residents in the Abdiasis district confirmed the incident, which has… pic.twitter.com/4ME1UVwCRk

— Kaab TV (@KaabTV) February 27, 2025

Following his visit, Abiy expressed his appreciation for the reception by President Mohamud, stating on X (formerly Twitter): “We held extensive discussions on a range of areas, including peace and security, economy, diplomacy, and the potential to build joint infrastructure.”

He added: “The Horn of Africa is rich in resources—fertile lands, fresh water, and human capital. Yet, as a region, we struggle to feed ourselves. This makes integration essential to achieving our shared aspirations. We have immense potential as a region that must be harnessed to achieve our collective greatness. We cannot grow in isolation, but together, we can thrive. Regional thinking and collaboration are essential, and we are ready to work with Somalia to make this a reality.”

Despite the diplomatic engagements, tensions remain high, with many Somalis continuing to voice opposition to Ethiopia’s ambitions in the region.

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However, with concerted efforts by the region’s states, this vital corridor can emerge as a global model for collaboration and shared progress, driven and sustained by its own people.

The Red Sea and Gulf of Aden represent one of the world’s most strategically significant maritime corridors.

Spanning from the Suez Canal to the Arabian Sea, they are a vital artery of global trade, carrying 10–15% of the world’s commerce, including critical oil exports, and accounting for 30% of global container shipping volumes.

Yet, this critical waterway remains fraught with competing interests, vulnerabilities, external intervention, and untapped potential.

A Regional Imperative for Maritime Cooperation

Ethiopia, a one-time Red Sea country, and now the most populous landlocked country in the region after separation from Eritrea, requires the urgent need for sustainable, cooperative maritime access. Its reliance on Djibouti’s ports is essential but insufficient for its growing needs. Broadening this access through regional collaboration with Eritrea, Kenya, and Somalia could establish a more resilient and diversified framework.

Djibouti’s commitment to accommodating Ethiopia’s maritime needs, Somalia’s offer of sea access, and initiatives such as the Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor reflect a promising spirit of regional cooperation.

These efforts must evolve into a broader framework that includes shared infrastructure, streamlined customs systems, and joint economic zones to benefit the entire region. In the long run, such a framework will lay a strong basis for regional economic integration too.

However, the durability of these efforts depends on the principle of regional ownership. External actors should support, not dictate, the region’s path forward. External solutions imposed without the consent and leadership of regional states risk exacerbating tensions and undermining the sustainability of progress.

The Red Sea Arena: Strength Through Unity

Eritrea, Djibouti, Sudan, and Somalia are central to the stability, or instability, of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. As stewards of this critical maritime corridor, these nations must lead the effort to create an inclusive and balanced framework for governance and cooperation.

Djibouti, Eritrea, Somalia, and Sudan, with their strategic positions hold immense potential to foster multilateral collaboration rather than pursue unilateral advantages.

Somalia’s recovery, though fragile, requires robust support to strengthen its maritime governance and institutional capacities.

Sudan, grappling with internal conflict, must be guided back to stability to ensure its constructive participation in the region’s future.

The Arabian Peninsula countries and Israel have an essential role to play, particularly in fostering a cooperative security environment.

Yet, external interventions by actors such as the UAE, Russia, and Iran have at times amplified tensions and rivalries.

To prevent the Red Sea from becoming a battleground for proxy conflicts, the region must assert its authority, prioritising collective interests over external agendas.

A Framework for Shared Prosperity

The establishment of a shared maritime framework is not merely an aspiration, it is an urgent necessity.

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), with its ongoing efforts to mobilise political and diplomatic support for its Red Sea and Gulf of Aden initiative, is uniquely positioned to lead this process. Working in synergy with the African Union, the United Nations, and other international partners, IGAD can help unify diverse interests and institutionalise cooperation.

However, this framework must be rooted in regional ownership. Solutions must emerge from within the region, reflecting its unique challenges and opportunities. International partners should serve as enablers, providing technical expertise, resources, and support without imposing their agendas.

A Vision for Collective Security and Development

The Red Sea and Gulf of Aden are at a crossroads. The future of this critical maritime corridor must be guided by principles of cooperation, inclusion, and multilateralism. The region’s states must seize this moment to define a shared vision, one that secures maritime access, fosters economic development, and ensures the security of one of the world’s most vital waterways.

The stakes are too high to allow fragmentation or external domination to prevail. Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, and their neighbours must come together to chart their course forward.

The Red Sea’s future depends on the collective will of its people to build a sustainable and enduring legacy, one owned and safeguarded by the region itself. Only through regional leadership and unity can the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden fulfil their potential as a beacon of cooperation in a challenging world.

—

Nuur Mohamud Sheekh, a diplomatic and geopolitical analyst based in London, is a former Spokesperson of the IGAD Executive Secretary. Follow on@NuursViews. He can be reached at nuur.ms@gmail.com

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“I categorically refute claims that Ethiopia has been granted access to the Red Sea. These baseless assertions lack any foundation. Somalia remains committed to protecting its sovereignty and ensuring transparency on national issues,” Fiqi stated on X.

I categorically refute claims that Ethiopia has been granted access to the Red Sea. These baseless assertions lack any foundation. Somalia remains committed to protecting its sovereignty and ensuring transparency on national issues.

— Hon. Ahmed FIQI (@AhmedMoFiqi) December 25, 2024

The denial follows a prior statement attributed to Fiqi, suggesting Somalia had agreed to grant Ethiopia Red Sea access as part of the Ankara Declaration, a deal brokered by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on December 11, 2024.

The Ankara Declaration aims to resolve tensions between Somalia and Ethiopia, particularly following Ethiopia’s controversial Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Somaliland on January 1, 2024.

That MoU granted Ethiopia access to the Red Sea while Somaliland sought recognition as an independent state.

As part of the agreement, technical committees will be established to address maritime disputes, with a resolution deadline set for mid-2025.

However, the deal has sparked controversy, particularly within the Tripartite Alliance of Somalia, Eritrea, and Egypt, which opposes Ethiopia’s ambitions for Red Sea access.

Eritrea and Egypt view Ethiopia’s demands as a threat to regional stability.

Eritrean Foreign Ministry advisor Abdulkadir Idris criticized the agreement in comments to BBC Somali, arguing that it undermines Somalia’s sovereignty and risks destabilizing the region.

“The agreement is hasty and poorly conceived,” Idris warned, expressing frustration over Somalia’s swift acceptance of the deal.

He also cautioned that it could strain existing alliances and lead to diplomatic fallout.

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The visit comes just days after a Somali delegation traveled to Addis Ababa for discussions with Ethiopian officials, following the Ankara Declaration brokered by Turkey which tends to ease the tension about the Somaliland-Ethiopia MOU.

The deal, aimed at ending a maritime dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia, has sparked concerns among regional powers.

The Ankara agreement has drawn suspicions from Eritrea and Egypt, both of which view Ethiopia’s potential access to the Red Sea as a violation of their previous understanding with Somalia.

Eritrean Foreign Ministry advisor Abdulkadir Idris told BBC Somali that the agreement undermines Somalia’s sovereignty and risks destabilizing the region.

Eritrea has warned of potential diplomatic fallout, describing the deal as “hasty and poorly conceived.”

Idris expressed frustration with Somalia’s rapid acceptance of the agreement, which he claimed jeopardizes existing alliances.

Tripartite Alliance of Somalia, Eritrea, and Egypt

The Ankara Declaration establishes technical committees to address maritime issues, with a deadline for resolution set for mid-2025.

As part of the deal, Ethiopia will contribute troops to the African Union’s new AUSSOM mission, scheduled to begin operations in Somalia next year.

The agreement has heightened tensions within the Tripartite Alliance of Somalia, Eritrea, and Egypt, which was formed to counter Ethiopia’s ambitions for Red Sea access.

Eritrea and Egypt view Ethiopia’s demand to get access to the Red Sea as a threat to regional stability.

Somalia has also signed a series of defense and military agreements with Egypt, Eritrea, and Turkey, many of which remain undisclosed.

Egypt has provided arms and equipment to Somalia, further straining Somalia’s relationship with Ethiopia.

Egypt also says it will contribute troops to an African Union Somalia peacekeeping mission.

The post Somali President Rushes to Eritrea Amid Tensions Over Ethiopia-Somalia Agreement appeared first on Kaab TV.

The Somali delegation arrived in Addis Ababa on Monday, focusing on implementing the Ankara Declaration.

This agreement seeks to resolve disputes and provide Ethiopia access to the Red Sea while maintaining Somalia’s territorial integrity.

Tensions between the two countries escalated in early 2024 after Ethiopia signed a controversial Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Somaliland, granting Ethiopia Red Sea access.

Somalia initially demanded the reversal of the Addis Ababa MoU but has since softened its stance to engage in negotiations.

According to a statement from Ethiopia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Mesganu Arga Moach, the State Minister for Foreign Affairs, reaffirmed Ethiopia’s commitment to implementing the Ankara Declaration.

Mesganu emphasized the importance of strengthening bilateral ties to achieve lasting peace, stability, and development in the region.

Somalia’s State Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ali Omar, highlighted the discussions’ scope, which included enhancing regional peace and security by combating terrorism and fostering improved bilateral relations to ensure full implementation of the Ankara Declaration.

Amid these discussions, Somalia issued a statement accusing Ethiopian forces in the Gedo region of involvement in a deadly clash between Somali federal troops and Jubbaland state forces.

The violence in Dollow, a town near the Ethiopian border, resulted in over 10 Somali soldiers killed and several others detained by Jubbaland forces.

Ethiopia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed dismay over the violence, attributing it to “third parties” attempting to destabilize the region.

The Ankara Agreement, signed on December 11, 2024, followed tensions ignited by Ethiopia’s MoU with Somaliland, which included leasing land along Somaliland’s coastline for a marine base in exchange for recognizing Somaliland’s independence.

Somalia condemned the deal as a violation of its sovereignty.

Under Turkey’s mediation, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud reached a joint declaration in Ankara.

The declaration outlined plans for technical talks starting February 2025, with a four-month timeline to conclude discussions.

The agreement emphasizes Somalia’s territorial integrity while acknowledging potential benefits of Ethiopia’s access to the sea.

Both sides agreed to finalize mutually beneficial commercial arrangements to secure Ethiopia’s access under Somalia’s sovereignty.

Meanwhile, Somaliland’s newly elected president, Abdirahman Irro, who assumed office in November, has announced plans to review the MoU signed by his predecessor, Muse Bihi Abdi.

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Bashir Good, Somaliland’s representative to the U.S., confirmed that the administration is open to hosting a U.S. military presence in Berbera, seeing it as a move that would benefit both Somaliland and the United States.

“Somaliland is prepared to provide a military base to the United States if it aligns with the mutual interests of both parties,” said Bashir Good.

Berbera, located on the Gulf of Aden, holds a key position on international maritime routes. Its proximity to the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, a vital shipping route connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, makes it a highly strategic location for military and commercial interests.

The city has long been central to Somaliland’s economic and security considerations.

In May 2022, a U.S. AFRICOM military plane was seen at Berbera Airport during a visit by AFRICOM officials, highlighting the growing military interest in the region.

Somaliland’s efforts to solidify its international standing include a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Ethiopia, granting the landlocked nation access to the Red Sea via Berbera.

This agreement is seen as a potential pathway for Somaliland to gain international recognition in exchange for facilitating Ethiopia’s maritime access.

In addition, Somaliland has an existing agreement with the UAE’s Dubai Ports World to manage and develop the Berbera Port, a deal that has included provisions for a military base.

The UAE has already established a military presence in the region, further cementing Berbera’s strategic significance.

Bashir Good also reiterated Somaliland’s broader ambitions, emphasizing the region’s commitment to building diplomatic and cooperative relations with the U.S. and other nations as an independent state.

Despite these efforts, Somaliland continues to pursue international recognition as a sovereign state independent from Somalia. However, no country has officially recognized Somaliland’s independence to date.

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