The newspaper *The New Arab* reported that Egyptian officers, trainers, and military advisors are engaged in preparing the planned mission to deploy troops to Somalia.

This report emerges at a time when relations between Cairo and Mogadishu have reached a high peak, following the bilateral defense cooperation agreement signed in 2024 and the decision to elevate their relationship to a strategic partnership in 2025.

Although the total headcount of the planned force, their arrival timeline, and their specific mandating duties have not yet been officially announced, emerging reports indicate that both governments seek to further strengthen cooperation in defense and security.

El-Adde Reportedly Designated for Egyptian Forces: Reports regarding this plan suggest that the area of El-Adde, located on the northern outskirts of Mogadishu, could be among the locations designated for the Egyptian troops.

El-Adde is cited as a location formerly used as a military airfield, enhancing its potential utility if repurposed as a support facility or military base.

If the reported plan is confirmed, an Egyptian troop presence at this site could form part of efforts to advance military cooperation, train Somali armed forces, and coordinate security operations.

However, no official statement has yet confirmed that El-Adde has been definitively selected as a base for Egyptian forces or that Egyptian troops have already arrived there.

Likewise, the number of troops to be stationed, the duration of their deployment, and the nature of the equipment or military support they will bring remain undisclosed.

The 2024 Somalia-Egypt Defense Agreement: Military cooperation between Somalia and Egypt entered a new phase when the two governments signed a defense cooperation agreement in 2024.

That agreement laid the groundwork for strengthening security ties, troop training, and building Somalia’s defense capacity.

The Somali government has long been engaged in rebuilding the Somali National Army (SNA) and enhancing the capacity of security institutions while seeking support from friendly partner nations.

Egypt, for its part, expressed its readiness to support efforts to enhance Somalia’s security and safeguard the nation’s sovereignty.

The defense agreement is therefore significant for both sides, as it creates a framework to expand cooperation in training, exchange military expertise, and support security institutions.

If the plan to deploy Egyptian troops to Somalia materializes, it could represent another concrete step toward implementing that cooperation.

Somalia and Egypt Elevate Relations to Strategic Level: In 2025, Somalia and Egypt elevated their relationship to a strategic partnership, reflecting both governments’ intent to broaden political, economic, and security cooperation.

Both parties have repeatedly emphasized the critical importance of preserving Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

This issue holds particular significance for Mogadishu, which seeks to reinforce alliances with nations supporting Somali unity and national institution-building.

Egypt views Somalia as a key regional partner in the Horn of Africa, particularly given the country’s strategic geographic location along the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden maritime corridors.

The bilateral relationship is anchored in shared security and diplomatic interests extending beyond military collaboration alone.

Egyptian Military Delegation Visits Mogadishu: According to reports, an Egyptian military delegation visited Mogadishu on September 20, where they met with Somali Defense Minister Ahmed Moallim Fiqi.

Discussions centered on defense cooperation, troop training, and enhancing the operational capabilities of the Somali National Army.

The visit underscores the priority both governments place on military ties, particularly as Somalia advances efforts to build defense capacity and combat Al-Shabaab.

However, comprehensive details regarding the meetings, specific pacts reached, and their direct link to the troop deployment plan still await official confirmation.

A central question surrounding this deployment plan is whether Egyptian forces will operate under the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) or deploy under a bilateral defense agreement.

AUSSOM is an African Union-led mission supporting the Somali government in counter-insurgency operations, stabilizing recovered territory, and building institutional security capacity.

Egypt previously expressed interest in supporting Somali security and potentially contributing to the African Union mission.

If Egyptian forces are integrated into AUSSOM, defining force strength, deployment sectors, and operational mandates will be critical.

If they deploy under a bilateral agreement, a clear framework will be required to define their relationship with the Somali government, the national armed forces, and the African Union mission.

These two arrangements differ in their administrative mechanisms, operational coordination, and troop mandates.

To date, no official statement has definitively clarified the exact framework under which Egyptian forces will contribute to Somalia’s security.

If this plan is confirmed, it could have multifaceted implications for Somalia, particularly regarding defense capacity-building and international cooperation.

First, Egyptian forces could assist in training and developing the skills of Somali troops, provided the agreements reached explicitly define that role.

Second, defense cooperation could create opportunities to strengthen technical expertise, military planning, and security institution interoperability.

Third, bilateral relations could provide Somalia with additional diplomatic support, particularly regarding the protection of national sovereignty and territorial integrity.

However, the tangible outcome will depend on the nature of the support provided, the duration of the Egyptian military presence, and how well it aligns with Somalia’s national security needs.

The presence of foreign forces alone does not guarantee security progress; it is vital that cooperation has clear objectives, accountability, and close coordination with Somali institutions.

The reported plan to deploy Egyptian troops to Somalia comes at a time when the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa have become convergence points for the security, economic, and strategic interests of many nations.

The Bab al-Mandab Strait connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and is vital for international commercial shipping.

Somalia occupies a strategic location near critical regional and global trade routes, increasing the importance of maritime security and national stability.

Egypt, for its part, relies heavily on the Suez Canal, one of the most vital waterways linking trade between Europe, Asia, and other global regions.

Consequently, security in the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab Strait is vital to the strategic interests of both nations, even as each maintains its own specific priorities.

The strengthening of defense cooperation between Cairo and Mogadishu can be understood as part of efforts to advance regional security ties.

Nonetheless, there is no official confirmation indicating that the plan to deploy Egyptian troops to Somalia directly targets any specific country or forms part of a plan for military confrontation.

The longstanding dispute between Egypt and Ethiopia regarding the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) remains among the key issues impacting political dynamics in the region.

Egypt views the dam as a direct water security concern, given the Nile’s critical role in the daily lives of its citizens and its national economy.

Ethiopia, for its part, considers the project vital for power generation and domestic economic development.

The two nations have long diverged on matters concerning the filling of the reservoir, water management protocols, and the guarantees downstream basin states require from Ethiopia.

While this friction forms part of the regional diplomatic landscape, it is insufficient on its own to determine the exact underlying motives of Egypt’s planned military deployment to Somalia.

It is essential to distinguish between verified facts and analytical commentary regarding the strategic interests of regional powers.

Pending an official statement outlining the specific objectives of the mission, it is premature to assume Egyptian forces are deploying to Somalia purely as part of the broader Cairo-Addis Ababa dispute.

Should the reported plan proceed, it could expand Egypt’s footprint in Horn of Africa security cooperation.

This development could also draw the attention of other regional actors, particularly those with strategic interests in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and Somali security.

However, the real strategic impact of this plan cannot be fully evaluated until details emerge regarding troop strength, mission types, and duration of stay.

Furthermore, it is important to recognize that any Egyptian military presence takes place under agreements authorized by Somalia, upholding national sovereignty and the Somali government’s authority over national security decisions.

Effective military cooperation can help strengthen security institutions, but it requires solid coordination and clearly defined mandates for all participating parties.

Although reports indicate military preparations are underway, several critical questions still await official clarification.

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The article focuses on relations between Somalia and Ethiopia, tensions over the Nile River, Red Sea security and shifting regional alliances.

It argues that Ethiopia has played a significant role in Somalia’s security affairs, particularly in efforts to combat the Al-Shabaab militant group, and that preserving bilateral cooperation remains important to both countries.

A major focus of the commentary is the strengthening relationship between Somalia and Egypt.

According to the article, Addis Ababa is concerned that closer cooperation between Mogadishu, Cairo and other regional governments could affect Ethiopian interests relating to the Nile and the Red Sea.

The criticism comes after President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud attended a four-way summit in New Alamein, Egypt, involving the leaders of Somalia, Egypt, Sudan and Eritrea.

The meeting took place against the backdrop of longstanding tensions between Ethiopia and Egypt over the use of Nile waters, as well as sensitive relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

Egypt and Ethiopia have been at odds over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), which Addis Ababa considers central to its development and electricity-generation ambitions.

Egypt, meanwhile, has repeatedly emphasized the importance of protecting its water security, given its heavy dependence on the Nile. Sudan also has significant interests in the management of the river and the broader regional security environment.

Eritrea’s participation in the summit adds another dimension to Ethiopia’s concerns, as relations between the two neighbouring countries remain sensitive despite periods of rapprochement following years of hostility.

The ENA commentary reflects Addis Ababa’s interpretation of the changing regional political landscape.

It argues that disputes in the Horn of Africa should be addressed through dialogue, cooperation and consideration of the interests of all countries, rather than through alliances that could intensify rivalries between regional powers.

The article also emphasizes the close geographical, economic and security ties between Somalia and Ethiopia. The two countries share a long border and have interconnected interests involving trade, cross-border communities and regional stability.

Ethiopia has also been involved in Somalia’s security operations over many years, including deployments against Al-Shabaab.

However, Somalia has its own foreign policy priorities and maintains the right to develop strategic partnerships with Egypt and other countries.

Cairo has publicly supported Somalia’s unity and territorial integrity, particularly amid disputes over Ethiopia’s pursuit of maritime access and its 2024 memorandum of understanding with Somaliland.

For Mogadishu, the challenge is to maintain relations with neighbouring Ethiopia while expanding cooperation with other regional partners.

For Addis Ababa, the growing Somalia-Egypt relationship raises questions about the future balance of influence in a region where security, access to maritime routes and control of water resources are closely connected.

The Nile and the Red Sea have consequently become central to the wider strategic calculations of several Horn of Africa and North African countries.

Ethiopia seeks to develop its water resources and secure maritime access, while Egypt prioritizes Nile water security and countries along the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden pursue their own security and economic interests.

Ultimately, the ENA article highlights Ethiopia’s concern about the direction of Somalia’s foreign relations and the implications of closer cooperation between Mogadishu and Cairo.

While Addis Ababa is advocating dialogue and continued bilateral cooperation, Somalia faces the task of balancing its relationships with both countries while prioritizing its sovereignty, national security and economic interests.

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This position was outlined in a statement issued on October 3, 2026, by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Somaliland, which also served as a response to ongoing discussions and debates regarding relations between Somalia, Somaliland, and Ethiopia.

Dawan Africa media broadcast details of the statement, reporting that Hargeysa maintained its firm stance on its foreign relations and agreements entered into with other parties.

The Somaliland Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that it has long supported negotiated agreements granting Ethiopia maritime access, emphasizing that such pacts must be anchored in shared interests and mutual benefit.

Somaliland’s position is rooted in the perspective that landlocked Ethiopia requires a reliable corridor to import and export its goods through a regional port.

Somaliland’s statement further indicates that Hargeysa does not view Ethiopia’s acquisition of maritime access as something that should be universally blocked, but rather as a matter resolvable through direct bilateral negotiations among the concerned parties.

This development reignites the intense diplomatic friction sparked by the January 1, 2024 Memorandum of Understanding between Ethiopia and Somaliland.

That memorandum triggered severe diplomatic tensions, as Somalia insisted that Somaliland constitutes part of its sovereign territory and rejected any external agreements independently concluded by Hargeysa concerning coastal access or territories claimed by Mogadishu.

That friction ultimately formed part of the Turkish-mediated efforts that culminated in the Ankara Declaration of December 2024.

The Ankara Declaration explicitly stated that Somalia and Ethiopia respect each other’s sovereignty, unity, and political and territorial independence. At the same time, that same document acknowledged the potential benefits of Ethiopia securing reliable maritime access through commercial arrangements operating under Somalia’s sovereign authority.

The core pillar of the Ankara Declaration was the endeavor to decouple two distinct issues: Ethiopia’s need for maritime access and Somalia’s territorial sovereignty.

According to the declaration, Somalia and Ethiopia agreed to formulate mutually beneficial commercial frameworks—such as contracts, lease agreements, or alternative modalities—providing Ethiopia with secure, continuous access to the sea.

However, it was stipulated that such maritime access would function under the sovereign jurisdiction of the Federal Republic of Somalia.

Somaliland maintains that it possesses the sovereign right to enter into agreements with external partners, whereas Somalia insists that territorial matters and such compacts fall exclusively under the purview of the federal government’s sovereignty.

Hargeisa’s recent statement also carried a direct political message: Somaliland stated that it will not accept interference in the agreements it concludes with other entities.

The Somaliland Ministry of Foreign Affairs asserted its intent to continue pursuing agreements it deems respectful of its self-governance and conducive to regional development and prosperity.

Hargeysa specifically linked this stance to the 2024 agreement with Ethiopia, which Mogadishu strongly opposed.

A report published on October 3 indicated that Somaliland also rejected the assertion that Mogadishu holds the authority to dictate its external relations or arbitrate the agreements Somaliland enters into with foreign states.

From Somalia’s perspective, the position remains grounded in the constitutional principle that Somaliland constitutes an integral part of Somalia; consequently, any agreement concerning territory, coastline, or ports located within that region cannot be independently contracted by Hargeysa with a foreign government.

This stance formed the core of Somalia’s rejection of the 2024 Ethiopia-Somaliland agreement.

Nevertheless, the current dynamic indicates that Mogadishu is attempting to present Ethiopia with an alternative pathway to secure maritime access, anchored in an agreement in which Somalia participates.

The Ankara Declaration previously established this framework, with both nations agreeing that Ethiopia could secure sea access while upholding Somalia’s sovereignty.

Ethiopia maintains an overriding strategic need for maritime access, given that it is one of the most populous landlocked nations in Africa.

Consequently, acquiring a reliable port and commercial transit corridor is vital for the country’s import and export sectors, especially as Ethiopia’s economy relies heavily on regional trade integration.

The Ankara Declaration formally acknowledged that Ethiopia could derive significant benefits from dependable maritime access, with Somalia and Ethiopia agreeing to resolve the matter through commercial contracts. At the time, the United States government welcomed the agreement, stating that Ethiopia’s maritime access could be advanced while fully respecting Somalia’s territorial integrity.

The Port of Berbera is situated on the Gulf of Aden, occupying a strategic nexus linking the commercial shipping lanes of the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Indian Ocean.

This geography renders Somaliland a central focal point in the debate over how Ethiopia can secure sea access.

The 2024 Memorandum of Understanding specifically tied Berbera to Ethiopia’s maritime strategy, a pact that subsequently triggered profound diplomatic friction between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa.

Somaliland’s stance coincides with a period in which the Horn of Africa is once again navigating shifting political and security dynamics.

This context renders the issue of Ethiopia’s maritime access far more than a matter of simple commerce; it is intimately linked to regional politics, security architectures, and the broader strategic competition unfolding across the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa.

Although Somalia and Ethiopia agreed in 2024 to pursue a commercial framework granting Ethiopia sea access, it remains essential to distinguish between the foundational principle of the agreement and the actual implementation of a functioning port accord.

The Ankara Declaration established a framework for dialogue and commercial compacts, but the technical specifics regarding port selection, duration, tariff structures, administration, security protocols, and operational implementation necessitate separate, detailed agreements. The formal declaration mandated the launch of technical negotiations facilitated by Turkey.

Consequently, Somaliland’s reiteration of support for Ethiopia’s maritime access transcends economics; it intersects directly with the overarching debate over which entity holds the legitimate legal and political authority to contract agreements concerning Somaliland’s coastline.

The first tier of the conflict centers on the political dispute over Somaliland’s status and Somalia’s assertion of territorial unity.

The second tier involves Ethiopia’s strategic imperative for sea access and the pursuit of a corridor acceptable to all relevant stakeholders.

Combined, these dual dimensions ensure that any formal port or coastal agreement remains inextricably tied to the fundamental question of who possesses the sovereign mandate to execute such pacts.

This is precisely why the 2024 agreement proved so combustible, while the Ankara Declaration subsequently attempted to anchor Ethiopia’s maritime access within commercial frameworks operating under Somalia’s sovereign authority.

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Hassan Sheikh made these remarks in an interview with Al Jazeera, days after meeting with Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed in Addis Ababa.

Hassan Sheikh emphasized that Somalia is not opposed to landlocked Ethiopia securing commercial access to the sea, provided that such an arrangement is established through a formal bilateral agreement between the two governments.

“We are ready to allow Ethiopia to use two or three Somali ports to import and export goods,” Hassan Sheikh said.

Hassan Sheikh also noted that port utilization could be regulated through commercial agreements specifying customs, fees, and other conditions governing port services.

Additionally, Hassan Sheikh stated that while Ethiopia has communicated its need for maritime access to Somalia, it has yet to submit a formal, detailed request specifying the exact nature of the access it seeks.

Hassan Sheikh’s remarks come days following his meeting with Abiy Ahmed in Addis Ababa, during which both sides discussed bilateral relations between Somalia and Ethiopia, as well as broader regional developments in the Horn of Africa.

To date, the two governments have not announced a final, definitive agreement regarding which specific port Ethiopia will utilize.

The Ankara Agreement remains the fundamental basis for bilateral discussions between the two sides concerning Ethiopia’s maritime access.

In December 2024, Somalia and Ethiopia reached a Turkey-mediated agreement in Ankara, stipulating that Ethiopia can secure secure, consistent, and reliable commercial maritime access, provided that the arrangement preserves the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Somalia.

The two nations subsequently launched technical talks to implement that accord; however, no definitive agreement has yet been announced regarding the specific port or ports that Ethiopia will utilize.

Meanwhile, President Hassan Sheikh did not name the two or three Somali ports that Somalia might permit Ethiopia to use.

Details regarding the duration of the agreement, the transit corridors linking Ethiopia to Somali ports, and the regulatory framework governing port fees and services were likewise omitted.

The matter remains under active dialogue, with authorities awaiting a formal request from Ethiopia outlining its specific needs and preferred maritime corridor model.

Should both parties reach a final accord on utilizing Somali ports, Ethiopia could secure additional commercial pathways, while Somalia stands to generate revenue from port services, customs duties, and trade cooperation.

Nevertheless, the central lingering challenge is maintaining a clear distinction between standard commercial access through a sovereign Somali port and any broader demands—particularly given the historical friction triggered by the prior Ethiopia-Somaliland memorandum of understanding.

Hassan Sheikh’s remarks reaffirmed that Somalia is prepared to grant Ethiopia access to Somali ports, subject strictly to a formal, mutually agreed interstate framework.

Consequently, negotiations between Somalia and Ethiopia are expected to continue, with the specifics of any future agreement remaining contingent upon Ethiopia’s formal application and the terms set forth by Mogadishu regarding the utilization of national ports.

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According to reports from local sources, the troops entered Ethiopia through areas near Shilabo District in Qorahay Zone and neighboring locations close to Wardheer, triggering a response from regional security forces.

The incident has raised questions about how and why the soldiers crossed into Ethiopian territory and whether they had authorization to do so.

Some of the soldiers were reportedly apprehended in Neefkuceshe, an area within Dollo Zone, where members of the Liyu Police intercepted them while they were traveling in seven Toyota Probox vehicles.

The detained troops were subsequently transported to Wardheer, where they are currently being held pending further decisions by the authorities.

Additional groups of soldiers were reportedly detained in the Caleen area of Qorahay Zone.

According to local accounts, those troops were traveling in two cargo trucks and three Probox vehicles when they were stopped by regional security forces.

The exact number of soldiers detained at each location has not yet been independently verified.

The soldiers are believed to be part of a recently trained contingent of the Somali National Army (SNA).

Their training was conducted as part of the Federal Government of Somalia’s ongoing efforts to expand and strengthen its military forces for operations against Al-Shabaab, which continues to pose a major security threat across parts of the country.

The Federal Government has invested heavily in recruiting, training, and deploying new military units in recent years as part of a broader strategy to increase pressure on Al-Shabaab and gradually transfer security responsibilities to Somali forces.

The crossing of Somali troops into Ethiopia’s Somali Region has added a regional dimension to the incident, given the strategic and often sensitive nature of the Somalia-Ethiopia border.

Security cooperation between the two countries has traditionally been important in efforts to combat armed groups operating in border areas.

However, it remains unclear what prompted the soldiers to enter Ethiopian territory or whether they were acting under official orders.

Neither the Federal Government of Somalia nor the Somali Regional State of Ethiopia has so far issued a detailed public statement explaining the circumstances surrounding the incident.

The development comes at a time when Somalia is intensifying military preparations and mobilizing newly trained forces for ongoing counterinsurgency operations.

The detention of such a large number of soldiers has therefore attracted significant attention from security observers and local communities on both sides of the border.

For now, the detained troops remain in the custody of Ethiopian regional security forces, while authorities are expected to clarify the circumstances of the border crossing and determine what action will be taken regarding the soldiers.

The incident is likely to prompt discussions between Somali and Ethiopian officials as they seek to establish how the troops entered the area and whether arrangements will be made for their return.

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The decision, issued by Libya’s Prime Minister, suspends the entry of nationals from the four countries through all border crossings, with limited exceptions for individuals holding valid work permits in essential sectors such as healthcare and education.

Under the new directive, Libya’s Ministry of Interior has also been instructed to take immediate steps to identify and deport foreign nationals residing in the country without legal immigration status. Officials said the measures are intended to regulate the presence of foreign residents, address security concerns, and improve the management of migration flows.

Libyan authorities stated that the decision comes amid growing debate over irregular migration and the increasing number of migrants arriving from countries in the Horn of Africa. Libya remains one of the main transit routes used by migrants seeking to reach Europe through the Mediterranean Sea, making migration a major political and security issue for the country.

Government officials argued that stronger border controls are necessary to combat human trafficking networks, reduce illegal crossings, and ensure that foreign workers residing in Libya comply with national immigration laws. The authorities also emphasized the need to regulate the employment of foreign labor while safeguarding national security and public stability.

The move is expected to have a significant impact on migrants from the Horn of Africa, many of whom travel through Libya in search of employment opportunities or as part of journeys toward Europe. Human rights organizations have previously raised concerns about the vulnerability of migrants in Libya, where many face difficult living conditions, detention, and exploitation by trafficking networks.

The latest measures reflect Libya’s ongoing efforts to tighten immigration controls and manage migration pressures amid continuing economic and security challenges facing the North African nation.

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According to a report presented by the government and supporting experts, Ethiopia’s need for sea access is grounded in international law, historical justice, and principles of cooperative partnership.

The government argues that Ethiopia—now home to more than 120 million people—requires access to the sea to safeguard its national interests, accelerate economic development, and contribute meaningfully to regional stability.

Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, featured in the report, stated that Ethiopia’s request for sea access is supported by legal, historical, geographical, and economic foundations. He emphasized that diplomatic efforts to achieve this goal will continue.

Officials and experts working with the government, including Tilahun Tefera from the Ethiopian Policy Studies Institute (PSI), described the loss of Ethiopia’s coastline as a historical injustice that must be corrected.

Tilahun urged scholars, the media, diplomats, and the Ethiopian diaspora to fully support the country’s pursuit of sea access.

Similarly, Gashaw Ayferam from the Institute of Foreign Affairs said the loss of sea access resulted from external pressure and internal weakness. He stressed that reclaiming sea access is viewed by Ethiopia as an essential national priority.

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“This blatant suspension of Deutsche Welle’s journalists is an outrageous act of censorship and intimidation,” said CPJ Africa Director Angela Quintal. “Ethiopian authorities are weaponizing media laws to silence independent reporting and control the narrative. The government must immediately lift the suspension, stop harassing journalists, and respect the public’s right to information.”

In an October 23 letter, the authority informed Deutsche Welle that it had temporarily suspended DW Amharic service correspondents in Ethiopia, saying that their reporting violated the country’s media and hate speech laws, DW reported. The authority further said DW’s reports were “not in line with professional ethical standards.”

According to the letter, the authority had previously summoned DW representatives several times for discussions, feedback sessions, and written warnings, including a “final written warning” in September 2022, but claimed that “no tangible improvements were observed.”

In a statement sent to CPJ, DW said the EMA letter contained no “concrete allegations” against its coverage and called on Ethiopian authorities to specify which reports allegedly breached media proclamations.

The suspension comes amid a broad expansion of the Ethiopian Media Authority’s powers, following an April 17, 2025 amendment to the country’s media law. The amendment weakened public participation and transparency requirements in the authority’s board appointments and transferred key regulatory powers, including the ability to suspend, revoke, or fine media licenses, directly to the authority.

The EMA did not reply to CPJ’s emailed request for comment on the coverage that resulted in the suspension.

(Source: CPJ)

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