With U.S. development aid shrinking, counterterrorism support declining, and European donors showing increasing fatigue, Somalia is becoming dangerously isolated. In this deteriorating context, alShabaab appears more empowered than ever—yet few are closely monitoring the group’s deepening internal rifts, driven by clan rivalries and a looming power struggle that could erupt into open conflict.

President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s recent call for a national consultation—inviting opposition politicians, federal member state presidents, and community leaders to unite against terrorism—was a welcome gesture. “I am extending an invitation to a consultation meeting for the politicians and the leaders of the community to come together to join our arms in fighting against the terrorists,” he declared. While the opposition cautiously welcomed the move, seeking clarity on the agenda, the more pressing struggle lies beyond the conference hall—in the shadows of al-Shabaab itself.

In November 2021, a striking remark by Boqor Osman Aw Mohamud, widely known as Boqor Buurmadow, an influential traditional leader from Somaliland, captured Somalia’s political psyche. Speaking at an assembly of his closest political elites in Mogadishu, he stated: “There are two governments in Somalia: The Federal Government and the al-Shabaab Government and we head one of them.” Though delivered with humor, the comment carried a chilling truth.

Today, a clan-based power struggle threatens to fracture al-Shabaab’s leadership. At the center of the tension lies a volatile divide between the elites from Dir and Hawiye clans. While the group has long been controlled by shadowy ethnic Dir leaders from the Somaliland region—most notably the current leader Ahmed Diriye aka Abu Ubaidah, the successor to the late Ahmed Godane “Abu Zubeyr”—the group’s public face has been dominated by prominent ethnic Hawiye figures: Ali Dhere, Mahad Karate, and Yusuf Kabakudukade.

Al-Shabaab’s leadership, inspired by the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan and the political evolution of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in Syria, began exploring its own path from terrorism to governance. But rather than consolidating its position, the group has become entangled in internal discord—an unraveling that reflects a form of ideological karma for the years of terror and repression it has inflicted on the Somali people. Its political aspirations have only sharpened internal contradictions and exposed deep-rooted fractures within its ranks.

Beneath the surface, a deeper strategic dilemma is taking shape: if peace negotiations—brokered by countries such as Norway, Qatar, Turkey, and the United States—materialize, the question of who will represent the group becomes unavoidable. The ethnic Hawiye faction, with its public visibility, seems more suitably placed to lead such talks, while the more clandestine ethnic Dir leadership risks being sidelined. Al-Shabaab’s top leader has sensed that his authority is being undermined by his own invisibility. To address this emerging threat, he has sought reinforcement by elevating prominent figures from his clan to serve as the group’s new public face.

The reinvention of al-Shabaab’s public image brought several high-profile figures from the Somaliland regions into the fold. Most notable among them is former academic Nageye Ali Khalif, alongside poet Abdiwahid Gama’did and hardline cleric Sheikh Adan Sune. These individuals quickly became part of al-Shabaab’s propaganda apparatus, appearing in videos, training camps, and sermons—serving as new public faces aligned with the group’s leader.

A growing fear compelled the Hawiye elites within al-Shabaab to reassess their alignment with the leader and their defensive strength. Past internal purges—like Godane’s 2013 assassination of Ibrahim Afghani and Moalim Burhan, two of the group’s founding fathers, which also forced hardliner Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys to flee and surrender to the government—served as a warning.

The arrival of figures like Nageye, Gama’did, and Adan Sune sent a chilling message to Ali Dhere, Mahad Karate, and Yusuf Kabakudukade, who perceived their inclusion as a strategic attempt to sideline them permanently. To avoid a similar fate to their eliminated comrades, they adopted a two-pronged strategy: recruiting from their own sub-clans to strengthen internal loyalty and reaffirming their relevance to both al-Shabaab’s leadership and external actors, including the Somali government and its international partners.

Their recruitment approach broke with al-Shabaab’s longstanding strategy of avoiding fighters from dominant clans. The group had traditionally sourced its foot soldiers from large but politically marginalized communities like the Jareerweyne and Rahanweyn, while reserving leadership for elites from the Dir, Hawiye, and Darod clans.

Diplomatic engagement with al-Shabaab is no longer speculative. Norway has spent years laying the groundwork for possible dialogue, gradually bringing in Turkey, Qatar, and the United States. While no formal talks have been acknowledged, mounting evidence suggests that indirect negotiations are taking shape.

The group’s capacity for destruction remains unmatched in the region, though its capacity to govern a nation remains entirely untested. Its deadliest act came in October 2017, when it executed Africa’s most devastating suicide bombing in Mogadishu, killing over 1,000 people—second only to 9/11 on a global scale. Al-Shabaab’s reach extends beyond Somalia. Its attacks have rocked regional capitals—Nairobi, Kampala, Djibouti—and various areas of Kenya and Ethiopia.

Somalia now stands at a critical crossroads—poised between the potential for transformative progress and the risk of deeper instability. If the government remains blind-spotted by constitutional wrangling, controversial land sales, and intra-elite rivalries—all based on self-interest and short-term ambitions— then the momentum may slip away. The reality is al-Shabaab’s internal divisions could escalate into open confrontation at any moment, and it may offer both a crisis and a strategic opportunity. A fractured insurgency could present the most promising chance in years to deliver a decisive blow, or a splintered terrorist group could give rise to more radical and unpredictable factions. Worse still, a dominant faction might reframe the group’s ideology into an even more dangerous project.

However, whether this chapter becomes a turning point or yet another missed opportunity will not be decided in militant hideouts—but by those in positions of legitimate power, willing to shape Somalia’s future, for better or worse.

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Abukar Albadri is a seasoned media professional with over two decades of experience in journalism, authorship, and cultural production. Email: abukar.albadri@gmail.com

The post Somalia: Al-Shabaab’s Growing Clan Divide and the Government’s Blind Spot appeared first on Kaab TV.

Erigabo, the regional capital of Sanaag, has an economy predominantly based on pastoralism, trade, and small-scale agriculture.

Livestock farming dominates, with camels, goats, and sheep often exported to Gulf countries.

The city links coastal towns like Laasqoray to inland areas, while small-scale farming produces sorghum and maize.

Remittances and informal markets sustain livelihoods, though large-scale resource extraction is limited.

However, since late November, clashes between the Warsangeli and Habar Jeclo clans have claimed over 20 lives and injured dozens more.

According to the United Nations, nearly 43,000 people have been displaced, with many fleeing to nearby areas such as El Afweyn and Laasqoray.

This escalating crisis has also drawn in forces from SSC-Khaatumo and Somaliland, each accused of taking sides, further complicating the situation.

The conflict has triggered an arms race in the Sanaag province, with reports of increased weapons trading and militia mobilization.

Observers fear renewed clashes in the city and surrounding villages affecting larger communities.

Recently, SSC-Khaatumo leader Abduqadir Aw-Ali Firdhiye announced their intention to capture Erigabo under the SSC-Khaatumo flag.

“Our forces are ready, and we will liberate Erigabo and bring it under SSC-Khaatumo state,” he declared in a speech delivered in Lasanod.

Meanwhile, Somaliland’s government has called for a peaceful resolution but insists on defending Erigabo as part of its territory.

Presidential Spokesperson Hussein Adan Deyr stated: “The President emphasized that his government is not at war with its people, but it is a constitutional obligation to defend the country from any enemy. The National Forces have full authority to protect the country and its people.”

The Historical Context

Understanding the complexity of the Erigabo conflict requires acknowledging the city’s social and political divisions.

Erigabo, the capital of Sanaag, is home to both Isaaq and Darood clans. Following Somalia’s deadly civil war in 1993, local clans agreed on peaceful coexistence based on a four-clan framework: two from the Darood and two from the Isaaq.

The arrangement, brokered by elders, has since unraveled, with the Warsangeli accusing Somaliland’s Isaaq clan of violating the 1993 agreement.

“The Sanaag region spans 55,000 square kilometers, 35,000 of which are inhabited by Warsangeli clans. Erigabo itself has four clans,” said Warsangeli spokesperson Ali Guray Diriye during a gathering in El Buh town early this month.

Drawing Parallels to Galkayo’s Two-State Solution

Dr. Abdirahman Mohamed Abdi, a former Somali Minister of Fisheries and now an SSC-Khaatumo adviser, suggests that Erigabo’s situation could be resolved through a model similar to Galkayo’s 1993 peace accord.

Galkayo, a town straddling two of Somalia’s major clan families—the Darood and the Hawiye—was the site of intense conflict in the early 1990s.

The United Somali Congress (USC) of the Hawiye and Somali Salvation and Democratic Front (SSDF) of the Daarood, initially allies against the Siad Barre regime, brokered a ceasefire known as the 1993 Mudug Peace Accord.

This agreement effectively divided northern Somalia from the center and south, paving the way for Puntland’s establishment in 1998.

Remarkably, the accord has mitigated large-scale conflict in the region for over two decades.

“The Erigabo situation could end in a similar scenario to the Galkayo peace accord,” Dr. Abdirahman remarked.

A delegation of clan elders from Jigjiga, the Somali Region in Ethiopia, has engaged in peace talks with Isaaq and Darood elders in Erigabo.

Mohamed Iba Abdi, an Erigabo resident, reported progress.

“The elders’ negotiations seem to be bearing fruit, with a ceasefire reached weeks ago. However, a comprehensive peace resolution is yet to be finalized. We hope the elders will foster peaceful coexistence, but concerns remain about the potential division of the city,” Mohamed said.

Whether Somaliland would accept a divided Erigabo remains unclear.

Hargeisa previously administered the city fully, and the notion of splitting it could face significant resistance.

Adding to the complexity, Erigabo’s Dhulbahante population is affiliated with SSC-Khaatumo, while the Isaaq aligns with Somaliland.

However, Puntland and pro-Mogadishu factions, such as Maakhir, are also vying for influence. Excluding these actors could further delay any lasting resolution.

Whether through a two-state solution or another innovative approach, achieving a durable resolution will require inclusive dialogue, mutual concessions, and steadfast commitment from all parties.

The post How to End the Erigabo Conflict: Can It Be Like Galkayo’s Two-State Solution? appeared first on Kaab TV.

In a statement issued after a clan conference in El Buh town, the Warsangeli clan condemned the clashes that have rocked Erigabo since late November 2024, leaving dozens dead and many displaced.

The meeting, led by Sultan Said Sultan Abdisalan, brought together elders, youth, diaspora members, and intellectuals from the Warsangeli clan.

The Erigabo conflict, which has pitted militias from the Warsangeli and Habar Jeclo clans against each other, has also drawn in forces from SSC-Khaatumo and Somaliland, who are accused of taking sides.

Independent sources estimate that over 20 people have been killed in the fighting, though the exact toll remains unclear.

Warsangeli Clan Issues Declaration

The Warsangeli clan’s statement alleged that a 1993 peace agreement with the Isaaq clan, which facilitated peaceful coexistence in the region, had been violated.

They announced the formation of a 35-member committee tasked with defending the Warsangeli clan’s people and property in Erigabo.

“The conference calls on the international community and humanitarian organizations to provide urgent assistance to those displaced, as they face dire conditions,” said Ali Yare Guray Dirir, the conference spokesperson.

The clan leaders also announced plans for a broader meeting in February 2025 to discuss their future.

Somaliland’s government, which administers Erigabo, has yet to respond officially to the Warsangeli declaration.

However, President Abdirahman Abdillahi Cirro has previously urged dialogue to resolve the clan-based conflict.

In contrast, King Osman Buurmadow, a the Habar Jeclo/Isaq elder, reiterated his clan’s calls for peace while warning, through local media on Friday, that their militias remain ready to defend themselves if attacked.

The conflict has triggered an arms race in Sanaag, with reports of increased weapons trading and militia mobilization.

Observers fear renewed clashes could erupt in Erigabo, a city once known for its tranquility.

According to the United Nations, nearly 43,000 people have been displaced since the fighting began, with many fleeing to nearby areas such as El Afweyn and Laasqoray.

Others have sought refuge in districts including Bosaso, Las Anod, Hudun, and Burao.

As tensions mount, humanitarian organizations warn of a deepening crisis, with displaced families facing severe hardships in makeshift shelters.

Efforts to mediate the conflict remain uncertain as the clan militias brace for potential escalation.

The post Tensions Escalate in Sanaag Amid Erigabo Conflict appeared first on Kaab TV.