AUSSOM was established at the beginning of 2025 to succeed the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), with a mandate focused on supporting Somali security forces, protecting key population centres and helping the Federal Government of Somalia combat Al-Shabaab.

The mission’s current mandate runs until December 31, 2026, and the United Nations has authorized the deployment of up to 11,826 uniformed personnel, including military and police personnel.

The mission’s financial difficulties have become more significant following the decision by the United States to oppose the continuation of United Nations logistical support for AUSSOM beyond the end of 2026.

Washington has indicated that it would not necessarily oppose the renewal of AUSSOM itself, but would oppose extending the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) arrangement that currently provides crucial logistical assistance to the African Union mission.

UNSOS plays a central role in keeping AUSSOM operational. Its support includes transportation, fuel, medical services, engineering, accommodation, water and other logistical requirements.

The UN has also been authorized to provide support to Somali National Army and Somali National Police personnel participating in joint or coordinated operations with AUSSOM.

The U.S. position therefore creates a potentially serious funding and logistics gap. If no alternative mechanism is found, AUSSOM could face difficulties maintaining troops and operating bases in remote areas where the cost of supplying personnel is particularly high.

What happens if funding falls further?

A reduction in funding would not necessarily mean that AUSSOM would immediately leave Somalia. However, it could accelerate the consolidation of its presence and force the mission to prioritize locations considered strategically essential.

The UN’s planning documents have already envisaged a more concentrated AUSSOM structure, with logistics organized around four sectors and a network of 14 main operating bases and nine tactical operating bases, supported by the Mogadishu Logistics Base and the rear support facility in Mombasa.

This is important because reports referring to larger numbers of existing or forward locations should not automatically be interpreted as the final approved structure of AUSSOM.

The UN planning documents currently available describe a future operational model based on 14 main bases and nine tactical bases rather than confirming a permanent network of 49 or 56 bases.

If financial pressure forces AUSSOM to withdraw from remote positions before Somali forces are ready to take over, however, the consequences could extend beyond the mission itself.

One immediate concern would be the creation of security gaps. Areas previously protected or supported by AUSSOM could become vulnerable if Somali forces do not have sufficient troops, equipment, intelligence, transport and logistical capacity to assume responsibility immediately.

That could provide Al-Shabaab with opportunities to exploit areas where security arrangements are weakened, particularly in parts of southern and central Somalia where the group continues to maintain significant operational capabilities.

The issue is therefore not simply whether an AUSSOM base remains open. The more important question is whether Somalia’s own security forces can take over the responsibilities attached to that location without creating a vacuum.

Somalia’s security forces face a major test

The funding crisis comes at a particularly sensitive moment for Somalia because the government has repeatedly emphasized that the long-term objective is for Somali security forces to take full responsibility for the country’s security.

The UN has similarly called for Somalia to develop its own sovereign logistical capacity rather than remaining permanently dependent on international support.

Under the existing framework, UNSOS is specifically tasked with helping Somalia build that capacity while continuing to support AUSSOM and Somali forces during the transition.

This creates two possible outcomes.

If the reduction of AUSSOM positions is carefully planned, Somali forces could take over locations in stages, with sufficient preparation, equipment and logistical support. Such a process could strengthen Somali ownership of national security.

But if financial constraints force a faster withdrawal than the Somali military can handle, the transition could become much more dangerous.

The difference between a planned handover and an unplanned withdrawal is therefore crucial.

The EU provides additional support

Despite the financial concerns, international support for AUSSOM has not completely disappeared.

In April 2026, the European Union approved an additional €75 million through the European Peace Facility for the military component of AUSSOM.

The funding is primarily intended to cover troop allowances, non-lethal equipment and related services.

The EU said the additional support would strengthen AUSSOM’s operational readiness and help maintain security and protect civilians in areas affected by Al-Shabaab and other armed groups.

The new contribution brought the EU’s total support to successive African Union-led missions in Somalia since 2007 to almost €2.8 billion.

However, the additional European funding does not by itself resolve the broader problem created by uncertainty surrounding the future of UN logistical support.

AUSSOM requires not only troop allowances but also fuel, transportation, medical evacuation, engineering, supplies and other services to maintain operations across Somalia.

The loss of a major logistical support mechanism would therefore require donors and the African Union to develop an alternative system.

Recent handovers show the transition is already underway

The debate over funding is taking place alongside an ongoing process of transferring security responsibilities from African Union forces to Somali troops.

Recent developments around the handover of AUSSOM positions, including reported transfers of responsibility in areas such as Buurhakaba in Bay region, demonstrate the direction in which the security transition is moving.

Such handovers can be an important step toward strengthening Somali ownership, but their success depends heavily on whether Somali forces are adequately prepared to hold the positions after the African Union troops leave.

This is particularly significant in areas where Al-Shabaab remains active. A base can be formally handed over, but maintaining control of the surrounding roads, villages and supply routes requires sustained manpower and logistical support.

Why this matters for Jubaland

The funding crisis could have particular implications for Jubaland because the federal government’s security transition is taking place amid an already complicated political and military environment in the region.

Jubaland has long been one of the main areas of operations against Al-Shabaab, particularly in Lower Juba and Gedo.

The region includes strategically important areas such as Kismayo and the wider Juba River corridor, while Al-Shabaab continues to operate in parts of southern Somalia.

Any reduction in international military and logistical support could therefore place additional pressure on Jubaland forces and Somali federal troops operating in the area.

The situation is further complicated by political tensions between the Federal Government and the Jubaland administration.

Disagreements over political authority, security arrangements and the role of federal forces have previously affected cooperation between Mogadishu and Kismayo.

This means that an AUSSOM withdrawal in Jubaland cannot be viewed solely as a military issue. The success of any handover would also depend on cooperation between the Federal Government, Jubaland authorities and the various Somali security forces operating in the region.

If AUSSOM reduces its presence without a coordinated replacement arrangement, the responsibility could fall disproportionately on Somali forces already operating in a politically divided environment.

For Jubaland, this could create pressure on its security forces to defend a wider area with limited resources while also confronting Al-Shabaab.

The Ethiopian factor in South West

The wider security situation in southern Somalia has also become more complicated following changes in the deployment of Ethiopian forces.

Ethiopian troops have for years played a significant role in security operations in Somalia, including in areas of South West State.

Reports of Ethiopian forces leaving positions such as Buurhakaba and other areas of Bay have added to concerns over how security responsibilities will be distributed among Somali forces, AUSSOM and other regional actors.

The situation is particularly sensitive because South West State is also experiencing political tensions involving the administration of Abdiasis Hassan Mohamed Laftagareen and federal authorities, while disagreements over political leadership and security arrangements remain unresolved.

This means that any reduction in foreign military support is occurring at a time when Somalia is already facing political disputes that can affect coordination between security forces.

The Al-Shabaab threat remains the central concern

The most serious risk associated with an abrupt reduction in AUSSOM’s capacity is the possibility that Al-Shabaab could exploit security gaps.

The group has demonstrated its ability to attack military positions, ambush security forces and re-establish influence in areas where government forces struggle to maintain a permanent presence.

For this reason, the success of the security transition will depend not only on the number of Somali soldiers available but also on their ability to sustain operations.

That requires reliable salaries, ammunition, vehicles, fuel, intelligence, medical evacuation capabilities, communications systems and supply chains.

A force may be capable of capturing a town during an offensive, but holding that town over the long term requires a much broader logistical and institutional system.

A critical deadline approaches

AUSSOM’s current mandate expires on December 31, 2026, making the coming months particularly important for Somalia, the African Union, the United Nations and international donors.

The United Nations has emphasized the importance of continued support for AUSSOM and Somali security forces, while also stressing the need for Somalia to develop its own security and logistical capabilities.

The central question is now whether international partners can find a sustainable financing and logistics arrangement before the current support structure expires.

If they do, AUSSOM could continue supporting Somali forces while positions are transferred gradually and responsibly.

If they do not, Somalia could face a much more difficult transition in which the African Union mission is forced to reduce its footprint faster than Somali forces can compensate for the loss.

For Somalia, the issue is therefore bigger than the future of AUSSOM itself. It is a test of whether the country can move from international security dependence toward a sustainable national security system without creating new opportunities for Al-Shabaab.

The challenge will be particularly significant in Jubaland, South West and other areas where security, political disputes and the presence of armed groups overlap.

Ultimately, the success of the transition will depend on whether security handovers are based on operational readiness rather than financial necessity alone.

AUSSOM’s departure from a location should occur only when Somali forces have the capacity to take over, maintain supply routes and protect civilians.

Otherwise, a process intended to strengthen Somalia’s ownership of its security could instead create the very security vacuum that Al-Shabaab has repeatedly sought to exploit.

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