Somalia has become an important arena for growing political, economic and security competition between Türkiye and the United Arab Emirates, two regional powers seeking to expand their influence across the Horn of Africa and the wider Red Sea region.
Their involvement centres on strategic ports, military cooperation, maritime security and relationships with Somalia’s federal government and regional administrations.
However, there is no established evidence that the two countries are directly fighting over Somalia or have agreed to divide the country between them.
Their competition is better understood as a contest for strategic partnerships, economic opportunities and regional influence, with implications for Somalia’s political unity and sovereignty.
An analysis published by Chatham House on October 16, 2026, identified Türkiye and the UAE as two of the most influential external actors involved in Somalia’s political tensions.
According to the assessment, Türkiye has generally maintained close relations with the Federal Government in Mogadishu, while the UAE has developed stronger ties with several federal member states and political actors opposed to the central government.
Türkiye’s engagement with Somalia expanded significantly in 2011, when President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Mogadishu during a severe drought and humanitarian crisis.
What initially focused on emergency assistance, infrastructure development and social services gradually developed into a broader partnership covering defence, security, trade and energy.
One of Türkiye’s most important investments in Somalia’s security sector is the TURKSOM military training facility in Mogadishu, where Somali soldiers, including members of the specialised Gorgor units, receive training.
Turkish companies have also become involved in managing major economic infrastructure, including Mogadishu’s seaport and international airport.
In 2024, the two governments signed a 10-year defence and economic cooperation agreement that includes support for developing Somalia’s naval capabilities and protecting its coastline.
The agreement strengthened Türkiye’s position as a major security partner for Mogadishu and gave the relationship a longer-term strategic dimension.
Energy cooperation has also expanded. Türkiye and Somalia have pursued agreements covering oil and gas exploration, creating potential long-term commercial interests for Ankara.
The arrival of Türkiye’s oil exploration vessel, Çağrı Bey, in Somali waters in 2026 further demonstrated the expansion of cooperation in the energy sector.
For Türkiye, maintaining close relations with the Federal Government provides an opportunity to strengthen its defence partnership, expand economic interests and establish a more prominent role in maritime security across the Horn of Africa.
The UAE’s approach has involved a combination of commercial investment, infrastructure development and security partnerships.
Abu Dhabi has developed relationships with several Somali regional administrations while pursuing interests in ports and strategic coastal locations.
One of its most significant commercial interests is the Port of Bosaso, where Dubai-based DP World holds a 30-year concession to manage and develop port operations.
The UAE has also established relationships with Somaliland and Jubbaland, including economic and security cooperation.
These partnerships reflect Abu Dhabi’s interest in protecting its investments, maintaining access to important maritime routes and strengthening its strategic presence along the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.
The region’s proximity to major international shipping corridors makes its ports and coastal infrastructure particularly valuable.
The rivalry became more visible in January 2026, when Somalia’s Federal Government announced the cancellation of all agreements with the UAE, including arrangements involving defence and security cooperation.
Mogadishu said the decision was based on concerns relating to the country’s sovereignty and national interests.
The UAE did not immediately respond to a request for comment from Reuters at the time.
The announcement also exposed disagreements between the federal government and several regional administrations over who has the authority to negotiate and maintain agreements with foreign governments.
Somaliland, Puntland and Jubbaland rejected the federal government’s decision, maintaining that it would not automatically invalidate their own arrangements with Abu Dhabi.
Puntland indicated that its relationship with the UAE, particularly the agreement involving Bosaso Port, would continue.
Jubbaland similarly maintained that the federal decision would not affect its existing security and development arrangements with the Emirates.
Somaliland also rejected the suggestion that Mogadishu’s announcement could determine the future of its relations with Abu Dhabi.
The dispute highlighted a longstanding constitutional and political question in Somalia: the extent of federal authority over international agreements and the role of regional administrations in conducting external relations.
It also demonstrated how competing foreign partnerships can become entangled in disagreements over the country’s federal system.
This is where the contrasting approaches of Türkiye and the UAE become particularly apparent.
Chatham House’s October 2026 analysis described Türkiye as primarily working through the Federal Government, while the UAE has maintained a wider network of relationships involving regional administrations and other political stakeholders.
A separate assessment published by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) on May 7, 2026, also highlighted these differences, noting Türkiye’s reliance on its partnership with Mogadishu and the UAE’s close relationships with Puntland, Jubbaland and Somaliland.
Nevertheless, Somalia’s political landscape cannot be reduced to two competing camps.
Not all regional administrations or political figures are formally aligned with either country, and both Türkiye and the UAE have interests that may overlap in certain economic and security areas.
Their relationships with Somali actors also reflect individual political, commercial and strategic calculations.
Somalia’s geographical position helps explain why the country attracts such sustained external interest.
Its extensive coastline stretches along the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, close to maritime routes connecting the Red Sea with the wider Indian Ocean. This location gives the country considerable importance for international shipping, trade and regional security.
The ports of Mogadishu, Bosaso, Berbera and Kismayo are therefore not merely commercial facilities. They also have strategic value because of their locations, access to maritime routes and potential roles in regional logistics and military operations.
Türkiye and the UAE are among several countries seeking to establish or strengthen economic and security relationships around these routes.
Competition across the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea also involves Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Israel and other regional and international powers, making Somalia part of a much wider geopolitical environment.
Foreign involvement can bring substantial benefits, including investment, military training, infrastructure development, equipment and support for security institutions.
However, the risks increase when external interests become closely connected to Somalia’s internal political divisions.
One major concern is the possibility of deeper political fragmentation.
If Somali political leaders and regional administrations use foreign partnerships to strengthen their positions in domestic disputes, reaching national agreements could become increasingly difficult.
Disagreements over port concessions and other international agreements could also generate legal and political confrontations between the Federal Government and regional administrations.
Without a clear and mutually accepted framework governing foreign agreements, disputes over jurisdiction and national authority are likely to persist.
Security cooperation presents another challenge. If military assistance, training and equipment become dependent on shifting political relationships, Somalia could struggle to maintain a unified national security strategy.
Differences between federal and regional authorities could also complicate coordination among forces operating in areas where Al-Shabaab remains active.
The militant group could benefit from such divisions if political disputes weaken cooperation between security agencies, disrupt military operations or divert resources from counterterrorism efforts.
Chatham House warned in its October 16 analysis that the combination of Somalia’s internal political divisions and competition among regional powers could increase the risk of prolonged instability and confrontation.
The central concern, therefore, is whether Somalia could become a theatre in which external powers pursue their interests through competing local partnerships.
When foreign governments maintain separate relationships with federal leaders, regional administrations and opposition figures, domestic disagreements can acquire a wider geopolitical dimension.
There is, however, insufficient evidence to conclude that Türkiye and the UAE have a coordinated plan to push Somalia into conflict or divide its territory.
Their competition should instead be assessed through their documented agreements, investments, military partnerships and political relationships.
For Somalia, the challenge is to benefit from international partnerships without allowing them to undermine national institutions or deepen existing divisions.
This requires a clear and consistent policy on foreign military cooperation, port concessions, natural resources and agreements with regional administrations.
A stronger federal framework, transparent contracts, parliamentary oversight and meaningful consultation with federal member states could help reduce disputes over external partnerships.
Somali authorities would also need to ensure that security agreements serve nationally agreed priorities rather than the interests of individual political actors.
Ultimately, Türkiye and the UAE will continue to pursue their respective strategic interests in the Horn of Africa.
Whether their involvement strengthens Somalia or adds to its political difficulties will depend substantially on how Somali institutions manage those relationships and protect the country’s sovereignty, unity and long-term interests.