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	<title>Opinion Archives - Kaab TV</title>
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		<title>Reflection on Puntland’s State-Building Legacy and Somalia’s Unfinished Journey</title>
		<link>https://en.kaabtv.com/reflection-on-puntlands-state-building-legacy-and-somalias-unfinished-journey/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Abdalle Mumin]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 01 Aug 2026 20:20:55 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Opinion]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Special Report]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Puntland]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://en.kaabtv.com/?p=20823</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>One morning in early 2003, while reading Kaaha Bari, a daily local newspaper in Puntland which I greatly admired, I came across an article with a powerful title in Somali: &#8220;Nin geedo tiriyay oo qurax ka tagay, geedo ma tirin&#8221;. It literally translates as &#8220;A man who counted the trees but left out the acacia [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/reflection-on-puntlands-state-building-legacy-and-somalias-unfinished-journey/">Reflection on Puntland’s State-Building Legacy and Somalia’s Unfinished Journey</a> appeared first on <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com">Kaab TV</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>One morning in early 2003, while reading <em>Kaaha Bari</em>, a daily local newspaper in <a href="https://kaabtv.com/puntland-oo-28-jirsatay-dowladnimadii-geedka-hoostiisa-ka-bilaabatay-ee-hana-qaaday/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><strong>Puntland</strong></a> which I greatly admired, I came across an article with a powerful title in Somali: &#8220;Nin geedo tiriyay oo qurax ka tagay, geedo ma tirin&#8221;.</p>
<p>It literally translates as “A man who counted the trees but left out the acacia tree did not count trees at all.”</p>
<p>It was a simple phrase, but it carried a profound lesson. It described the danger of focusing only on what is visible — numbers, names, reports, and events — while missing the deeper reality that gives meaning to everything else.</p>
<p>It was a reminder that sometimes the most important thing is not what attracts immediate attention, but the foundation that quietly provides shelter and stability — like the acacia tree whose shade protects everything around it.</p>
<p>Over the years, I have read thousands of articles by others. I had also written many myself. Yet that <em>Kaaha Bari</em> article and its title have remained in my memory. The phrase returns whenever I reflect on Somalia’s long and painful search for statehood and the way we measure political progress.</p>
<p>Twenty-eight years ago, few Somalis could have imagined that a functioning system of governance could emerge from a country that had lost its central state, where violence had become normal, and where armed factions competed for control.</p>
<p>The idea that a political order could be built away from the traditional centres of power — even beginning under the shade of a tree — seemed almost impossible.</p>
<p>Hope was fragile. Doubt was overwhelming.</p>
<p>Somalia was living through one of the darkest periods in its modern history. Mogadishu was devastated by conflict. My family had to flee several times from the capital due to the endless clashes that turned to ruthless and bloody.</p>
<p>That was following the civil war that began in 1990. The national government had collapsed and militias ruled the streets, towns and cities including Mogadishu. Institutions had disappeared. Militias and warlords shaped daily life. For many, the idea of rebuilding a state seemed like a distant dream.</p>
<p class="PDq2pG_selectionAnchorContainer" data-start="0" data-end="228">That is why many had lost hope. With the exception of those who fled to refugee camps in Kenya, Ethiopia, and elsewhere, many others sought safety and stability in regional towns and cities such as Garowe, Bosaso, and Galkayo.</p>
<p data-start="230" data-end="362" data-is-last-node="" data-is-only-node="">Two years later, in 1991, Somaliland announced its withdrawal from the rest of Somalia and began pursuing a separate political path.</p>
<p>Yet on 1 August 1998, Puntland declared its formation and began an ambitious experiment: rebuilding governance from within Somali society through consensus, local legitimacy, traditional structures, and emerging institutions.</p>
<p class="isSelectedEnd">The region laid the foundation for a new model of governance built around a localised political system, clan consensus, and institutional structures. It adopted a constitution, established a parliament selected through clan-based representation, and created a process through which a regional president could be elected.</p>
<p class="isSelectedEnd">Unlike Somaliland, which declared its separation from the rest of Somalia, Puntland’s founding vision was different. Its constitution clearly advocated for a federal Somalia and positioned Puntland as part of a united Somali state based on power-sharing, decentralisation, and regional autonomy.</p>
<h3><strong>Wait and see</strong></h3>
<p>Puntland did not seek secession. Instead, it presented itself as an experiment in rebuilding Somali statehood from the ground up — creating functioning institutions at the regional level while working toward the restoration of a federal national government.</p>
<p>It was an experiment that few believed could succeed.</p>
<p>At the time, many observers responded with a simple phrase: “Let us wait and see.”</p>
<p>Few could predict whether such an experiment would survive. There were no guarantees that a regional administration born amid insecurity and uncertainty could establish institutions, maintain order, and develop a political identity over decades.</p>
<p>But that is precisely what made <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/what-we-learned-from-puntlands-elections/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><strong>Puntland’s journey</strong></a> significant.</p>
<p>Today, Puntland marks its 28th anniversary — the fruit of a journey that began under the shade of a tree, built through local consensus, and shaped by the people whose lives it was created to serve.</p>
<figure id="attachment_20825" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-20825" style="width: 1600px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img fetchpriority="high" decoding="async" class="Today, Puntland marks its 28th anniversary. wp-image-20825 size-full" title="Today, Puntland marks its 28th anniversary." src="https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/dabaaldegga-Puntland-.jpeg" alt="Today, Puntland marks its 28th anniversary." width="1600" height="1066" srcset="https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/dabaaldegga-Puntland-.jpeg 1600w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/dabaaldegga-Puntland--300x200.jpeg 300w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/dabaaldegga-Puntland--1024x682.jpeg 1024w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/dabaaldegga-Puntland--768x512.jpeg 768w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/dabaaldegga-Puntland--1536x1023.jpeg 1536w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/dabaaldegga-Puntland--630x420.jpeg 630w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/dabaaldegga-Puntland--150x100.jpeg 150w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/dabaaldegga-Puntland--696x464.jpeg 696w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/dabaaldegga-Puntland--1068x712.jpeg 1068w" sizes="(max-width: 1600px) 100vw, 1600px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-20825" class="wp-caption-text">Today, Puntland marks its 28th anniversary.</figcaption></figure>
<p>While much of Somalia continued to struggle with lawlessness, political fragmentation, corruption, and weak institutions, Puntland gradually developed a functioning system of administration. It built security structures, established government institutions, created a legal framework, conducted political processes, and for the first implemented <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/puntland-takes-historic-step-with-first-direct-election-in-54-years/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><strong>a local government election</strong></a> based on direct vote by its people in 2023, and developed a level of continuity rarely seen elsewhere in Somalia.</p>
<p>Its achievements were not perfect, and Puntland has faced its own internal challenges, including political disputes, security threats, governance shortcomings, and debates over democracy and representation.</p>
<p>But history must be judged by comparison with the reality from which it emerged.</p>
<h3><strong>Ignoring Puntland’s experience would be a mistake</strong></h3>
<p>The question is not whether Puntland became an ideal state. The question is whether it demonstrated that Somalis could rebuild institutions after state collapse — and whether it provided lessons for the rest of the country.</p>
<p>In many ways, Puntland became a living example that Somalia was not incapable of governance. It challenged the assumption that state failure was permanent. It showed that political order could be rebuilt through Somali-led solutions, local ownership, and gradual institution-building.</p>
<p>The contrast with the wider Somali landscape remains difficult to ignore.</p>
<p>Decades after the collapse of the central government, many parts of Somalia continue to face insecurity, corruption, weak rule of law, political instability, and institutions that struggle to deliver basic services. Despite billions of dollars in international support and repeated attempts at national reconstruction, the country continues to wrestle with questions that Puntland confronted at its birth.</p>
<p>This does not mean Puntland holds all the answers, nor that its experience can simply be copied across Somalia. Every region has its own history, challenges, and political realities.</p>
<p>But ignoring Puntland’s experience would be a mistake.</p>
<p>Anyone trying to understand state-building in Somalia and the wider Horn of Africa without seriously examining Puntland’s 28-year journey is overlooking one of the most important chapters of the story.</p>
<p>They risk becoming the person who counted the trees but failed to see the acacia tree.</p>
<p>Because sometimes, the true measure of progress is not found in grand declarations or international conferences. It is found in the quiet growth of institutions — in places where people began with almost nothing and proved that rebuilding was possible.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/reflection-on-puntlands-state-building-legacy-and-somalias-unfinished-journey/">Reflection on Puntland’s State-Building Legacy and Somalia’s Unfinished Journey</a> appeared first on <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com">Kaab TV</a>.</p>
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		<title>Somalia’s Counterterrorism Consensus Is Giving Way to Geopolitics</title>
		<link>https://en.kaabtv.com/somalias-counterterrorism-consensus-is-giving-way-to-geopolitics/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Abdi Guled]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 27 Jul 2026 15:14:52 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Conflict & Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Opinion]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AUSSOM]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Somalia counter terror security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Turkey in Somalia]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://en.kaabtv.com/?p=20697</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>For much of the post-2006 period, Somalia occupied an unusual place in international diplomacy. Despite disagreements over governance, federalism and competing national interests, foreign governments, regional powers and Somali political actors shared one overarching assumption: whatever their differences, the campaign against al-Shabaab had to remain the first priority. That understanding became the invisible architecture supporting [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/somalias-counterterrorism-consensus-is-giving-way-to-geopolitics/">Somalia’s Counterterrorism Consensus Is Giving Way to Geopolitics</a> appeared first on <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com">Kaab TV</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p id="ember74" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">For much of the post-2006 period, Somalia occupied an unusual place in international diplomacy.</p>
<p id="ember75" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Despite disagreements over governance, federalism and competing national interests, foreign governments, regional powers and Somali political actors shared one overarching assumption: whatever their differences, the campaign against al-Shabaab had to remain <a class="tBFjffeGIQFLpveCPjltPbGBTBmBprvDA " tabindex="0" href="https://fic.tufts.edu/wp-content/uploads/state-building-somalia.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">the first priority.</a></p>
<p id="ember76" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">That understanding became the invisible architecture supporting Somalia&#8217;s modern state-building <a class="tBFjffeGIQFLpveCPjltPbGBTBmBprvDA " tabindex="0" href="https://www.politicalsettlements.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/PSRP-RVI-Report-7-Stabilization-Extraversion-and-Political-Settlements-in-Somalia-Tobias-Hagmann-2016.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">project</a>.</p>
<p id="ember77" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">African Union peacekeepers deployed under successive <a class="tBFjffeGIQFLpveCPjltPbGBTBmBprvDA " tabindex="0" href="https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc-report-on-somalia-en.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">mandates</a>. Western governments financed military operations while investing in <a class="tBFjffeGIQFLpveCPjltPbGBTBmBprvDA " tabindex="0" href="https://icct.nl/sites/default/files/import/publication/Hogendoorn-The-Good-Governance-Gap-in-EU-Policy-for-Somalia-Dec2017.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">institution-building</a>. The United Nations sustained the logistical infrastructure that enabled those missions to function.</p>
<p id="ember78" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Political crises routinely emerged between Mogadishu and federal member states, but international mediation was largely guided by a single objective &#8211; preventing those disputes from undermining the <a class="tBFjffeGIQFLpveCPjltPbGBTBmBprvDA " tabindex="0" href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv.7614.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">counterinsurgency campaign.</a></p>
<p id="ember79" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">For nearly twenty years, counterterrorism did more than shape military policy. It defined diplomatic priorities, determined aid allocations and provided a common language through which external powers justified their <a class="tBFjffeGIQFLpveCPjltPbGBTBmBprvDA " tabindex="0" href="https://media.odi.org/documents/7646.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">engagement</a> with Somalia.</p>
<p id="ember80" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Today, that strategic framework is quietly dissolving.</p>
<p id="ember81" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Not because the al-Qaeda-linked extremist group of al-Shabaab has diminished as a security threat. If anything, the radical group has demonstrated an extraordinary capacity to <a class="tBFjffeGIQFLpveCPjltPbGBTBmBprvDA " tabindex="0" href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/23311886.2025.2576151" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">adapt</a>, recovering territory after setbacks, exploiting governance failures, infiltrating state institutions and expanding influence in areas where government authority has weakened.</p>
<p id="ember82" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Rather, the insurgency is no longer the central lens through which Somalia is viewed.</p>
<p id="ember83" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Counterterrorism has become one priority among several competing strategic interests, and increasingly it is not the one driving regional <a class="tBFjffeGIQFLpveCPjltPbGBTBmBprvDA " tabindex="0" href="https://rsdi.ae/en/publications/egypts-growing-role-in-somalia-implications-for-red-sea-security-and-regional-balance" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">decision-making.</a></p>
<p id="ember84" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The transformation has been gradual enough to escape dramatic headlines.</p>
<h3 id="ember85" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong>The Rise of Competitive Geopolitics</strong></h3>
<p id="ember86" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">There was no conference announcing the end of the counterterrorism era. No formal declaration that international priorities had shifted. Instead, a succession of political crises steadily redirected diplomatic attention toward new disputes that often carried greater strategic urgency for the actors involved.</p>
<p id="ember87" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The catalyst was not a battlefield development but geopolitics.</p>
<p id="ember88" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Ethiopia&#8217;s controversial maritime <a class="tBFjffeGIQFLpveCPjltPbGBTBmBprvDA " tabindex="0" href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/qna/africa/ethiopia/stakes-ethiopia-somaliland-deal" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">memorandum of understanding</a>with Somaliland transformed Somalia&#8217;s sovereignty into a regional fault line, fundamentally reshaping relations between Addis Ababa and Mogadishu.</p>
<p id="ember89" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Egypt, viewing Ethiopia primarily through the prism of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam dispute, expanded its <a class="tBFjffeGIQFLpveCPjltPbGBTBmBprvDA " tabindex="0" href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/377703241_The_Grand_Ethiopian_Renaissance_Dam_GERD_Geopolitical_Implications" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">military partnership</a> with Somalia, turning the country into another arena within a much broader contest for regional influence.</p>
<p id="ember90" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Turkey simultaneously <a class="tBFjffeGIQFLpveCPjltPbGBTBmBprvDA " tabindex="0" href="https://dergipark.org.tr/en/download/article-file/5055444" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">evolved</a> beyond its long-standing role as Somalia&#8217;s principal security partner. Ankara increasingly positioned itself as both mediator and strategic stakeholder, balancing security cooperation with expanding maritime and economic interests.</p>
<figure id="attachment_20699" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-20699" style="width: 1035px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img decoding="async" class="Turkey military officials in Mogadishu. Photo/handout. wp-image-20699 size-full" title="Turkey military officials in Mogadishu. Photo/handout." src="https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Xasan-iyo-Turkey.jpg" alt="Turkey military officials in Mogadishu. Photo/handout." width="1035" height="932" srcset="https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Xasan-iyo-Turkey.jpg 1035w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Xasan-iyo-Turkey-300x270.jpg 300w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Xasan-iyo-Turkey-1024x922.jpg 1024w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Xasan-iyo-Turkey-768x692.jpg 768w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Xasan-iyo-Turkey-466x420.jpg 466w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Xasan-iyo-Turkey-150x135.jpg 150w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Xasan-iyo-Turkey-696x627.jpg 696w" sizes="(max-width: 1035px) 100vw, 1035px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-20699" class="wp-caption-text">Turkey military officials in Mogadishu. Photo/handout.</figcaption></figure>
<p id="ember91" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Elsewhere, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and other Gulf powers continued pursuing commercial, logistical and political <a class="tBFjffeGIQFLpveCPjltPbGBTBmBprvDA " tabindex="0" href="https://www.policycenter.ma/sites/default/files/PB_20-02_Aidi.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">influence</a> through ports, infrastructure investments and bilateral partnerships, reinforcing a broader regional competition that extended well beyond counterterrorism.</p>
<h3 id="ember92" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong>The Fragmentation of Somalia’s Security Coalition</strong></h3>
<p id="ember93" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Somalia itself was changing as well.</p>
<p id="ember94" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Domestic politics increasingly eclipsed the security consensus that had previously united competing political actors.</p>
<p id="ember95" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Constitutional amendments advanced by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud reopened fundamental questions about federalism, elections and the distribution of power.</p>
<p id="ember96" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Puntland, the semiautonomous federal state in northern Somalia suspended <a class="tBFjffeGIQFLpveCPjltPbGBTBmBprvDA " tabindex="0" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitutional_crisis_in_Somalia#:~:text=Part%20of%20the%20Somali%20Civil%20War%20(2009%E2%80%93present),after%20regional%20administration%20ends%20recognition%20of%20FGS." target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">recognition</a> of key federal institutions. Relations with Jubaland <a class="tBFjffeGIQFLpveCPjltPbGBTBmBprvDA " tabindex="0" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitutional_crisis_in_Somalia#:~:text=Part%20of%20the%20Somali%20Civil%20War%20(2009%E2%80%93present),after%20regional%20administration%20ends%20recognition%20of%20FGS." target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">deteriorated</a>. Political debates that had once been temporarily contained in the name of fighting al-Shabab instead became defining struggles over the future structure of the Somali state.</p>
<p id="ember97" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The consequence was subtle but profound.</p>
<p id="ember98" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Political capital that had previously been devoted to sustaining military coordination was redirected toward constitutional disputes, electoral competition and negotiations over authority between Mogadishu and regional administrations.</p>
<p id="ember99" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The effects gradually became visible on the battlefield.</p>
<p id="ember100" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The nationwide offensive launched in 2022 represented perhaps the closest Somalia had come to a genuinely <a class="tBFjffeGIQFLpveCPjltPbGBTBmBprvDA " tabindex="0" href="https://thesoufancenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/TSC-Insight_Operation-Black-Lion.pdf#:~:text=Following%20a%20series%20of%20clan%20uprisings%20against,Macawiisley%2C%20launched%20an%20offensive%20against%20the%20group." target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">integrated counterinsurgency</a>strategy in more than a decade.</p>
<p id="ember101" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The Somali National Army, local Ma&#8217;awisley militias and international partners combined military pressure with unprecedented community mobilization. Government forces recaptured dozens of towns across central Somalia, while local resistance demonstrated that al-Shabab could be challenged not only through conventional military operations but through <a class="tBFjffeGIQFLpveCPjltPbGBTBmBprvDA " tabindex="0" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022_Central_Somalia_offensive#:~:text=Ma%27awisley%20in%20Hiraan%20had%20organized%20in%202018,Ethiopia%2C%20triggering%20a%20strong%20Ethiopian%20military%20response." target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">popular rejection</a> of the austere insurgent rule.</p>
<p id="ember102" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">For a moment, the campaign appeared to alter the strategic balance. Yet counterinsurgency victories require political cohesion as much as military momentum.</p>
<p id="ember103" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">As relations between the federal government and regional administrations deteriorated, operational coordination <a class="tBFjffeGIQFLpveCPjltPbGBTBmBprvDA " tabindex="0" href="https://adf-magazine.com/2025/08/al-shabaab-surges-as-somali-states-squabble/" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">inevitably suffered</a>. Intelligence sharing became more difficult. Trust weakened. Forces trained for counterinsurgency were increasingly reassigned to manage domestic political confrontations and security crises unrelated to the insurgency itself.</p>
<p id="ember104" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Al-Shabab, by contrast, demonstrated the <a class="tBFjffeGIQFLpveCPjltPbGBTBmBprvDA " tabindex="0" href="https://africacenter.org/publication/asb45en-somalia-risk-jihadist-state/" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">patience</a> that has long distinguished successful insurgent organizations.</p>
<p id="ember105" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Rather than seeking decisive conventional battles, it absorbed military setbacks, dispersed its forces and waited for political fragmentation to erode the coherence of the coalition confronting it.</p>
<p id="ember106" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Its greatest advantage was not superior firepower but strategic consistency. International support was evolving in parallel as well.</p>
<h3 id="ember107" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong>The New Strategic Order in the Horn of Africa</strong></h3>
<p id="ember108" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The transition from the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) to the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) reflected more than an institutional <a class="tBFjffeGIQFLpveCPjltPbGBTBmBprvDA " tabindex="0" href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/the-new-au-somalia-mission-aussom-is-atmis-by-another-name-but-with-more-problems/" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">rebranding</a>. It revealed the changing political environment surrounding international engagement.</p>
<p id="ember109" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">European governments redirected attention and resources toward Russia&#8217;s war against Ukraine, instability across the Middle East and security pressures closer to Europe&#8217;s <a class="tBFjffeGIQFLpveCPjltPbGBTBmBprvDA " tabindex="0" href="https://www.diis.dk/en/research/the-african-union-stabilization-mission" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">borders</a>.</p>
<figure id="attachment_20640" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-20640" style="width: 1041px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="wp-image-20640 size-full" src="https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Ethiopias-Shadow-administration.png" alt="Explainer: Why Al-Shabaab's Shadow Administration Matters to Ethiopia" width="1041" height="606" srcset="https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Ethiopias-Shadow-administration.png 1041w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Ethiopias-Shadow-administration-300x175.png 300w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Ethiopias-Shadow-administration-1024x596.png 1024w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Ethiopias-Shadow-administration-768x447.png 768w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Ethiopias-Shadow-administration-721x420.png 721w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Ethiopias-Shadow-administration-150x87.png 150w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Ethiopias-Shadow-administration-696x405.png 696w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1041px) 100vw, 1041px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-20640" class="wp-caption-text">Ethiopian AU soldiers in Somalia. | Photo: AU/UN.</figcaption></figure>
<p id="ember110" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The United Nations confronted growing financial <a class="tBFjffeGIQFLpveCPjltPbGBTBmBprvDA " tabindex="0" href="https://unsos.unmissions.org/en/about/mandate" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">constraints</a> affecting peace operations globally. Washington increasingly <a class="tBFjffeGIQFLpveCPjltPbGBTBmBprvDA " tabindex="0" href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/visual-explainers/us-containment-strategy-somalia" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">emphasized</a> targeted counterterrorism capabilities, including intelligence support, air operations and specialized partnerships, rather than the expansive state-building ambitions that had characterized earlier phases of engagement.</p>
<p id="ember111" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Support for Somalia did not disappear. It became narrower.</p>
<h3 id="ember112" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong>The End of the Counterterrorism Era</strong></h3>
<p id="ember113" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The international coalition that once pursued broad political stabilization alongside security assistance increasingly shifted toward more selective, transactional forms of cooperation tailored to <a class="tBFjffeGIQFLpveCPjltPbGBTBmBprvDA " tabindex="0" href="https://www.diis.dk/en/research/the-african-union-stabilization-mission" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">individual</a> national interests.</p>
<p id="ember114" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">What emerged in its place was a broader strategic agenda driven less by traditional alliances than by maritime security, bilateral defense partnerships, infrastructure competition and shifting regional balances of power.</p>
<p id="ember115" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">A collective approach gradually gave way to a landscape of overlapping national interests, reflecting a wider transformation in international politics.</p>
<p id="ember116" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Across strategic regions, shared security frameworks have increasingly been replaced by more transactional arrangements shaped by competition, influence and access.</p>
<p id="ember117" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The post-9/11 era had elevated counterterrorism into the <a class="tBFjffeGIQFLpveCPjltPbGBTBmBprvDA " tabindex="0" href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-changing-character-of-terrorism-and-u-s-counterterrorism/" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">organizing principle</a> of foreign policy across much of Africa and the Middle East. Security assistance, diplomatic engagement and development programs were often structured around a singular objective: weakening extremist organizations before advancing broader political, economic and institutional goals.</p>
<p id="ember118" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">That hierarchy no longer dominates strategic thinking. Today&#8217;s international environment is increasingly multipolar.</p>
<p id="ember119" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Middle powers exercise <a class="tBFjffeGIQFLpveCPjltPbGBTBmBprvDA " tabindex="0" href="https://www.economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/The-Great-Fragmentation-web.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">greater influence</a>. Competition over trade corridors, critical infrastructure, energy resources and maritime access now shapes foreign policy calculations as much as ideological conflicts once did.</p>
<p id="ember120" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The Horn of Africa has become one of the clearest expressions of that shift.</p>
<p id="ember121" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Ports are strategic assets. Shipping lanes are geopolitical leverage. Military partnerships increasingly intersect with commercial investment, energy exploration and access to the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. Security policy has become inseparable from <a class="tBFjffeGIQFLpveCPjltPbGBTBmBprvDA " tabindex="0" href="https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-902454" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">economic geography.</a></p>
<p id="ember122" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Within that environment, al-Shabaab occupies a paradoxical position.</p>
<p id="ember123" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The group remains one of Africa&#8217;s most capable insurgent movements, yet it is no longer the <a class="tBFjffeGIQFLpveCPjltPbGBTBmBprvDA " tabindex="0" href="https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/SOM#:~:text=In%202012%2C%20al%2DShabaab%20successively%20lost%20control%20of,of%20the%20southern%20and%20central%20Somali%20countryside." target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">principal factor</a> shaping how major regional and international actors engage with Somalia.</p>
<p id="ember124" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Its threat persists. The strategic consensus surrounding that threat does not.</p>
<p id="ember125" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">History suggests that insurgencies rarely prevail because they overpower stronger states militarily. More often, they endure because the political coalitions confronting them gradually lose coherence. Competing priorities emerge. External partners diverge. Domestic political disputes overshadow shared security objectives.</p>
<p id="ember126" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Somalia increasingly <a class="tBFjffeGIQFLpveCPjltPbGBTBmBprvDA " tabindex="0" href="https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/SOM#:~:text=Al%2DShabaab%20maintained%20control%20over%20vast%20rural%20areas,southern%20Somalia%2C%20resulting%20in%20hundreds%20of%20deaths." target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">exhibits</a> those dynamics.</p>
<p id="ember127" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Federal institutions, regional administrations and foreign partners continue to pursue overlapping security goals, but they no longer operate within a unified strategic framework. Each actor is increasingly guided by distinct political calculations, bilateral interests and regional rivalries.</p>
<p id="ember128" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Al-Shabaab has not needed to transform itself nearly as <a class="tBFjffeGIQFLpveCPjltPbGBTBmBprvDA " tabindex="0" href="https://hornreview.org/2026/07/16/somalias-red-sea-balancing-act-and-the-houthi-spillover-risk/#:~:text=The%20Africa%20Center%20for%20Strategic%20Studies%20reported,Houthi%20proxy%20for%20the%20relationship%20to%20matter." target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">dramatically</a>.</p>
<p id="ember129" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">It has remained focused on a singular objective: preserving organizational resilience while expanding influence wherever state authority fragments.</p>
<p id="ember130" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The implications extend beyond Somalia.</p>
<p id="ember131" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The quiet erosion of the counterterrorism consensus marks a broader strategic transition across the Horn of Africa. The region is no longer primarily organized around defeating violent extremism. It is increasingly defined by contests over sovereignty, maritime access, infrastructure, commercial corridors and the ambitions of competing regional and middle powers.</p>
<p id="ember132" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Counterterrorism has not disappeared. It has simply been displaced from the center of the strategic map.</p>
<p id="ember133" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">For nearly two decades, defeating al-Shabab was widely treated as the prerequisite for political progress in Somalia. Today, political fragmentation increasingly defines the conditions under which that fight is conducted.</p>
<p id="ember134" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">That reversal may prove to be one of the most consequential, and least appreciated strategic transformations the Horn of Africa has experienced since al-Shabab first <a class="tBFjffeGIQFLpveCPjltPbGBTBmBprvDA " tabindex="0" href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounders/al-shabaab" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">emerged</a> as a regional insurgency.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/somalias-counterterrorism-consensus-is-giving-way-to-geopolitics/">Somalia’s Counterterrorism Consensus Is Giving Way to Geopolitics</a> appeared first on <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com">Kaab TV</a>.</p>
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			<media:title type="html">Xasan iyo Turkey</media:title>
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			<media:title type="html">Ethiopia&#8217;s Shadow administration</media:title>
			<media:description type="html">Explainer: Why Al-Shabaab&#039;s Shadow Administration Matters to Ethiopia</media:description>
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		<title>If Fahiima Quuje and Somaliland Can Reconcile, Why Can’t All Somalis Move Beyond Conflict?</title>
		<link>https://en.kaabtv.com/if-fahiima-quuje-and-somaliland-can-reconcile-why-cant-all-somalis-move-beyond-conflict/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Khadija Gutale]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 27 Jul 2026 14:44:55 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Conflict & Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Opinion]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Fahiima Quuje]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Khadija Gutale]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://en.kaabtv.com/?p=20681</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The recent developments involving Fahiima Quuje and Somaliland raise an important question: if individuals who were once deeply involved in conflict can reconcile or return, shouldn&#8217;t Somalis also find a way to move beyond the long-standing conflicts that have divided them? Fahiima Quuje was a prominent figure during the conflict between Somaliland and the SSC-Khaatumo [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/if-fahiima-quuje-and-somaliland-can-reconcile-why-cant-all-somalis-move-beyond-conflict/">If Fahiima Quuje and Somaliland Can Reconcile, Why Can’t All Somalis Move Beyond Conflict?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com">Kaab TV</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p class="isSelectedEnd">The recent developments involving Fahiima Quuje and Somaliland raise an important question: if individuals who were once deeply involved in conflict can reconcile or return, shouldn’t Somalis also find a way to move beyond the long-standing conflicts that have divided them?</p>
<p class="isSelectedEnd"><a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/nes-mp-fihiima-quujes-resignation-signals-new-political-realignment-in-las-anod-dispute/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><strong>Fahiima Quuje</strong></a> was a prominent figure during the conflict between Somaliland and the SSC-Khaatumo (now North Eastern Somalia NES). She was a key driver for the Dhulbahante movement that opposed Somaliland and is said to have supported efforts, both financially and politically, to remove Somaliland’s control from areas where her family originates.</p>
<p class="isSelectedEnd">On the 17th of July, reports emerged that she had returned to Somaliland.</p>
<p class="isSelectedEnd">Fahiima <a href="https://www.facebook.com/photo?fbid=2107692850158263&amp;set=a.104360037158231" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><strong>resigned</strong></a> from her seat in the Northeastern State Assembly, which she held as a representative of her clan since August last year after the regional state was established with Mogadishu backing.</p>
<p>Two days later, she received a heroic welcome at Hargeisa Egal International Airport, where government officials queued to greet her. Perhaps that marked the end of the many months of campaigns fueled by animosity on both sides—the Somaliland side and the Las Anod side.</p>
<p class="isSelectedEnd">The main purpose of this article is to ask whether Somalis can also move beyond the civil conflicts that have caused immense human suffering and economic destruction.</p>
<p class="isSelectedEnd">The country has endured decades of internal warfare, resulting in countless deaths and devastating communities across Somalia.</p>
<p class="isSelectedEnd">The political struggle that initially led to the collapse of Somalia’s military government gradually evolved into clan-based conflict, the effects of which continue to be felt today.</p>
<p class="isSelectedEnd">In some parts of Somalia, homes have been burned, innocent civilians have been killed, and vulnerable groups, including women, children, and traditional elders, have often become the primary victims.</p>
<figure id="attachment_20684" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-20684" style="width: 1363px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="wp-image-20684 size-full" title="Khadija Gutale." src="https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Khadiijo.jpeg" alt="Khadija Gutale." width="1363" height="1320" srcset="https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Khadiijo.jpeg 1363w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Khadiijo-300x291.jpeg 300w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Khadiijo-1024x992.jpeg 1024w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Khadiijo-768x744.jpeg 768w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Khadiijo-434x420.jpeg 434w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Khadiijo-150x145.jpeg 150w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Khadiijo-696x674.jpeg 696w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Khadiijo-1068x1034.jpeg 1068w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1363px) 100vw, 1363px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-20684" class="wp-caption-text">Khadija Gutale.</figcaption></figure>
<h4><strong>Somalis must also overcome clan bias, hatred</strong></h4>
<p class="isSelectedEnd">Communities have fought over water wells, and there have been reports of horrific acts of violence committed in the name of clan identity, including attacks on pregnant women.</p>
<p class="isSelectedEnd">Such incidents demonstrate the devastating consequences of hatred, division, and revenge.</p>
<p class="isSelectedEnd">Although Somalia’s clan-based political power-sharing system, commonly known as the 4.5 formula, may eventually give way to a multiparty political system, lasting peace requires more than institutional change.</p>
<p class="isSelectedEnd">Somalis must also overcome clan bias, hatred, and the culture of clan-based discrimination that has held the nation back for decades.</p>
<p class="isSelectedEnd">It is often ordinary citizens who suffer the most, while politicians from different clans frequently maintain working relationships and cooperate when pursuing political office.</p>
<p class="isSelectedEnd">This reality highlights the need to prioritize the welfare of the people over narrow clan interests.</p>
<p>The Somali media has a crucial role to play in promoting peace. Strong public awareness campaigns should reach even the most remote parts of the country, educating communities about the importance of peace, reconciliation, mutual respect, and peaceful coexistence.</p>
<p>Building a stable and united Somalia will require not only political reforms but also a collective commitment to healing divisions, rejecting clan hatred, and fostering national unity.</p>
<p><em>&#8211;</em><br />
<em>Khadija Gutale is a journalist and writer based in Mogadishu.</em></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/if-fahiima-quuje-and-somaliland-can-reconcile-why-cant-all-somalis-move-beyond-conflict/">If Fahiima Quuje and Somaliland Can Reconcile, Why Can’t All Somalis Move Beyond Conflict?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com">Kaab TV</a>.</p>
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		<media:thumbnail url="https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Khadiijo-150x150.jpeg" />
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			<media:title type="html">Khadiijo</media:title>
			<media:description type="html">Khadijo Gutale.</media:description>
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		<title>Beyond Piracy: How the Horn of Africa Reinvented Itself</title>
		<link>https://en.kaabtv.com/beyond-piracy-how-the-horn-of-africa-reinvented-itself/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Abdi Guled]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 15 Jul 2026 11:34:29 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[News]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Opinion]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Piracy in the horn of Africa]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Somalia pirates]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://en.kaabtv.com/?p=20361</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>At first light, the Port of Mogadishu moves to the rhythm of a national economy. Cargo ships discharge food, fuel and manufactured goods destined for cities across Somalia as customs officers process manifests and truck convoys head inland. Several hundred kilometers to the northwest, the Port of Berbera begins a different day. There, container vessels, [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/beyond-piracy-how-the-horn-of-africa-reinvented-itself/">Beyond Piracy: How the Horn of Africa Reinvented Itself</a> appeared first on <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com">Kaab TV</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p id="ember74" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">At first light, the Port of Mogadishu moves to the rhythm of a national economy. Cargo ships discharge food, fuel and manufactured goods destined for cities across Somalia as customs officers process manifests and truck convoys head inland.</p>
<p id="ember75" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Several hundred kilometers to the northwest, the <a class="nnFuRRoHPXobuvhnNQKLVHTCAHHBMHsMruzUf " tabindex="0" href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Red-Sea-Rivalries-The-Gulf-The-Horn-and-the-New-Geopolitics-of-the-Red-Sea-1.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">Port of Berbera</a> begins a different day.</p>
<p id="ember76" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">There, container vessels, logistics companies and foreign investors focus less on supplying a single country than on connecting an expanding trade corridor stretching into landlocked Ethiopia and beyond.</p>
<p id="ember77" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The two ports serve different markets, answer to different political authorities and embody competing visions of the Horn of Africa. Together, they reveal how a coastline once synonymous with piracy has become one of the world&#8217;s most consequential geopolitical frontiers.</p>
<p id="ember78" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Today they form parts of the same geopolitical story in the region.</p>
<p id="ember79" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">For much of the early twenty-first century, the Horn of Africa occupied a narrow place in the international imagination. The region was viewed primarily through the lens of piracy, famine, terrorism and fragile states. International engagement reflected that perception.</p>
<p id="ember80" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Foreign navies escorted merchant ships through the Gulf of Aden, humanitarian agencies responded to recurring crises and diplomats concentrated on containing instability before it spilled into international commerce.</p>
<p id="ember81" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">That framework increasingly belongs to another era.</p>
<p id="ember82" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The Horn has undergone one of the most significant <a class="nnFuRRoHPXobuvhnNQKLVHTCAHHBMHsMruzUf " tabindex="0" href="https://worldpeacefoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Pax-Africana-or-Middle-East-Security-Alliance-final.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">strategic transformations</a> in contemporary international politics. The central question is no longer how to suppress pirates operating from isolated coastlines. It is who will shape the political and economic architecture surrounding one of the world&#8217;s most consequential maritime corridors.</p>
<p id="ember83" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Ports, logistics corridors, naval facilities, energy exploration, submarine cables and diplomatic recognition have become the region&#8217;s new strategic currency, highlighted by the geopolitical maneuvers surrounding the controversial <a class="nnFuRRoHPXobuvhnNQKLVHTCAHHBMHsMruzUf " tabindex="0" href="https://riftvalley.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Red-Sea-Politics_FINAL.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">Ethiopia-Somaliland Port Deal.</a></p>
<p id="ember84" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">What has changed is not simply the Horn itself. It is the geography of global power.</p>
<figure id="attachment_20362" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-20362" style="width: 2442px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="Armed Somali military man standing near the coast of Marka town. | Photo/AU /UN. wp-image-20362 size-full" title="Armed Somali military man standing near the coast of Marka town. | Photo/AU /UN." src="https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Marka-beach-Somalia.png" alt="Armed Somali military man standing near the coast of Marka town. | Photo/AU /UN." width="2442" height="1630" srcset="https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Marka-beach-Somalia.png 2442w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Marka-beach-Somalia-300x200.png 300w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Marka-beach-Somalia-1024x684.png 1024w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Marka-beach-Somalia-768x513.png 768w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Marka-beach-Somalia-1536x1025.png 1536w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Marka-beach-Somalia-2048x1367.png 2048w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Marka-beach-Somalia-629x420.png 629w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Marka-beach-Somalia-150x100.png 150w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Marka-beach-Somalia-696x465.png 696w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Marka-beach-Somalia-1068x713.png 1068w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Marka-beach-Somalia-1920x1282.png 1920w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 2442px) 100vw, 2442px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-20362" class="wp-caption-text">Armed Somali military man standing near the coast of Marka town. | Photo/AU /UN.</figcaption></figure>
<p id="ember85" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">For generations, policymakers treated the Red Sea as a boundary separating two distinct strategic systems. The Middle East occupied one side; the Horn of Africa occupied the other.</p>
<p id="ember86" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Although conflicts occasionally crossed the water, each region largely maintained its own political logic, but today, Gulf states and African littoral countries are forming an interconnected <a class="nnFuRRoHPXobuvhnNQKLVHTCAHHBMHsMruzUf " tabindex="0" href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Red-Sea-Forum-English-Web.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">Red Sea Arena</a> where their security and economic fates are deeply intertwined.</p>
<p id="ember87" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">That distinction has steadily eroded.</p>
<p id="ember88" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The disruption of commercial shipping by Yemen&#8217;s Houthi movement demonstrated that instability on one shoreline could rapidly reshape political calculations on the other.</p>
<p id="ember89" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Insurance costs rose, shipping companies diverted vessels around southern Africa, Suez Canal revenues declined sharply and governments throughout the region were forced to reconsider long-held assumptions about maritime security.</p>
<p id="ember90" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">&#8220;The Bab el-Mandeb Strait is no longer a peripheral commercial highway separating two distinct continents,&#8221; observes Kaan Devecioğlu, a regional geopolitics specialist at ORSAM.</p>
<p id="ember91" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">&#8220;It has become a <a class="nnFuRRoHPXobuvhnNQKLVHTCAHHBMHsMruzUf " tabindex="0" href="https://gsd.msu.edu.tr/Content/sayilar/dokuman/GSD_WIS_OS/GSD_WIS_OS_Art_3_122024.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">highly integrated security continuum</a> where land, maritime and energy politics are completely inseparable.&#8221;</p>
<p id="ember92" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The water separating Arabia from Africa has become less a frontier than a shared strategic space.</p>
<p id="ember93" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">That transformation has fundamentally altered how regional governments perceive themselves.</p>
<p id="ember94" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Few events illustrated this shift more dramatically than Ethiopia&#8217;s memorandum of understanding with Somaliland in early 2024.</p>
<p id="ember95" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">By pursuing guaranteed maritime access through Somaliland in exchange for the prospect of diplomatic recognition, Addis Ababa challenged long-standing assumptions surrounding <a class="nnFuRRoHPXobuvhnNQKLVHTCAHHBMHsMruzUf " tabindex="0" href="https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2193&amp;context=auilr" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">sovereignty, access to the sea and regional diplomacy.</a></p>
<p id="ember96" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">For Ethiopia, home to well over 120 million people yet lacking direct maritime access, the agreement reflected a strategic imperative. For Somalia, it represented an unacceptable challenge to territorial integrity.</p>
<p id="ember97" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">What might once have remained a bilateral dispute rapidly acquired regional dimensions.</p>
<p id="ember98" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Egypt, already locked in a prolonged confrontation with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, deepened its strategic engagement with Somalia. Military cooperation between Cairo and Mogadishu increasingly reflected broader calculations extending far beyond Somali territory.</p>
<p id="ember99" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The Nile and the Red Sea, once treated as separate strategic questions, have become increasingly interconnected.</p>
<p id="ember100" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Turkey&#8217;s mediation efforts demonstrated another emerging reality.</p>
<p id="ember101" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Unlike many outside powers, Ankara has cultivated substantial political, economic and security relationships with both Somalia and Ethiopia. Rather than choosing between competing partners, it has attempted to preserve influence across both capitals.</p>
<p id="ember102" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The resulting diplomacy has often emphasized managing disagreements rather than definitively resolving them.</p>
<p id="ember103" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">That preference for ambiguity reflects a wider characteristic of contemporary geopolitics.</p>
<p id="ember104" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Increasingly, governments seek flexibility instead of fixed alliances.</p>
<p id="ember105" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Perhaps the clearest illustration can be found in Djibouti.</p>
<p id="ember106" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Over the past decade the small state has transformed strategic geography into national leverage by hosting military facilities belonging to countries that <a class="nnFuRRoHPXobuvhnNQKLVHTCAHHBMHsMruzUf " tabindex="0" href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/FP_20200615_china_djibouti_vertin.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">compete globally</a>, including the United States, China, France and Japan.</p>
<p id="ember107" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Rather than viewing those relationships as contradictory, Djibouti has converted competing interests into mutually reinforcing sources of <a class="nnFuRRoHPXobuvhnNQKLVHTCAHHBMHsMruzUf " tabindex="0" href="https://d-nb.info/1097381390/34" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">political and economic relevance.</a></p>
<p id="ember108" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The arrangement reflects a broader regional strategy that might best be described as distributed dependency.</p>
<p id="ember109" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Instead of aligning exclusively with a single external patron, governments increasingly cultivate <a class="nnFuRRoHPXobuvhnNQKLVHTCAHHBMHsMruzUf " tabindex="0" href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25765949.2024.2340332" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">overlapping partnerships,</a> diversifying investment, security cooperation and diplomatic engagement while avoiding complete dependence on any one power.</p>
<p id="ember110" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Cold War notions of choosing sides have become progressively less useful here. The competition itself has become more fluid.</p>
<p id="ember111" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Somaliland, the self-governingbreakaway territory in northern Somalia, offers perhaps the clearest example of this evolving approach.</p>
<p id="ember112" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Rather than relying solely on traditional diplomatic recognition through international institutions, it has increasingly sought to convert strategic geography into political influence.</p>
<p id="ember113" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Access to coastline, ports and logistics infrastructure has become an <a class="nnFuRRoHPXobuvhnNQKLVHTCAHHBMHsMruzUf " tabindex="0" href="https://riftvalley.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Red-Sea-Politics_FINAL.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">instrument</a> through which an unrecognized territory seeks greater international engagement.</p>
<p id="ember114" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Whether that strategy ultimately succeeds remains uncertain. Its significance lies elsewhere.</p>
<p id="ember115" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">It suggests that geography itself is becoming a negotiable political asset in an era when maritime access carries growing strategic value.</p>
<p id="ember116" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Recognition, in this sense, is no longer shaped exclusively through diplomatic declarations. It is increasingly influenced by infrastructure, logistics and commercial calculation.</p>
<p id="ember117" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The implications extend well beyond the Horn.</p>
<p id="ember118" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Western engagement has historically emphasized counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance and stabilization.</p>
<p id="ember119" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Those priorities remain important. Yet they now compete with a broader agenda centered on supply chains, critical minerals, energy exploration, digital connectivity, military logistics and competition among middle powers seeking greater regional influence.</p>
<p id="ember120" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The region has become a crossroads where African politics, Gulf security, Mediterranean strategy and Indo-Pacific commerce <a class="nnFuRRoHPXobuvhnNQKLVHTCAHHBMHsMruzUf " tabindex="0" href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Red-Sea-Forum-English-Web.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">increasingly converge.</a></p>
<p id="ember121" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">This evolution also requires rethinking piracy itself.</p>
<p id="ember122" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Piracy has not disappeared. Isolated incidents continue to occur, particularly during periods of wider maritime insecurity. But the phenomenon no longer defines the strategic landscape.</p>
<p id="ember123" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Statecraft has replaced criminality as the principal driver of geopolitical change.</p>
<p id="ember124" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The greater danger today is not that armed men in small boats interrupt global commerce. It is that <a class="nnFuRRoHPXobuvhnNQKLVHTCAHHBMHsMruzUf " tabindex="0" href="https://www.oiip.ac.at/cms/media/policy-analysis-geopolitical-formation-wider-horn-of-africa.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">overlapping rivalries</a> involving Ethiopia, Somalia, Egypt, the Gulf states, Turkey and Israel create pathways through which localized disputes could escalate into wider regional confrontations.</p>
<p id="ember125" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The Horn now sits at the intersection of several overlapping strategic competitions simultaneously.</p>
<p id="ember126" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">That convergence explains why governments once only marginally engaged in the region now devote increasing diplomatic, military and economic attention to it.</p>
<p id="ember127" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The reinvention of the Horn of Africa has occurred gradually, almost quietly.</p>
<p id="ember128" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">There was no singular turning point announcing the transition from peripheral crisis zone to geopolitical centerpiece. Instead, a succession of events, the Red Sea shipping crisis, Ethiopia&#8217;s maritime ambitions, renewed competition among Gulf powers, Turkish mediation, Egypt&#8217;s expanding military role and the growing importance of strategic ports, collectively altered the region&#8217;s place within the international system.</p>
<p id="ember129" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">History rarely announces such transformations while they are unfolding. Yet one conclusion is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore.</p>
<p id="ember130" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The era when the world looked toward the Horn of Africa and saw principally piracy has passed.</p>
<p id="ember131" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Today, governments, investors and military planners see something fundamentally different: a maritime crossroads where the future balance of power linking Africa, the Middle East and the wider Indo-Pacific may increasingly be shaped.</p>
<hr class="reader-divider-block__horizontal-rule" />
<p id="ember132" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong>Abdi Guled</strong><em> is a Horn of Africa analyst and journalist focusing on political risk, armed groups and geostrategic competition in the region.</em></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/beyond-piracy-how-the-horn-of-africa-reinvented-itself/">Beyond Piracy: How the Horn of Africa Reinvented Itself</a> appeared first on <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com">Kaab TV</a>.</p>
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			<media:title type="html">Marka beach Somalia</media:title>
			<media:description type="html">Armed Somali military man standing near the coast of Marka town. &#124; Photo/AU /UN.</media:description>
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		<title>The Blue Economy Battle: How a Fishing Deal Tested Somalia&#8217;s Federal Experiment</title>
		<link>https://en.kaabtv.com/the-blue-economy-battle-how-a-fishing-deal-tested-somalias-federal-experiment/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Abdi Guled]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 08 Jul 2026 11:44:29 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Opinion]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Somalia Blue Economy Dispute]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://en.kaabtv.com/?p=20192</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>For more than a decade, Somalia&#8217;s federal system has rested on a fragile political compromise: that disputes over sovereignty could be postponed while the state itself was rebuilt. That assumption is now under unprecedented strain, not over elections or constitutional amendments alone, but over tuna, territorial waters and who has the authority to monetize one [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/the-blue-economy-battle-how-a-fishing-deal-tested-somalias-federal-experiment/">The Blue Economy Battle: How a Fishing Deal Tested Somalia&#8217;s Federal Experiment</a> appeared first on <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com">Kaab TV</a>.</p>
]]></description>
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<p id="ember74" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">For more than a decade, Somalia&#8217;s federal <a class="rbJlXBzRbySbuPCWQzjoswVAGlGBFmEhY " tabindex="0" href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23311886.2026.2640641" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">system</a> has rested on a fragile political compromise: that disputes over sovereignty could be postponed while the state itself was rebuilt.</p>
<p id="ember75" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">That assumption is now under unprecedented strain, not over elections or constitutional amendments alone, but over tuna, territorial waters and who has the authority to monetize one of East Africa&#8217;s richest maritime frontiers.</p>
<p id="ember76" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">A sharply worded <a class="rbJlXBzRbySbuPCWQzjoswVAGlGBFmEhY " tabindex="0" href="https://www.somaliguardian.com/news/somalia-news/somalia-puntland-bans-turkish-fishing-firm-somturk/" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">declaration</a> issued by Puntland on July 5 banning the Turkish-backed fishing company SOMTURK from operating along its coastline may appear, at first glance, to concern fisheries management. In reality, it reflects a much deeper struggle over the distribution of political authority inside <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a> and the future architecture of the federal state.</p>
<p id="ember77" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The dispute illustrates how the country&#8217;s <a class="rbJlXBzRbySbuPCWQzjoswVAGlGBFmEhY " tabindex="0" href="https://enact-africa.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/pages/1769157325550-2026-01-20-ENACT-IUUfishing-Somalia-paper2.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">blue economy</a> has become the latest arena in which unresolved constitutional questions are colliding with expanding foreign strategic interests.</p>
<p id="ember78" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">More significantly, the declaration represents one of Puntland&#8217;s clearest assertions yet of its interpretation of federalism. While the move is consequential, it is not entirely surprising given the <a class="rbJlXBzRbySbuPCWQzjoswVAGlGBFmEhY " tabindex="0" href="https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/SOM" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">steady deterioration</a>in relations between Garowe and Mogadishu.</p>
<p id="ember79" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">By explicitly rejecting federal mandates and &#8216;unilateral&#8217; agreements such as SOMTURK, Puntland is drawing a clear constitutional line in the sand, signaling that it will not allow decisions affecting its maritime domain and natural resources to be imposed without its consent. In doing so,</p>
<p id="ember80" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Garowe is reaffirming what it considers its constitutional authority over maritime governance and resource management within its jurisdiction.</p>
<p id="ember81" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">SOMTURK, established in late 2025 as part of the broader defense and economic <a class="rbJlXBzRbySbuPCWQzjoswVAGlGBFmEhY " tabindex="0" href="https://hornreview.org/2026/04/02/somalias-blue-economy-deal-with-turkey/" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">partnership</a>between Mogadishu and Ankara, was designed to serve as both a commercial enterprise and a regulatory mechanism.</p>
<p id="ember82" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Operating through a partnership involving Turkey&#8217;s military-affiliated <a class="rbJlXBzRbySbuPCWQzjoswVAGlGBFmEhY " tabindex="0" href="https://www.dailysabah.com/business/economy/turkiye-somalia-sign-deal-to-cooperate-in-fisheries-sector" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">pension fund, OYAK</a>, and Somalia&#8217;s Ministry of Fisheries and Blue Economy, the company represents far more than a fishing venture. It embodies Mogadishu&#8217;s effort to centralize authority over the country&#8217;s Exclusive Economic Zone, regulate foreign fishing licenses, combat illegal fishing and channel maritime revenues toward rebuilding national naval capabilities.</p>
<p id="ember83" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">From the perspective of the Federal Government, such centralization is an expression of sovereign statehood. A country fragmented by decades of conflict cannot, officials argue, afford competing systems of maritime governance if it hopes to protect one of Africa&#8217;s longest coastlines from illegal exploitation.</p>

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<h3 id="ember84" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong>The Competing Visions of Sovereignty</strong></h3>
<p id="ember85" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Puntland sees an entirely different picture.</p>
<p id="ember86" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">To authorities in Garowe, SOMTURK represents the latest attempt by the federal government to absorb powers that remain constitutionally unresolved.</p>
<p id="ember87" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Their argument rests not simply on political disagreement but on their interpretation of Somalia&#8217;s 2012 Provisional Federal <a class="rbJlXBzRbySbuPCWQzjoswVAGlGBFmEhY " tabindex="0" href="https://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/legislation/details/14305" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">Constitution</a>, particularly provisions concerning natural resources and the preservation of pre-existing state authorities until a final constitutional settlement is reached.</p>
<p id="ember88" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Because Somalia&#8217;s federal constitutional framework remains incomplete, Puntland argues that unilateral agreements involving strategic natural resources require negotiated consent rather than executive decisions from Mogadishu.</p>
<p id="ember89" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The <a class="rbJlXBzRbySbuPCWQzjoswVAGlGBFmEhY " tabindex="0" href="https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1Cm6g9aAmt/" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">declaration</a> goes further by questioning the legitimacy of the current federal administration&#8217;s mandate to conclude long-term international concessions.</p>
<p id="ember90" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">That legal disagreement is not merely academic.</p>
<p id="ember91" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">It strikes at the central question that has shadowed Somalia&#8217;s reconstruction since 2012: where does federal authority end and regional sovereignty begin?</p>
<h3 id="ember92" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong>From Legal Dispute to Political Strategy</strong></h3>
<p id="ember93" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The fishing dispute also arrives after months of steadily <a class="rbJlXBzRbySbuPCWQzjoswVAGlGBFmEhY " tabindex="0" href="https://www.garoweonline.com/en/news/somalia/somalia-puntland-accuses-president-hassan-sheikh-of-fueling-piracy-and-undermining-federalism" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">worsening relations</a> between President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud&#8217;s administration and Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni.</p>
<p id="ember94" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Political tensions accelerated earlier this year following disputes surrounding federal consultative meetings, disagreements over aviation access and growing accusations from Puntland that Mogadishu was <a class="rbJlXBzRbySbuPCWQzjoswVAGlGBFmEhY " tabindex="0" href="https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/SOM" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">interfering</a>in regional political affairs.</p>
<p id="ember95" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Subsequent restrictions imposed by Puntland on federal security recruitment, coupled with allegations that the federal government was supporting rival local actors inside the state, deepened mutual distrust.</p>
<p id="ember96" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Against that backdrop, the maritime confrontation appears less like an isolated disagreement than another stage in an increasingly comprehensive political rupture. It also raises broader questions about Puntland&#8217;s political trajectory.</p>
<p id="ember97" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The increasingly assertive posture adopted by Garowe may suggest that President Said Abdullahi Deni is prioritizing the consolidation of his domestic political base and institutional authority within Puntland rather than positioning himself for a bid for the federal presidency in the coming electoral cycle.</p>
<p id="ember98" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">While such an interpretation remains necessarily speculative, experts say, the timing and substance of Puntland&#8217;s latest actions point toward a leadership increasingly focused on strengthening regional autonomy amid an intensifying constitutional confrontation with Mogadishu.</p>
<p id="ember99" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong>Turkey&#8217;s Expanding Maritime Footprint</strong></p>
<p id="ember100" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The timing is equally significant.</p>
<p id="ember101" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Only days before Puntland&#8217;s announcement, Mogadishu expanded its <a class="rbJlXBzRbySbuPCWQzjoswVAGlGBFmEhY " tabindex="0" href="https://eafricaninstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Turkiye-Africa-Ties-Paper-1.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">maritime cooperation</a> with Turkish institutions through additional legal and educational agreements. Rather than reassuring regional administrations, those agreements reinforced perceptions within Puntland that Turkey&#8217;s growing role extends beyond capacity-building into the political consolidation of federal authority.</p>
<p id="ember102" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">That perception matters because foreign partnerships inside <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a> rarely remain purely technical. Infrastructure projects, military training missions and economic investments often acquire symbolic significance within domestic political competition.</p>
<p id="ember103" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">For supporters of the federal government, Turkish involvement represents one of the few <a class="rbJlXBzRbySbuPCWQzjoswVAGlGBFmEhY " tabindex="0" href="https://www.policycenter.ma/publications/turkiye-emerging-middle-power-africa" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">consistent international partnerships</a> that has strengthened Somali institutions after years of state collapse.</p>
<figure id="attachment_20200" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-20200" style="width: 1789px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="wp-image-20200 size-full" title="The fishing dispute also arrives after months of steadily worsening relations between President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's administration and Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni." src="https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Hassan-Sheikh-vs-Said-Deni.png" alt="The fishing dispute also arrives after months of steadily worsening relations between President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's administration and Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni." width="1789" height="970" srcset="https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Hassan-Sheikh-vs-Said-Deni.png 1789w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Hassan-Sheikh-vs-Said-Deni-300x163.png 300w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Hassan-Sheikh-vs-Said-Deni-1024x555.png 1024w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Hassan-Sheikh-vs-Said-Deni-768x416.png 768w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Hassan-Sheikh-vs-Said-Deni-1536x833.png 1536w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Hassan-Sheikh-vs-Said-Deni-775x420.png 775w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Hassan-Sheikh-vs-Said-Deni-150x81.png 150w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Hassan-Sheikh-vs-Said-Deni-696x377.png 696w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Hassan-Sheikh-vs-Said-Deni-1068x580.png 1068w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1789px) 100vw, 1789px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-20200" class="wp-caption-text">The fishing dispute also arrives after months of steadily worsening relations between President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud&#8217;s administration and Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni.</figcaption></figure>
<p id="ember104" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">For many critics including some based in Puntland, however, Ankara increasingly appears less as a neutral development partner than as a strategic enabler of centralized authority in Mogadishu.</p>
<p id="ember105" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Whether that perception accurately reflects Turkish policy is almost secondary to its political consequences.</p>
<p id="ember106" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Perhaps the most consequential aspect of Puntland&#8217;s declaration lies in its language regarding enforcement.</p>
<p id="ember107" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">By warning that unauthorized vessels operating under federal licenses could face inspection and law enforcement measures, Puntland signaled its willingness to move beyond constitutional objections toward operational implementation.</p>
<p id="ember108" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">That introduces an entirely new layer of risk.</p>
<p id="ember109" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Unlike many regional administrations elsewhere, Puntland possesses a relatively established maritime security capability through the Puntland Maritime Police Force, originally developed with substantial international support to combat piracy.</p>
<p id="ember110" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">If regional authorities attempt to enforce their own interpretation of maritime jurisdiction against vessels operating under federal authorization, experts warn that competing claims of legal authority could quickly escalate from a constitutional dispute into a potential confrontation at sea.</p>
<p id="ember111" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Such a scenario would place external partners, including Turkey, in an exceptionally delicate position, potentially forcing them to navigate conflicting assertions of authority between Somalia&#8217;s internationally recognized federal government and one of its most institutionally capable federal member states.</p>
<h3 id="ember112" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong>A Test for Somalia&#8217;s Federal Future</strong></h3>
<p id="ember113" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">More broadly, the dispute underscores a recurring lesson in Somali politics: institutional ambiguity rarely remains confined to legal debate.</p>
<p id="ember114" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Over time, unresolved constitutional questions tend to migrate into disputes over territory, security and economic resources.</p>
<p id="ember115" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The country&#8217;s offshore fisheries, estimated to be among the <a class="rbJlXBzRbySbuPCWQzjoswVAGlGBFmEhY " tabindex="0" href="https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/somalia-fisheries-and-blue-economy" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">most valuable</a> in the western Indian Ocean, have therefore become more than an economic asset. They are now a test of whether Somalia&#8217;s federal system can accommodate competing centers of political authority without descending into parallel governance.</p>
<p id="ember116" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The immediate implications extend well beyond the fisheries sector.</p>
<p id="ember117" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">International investors may increasingly find themselves navigating competing licensing frameworks, while economists warn that uncertainty over regulatory authority could complicate commercial decisions. At the same time, security cooperation risks becoming entangled in Somalia’s unresolved constitutional disputes, further blurring the line between institutional partnership and domestic political competition.</p>
<p id="ember118" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Foreign governments operating through agreements with Mogadishu may find those arrangements challenged by regional administrations asserting their own constitutional legitimacy.</p>
<p id="ember119" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">For <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a>, the episode reveals that the country&#8217;s deepest political contest is no longer confined to electoral timelines or constitutional drafting committees. It has expanded into questions of who governs strategic resources, who speaks for the state internationally and who ultimately exercises authority over one of Africa&#8217;s largest maritime domains.</p>
<p id="ember120" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The struggle over Somalia&#8217;s blue economy is therefore not simply about fishing rights.</p>
<p id="ember121" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">It is about whether the federal project itself can reconcile competing visions of sovereignty before constitutional disagreement hardens into permanent political separation.</p>
<p id="ember122" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">If that accommodation fails, the country&#8217;s coastline may become not the foundation of national economic renewal but the newest frontier in Somalia&#8217;s unfinished state-building project.</p>
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<p id="ember123" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong>Abdi Guled</strong><em> is a Horn of Africa analyst and journalist focusing on political risk, armed groups and geostrategic competition in the region.</em></p>
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<p>The post <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/the-blue-economy-battle-how-a-fishing-deal-tested-somalias-federal-experiment/">The Blue Economy Battle: How a Fishing Deal Tested Somalia&#8217;s Federal Experiment</a> appeared first on <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com">Kaab TV</a>.</p>
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			<media:title type="html">Hassan Sheikh vs Said Deni</media:title>
			<media:description type="html">The fishing dispute also arrives after months of steadily worsening relations between President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud&#039;s administration and Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni.</media:description>
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		<title>The End of the Blank Check? America&#8217;s Somalia Pivot Signals a New Era for the Horn</title>
		<link>https://en.kaabtv.com/the-end-of-the-blank-check-americas-somalia-pivot-signals-a-new-era-for-the-horn/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Abdi Guled]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 05 Jul 2026 11:21:45 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Conflict & Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Opinion]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://en.kaabtv.com/?p=20121</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>For nearly two decades, the architecture of international security in Somalia rested on an assumption so deeply embedded that it rarely required articulation: whatever political disagreements emerged among international partners, the United States would remain the indispensable financial anchor of the mission. That assumption is beginning to unravel. The diplomatic note Washington delivered to the [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/the-end-of-the-blank-check-americas-somalia-pivot-signals-a-new-era-for-the-horn/">The End of the Blank Check? America&#8217;s Somalia Pivot Signals a New Era for the Horn</a> appeared first on <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com">Kaab TV</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p id="ember73" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">For nearly two decades, the architecture of international security in <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a> rested on an assumption so deeply embedded that it rarely required articulation: whatever political disagreements emerged among international partners, the United States would remain the indispensable financial anchor of the mission.</p>
<p id="ember74" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">That assumption is beginning to unravel.</p>
<p id="ember75" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The <a class="rbJlXBzRbySbuPCWQzjoswVAGlGBFmEhY " tabindex="0" href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalia-peacekeeping-mission-risk-us-blocks-un-support-sources-say-2026-07-02/" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">diplomatic note</a> Washington delivered to the African Union on July 1, announcing its intention to <a class="rbJlXBzRbySbuPCWQzjoswVAGlGBFmEhY " tabindex="0" href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/the-us-plan-to-unplug-the-un-support-office-in-somalia-the-last-straw-that-may-break-the-african-unions-peace-operation/" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">terminate</a> support for the United Nations Support Office in <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a> (UNSOS) by the end of 2026, is more than another dispute over U.N. budgets.</p>
<p id="ember76" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">It signals one of the most consequential shifts in the international approach to <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a> since African Union peacekeepers first arrived in Mogadishu in <a class="rbJlXBzRbySbuPCWQzjoswVAGlGBFmEhY " tabindex="0" href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2007/3/1/first-au-peacekeepers-in-somalia-2" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">2007</a>.</p>
<p id="ember77" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Its significance extends well beyond accounting.</p>
<p id="ember78" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Behind the language of fiscal responsibility lies a broader reassessment of how the United States views protracted stabilization missions, the limits of externally financed state-building and the changing priorities of American foreign policy in an increasingly competitive geopolitical environment.</p>
<p id="ember79" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The message is unmistakable.</p>
<p id="ember80" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Washington no longer appears willing to underwrite an open-ended multilateral security architecture whose costs have continued to grow while Somalia&#8217;s political institutions remain fragile and its security gains uneven.</p>
<p id="ember81" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Instead, experts say, U.S. policymakers appear to be testing a different proposition: that financial pressure could achieve what years of diplomatic engagement have struggled to deliver by encouraging Somali political actors to compromise, prompting regional partners to assume greater responsibility and accelerating a transition from externally supported security arrangements toward greater Somali ownership.</p>
<p id="ember82" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Whether those objectives prove compatible is another matter. The American argument is, on its own terms, difficult to dismiss.</p>
<p id="ember83" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Since 2007, the United States has invested <a class="rbJlXBzRbySbuPCWQzjoswVAGlGBFmEhY " tabindex="0" href="https://2021-2025.state.gov/countries-areas/somalia/" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">billions of dollars</a>in <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a> through assessed United Nations contributions, bilateral military assistance, humanitarian relief and sustained counterterrorism operations.</p>
<p id="ember84" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">American support has enabled African peacekeepers to <a class="rbJlXBzRbySbuPCWQzjoswVAGlGBFmEhY " tabindex="0" href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalia-peacekeeping-mission-risk-us-blocks-un-support-sources-say-2026-07-02/" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">remain deployed,</a> strengthened elite Somali security units and helped prevent the federal government from suffering military collapse during periods of acute instability.</p>
<p id="ember85" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Yet the underlying strategic picture has changed remarkably little.</p>
<p id="ember86" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The al-Qaeda-linked al-Shabab group continues to demonstrate <a class="rbJlXBzRbySbuPCWQzjoswVAGlGBFmEhY " tabindex="0" href="https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/ASB-45-EN-Somalia-at-Risk-of-Becoming-a-Jihadist-State.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">operational resilience,</a>mounting major offensives and recovering previously lost territory.</p>
<p id="ember87" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Somali security institutions remain dependent on foreign logistics and external financing. Political disputes between Mogadishu and the Federal Member States repeatedly disrupt efforts to build unified national institutions. Tactical victories have accumulated, but they have not yet produced an enduring political settlement.</p>
<p id="ember88" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">From Washington&#8217;s perspective, <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a> increasingly resembles a challenge that has confronted the United States elsewhere &#8211; from Afghanistan to parts of the Sahel, where years of substantial financial investment yielded measurable security improvements without resolving the political conditions that sustained conflict.</p>
<p id="ember89" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">At a moment when American policymakers are balancing rising fiscal pressures with strategic competition against major powers, expensive stabilization missions have become increasingly difficult to defend.</p>
<p id="ember90" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">This shift is reflected in broader policy changes under the <a class="rbJlXBzRbySbuPCWQzjoswVAGlGBFmEhY " tabindex="0" href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/advance-article/doi/10.1093/afraf/adag021/8704472?login=false" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">U.S. National Security Strategy</a> and budget recalibrations prioritizing direct, interest-driven engagements.</p>
<p id="ember91" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">That does not necessarily imply disengagement.</p>
<p id="ember92" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The July 1 communication makes clear that Washington intends to preserve bilateral security cooperation even as it withdraws support for UNSOS.</p>
<p id="ember93" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The distinction is revealing.</p>
<p id="ember94" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Rather than financing the broad logistical infrastructure that sustains multinational peace operations, the United States appears to favor a narrower model built around direct partnerships with <a class="rbJlXBzRbySbuPCWQzjoswVAGlGBFmEhY " tabindex="0" href="https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2025-04/Brief_2025-9_Somalia_rev.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">capable Somali units</a>, intelligence cooperation, precision counterterrorism operations and targeted military assistance.</p>
<h4 id="ember95" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong>Washington’s Calculus vs Mogadishu’s Reality</strong></h4>
<p id="ember96" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Rather than signaling a retreat from <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a>, the move appears to reflect a recalibration of how Washington seeks to exercise its influence.</p>
<p id="ember97" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The challenge, however, is that strategies designed in Washington rarely unfold according to the political logic of Mogadishu.</p>
<p id="ember98" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">American officials have long identified Somalia&#8217;s internal fragmentation as the central obstacle to durable security.</p>
<p id="ember99" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Constitutional disputes remain unresolved. Relations between the federal government and several Federal Member States continue to oscillate between uneasy cooperation and open confrontation. Questions surrounding elections, revenue-sharing and authority over security institutions remain politically explosive.</p>
<p id="ember100" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Washington&#8217;s apparent calculation is that reducing external financial guarantees will increase the incentives for compromise.</p>
<p id="ember101" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Somalia&#8217;s political history offers little assurance that such pressure will produce the intended outcome.</p>
<p id="ember102" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Security sector reform is rarely a purely administrative exercise. It redistributes authority among clans, reshapes local balances of power and alters long-standing calculations about communal protection. Decisions concerning force integration, command structures or military deployments inevitably carry political consequences that extend well beyond military effectiveness.</p>
<p id="ember103" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">What international policy papers often describe as institutional reform is frequently understood within <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a> as a <a class="rbJlXBzRbySbuPCWQzjoswVAGlGBFmEhY " tabindex="0" href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/the-us-plan-to-unplug-the-un-support-office-in-somalia-the-last-straw-that-may-break-the-african-unions-peace-operation/" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">negotiation over political survival.</a></p>
<p id="ember104" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Compressed timelines and shrinking financial support could therefore encourage agreements that appear functional on paper while remaining contested in practice. Rather than reinforcing national cohesion, hurried political settlements risk deepening mistrust between federal authorities and regional administrations precisely when military coordination against al-Shabaab remains essential.</p>
<p id="ember105" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The operational consequences would extend beyond Somalia&#8217;s borders.</p>
<p id="ember106" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a> (AUSSOM) depends fundamentally on the logistical backbone provided through UNSOS.</p>
<p id="ember107" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Fuel, engineering support, transportation, medical evacuation and supply chains are not secondary administrative functions; they are <a class="rbJlXBzRbySbuPCWQzjoswVAGlGBFmEhY " tabindex="0" href="https://africa.businessinsider.com/local/markets/us-pulls-support-for-somalia-peacekeeping-mission-raising-fears-over-fight-against-al/1lme654" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">the critical infrastructure</a> that enables thousands of regional troops to remain operational across some of the country&#8217;s most contested territory.</p>
<p id="ember108" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">For troop-contributing countries including Kenya, Uganda, and Ethiopia, replacing those capabilities independently would be extraordinarily difficult.</p>
<p id="ember109" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Each faces mounting fiscal constraints at home, competing domestic security priorities, and increasing political scrutiny over prolonged overseas deployments. Should international financing diminish substantially, <a class="rbJlXBzRbySbuPCWQzjoswVAGlGBFmEhY " tabindex="0" href="https://www.diis.dk/en/research/the-african-union-stabilization-mission" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">mounting deficits</a> may force troop-contributing countries to withdraw forces or scale back operations unilaterally.</p>
<p id="ember110" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The greater danger is unlikely to be an abrupt collective withdrawal. History suggests a more gradual and potentially more destabilizing scenario.</p>
<p id="ember111" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Individual governments may begin adjusting deployments according to domestic political and financial calculations rather than a coordinated regional strategy.</p>
<p id="ember112" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Such staggered reductions could create uneven security vacuums across central and southern <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a>, presenting al-Shabaab with opportunities to exploit gaps created not by battlefield defeat but by shifting political priorities among its opponents.</p>
<h4 id="ember113" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong>A Shifting Regional Balance</strong></h4>
<p id="ember114" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Beyond the immediate military implications lies an equally significant geopolitical transition.</p>
<p id="ember115" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Strategic vacuums seldom remain empty.</p>
<p id="ember116" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">As the United States narrows its commitment to financing multilateral stabilization, other regional powers are likely to assume greater prominence.</p>
<p id="ember117" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Saudi Arabia’s approach to the Horn is increasingly shaped by Red Sea security considerations. The United Arab Emirates has expanded its regional footprint through ports, logistics infrastructure, and security partnerships. Turkey, meanwhile, has deepened its engagement through military training, defense cooperation, and longer-term institutional ties with Somali security forces.</p>
<p id="ember118" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Their approaches differ, but each possesses both the resources and the strategic incentive to expand influence should Western financing contract.</p>
<p id="ember119" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">For <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a>, this evolution presents both opportunity and risk.</p>
<p id="ember120" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Alternative partnerships may ease immediate funding pressures, yet external assistance rarely arrives detached from wider strategic interests.</p>
<p id="ember121" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Security cooperation increasingly intersects with maritime infrastructure, commercial investment, defense agreements and diplomatic alignment across the Red Sea basin.</p>
<p id="ember122" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The Horn of Africa is becoming part of a wider geopolitical theater that stretches from the Gulf to the eastern Mediterranean, where competition is shaped as much by trade routes and maritime access as by counterterrorism.</p>
<p id="ember123" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Washington&#8217;s decision may accelerate that transition rather than slow it.</p>
<p id="ember124" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Seen in that context, the American demarche represents more than a budgetary adjustment.</p>
<p id="ember125" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">It reflects a deeper evolution in American strategic thinking about the nature of long-term interventions. The era in which the United States routinely served as the unquestioned financial guarantor of expansive multilateral stabilization missions appears to be giving way to a more selective model centered on bilateral partnerships, fiscal restraint and narrowly defined security objectives.</p>
<p id="ember126" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Whether that shift ultimately encourages greater Somali self-reliance or instead contributes to renewed fragmentation will depend less on the scale of the funding reduction than on the political choices made in Mogadishu, the cohesion of African partners and the willingness of emerging regional powers to shape the security order that follows.</p>
<p id="ember127" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The larger question is therefore not whether the United States is leaving <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a>.</p>
<p id="ember128" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">It is whether the rules governing international engagement in <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a> are being rewritten.</p>
<p id="ember129" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">If they are, the coming years may be remembered not as the moment international attention receded from the Horn of Africa, but as the point at which competition over its future entered an entirely new phase, one in which influence is measured less by who finances peacekeeping than by who defines the region&#8217;s strategic architecture after it.</p>
<hr class="reader-divider-block__horizontal-rule" />
<p id="ember130" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong>Abdi Guled</strong><em> is a Horn of Africa analyst and journalist focusing on political risk, armed groups and geostrategic competition in the region.</em></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/the-end-of-the-blank-check-americas-somalia-pivot-signals-a-new-era-for-the-horn/">The End of the Blank Check? America&#8217;s Somalia Pivot Signals a New Era for the Horn</a> appeared first on <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com">Kaab TV</a>.</p>
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		<title>Sadia Moalin Ali: I Want Justice and an Independent Judiciary</title>
		<link>https://en.kaabtv.com/sadia-moalin-ali-i-want-justice-and-an-independent-judiciary/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Sadia Moalin Ali]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 02 Jul 2026 09:39:07 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[News]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Opinion]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Special Report]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Sadia Bajaaj]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Sadia Moalin Ali Hassan]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://en.kaabtv.com/?p=20066</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>My name is Sadia Moalin Ali Hassan. I am a Somali mother with a 12-month-old child who still depends on breastfeeding, care, and a mother&#8217;s love. My child needs my presence, and I have a responsibility to fulfill my duties as a mother. My lawyers have argued that my role as a mother, my child&#8217;s [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/sadia-moalin-ali-i-want-justice-and-an-independent-judiciary/">Sadia Moalin Ali: I Want Justice and an Independent Judiciary</a> appeared first on <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com">Kaab TV</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p class="isSelectedEnd">My name is <strong>Sadia Moalin Ali Hassan</strong>. I am a Somali mother with a 12-month-old child who still depends on breastfeeding, care, and a mother&#8217;s love. My child needs my presence, and I have a responsibility to fulfill my duties as a mother. My lawyers have argued that my role as a mother, my child&#8217;s dependence on me, and the fact that my child is still breastfeeding are circumstances that deserve careful consideration under the law and by the court.</p>
<p class="isSelectedEnd">In addition, I suffer from asthma, which has caused me significant hardship. As I have repeatedly stated, I have not received the medical care that my condition requires. I therefore request immediate access to an independent doctor to assess my health and ensure that I receive the medication, treatment, and living conditions necessary for my well-being.</p>
<p class="isSelectedEnd">I have been in detention since <strong>12 April 2026</strong>, and on <strong>14 April</strong> I was transferred to Mogadishu Central Prison. On <strong>25 June 2026</strong>, the Banadir Regional Court <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/banadir-court-sentences-sadia-moalin-ali-to-three-years-in-prison/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><strong>sentenced</strong></a> me to three years&#8217; imprisonment. I do not admit, and have never admitted, committing any crime. I believe I am being persecuted because of my peaceful statements and opinions that I have expressed, and that the judgment against me was not the product of an independent judicial process free from pressure or interference.</p>
<p class="isSelectedEnd">I believe that I have been deprived of my rights that were guaranteed to me under the Constitution. I feel that state power has been wrongly used against me and that I am being punished for expressing my views. Nevertheless, I do not want my case to become a tool for political confrontation, social conflict, or clan disputes. I do not want any individual or group to use my case to advance their own agenda in ways that could further complicate my situation. I ask only that my case be decided according to the law, credible evidence, and justice.</p>
<h3><strong>My Concerns About the Handling of My Case</strong></h3>
<p class="isSelectedEnd">My case was initially assigned to a judge whom I expected would hear it independently. I was later informed that the case file was taken over by the Chairman of the Banadir Regional Court, who also became the judge responsible for delivering the judgment against me. I believe this raises legitimate questions about the impartiality and independence that can reasonably be expected when a court president presides over a case brought by the very government that appointed him.</p>
<h3><strong>I Am Not Seeking a Presidential Pardon</strong></h3>
<p class="isSelectedEnd">I wish to make my position absolutely clear. I am <strong>not</strong> seeking a presidential pardon because I do not admit to committing any offence. A pardon is generally sought by someone who pleads guilty and asks to have a sentence forgiven or reduced. Instead, I seek a fair trial and a judgment based on the law and reliable evidence. I also seek an independent appeal that thoroughly reviews the way my case was handled, the evidence presented, the procedural safeguards afforded to me, and the legal reasoning behind my conviction.</p>
<p class="isSelectedEnd">I do not want emotional rhetoric or exaggerated statements that could damage my appeal.</p>
<p class="isSelectedEnd">I do not want my case to be reduced to clan politics or tribal divisions, which would only make my situation more difficult.</p>
<p class="isSelectedEnd">I do not want anyone to be abused or harmed because of my case.</p>
<p class="isSelectedEnd">Justice is a public trust and the foundation of every individual, family, society, and state. The judiciary must remain independent from political, social, economic, and clan-based pressure.</p>
<p class="isSelectedEnd">As Allah says in the Holy Qur&#8217;an:</p>
<blockquote>
<p data-pm-slice="1 1 []">Indeed, Allah commands you to return trusts to their rightful owners; and when you judge between people, judge with fairness. What a noble commandment from Allah to you! Surely Allah is All-Hearing, All-Seeing. (Quran: 4:58)</p>
</blockquote>
<p class="isSelectedEnd">Judicial office is not merely an authority to pass judgment; it is a responsibility entrusted by both God and society. Judges must treat all people equally, regardless of power, wealth, clan identity, public office, or personal connections. Before delivering judgment, a judge should remember that the person standing before the court has a dignity, a family, children, a life, and constitutional rights deserving of protection.</p>
<h3><strong>What I Am Asking For</strong></h3>
<p class="isSelectedEnd">In summary, I respectfully request the following:</p>
<ol start="1" data-spread="true">
<li><strong>A prompt and independent appeal.</strong> I ask that my appeal be heard without delay by an independent court that impartially reviews the judgment, the evidence, and the procedures followed during my trial.</li>
<li><strong>An impartial judge.</strong> I seek a judge whose decisions are not influenced by the wishes or interests of other officials, and who does not fear losing their position for upholding the law and justice.</li>
<li><strong>A clear separation between court administration and judge making the decision.</strong> I request that my appeal be assigned to a judge who does not simultaneously hold senior administrative responsibilities that could create actual or perceived pressure. Justice must not only be done; it must also be seen to be done.</li>
<li><strong>Full access to my case file for my lawyers.</strong> My legal team should be provided with the complete written judgment, all prosecution evidence, and the records and transcripts of the court proceedings.</li>
<li><strong>Immediate medical care.</strong> I request an examination by an independent doctor and access to the treatment, medication, and healthcare my condition requires.</li>
<li><strong>Consideration of my child&#8217;s best interests.</strong> The court should carefully consider my infant child&#8217;s need for breastfeeding, maternal care, and the impact my absence may have on my child&#8217;s health and development. My child is not a party to this case and should not suffer an indirect punishment for circumstances beyond their control.</li>
<li><strong>A transparent public appeal hearing.</strong> I request that my appeal hearing be open to the public, where permitted by law, so that the proceedings can be observed and public rumors or conflicting reports can be minimized.</li>
<li><strong>A judiciary free from social media pressure.</strong> I ask for judges who decide cases based on the law and evidence, free from the influence of Facebook, TikTok, or other social media platforms. Judicial decisions should never be driven by popularity, public approval, or the desire to satisfy those in positions of power, but solely by justice and the rule of law.</li>
<li><strong>No retaliation in my name.</strong> I ask my supporters not to insult others or blame entire families or clans because of my case. I reject responding to injustice with further injustice. My conscience tells me that a victim cannot seek justice by victimizing innocent people.</li>
</ol>
<h3><strong>Freedom of Expression and the Responsibility of the State</strong></h3>
<p class="isSelectedEnd">Citizens have the right to criticize their government, question its policies, and speak about unemployment, discrimination, corruption, poverty, and unequal opportunities. Freedom of expression does not place anyone above the law. Equally, the law must never become a weapon to silence criticism or intimidate those with less power.</p>
<p class="isSelectedEnd">Where a person is accused of unlawful speech, the authorities should clearly identify the specific statements alleged to be unlawful, explain which law they are said to have violated, and demonstrate the harm they caused. The accused must also be given a genuine opportunity to defend themselves.</p>
<p class="isSelectedEnd">The reality remains that the state possesses far greater power than an individual who is imprisoned. That is why the greatest responsibility rests with the government and the judiciary, both of which must demonstrate restraint, impartiality, and unwavering respect for the rule of law.</p>
<h3><strong>My Message to the Somali People</strong></h3>
<p class="isSelectedEnd">I ask the Somali public not to turn my case into a source of conflict, clan rivalry, insults, or revenge.</p>
<p class="isSelectedEnd">I encourage lawyers, religious scholars, women, mothers, journalists, academics, and human rights organizations to support every person&#8217;s right to a fair trial.</p>
<p class="isSelectedEnd">I am not asking for support because I belong to a particular clan.</p>
<p class="isSelectedEnd">Nor am I asking for support simply because I am a woman.</p>
<p class="isSelectedEnd">I ask for support because I am a Somali citizen entitled to justice, healthcare, and an independent judiciary.</p>
<p class="isSelectedEnd">Any one of us may one day stand before a court. If an unfair trial is accepted today, another person may face the same injustice tomorrow, until injustice becomes normalized.</p>
<p class="isSelectedEnd">Protecting my rights is therefore not only about protecting Sadiyo. It is about protecting the rights of every Somali citizen and safeguarding justice for both present and future generations.</p>
<h3><strong>Conclusion</strong></h3>
<p class="isSelectedEnd">No one should be oppressed through power, imprisonment, violence, intimidation, censorship, or the misuse of the law.</p>
<p class="isSelectedEnd">Somalia&#8217;s history contains many examples of people imprisoned because of their ideas, their speech, or their political views. My intention is not to compare myself with those who were unjustly treated in the past. Rather, I wish to remind my fellow Somalis that freedom of expression and an independent judiciary are precious values that every generation has a duty to preserve for the next.</p>
<p class="isSelectedEnd"><strong>By: Sadia Moalin Ali Hassan</strong></p>
<p class="isSelectedEnd"><em>Held at the Mogadishu Central Prison</em></p>
<p>___________</p>
<p><em>Note: This letter was sent by Sadia from Mogadishu Central Prison through her lawyer, Zakariye Ismail Nur, on 28 June 2026. The translation was done by Kaab TV team. <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Maqaal-Sacdiyo-bajaaj-Farriin-ka-timid-xabsiga-dhexe.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><strong>Read the full letter in Somali</strong></a></em></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/sadia-moalin-ali-i-want-justice-and-an-independent-judiciary/">Sadia Moalin Ali: I Want Justice and an Independent Judiciary</a> appeared first on <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com">Kaab TV</a>.</p>
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		<title>Somalia: When Force Amplifies the Very Message It Seeks to Silence</title>
		<link>https://en.kaabtv.com/when-force-amplifies-the-very-message-it-seeks-to-silence/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Abdirahman Abdishakur Warsame]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 10 Jun 2026 09:51:31 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Conflict & Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Opinion]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mogadishu Conflict]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Somalia Election Standoff]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://en.kaabtv.com/?p=19590</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The Mogadishu confrontation exposed the limits of governing through coercion and the growing gap between power and statesmanship. The confrontation that unfolded in Mogadishu on 3 June will be remembered not because an opposition demonstration was planned, but because of how Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), whose constitutional mandate had expired, chose to respond to it. [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/when-force-amplifies-the-very-message-it-seeks-to-silence/">Somalia: When Force Amplifies the Very Message It Seeks to Silence</a> appeared first on <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com">Kaab TV</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>The Mogadishu confrontation exposed the limits of governing through coercion and the growing gap between power and statesmanship.</em></p>
<p>The confrontation that unfolded in Mogadishu on 3 June will be remembered not because an opposition demonstration was planned, but because of how Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), whose constitutional mandate had expired, chose to respond to it. What could have remained a manageable political dispute was transformed into a national crisis that attracted widespread domestic and international attention.</p>
<p>The opposition’s objective was straightforward: to draw attention to the political crisis that emerged following the expiration of HSM’s constitutional mandate and to advocate for an inclusive electoral agreement, supported by credible mediation, capable of guiding <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a> through a peaceful and legitimate political transition.</p>
<p>Since the issues at stake were fundamentally political, they could only be resolved through dialogue, compromise, and consensus. Yet the decision to rely on force instead transformed what had been a manageable political dispute into a wider crisis, exposing civilians to danger, deepening mistrust among political actors, raising serious questions about the neutrality of security institutions, and focusing national and international attention on the legitimacy of the political process and the future of Somalia’s transition.</p>
<p>In attempting to suppress the message through force, HSM amplified it. In doing so, he exposed something even more consequential: the limits of governing through coercion, the dangers of political recklessness, and the widening gap between the exercise of power and the practice of statesmanship.</p>
<h3><strong>A Missed Opportunity for De-escalation</strong></h3>
<p>Recognizing the danger of further escalation, traditional elders and senior political figures initiated mediation efforts between HSM and the opposition.</p>
<p>Following consultations with both sides, they proposed a simple de-escalation agreement whereby government forces would return to their original positions, opposition leaders who had moved out of the heavily fortified zone around Mogadishu’s airport would return to their residences and headquarters, and an immediate political dialogue would begin under a mutually agreed framework.</p>
<p>The opposition leadership, including myself, accepted these proposals in good faith as a foundation for de-escalation and meaningful dialogue. HSM, however, rejected the agreement, thereby forfeiting an opportunity to reduce tensions and pursue a peaceful political settlement.</p>
<p>That decision reflected a preference for coercion over compromise, force over dialogue, and confrontation over consensus. History shows that lasting political authority is not measured by how many security forces a leader can deploy, but by how many crises he can resolve without resorting to force.</p>
<p>Statesmanship is demonstrated not by the exercise of power alone, but by the restraint, judgment, and political wisdom with which it is used.</p>
<h3><strong>Civilians Bore the Cost</strong></h3>
<p>While politicians and security commanders occupied the center of the confrontation, the heaviest burden was borne by ordinary citizens, who found themselves trapped in a crisis they neither created nor desired.</p>
<p>As gunfire echoed through neighborhoods, families were confined to their homes, businesses were forced to close, roads became impassable, and daily life ground to a halt. Children were exposed to scenes of fear and uncertainty, while many elderly citizens were forced to relive painful memories of conflicts that <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a> has spent decades struggling to overcome.</p>
<p>This human cost should not be underestimated. Somalis have sacrificed enormously to rebuild their communities, restore normalcy, and nurture hopes for a more peaceful future, yet every episode of political violence risks undermining that hard-won progress and reopening wounds that have not fully healed.</p>
<p>Although political disputes are inevitable in any society, exposing civilians to violence, fear, and insecurity should never be accepted as a legitimate consequence of political competition. Every life lost is a tragedy, every injury leaves a lasting impact on families and communities, and every act of destruction represents a failure to manage political disagreements responsibly.</p>
<p>Above all, statesmanship requires an unwavering commitment to protecting citizens from preventable harm, for the first duty of any leader is not to defeat political rivals but to safeguard the lives, security, and well-being of the people. In this confrontation, it was ordinary Somalis who paid the highest price.</p>
<h3><strong>Force Cannot Resolve a Crisis of Legitimacy</strong></h3>
<p>The central challenge facing <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a> today is not primarily a security challenge but a crisis of legitimacy, as questions concerning constitutional mandates, electoral processes, political representation, and the lawful transfer of authority cannot be resolved through security deployments, coercive measures, or demonstrations of force.</p>
<p>Following the collapse of the mediation effort, HSM rejected the proposed de-escalation agreement and authorized a large-scale security operation directed not only against opposition figures but also against traditional elders and political leaders who had been engaged in efforts to mediate between the two sides. The operation involved every major component of the national security forces, including the Gorgor units trained by Türkiye, the Haramcad special police forces, UAE-trained military police units, the Presidential Guard Regiment, the Special Guard Force, and elements of the National Intelligence and Security Agency (<a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/how-somalias-nisa-planted-spies-inside-opposition-circles/">NISA</a>), while also authorizing the use of heavy weapons, including mortars and armed fixed-wing drones.</p>
<p>Yet whether viewed as a show of strength or a security operation, the central political reality remains unchanged: force cannot resolve the underlying crisis. While it may suppress political opponents, intimidate critics, restrict political activity, or temporarily silence dissent, and may even eliminate individual adversaries, it cannot create political consent, restore public trust, or answer the fundamental questions of legitimacy that continue to shape Somalia’s political debate.</p>
<p>Indeed, the opposite occurred. The opposition sought to draw attention to concerns regarding legitimacy and the absence of an agreed electoral framework, but by attempting to suppress those concerns through force, HSM ensured that they received far greater attention than they otherwise would have received.</p>
<p>Consequently, public attention shifted away from the demonstration itself and toward the issues it was intended to highlight: the legitimacy of the political process, the future of Somalia’s political transition, and the urgent need for a negotiated political settlement.</p>
<p>History repeatedly demonstrates that legitimacy cannot be imposed through force; rather, it is earned through dialogue, constitutional order, political agreement, and public confidence, all of which remain indispensable to any durable solution to Somalia’s current crisis.</p>
<h3><strong>The Crisis Revealed Recklessness Rather Than Statesmanship</strong></h3>
<p>Leadership is tested most severely during moments of political tension and uncertainty, when judgment, restraint, patience, and a willingness to place national stability above immediate political interests become indispensable qualities of statesmanship.</p>
<p>The events in Mogadishu projected a very different image, however, as HSM chose escalation over dialogue, deepened polarization instead of fostering compromise, and generated greater uncertainty and mistrust rather than reassuring citizens and political stakeholders about the country’s political future. In doing so, he reinforced a pattern that many Somalis have increasingly come to recognize: the treatment of political disagreements as security threats, the portrayal of critics as adversaries to be subdued rather than political actors to be engaged, and the tendency to regard consensus-building as an obstacle rather than a necessity.</p>
<p>Yet leaders who are confident in the legitimacy of their position typically seek dialogue because they trust the strength of their arguments and their ability to prevail through political engagement. By contrast, leaders who are uncertain of their position often seek greater control because they fear the consequences of open political competition and genuine political contestation.</p>
<p>For many observers, therefore, the use of force against political opponents advocating for an agreed electoral process appeared less a demonstration of strength than an expression of insecurity, impatience, and strategic miscalculation. Rather than projecting confidence and authority, it raised deeper questions about political judgment and reinforced concerns that coercion was being used where dialogue, compromise, and consensus were required.</p>
<h3><strong>The Security Apparatus Exposed Structural Weaknesses</strong></h3>
<p>The confrontation also exposed troubling weaknesses within Somalia’s security apparatus, raising serious questions about its professionalism, command structure, and ability to remain insulated from political disputes.</p>
<p>Rather than operating as professional national institutions entrusted with protecting the lives, property, and rights of citizens, the security forces appeared to be carrying out the directives of an individual whose constitutional mandate had expired, while losing sight of their fundamental responsibilities to safeguard the public, uphold the Constitution, and enforce the rule of law.</p>
<p>The operation revealed significant deficiencies in command and control, marked by conflicting orders, overlapping chains of authority, and poor coordination among the various forces involved. Instead of demonstrating unity of purpose and operational discipline, the deployment exposed fragmentation, uncertainty, and a lack of coherent leadership.</p>
<p>There appeared to be no clearly defined political or security objective, no unified command structure directing the operation, and no shared sense of mission among the forces involved. Consequently, discipline gave way to confusion, coordination yielded to disorder, and the operation descended into chaos and disarray.</p>
<p>Such outcomes should concern every Somali citizen. When security institutions become entangled in political disputes, politics inevitably becomes more dangerous while security itself becomes less effective. Forces established to protect citizens, defend national institutions, and confront terrorist organizations such as Al-Shabaab and ISIS risk being diverted into political contests for which they were neither designed nor trained.</p>
<p>The recent crisis therefore exposed vulnerabilities within Somalia’s security architecture that can no longer be ignored, while underscoring the urgent need to preserve the professionalism, neutrality, cohesion, and institutional integrity of the country’s security forces.</p>
<h3><strong>The Way Forward</strong></h3>
<p>Somalia’s current crisis cannot be resolved through force, nor can it be overcome through unilateral decisions imposed by one side upon another. At its core, the crisis is not a security problem but a crisis of legitimacy, trust, political representation, and the future direction of the Somali state. These are fundamentally political questions that require political solutions.</p>
<p>The first and most urgent priority must be de-escalation. No meaningful political process can succeed while tensions remain high, mistrust deepens, and political actors fear confrontation. Restoring confidence among all stakeholders is therefore essential to creating an environment conducive to dialogue and compromise.</p>
<p>The second priority should be the establishment of mutually agreed security protocols for the transitional period. Such arrangements must provide credible security guarantees for political leaders, mediators, civil society representatives, and all participants in the political process, while ensuring that national security institutions remain professional, politically neutral, and insulated from partisan competition. Security must become a guarantor of political dialogue rather than an instrument of political leverage.</p>
<p>The third priority is the identification of mutually acceptable mediators who command the trust and confidence of all sides. Their role should extend beyond facilitating discussions to rebuilding confidence, reducing tensions, addressing grievances, and guiding the parties toward a durable political settlement.</p>
<p>The fourth priority should be the negotiation of an inclusive electoral roadmap supported by all major political stakeholders. Such a roadmap must establish a clear timetable, agreed rules, implementation mechanisms, and oversight arrangements capable of restoring legitimacy to Somalia’s institutions and providing a peaceful pathway out of the current impasse.</p>
<p>Beyond these immediate steps, <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a> requires a broader political understanding: legitimacy cannot be manufactured through force, and stability cannot be sustained through coercion. Durable political order emerges when citizens trust their institutions, believe that political competition is fair, and accept that power is exercised within agreed constitutional limits and subject to the rule of law.</p>
<p>Most importantly, <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a> needs a different model of leadership—one that inspires confidence rather than fear, seeks dialogue rather than confrontation, treats opponents as political competitors rather than enemies, and understands that compromise is often the highest expression of political strength rather than a sign of weakness. True leadership is measured not by the ability to mobilize force, but by the ability to build consensus, manage disagreement peacefully, and unite a divided nation around a common future.</p>
<p>Ultimately, the choice facing <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a> is not between government and opposition, nor between victory and defeat for any particular political actor. It is a choice between two competing visions of politics: one rooted in coercion, escalation, and the pursuit of power through force, and another grounded in legitimacy, dialogue, constitutionalism, political inclusion, and statesmanship.</p>
<p>The events in Mogadishu exposed the limitations of the first approach. Somalia’s future stability, national unity, and democratic development will depend upon embracing the second. The enduring lesson of this crisis is clear: force may compel compliance for a time, but only legitimacy, trust, and political consensus can secure lasting peace, stable governance, and a democratic future.</p>
<p>&#8212;<br />
<em>Abdirahman Abdishakur Warsame is a member of the Somali Federal Parliament, an opposition leader, the chairman of the Wadajir Party, and a presidential candidate in the forthcoming elections of 2026.</em></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/when-force-amplifies-the-very-message-it-seeks-to-silence/">Somalia: When Force Amplifies the Very Message It Seeks to Silence</a> appeared first on <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com">Kaab TV</a>.</p>
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		<title>Somali Piracy is back. With Strait of Hormuz all Over the News, Renewed Threats to the Red Sea and East Africa Passage are Failing to Make Headlines</title>
		<link>https://en.kaabtv.com/somali-piracy-is-back-with-strait-of-hormuz-all-over-the-news-renewed-threats-to-the-red-sea-and-east-africa-passage-are-failing-to-make-headlines/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Willem H. van der Kooi]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 19:03:05 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Conflict & Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[News]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Opinion]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Somali Piracy is back]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://en.kaabtv.com/?p=19470</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Between April 21 and May 2, 2026, a sequence of incidents marked&#160;the clearest reactivation of Somali Pirate Action Group activity&#160;since expensive suppression efforts brought the threat to low levels over a decade ago. During this 2-week period&#160;alone, six maritime security incidents&#160;appeared and four confirmed hijackings (three commercial vessels and at least one dhow), plus one [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/somali-piracy-is-back-with-strait-of-hormuz-all-over-the-news-renewed-threats-to-the-red-sea-and-east-africa-passage-are-failing-to-make-headlines/">Somali Piracy is back. With Strait of Hormuz all Over the News, Renewed Threats to the Red Sea and East Africa Passage are Failing to Make Headlines</a> appeared first on <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com">Kaab TV</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p id="ember53" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Between April 21 and May 2, 2026, a sequence of incidents marked the clearest reactivation of Somali Pirate Action Group activity since expensive suppression efforts brought the threat to low levels over a decade ago.</p>
<p id="ember54" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">During this 2-week period alone, six maritime security incidents appeared and four confirmed hijackings (three commercial vessels and at least one dhow), plus one armed boarding attempt deterred by embarked security, and at least two suspicious skiff approaches inside the Maritime Security Transit Corridor (MSTC).</p>
<p id="ember55" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Three of the four hijacked commercial vessels remain under pirate control as of mid-May 2026. Ransom demands on <em>Eureka</em> alone are reported to have escalated from $3 million to $10 million.</p>
<p id="ember56" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">A further attempted approach was reported approximately 500 NM east of Mogadishu on April 28, in which a tanker was approached by a suspected pirates employing a larger wooden vessel as a mothership and two smaller skiffs, the operational signature of an extended-range PAG deployment we have seen in the past extending their reach well withing the Indian Ocean and Red Sea passage.</p>
<p id="ember57" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The operational signature is consistent: small skiffs deployed from coastal launch points or from a recently seized dhow, targeting transiting vessels in already a window of 100+ NM from the coast, with rapid redirection toward Puntland anchorages on successful boarding.</p>
<p id="ember58" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">History around the Somali coast is repeating itself with lack of national stability and a divided international community fuelling the unrest within the country.</p>
<p id="ember59" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Since the Kampala Accord were signed in 2011, providing the agreed roadmap towards a functioning Somali State, limited progress was achieved towards establishing stable and united national or regional governments. Divisions between the federal government and opposition groups – including Puntland, Somaliland and Jubaland federal (member) state leaders and the opposition Somali Salvation Forum coalition led by former president <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/how-somalias-nisa-planted-spies-inside-opposition-circles/">Sharif Sheikh Ahmed</a> – have undermined current election preparations.</p>
<p id="ember60" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">None of this is new to Somalia’s political scene. The same issues arose among the same actors during the election that brought Mohamud to power in 2022 or President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed before him. The conflict between opposing sides is powered and maintained by various ME and Asian States supporting different players who suit their local interests best. The EU’s approach is also not very consistent. While EU advocating the sponsorship of a ‘one-nation’ solution, many of their aid and training programs are directly via regional State Governments, undermining he national powers of the Mogadishu Officials.</p>
<p id="ember61" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Again, like over a decade ago, voices are raised to pour money and resources into suppressing the occurrence of Piracy through sailing an expensive navy fleet through the area. However, although such actions proved to temporarily supress the symptoms, such use of navy equipment, designed to be effective war machines, are fully inadequate for a policing task.  For me the picture tells it all. A billion-dollar piece of marine equipment to launch a RIB (designed for beaching and not for 24/7 open ocean operations) to intercept a small skiff in non-existing perfect weather conditions.</p>
<p id="ember62" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Bringing the rule of law along the (Somali-)coast requires an effective maritime law enforcement capability, supporting both coast guard vessels designed for policing tasks and able to operate at the high-seas, as well as establishing the task force that can operate within the agreed rules of engagement.</p>
<p id="ember63" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Regretfully, with circumstances lacking tangible improvements over the last two decades and international players powering opposing Somali sides, the increasing threats to ships using the Red Sea and Indian Ocean passage will not disappear and should get the attention it deserves.</p>
<p>__<br />
<em>Willem H. van der Kooi Company Owner AMO / Strategist Blue Economy</em></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/somali-piracy-is-back-with-strait-of-hormuz-all-over-the-news-renewed-threats-to-the-red-sea-and-east-africa-passage-are-failing-to-make-headlines/">Somali Piracy is back. With Strait of Hormuz all Over the News, Renewed Threats to the Red Sea and East Africa Passage are Failing to Make Headlines</a> appeared first on <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com">Kaab TV</a>.</p>
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		<title>If Somalia Is Serious About Its Future, It Must Take Children’s Rights Seriously</title>
		<link>https://en.kaabtv.com/if-somalia-is-serious-about-its-future-it-must-take-childrens-rights-seriously/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Rahma Shire]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 23 May 2026 10:42:07 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[News]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Opinion]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Somali Children's Rights]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Women and Girls Somalia]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://en.kaabtv.com/?p=19085</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>MOGADISHU, Somalia &#8211; Across the world, children&#8217;s rights are under strain, from conflict, displacement, poverty, climate shocks and weakened institutions. (Liefaard &#38; Todres, 2026) The International Journal of Children&#8217;s Rights highlights a truth that Somalia cannot afford to ignore: protecting and advancing children&#8217;s rights is not an academic exercise. It is a global responsibility that [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/if-somalia-is-serious-about-its-future-it-must-take-childrens-rights-seriously/">If Somalia Is Serious About Its Future, It Must Take Children’s Rights Seriously</a> appeared first on <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com">Kaab TV</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p id="ember52" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">MOGADISHU, <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a> &#8211; Across the world, children’s rights are under strain, from conflict, displacement, poverty, climate shocks and weakened institutions. (Liefaard &amp; Todres, 2026) The<em> International Journal of Children’s Rights</em> <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/chil/34/1/article-p1_001.xml?srsltid=AfmBOopk5FnUS0k1x8S19DjR35kNJBPgYWspOlMHuQVIyuT5cgu-GkCL" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><strong>highlights</strong></a> a truth that <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a> cannot afford to ignore: protecting and advancing children’s rights is not an academic exercise. It is a global responsibility that demands leadership, collaboration and courage.</p>
<p id="ember53" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">For <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a>, this message is urgent. We are rebuilding systems, strengthening institutions and imagining a different future. However, none of this is possible if we overlook the rights, voices and well-being of the youngest members of our society.</p>
<p id="ember54" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Children’s rights are not optional. They are the foundation of nation‑building.</p>
<h3 id="ember55" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong>Children’s Rights Are the Starting Point of Development</strong></h3>
<p id="ember56" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The editorial reminds us that children’s rights have a strong legal foundation in international human rights law, but their real power comes from how societies choose to implement them. <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a> is at a critical moment where choices made today will shape generations.</p>
<p id="ember57" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Children’s rights directly influence:</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>school readiness and early learning</strong></li>
<li><strong>health, nutrition and physical development</strong></li>
<li><strong>safety, protection and psychosocial wellbeing</strong></li>
<li><strong>participation, voice and agency</strong></li>
<li><strong>long‑term human capital and economic stability</strong></li>
</ul>
<p id="ember59" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">A nation cannot rise if its children are left behind. Moreover, <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a> cannot build a peaceful, prosperous future without investing in the early years.</p>
<h3 id="ember60" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong>Why Somalia Must Step Up Now</strong></h3>
<p id="ember61" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Liefaard &amp; Todres (2026) call for greater global representation, especially from the Global South, and for stronger pathways that uplift children’s voices and lived experiences. <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a> fits squarely into this call.</p>
<p id="ember62" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Our children face layered vulnerabilities, conflict, poverty, displacement, and climate shocks, yet they also hold extraordinary resilience and potential. To unlock that potential, <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a> must:</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>invest in early childhood development</strong></li>
<li><strong>ensure safe, inclusive learning environments</strong></li>
<li><strong>protect children from violence and exploitation</strong></li>
<li><strong>strengthen community‑based systems of care</strong></li>
<li><strong>amplify children’s voices in decisions that affect them</strong></li>
</ul>
<p id="ember64" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Children’s rights are not a Western concept. They are a Somali necessity.</p>
<h3 id="ember65" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong>Knowledge, Research and Local Leadership Matter</strong></h3>
<p id="ember66" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The editorial emphasises the importance of interdisciplinary research, cross‑regional collaboration and elevating early‑career scholars and practitioners. <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a> needs this too.</p>
<p id="ember67" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">We need:</p>
<ul>
<li>Somali researchers documenting children’s realities</li>
<li>Somali practitioners shaping policy</li>
<li>Somali youth contributing to knowledge</li>
<li>Somali institutions leading the conversation on rights</li>
</ul>
<p id="ember69" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">When we generate our own evidence, we shape our own solutions.</p>
<p id="ember70" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Somalia’s education and protection systems cannot rely solely on external frameworks. They must be informed by local knowledge, cultural understanding and lived experience. This is how we build systems that are both effective and trusted.</p>
<h3 id="ember71" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong>Children Are Not Just Beneficiaries, They Are Agents</strong></h3>
<p id="ember72" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">One of the strongest messages in <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/chil/34/1/article-p1_001.xml?srsltid=AfmBOopk5FnUS0k1x8S19DjR35kNJBPgYWspOlMHuQVIyuT5cgu-GkCL" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><strong>Liefaard &amp; Todres (2026)</strong></a>  is the need to treat children as co-creators rather than passive recipients. This aligns deeply with Somalia’s own traditions of community participation and collective responsibility.</p>
<p id="ember73" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">In <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a>, this means:</p>
<ul>
<li>listening to children’s experiences in camps, schools and communities</li>
<li>involving them in designing programmes</li>
<li>recognising their capacity to contribute</li>
<li>valuing their perspectives as part of national development</li>
</ul>
<p id="ember75" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">A child who is heard becomes an adult who participates. A child who participates becomes a citizen who leads.</p>
<h3 id="ember76" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong>Building a Somali‑Led Children’s Rights Agenda</strong></h3>
<p id="ember77" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a> has an opportunity to shape a children’s rights agenda that is culturally grounded, community‑driven and future‑focused. This requires:</p>
<p id="ember78" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong>1. Strengthening Early Childhood Systems</strong></p>
<p id="ember79" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Early childhood is where rights become reality. Nutrition, safety, stimulation and early learning shape lifelong outcomes.</p>
<p id="ember80" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong>2. Investing in Teachers and Caregivers</strong></p>
<p id="ember81" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">People, not policies- implement children’s rights. Training, support and well-being for educators are essential.</p>
<p id="ember82" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong>3. Integrating Community Structures</strong></p>
<p id="ember83" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Dugsi, women’s groups, youth networks and elders all play a role. Children’s rights must be embedded in the systems that communities already trust.</p>
<p id="ember84" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong>4. Protecting Children in Crisis and Displacement</strong></p>
<p id="ember85" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Somalia’s most vulnerable children need safe spaces, psychosocial support and continuity of learning.</p>
<p id="ember86" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong>5. Elevating Somali Scholarship and Voices</strong></p>
<p id="ember87" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Somali researchers, practitioners and youth must shape the narrative, not just participate in it.</p>
<h3 id="ember89" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong>A Call to Action for Somalia</strong></h3>
<p id="ember90" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">If <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a> is to build a peaceful, stable and prosperous future, we must place children’s rights at the centre of national development, not as a slogan but as a strategy.</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Strong rights = strong foundations</strong></li>
<li><strong>Strong foundations = strong learners</strong></li>
<li><strong>Strong learners = strong communities</strong></li>
<li><strong>Strong communities = a strong nation</strong></li>
</ul>
<p id="ember92" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Children’s rights are not a side issue. They are the blueprint for Somalia’s future.</p>
<p id="ember93" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Somalia’s next chapter depends on the choices we make today and the courage we show in protecting, nurturing and empowering every child.</p>
<p>_</p>
<p><em><span class="hover:entity-accent entity-underline inline cursor-pointer align-baseline"><span class="whitespace-normal">Rahma Shire</span></span> is a researcher specializing in leadership, inclusion, and systems improvement in education, with a focus on designing inclusive, scalable, and future-focused learning systems.</em></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/if-somalia-is-serious-about-its-future-it-must-take-childrens-rights-seriously/">If Somalia Is Serious About Its Future, It Must Take Children’s Rights Seriously</a> appeared first on <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com">Kaab TV</a>.</p>
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