According to a new analysis published by the Ethiopian Institute of Foreign Affairs (IFA), Al-Shabaab’s strength should no longer be measured primarily by the territory it controls, but by its ability to function as an alternative system of authority across large parts of Somalia.
The report argues that while military offensives remain important, the group’s long-term resilience is increasingly rooted in governance rather than battlefield victories.
According to the IFA analysis, Somalia’s conflict has entered a phase where the central competition is no longer simply over towns and districts, but over who can effectively tax businesses, regulate trade routes, resolve disputes, gather intelligence, and enforce rules in contested areas.
The report says this “shadow administration” allows Al-Shabaab to preserve influence even when it loses military positions.
The report cites the International Crisis Group, noting that Al-Shabaab recovered much of the ground lost during Somalia’s 2022–2023 counteroffensive, returning the conflict to what it describes as a military and political stalemate.
However, the IFA argues that focusing only on territorial maps overlooks the deeper contest over authority that determines who ultimately governs local communities.
According to the report, a district may officially fall under government control while traders continue paying taxes to Al-Shabaab, residents seek judgments through its courts, and local officials respond to its directives.
Likewise, the group can lose visible military positions while maintaining the administrative and financial networks that enable it to quickly regain influence after government forces withdraw.
According to the IFA, Al-Shabaab’s governance model relies heavily on predictable taxation and organized administration. While describing the group’s system as coercive, the report argues that standardized checkpoint procedures and consistent tax collection provide greater predictability than fragmented or inconsistent state institutions in some contested areas.
This predictability, the report says, helps the group generate revenue while simultaneously collecting intelligence on commercial traffic, local populations, and security movements.
According to research referenced by the IFA, including findings from the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime and The Soufan Center, Al-Shabaab has developed an organized taxation apparatus supported by commercial networks, intelligence gathering, and systematic revenue collection.
The report notes that after capturing towns, the group often moves quickly to establish checkpoints and taxation systems, turning military gains into long-term administrative control.
The report also argues that Al-Shabaab’s influence extends beyond security through its informal judicial system. According to the IFA, research indicates that some individuals and businesses have turned to the group’s courts because of delays or limited access to formal justice institutions.
While stressing that these courts operate outside internationally recognized legal standards and have been associated with coercive punishments, the report argues that their speed and consistency have nevertheless strengthened the group’s administrative reach.
According to the analysis, every dispute handled by Al-Shabaab’s courts also provides the organization with valuable information about property ownership, business relationships, clan dynamics, and local loyalties, strengthening its capacity to recruit members, collect taxes, and identify opposition.
The IFA argues that these governance dynamics carry direct implications for Ethiopia’s national security. According to the report, Addis Ababa’s interests in Somalia extend beyond counterterrorism operations to include border security, intelligence cooperation, trade corridors, and ensuring that Somali institutions can maintain authority after military campaigns conclude.
According to the report, Ethiopia should evaluate security cooperation not only by troop deployments or the number of towns under government control, but also by examining who collects taxes, resolves disputes, manages commercial activity, and exercises day-to-day authority in areas bordering Ethiopia, including Gedo, Bay, Bakool, and Hiiraan.
The IFA further argues that stronger coordination between Somalia’s Federal Government and regional administrations should be viewed as an essential counterinsurgency tool.
According to the report, fragmented governance can create overlapping checkpoints, competing taxation systems, and inconsistent policing, providing opportunities for Al-Shabaab’s parallel administration to expand its influence. Better institutional coordination, it says, would reduce those governance gaps.
According to the report, military operations should also be followed by effective civilian administration, including disciplined checkpoint management, transparent revenue collection, accessible courts, and functioning local governance.
Without these institutions, the analysis warns, military victories alone are unlikely to produce lasting stability because Al-Shabaab’s administrative infrastructure often survives battlefield defeats.
The IFA concludes that Somalia’s conflict is increasingly defined by a competition over governance rather than territory alone.
According to the report, the long-term outcome will depend not simply on who controls the battlefield today, but on whether Somali state institutions can consistently outperform Al-Shabaab in delivering the everyday functions of government, including taxation, dispute resolution, regulation of movement, and protection of commerce.
As the analysis notes, maps may show where armed forces are deployed, but they do not necessarily reveal which authority is most likely to endure.