Mogadishu (KAAB TV) – Somalia is currently experiencing a serious political crisis as the country approaches its planned 2026 national elections.
Key political actors — including federal government officials, regional leaders, and opposition figures — are locked in a bitter standoff over how the elections should be conducted, leaving the country’s stability and future governance model at risk.
This supplement examines four major fault lines driving the conflict: the format of the 2026 election, the Jubaland-Mogadishu crisis, the return of former President Mohamed “Farmajo,” and controversial constitutional changes.
A newly-formed political bloc called the Somali Future Council — which brings together Puntland, Jubaland, and prominent opposition leaders — has rejected the federal government’s proposed election plan, warning that any vote held without broad national agreement is illegitimate.
The Council held a three-day meeting in Nairobi in November 2025, where it reiterated its demand for inclusive dialogue, adherence to the Provisional Constitution, and consultation before any electoral roadmap moves forward.
The core of the disagreement centers on electoral system reform: the federal government is pushing for a “one-person, one-vote” (1P1V) system for 2026, while the Future Council argues the country is not ready, citing security, institutional, and political challenges.
The Council has threatened to reject the results of any election they view as “non-consensus,” raising the possibility of a parallel political process if elections are held unilaterally.
According to the ISS policy brief, disputes between the federal government and member states over elections, power-sharing, and resource distribution remain unresolved.
Relations between Mogadishu (federal government) and Jubaland have deteriorated sharply. High-level negotiations reportedly broke down, with neither side willing to compromise.
The federal government has rejected Jubaland’s regional election results from November 2024, declaring them invalid.
Analysts describe Mogadishu’s strategy as a pressure campaign: deploying legal tools (“lawfare”), attempting to politically isolate Jubaland, and even applying military pressure.
In December 2024, clashes occurred between federal forces and Jubaland troops in Ras Kamboni, a flashpoint strategic town.
Jubaland’s leadership, particularly President Ahmed Madobe, has strongly opposed what they perceive as encroachment by Mogadishu.
Both sides have issued arrest warrants against each other: Mogadishu accuses Madobe of treason, while Jubaland has issued a warrant for President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud.
Regional states, including Puntland and Jubaland, have publicly questioned the legitimacy of the constitutional amendments and the appointment of the national electoral commission by the federal government. Kaab TV
According to Good Governance Africa, this crisis is compounded by deeper issues such as resource control, clan dynamics, and the struggle for genuine federalism.
Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed “Farmajo”, Somalia’s former president, returned to Mogadishu in November 2025 after about two years in exile.
His return has fueled speculation that he aims to play a unifying role in the opposition’s drive to force a more inclusive electoral process. According to his office, Farmajo plans to hold “consultation meetings” with political leaders, civil society, and community stakeholders.
In his statements, he emphasized that elections should be a right of every Somali citizen, and warned against decisions made unilaterally by the current government.
Many interpret his comeback as a political signal: that the opposition is consolidating ahead of 2026, and believes it can mount a credible challenge to President Mohamud’s agenda.
In March 2024, Somalia’s parliament approved a package of far-reaching constitutional amendments. These changes include shifting to direct presidential elections, extending the presidential term from four to five years, and giving the president greater powers — including the authority to appoint the prime minister.
The government argues these reforms are essential to modernize Somalia’s political system, moving away from the clan-based indirect “4.5 formula” toward universal suffrage.
However, opposition leaders and some regional governments strongly criticize the reforms as unilateral, illegal, and a centralization of power.
For instance, Puntland leadership has publicly refused to accept the amended constitution, arguing that it was passed without full consensus or a nationwide referendum.
According to Kaab TV, Jubaland and Puntland leaders have questioned not just the reforms but also the legitimacy of the electoral commission appointed by the president. Kaab TV
The ISS policy brief further warns that unresolved constitutional tensions threaten federalism, institutional stability, and national reconciliation.
If the government proceeds with elections without broad agreement, the Future Council may disavow the results, leading to competing claims to legitimacy.
This raises the specter of a dual-power scenario, which could destabilize the country and undermine the rule of law.
Political instability distracts from Somalia’s fight against al-Shabaab. The opposition warns that internal power struggles could derail military gains.
Federal-regional friction, especially in places like Jubaland, may trigger further clashes, reducing the capacity to address terrorism.
The centralization of power in Mogadishu, perceived or real, threatens the autonomy of federal member states.
There is a pressing need for a genuine, all-encompassing national conference to build consensus around the electoral model, constitutional changes, and the role of regional states.
The federal government should engage regional administrations (especially Puntland and Jubaland) with concrete confidence-building policies — such as respecting their autonomy, addressing resource-sharing, and involving them in electoral planning.
Stakeholders must agree on and publicly commit to a clear, transparent timetable for elections, including mechanisms for voter registration, election commission formation, and dispute resolution.
Constitutional reforms should be revisited through a process that ensures regional buy-in, perhaps via a referendum or structured regional consultations.
Regional and global partners can play a mediator role by supporting dialogue, but they must be careful not to be perceived as taking sides.