Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi Irro delivered sensitive remarks in Washington on his country’s relationship with Israel, touching on security cooperation, the possibility of a foreign troop presence in Somaliland, and a proposed international force for the Gaza Strip.
In an interview given during his visit to Washington, Irro said there is currently no military presence or official Israeli base in Somaliland, but he did not rule out the possibility that the situation could change in the future.
His comments come as ties between Somaliland and Israel have grown significantly stronger, particularly since Israel formally recognized Somaliland.
The president said Somaliland needs international partners that can support it on security and defense, describing Israel and the United States as countries with which Somaliland could work more closely in those areas going forward.
According to Irro, Somaliland is seeking modern technology, training and equipment to strengthen its armed forces and its coastal security capacity.
His remarks carry particular weight given Somaliland’s strategic location near the Gulf of Aden and the Bab al-Mandab strait, a corridor used by large volumes of commercial shipping.
That position has made the port of Berbera and Somaliland’s coastline increasingly significant, both for regional security and for growing trade interests.
Cirro said Somaliland has an army of roughly 25,000 personnel, along with a coast guard force of around 1,500.
He said current troop numbers allow Somaliland to defend itself, but that the country still needs modern technology and additional training to build up its military capacity.
These figures were provided by the Somaliland president; there is no independent verification confirming their accuracy.
The question of an Israeli presence remains a delicate one, after earlier reports suggested the new relationship between Hargeisa and Tel Aviv could carry a security dimension.
However, Somaliland’s Defense Minister told Reuters in June that Israel does not have a base in Somaliland, though he said Israel is providing training to Somaliland’s police and military forces.
He said at the time that there were no discussions underway regarding an Israeli military base in Somaliland.
Irro’s latest comments indicate that although there is currently no formal Israeli military presence, Somaliland’s leadership is not ruling out broader security cooperation in the future.
This suggests Hargeisa wants to leverage its relationship with Israel across recognition, security, economic and technological fronts.
Another development drawing significant attention is Somaliland’s stated readiness to contribute up to 2,000 troops to a planned international force intended to stabilize Gaza, should the United States or Israel formally request it.
Irro said Somaliland is not currently seeking to deploy troops on its own initiative, but that if a formal request is submitted, it is prepared to provide forces.
The international force under discussion is reportedly planned to eventually reach around 20,000 troops, with a mandate covering security, support for training Palestinian police, facilitation of humanitarian aid, and preventing armed groups from rebuilding military capability.
Available reports indicate Uganda has approved roughly 1,200 troops for the mission, while Morocco has pledged up to 500, with other countries also expected to take part.
Were Somaliland to actually send troops to Gaza, it would mark a major new step in Hargeisa’s foreign and security policy.
Somaliland has not previously contributed troops to African Union peacekeeping operations, according to a Jerusalem Post report, meaning a deployment to an international Gaza mission would represent new military territory for the country.
The prospect also raises a number of political questions — including how the duties of any Somaliland troops in Gaza would be defined, whose command they would fall under, the legal basis for the operation, and what Somaliland stands to gain politically and in security terms.
For his part, Irro acknowledged that the relationship with Israel has opened new opportunities for Somaliland, but has also created political and security risks.
He said that when any country or administration builds ties with international partners, nothing comes free — and that the new relationship carries both benefits and political costs.
Somaliland has for years sought international recognition, and its relationship with Israel has become a new avenue through which Hargeisa is pursuing global support.
Israel became the first country to formally recognize Somaliland, a move that Somalia and other regional and international actors have strongly opposed.
Irro also addressed regional security threats, particularly Houthi activity in Yemen and the strategic importance of Bab al-Mandab.
Somaliland sits directly across from Yemen, making developments there directly relevant to the security of its coastline and regional shipping.
However, Irro said Somaliland is not currently engaged in war or direct confrontation with the Houthis, and that Somaliland has held no talks with Israel regarding the use of its territory or airspace for military operations against the Houthis.
That distinction is important for separating confirmed facts from speculation or reporting about the possibility of foreign bases and operations.
Even so, Somaliland’s strategic importance continues to grow. The port of Berbera, its long coastline, and its position along the Gulf of Aden make it a location of interest to powers seeking to protect commercial shipping and key routes between the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean.
It is also important to note that Irro’s remarks do not mean Israel currently has a military base in Somaliland.
A Reuters report published in June stated that Israel does not have a base in Somaliland, while noting that training has been provided to Somaliland forces.
There is, therefore, a meaningful distinction between military training, security cooperation, troop presence and a military base — the four are not the same thing.
What has been confirmed so far is security cooperation and training; a formal Israeli presence or base in Somaliland has not been confirmed by available reporting.
For Somalia, this is a sensitive political and security matter. Somalia’s federal government considers Somaliland part of Somali territory, while Somaliland maintains that it is an independent nation.
Any security or military agreement Hargeisa enters into with a foreign government is therefore likely to be viewed by Mogadishu as directly affecting Somalia’s unity, sovereignty and security.
Beyond that, a foreign military presence near Bab al-Mandab could affect the broader regional security calculus.
If Israel or the United States were to eventually establish a base or military hub in Berbera, it could reshape how regional powers view Somaliland and the Gulf of Aden.
For Somaliland’s leadership, Irro sees this as an opportunity to secure protection, technology, training, investment and political support.
On the other hand, a very close relationship with Israel could expose Somaliland to new hostility and pressure from groups or governments opposed to Israel.
Irro himself acknowledged that the new relationship carries political and security costs. The question facing Somaliland, then, is how to benefit from the relationship without becoming a battleground for competing regional and international powers.
The Gaza question may prove to be the most contentious aspect of the Somaliland-Israel relationship.
If Somaliland does send troops to Gaza, supporters could argue it is joining an international effort to secure peace and deliver humanitarian aid. Critics, on the other hand, may question why Somaliland is becoming involved in a war and conflict far from the Horn of Africa.
It is also worth noting that Cirro did not say Somaliland troops are currently heading to Gaza. His statement was that Somaliland is prepared to provide up to 2,000 troops if formally requested.
The matter of sending troops to Gaza therefore remains at the level of discussion and political readiness — it should not be interpreted as troops having already been deployed or a final agreement having been signed.
Overall, Irro’s remarks in Washington show that Somaliland is seeking to leverage its international relationships across three major areas: political recognition, security cooperation, and economic ties.
Israel has given Somaliland the recognition it long sought, and Hargeisa now appears to want to build on that relationship toward broader multi-sector cooperation.
That path, however, carries significant obstacles. Somalia strongly opposes any move toward recognizing Somaliland as an independent state, while some countries in the region and international institutions are concerned that the Somaliland-Somalia dispute could deepen further.
Irro’s remarks reflect a shifting security posture for Somaliland. Hargeisa wants to position itself as a strategic location where international powers can cooperate on Red Sea and Gulf of Aden security. At the same time, it must weigh the benefits of that relationship against the risks it could bring.
What remains to be seen is whether the current security discussions evolve into formal agreements, training and technical support — or into an actual, formal foreign military presence in Somaliland.
As of now, according to available reporting, an Israeli base in Somaliland remains unconfirmed, even as training and security cooperation continue.
Should a future military presence by Israel or the United States be confirmed, it would represent a major shift in the security landscape of the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea.
If it does not materialize, Somaliland is likely to continue its current course — built on diplomatic engagement, security cooperation, the pursuit of recognition, and efforts to attract foreign investment.
Ultimately, Irro’s comments show that Somaliland wants to capitalize on its geographic position and its new relationship with Israel to strengthen its security, economy and bid for international recognition.
But any future military or security move involving Somaliland is likely to have consequences beyond Hargeisa — with direct implications for Somalia, Yemen, the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandab, and the Horn of Africa as a whole.