The security and political situation in the Bay and Bakool regions is facing a critical juncture, marked by shifts in territorial control, troop movements, and political discord among factions competing for control over the South West State administration.
The reported withdrawal of Ethiopian forces, the advances made by forces loyal to former South West State President Abdiaziz Hassan Mohamed ‘Laftagareen,’ and the movements of Al-Shabaab have raised questions about who will fill the vacuum left by departing troops and how to prevent the political volatility from creating opportunities for armed groups.
Reports published on October 17, 2026, indicated that forces loyal to Laftagareen entered the Bardale district of Bay region after troops stationed there pulled back.
These reports also noted that shifts in territorial control occurred days earlier in Qansaxdheere and Burhakaba.
Meanwhile, other reports outlined allegations that Ethiopian troops withdrew from bases they previously occupied in parts of southern Somalia, sparking concerns over the potential for Al-Shabaab to exploit the resulting security void.
Ethiopia has long been one of the key actors supporting anti-Al-Shabaab counter-terrorism operations in southern Somalia, particularly in the Bay and Bakool regions and areas adjacent to the bilateral border.
The presence of Ethiopian troops is predicated on fighting Al-Shabaab, securing border corridors, and preventing armed groups from establishing operational bases near Ethiopian territory.
Al-Shabaab has long maintained a significant presence in parts of the Bay and Bakool regions, occasionally controlling rural areas and critical transit routes vital to civilian movement and commercial transport.
A situational report updated in October 2026 and published on ECOI indicates that Al-Shabaab still controls parts of South West State, while the government and supporting forces control major towns and key urban centers.
The report also noted the importance of Ethiopian forces to security in parts of the Bakool region.
This intelligence demonstrates that the security situation in the region remains mixed, and cannot be generalized as a single faction exercising complete control over all areas.
It is possible that when troops withdraw from forward positions in vulnerable areas, Al-Shabaab will attempt to expand its operational footprint there.
However, this possibility does not mean that every area vacated by troops automatically falls directly into the hands of the group.
Waajid district in Bakool region is among the critical hubs for the security situation in South West State.
It holds strategic importance regarding transit logistics, connectivity with surrounding localities, and anti-Al-Shabaab military operations.
Available security reports indicate that Waajid previously hosted a military presence comprising Somali government forces and Ethiopian troops.
Consequently, any alteration in troop strength or stationing could have a pronounced operational impact.
Claims have also surfaced alleging that a plan regarding the troop withdrawal and control of Waajid was halted.
However, available intelligence remains insufficient to independently verify who spearheaded this plan, why it was suspended, or whether there was a deliberate attempt to hand the district over to Al-Shabaab.
The security situation in Bay and Bakool cannot be decoupled from the political conflict between the Federal Government of Somalia and the factions competing for leadership in South West State.
Troop movements and shifts in territorial control come at a time of intense rivalry over regional administration, institutional authority, and control of the political order in South West State.
Any nation may harbor security, economic, and strategic interests in Somalia. However, weaponizing those interests into allegations of supporting Al-Shabaab requires specific evidence detailing the actor, the exact actions taken, and a direct link to the group.
Turkey has in recent years strengthened its security and military partnership with the Federal Government of Somalia, contributing to troop training and enhancing national defense capabilities.
The Federal Government of Somalia has an opportunity to reassess the security landscape in Bay and Bakool, particularly in light of shifts in the Ethiopian military footprint.
If foreign forces withdraw from areas they have occupied for extended periods, the federal government requires a clear contingency plan to secure critical infrastructure, key transit corridors connecting towns, and civilian population centers.
Such a strategy necessitates effective coordination among the Somali National Army, South West State security forces, AUSSOM, and international partners.
It is equally essential to ensure reliable intelligence, adequate logistics support, unified command structures, and the re-establishment of civilian administration in areas liberated from Al-Shabaab.
Security success cannot be measured solely by driving an armed group out of a town. It is equally critical to prevent insurgent re-entry, ensure access to basic public services, and enable state institutions to maintain a durable presence.
If the federal government succeeds in strengthening security in South West State, it could impact the country’s political balance and its relations with other regional administrations.
Jubbaland, led by Ahmed Mohamed Islam ‘Ahmed Madobe,’ is among the regional administrations maintaining political disputes with the federal government.
Any shift in the central government’s power dynamic could influence negotiations surrounding the federal framework and the future of power-sharing.
Political analyses suggest that developments in South West State could reopen debate regarding the leadership of Jubbaland and its relationship with the central government.
However, notions suggesting that Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre could lead Jubbaland in the future remain political speculation unsupported by official verification.
Therefore, the Jubbaland matter should be viewed as a potential political ripple effect stemming from the national situation, rather than a confirmed plan.
Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and the federal government face two major imperatives: safeguarding public security and managing internal political disputes within the country.
If Al-Shabaab exploits troop withdrawals or political friction among stakeholders, the government bears the responsibility to prevent the group from gaining additional power in new areas.
On the other hand, the war against Al-Shabaab must not be used as a pretext to further fuel political conflict or weaken local administrative institutions.