The opposition-aligned National Consultation Conference, which concluded this week in Kismayo, has accused President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud of constitutional violations, governance failures, and abandoning the fight against Al-Shabaab. Its communiqué warns that unilateral decision-making and delayed elections risk “political collapse, insecurity, and economic breakdown.” More striking than the language, however, is the breadth of the coalition delivering the message and the timing of its ultimatum.

The gathering brought together Puntland and Jubaland presidents Said Abdullahi Deni and Ahmed Mohamed Islam (Madobe); former President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed; former prime ministers Abdi Farah Shirdoon, Hassan Ali Khaire, and Mohamed Hussein Roble; sitting members of parliament; and multiple presidential aspirants.

Such ideological and regional diversity rarely converges in Somali politics unless the participants believe a structural red line is being crossed.

At issue is not only whether elections will occur on time, but whether Somalia’s post-transition order—formalized after the end of the provisional era, reinforced by debt relief in 2023, and underwritten by sustained donor engagement—can survive an increasingly centralized presidency.

The opposition’s rejection of unilateral constitutional amendments speaks to a deeper anxiety: that Somalia’s federal system is being hollowed out through legal and procedural shortcuts rather than formal renegotiation. By declaring all presidentially driven constitutional changes “null and void” and reasserting the supremacy of the 2012 Provisional Constitution, the communiqué challenges not just the President’s authority but the method by which power is being accumulated in Mogadishu.

This matters because Somalia’s political equilibrium has always rested less on formal institutions than on negotiated consent. Every major political advance since 2000—from the federal charter to indirect elections—has been sustained by elite bargains rather than enforcement mechanisms. When those bargains fracture, the state does not fail abruptly; it fragments quietly, with parallel processes replacing national ones.

The opposition’s categorical rejection of term extensions beyond April and May 2026 reflects this fear. Somalia’s political class remembers too well how “technical delays” have historically become open-ended power grabs. In a country without an independent constitutional court capable of arbitrating such disputes, legitimacy is binary: either elections are agreed upon in advance, or they are contested by default.

KISMAYO COMMUNIQUE:

– The Kismayo Conference underlines that the term of office of the Houses of Parliament expires on 14 April 2026, while that of the President expires on 15 May 2026. The Conference will never accept any extension of the term of office of constitutional… pic.twitter.com/dcaJsL713t

— Kaab TV (@KaabTV) December 21, 2025

 The one-month ultimatum issued to President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud—giving him until January 20, 2026, to convene all stakeholders around an inclusive electoral framework—is therefore less a threat than a deadline for salvaging elite consensus.

The warning of a “parallel electoral process” should not be read as posturing. Somalia has pursued parallel tracks before, and each time they have weakened federal cohesion, emboldened spoilers, and distracted security forces at critical moments.

The Banadir question further complicates matters. The opposition’s rejection of the Mogadishu election process on constitutional grounds highlights a long-deferred issue in Somali governance: the capital’s ambiguous legal status.

Risks of delegitimisation

Successive administrations have avoided resolving Banadir’s representation because doing so would redistribute political power. Yet proceeding with elections there without consensus risks delegitimizing the entire national process.

President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s response has so far been cautious. Speaking at a public event, he dismissed the Kismayo meeting but signaled openness to dialogue should the opposition present a unified position.

That formulation places the burden back on his rivals, even as their communiqué suggests rare alignment. Former President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed (Farmaajo) did not attend the talks but is reported to broadly agree with their conclusions—an indication that the opposition’s center of gravity may be larger than it appears.

For international partners, this confrontation presents an uncomfortable dilemma. Donors and security allies have invested heavily in portraying Somalia as a country moving beyond perpetual transition—evidenced by debt relief, normalized financial relations, and the planned drawdown of ATMIS.

Yet those gains rest on political predictability. A disputed or fragmented election would undermine not only Somalia’s domestic legitimacy but also the assumptions underpinning international engagement.

The deeper question, then, is whether Somalia’s post-transition state can function without constant external arbitration. If every major political disagreement requires international mediation to prevent collapse, the model itself remains incomplete.

What is unfolding is not simply an opposition challenge to an incumbent president. It is a referendum on whether Somalia’s leaders can internalize the rules of political competition—or whether power will continue to be negotiated at the edge of crisis. The coming weeks will reveal whether consensus politics can be restored, or whether Somalia is drifting toward another prolonged electoral impasse—this time with far more to lose.

——

Abdirahman Jeylani Mohamed is a Somali journalist based in Mogadishu, a foreign policy commentator and communications specialist 

The post Somalia’s Election Standoff Is a Referendum on Its Post-Transition State appeared first on Kaab TV.

President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, now in the second term of his presidency, is advancing an ambitious electoral and constitutional agenda ahead of the 2026 general elections—one that has ignited both cautious optimism and deep suspicion.

Three rounds of dialogue between the President and a bloc of presidential hopefuls have so far failed to yield tangible results.

A fourth round is slated for August 10. The stated aim is to reach a consensus on the structure of the next election and finalize changes to the provisional constitution.

But beneath the surface, a fierce contest over the future of the Somali state is unfolding—one that pits central authority against federal autonomy, urgency against consensus, and reform against resistance.

This is not just a debate about elections.

It is a test of Somalia’s post-conflict political architecture, and whether it can survive the pressure of majoritarian reform in the absence of national consensus.

Elections or Executive Power?

The federal government’s proposed roadmap includes registering at least one million voters and holding a one-person, one-vote election in 2026.

The plan is seen by many within Villa Somalia as a landmark effort to break away from the clan-based, indirect electoral model that has dominated Somali politics for decades.

But the plan goes further. The administration is also pursuing amendments to the Provisional Constitution — most notably Chapter 4 — that would remove Parliament’s authority to confirm the Prime Minister and vest more powers directly in the presidency.

To supporters, these are overdue reforms that will bring Somalia in line with more centralized, functional state systems. To critics, they represent a dangerous shift toward unchecked executive authority.

The optics of reform are compelling: a streamlined executive, direct electoral legitimacy, and a country finally shedding the limitations of its transitional past.

But critics argue the substance tells a different story—one of consolidation, not consensus; of imposition, not inclusion.

Divided Tactics, Common Anxiety

Within the opposition camp, reactions to the talks have ranged from cautious participation to outright skepticism.

Some candidates have called for patience, hoping the President may soften his position in the next round.

Others, however, view the process as a calculated delay—designed to buy political time while solidifying reforms that fundamentally alter Somalia’s balance of power.

What unites many of these actors is the fear that the President’s agenda is not being driven by national interest, but by a desire to shape the political landscape in his favor ahead of the 2026 vote.

Concerns over transparency, accountability, and motive have become central to the political discourse in Mogadishu.

Key Federal States Push Back

Nowhere has resistance been more visible than in Puntland and Jubaland.

Once politically estranged, the two federal member states recently realigned their positions in a strategic effort to counter Villa Somalia’s moves.

Their message has been consistent: no forward movement on elections or constitutional reform without genuine dialogue and rollback of the most contested proposals.

They accuse President Hassan Sheikh of centralizing power at the expense of the federal system, using the constitutional review process as a vehicle to marginalize regional voices and consolidate control.

From Gedo region to SSC-Khaatumo, they see a pattern of federal overreach — one that threatens the fragile equilibrium Somalia has tried to build since the adoption of federalism.

The political realignment between Puntland and Jubaland is not just symbolic. It represents the re-emergence of a counterweight to the federal government — one that could challenge not only Mogadishu’s authority but the legitimacy of the reforms themselves if pushed through unilaterally.

A Constitution Under Siege?

What began as a review process aimed at finalizing Somalia’s Provisional Constitution has become a highly contested battleground?

At issue is not only the content of the amendments but the process itself.

Can a constitution meant to be inclusive and unifying be rewritten under political pressure, and in the absence of regional agreement? Is it still a “national” constitution if key federal member states do not consent?

Legal experts warn that any attempt to pass and implement such amendments without broad buy-in could result in rival interpretations of constitutional authority, deepen institutional fragmentation, and pave the way for parallel governance structures.

The specter of a constitutional crisis is no longer hypothetical—it is looming. Without compromise before September 2025, Somalia may face a breakdown in political coordination between the center and the periphery, further complicating security, aid delivery, and governance in an already fragile context.

Reform or Rupture?

Supporters of the President argue that bold action is needed to move Somalia forward—that consensus has become a synonym for stagnation.

They see the old system as a barrier to progress, one that privileges clan elites and procedural deadlock over performance and accountability.

But Somalia’s journey toward a stable, representative democracy cannot rely solely on the momentum of one political figure or faction. It requires shared ownership, collective sacrifice, and institutional humility.

Reform without legitimacy risks becoming repression. Urgency without trust breeds resistance.

Somalia has made remarkable progress in recent years: reclaiming territory from insurgents, expanding international partnerships, and beginning to rebuild public institutions.

But the path forward depends on how its leaders manage disagreement, not how swiftly they push through agendas.

A Nation at a Political Tipping Point

Somalia is standing on a narrow ridge—on one side, the possibility of political evolution; on the other, a descent into yet another round of contested authority, federal estrangement, and constitutional disarray.

President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud may see himself as an architect of a new political order. But history will judge him by whether he chose consolidation over consensus, and whether his reforms brought the country together—or pulled it apart.

What Somalia needs now is not a victor in the power struggle. It needs a statesman willing to put national unity above political ambition.

If that leadership fails to emerge before the next round of talks, Somalia may not just miss the chance to hold credible elections—it may lose its fragile sense of national cohesion altogether.

–

The author is the Director of Arlaadi Media Network, a foreing policy journalist, and communications specialist.

The post Somalia’s Political Crossroads – Reform, Resistance, and the Road to 2026 appeared first on Kaab TV.

Announced by State Minister for Foreign Affairs Ali Omar, the move was couched in the language of sovereignty. He described the C6+ as an “obsolete structure,” no longer aligned with Somalia’s needs or aspirations.

But strip away the diplomatic varnish, and a far more troubling reality emerges.

This is not about independence. It’s about insulation.

A Dangerous Message at a Dangerous Time

The decision comes at a perilous moment: less than a year before Somalia’s 2026 elections, with the country divided over how those elections should be conducted—and by whom.

At the center of the storm is the long-promised but still elusive shift to a one-person, one-vote system. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s administration claims to champion this model, but critics accuse it of bulldozing ahead without consensus, sidelining opposition leaders, and ignoring regional concerns.

The national dialogue meant to resolve these differences has stalled. Trust has evaporated. And now, the one international platform still capable of mediating across the divide—the C6+—has been ejected from the room.

“This isn’t reform. It’s retreat,” said a senior opposition figure. “The government is not just rejecting outside interference—it’s dismantling the last guardrails of accountability.”

In the absence of strong domestic institutions, the C6+ played an imperfect but essential role: applying pressure, facilitating mediation, and serving as a diplomatic conscience in Somalia’s fragile political landscape.

During the 2021–2022 electoral crisis, it was this bloc that helped force a return to dialogue. Its statements, visits, and joint positions mattered—not because they imposed decisions, but because they provided balance in a country where politics too often tips toward brinkmanship.

Now, with that structure cast aside, Somalia risks heading into its most consequential election in years without a neutral referee.

It’s like pulling the fire alarm out of the wall while the building is still on fire.

Sovereignty vs. Spin

Supporters of Villa Somalia frame the decision as a bold stand for Somali sovereignty. They argue the C6+ imposes foreign agendas and that Somalia must now walk its own path.

But critics—at home and abroad—see it differently.

“Sovereignty is not an excuse for power hoarding,” says Hodan Ahmed, a democracy activist in Mogadishu. “If the government truly respected the Somali people’s right to choose, it would build inclusive processes—not dismantle the only external mechanisms capable of encouraging that inclusion.”

In truth, the timing of this move is revealing. With pressure mounting over constitutional changes and increasing questions about whether the upcoming elections will be free and fair, Villa Somalia has chosen to shut out scrutiny rather than engage with it.

This isn’t just about one coordination group. It’s about the kind of country Somalia is becoming—and what kind of leadership it wants to project.

Across the Horn of Africa, democratic backsliding is becoming a trend. From Ethiopia’s shrinking civic space to Sudan’s total collapse, the region is watching as strongmen close ranks and institutions decay.

Somalia is at a crossroads

This government could choose to lead by example—building consensus, inviting oversight, and showing the world that fragile states can still produce strong democracies.

Or it can keep dismantling every mechanism that questions its authority and drift further into isolation, repression, and instability. 

Somalia’s international partners now face a dilemma: step back and risk being sidelined—or recalibrate, double down on principled engagement, and find new ways to support civil society, local peacebuilders, and inclusive dialogue.

Meanwhile, domestic actors must ask hard questions. If this government can unilaterally kick out the C6+ today, what—or who—gets sidelined tomorrow?

This is not just a test of diplomacy. It’s a test of democracy. Somalia’s future cannot be built on exclusion. The country needs bridges, not barricades. Dialogue, not decrees. Oversight, not opacity.

The rejection of the C6+ might bring short-term political relief for Villa Somalia. But it risks ushering in a long-term crisis—a vacuum of trust, a collapse of dialogue, and the unraveling of the fragile gains made over the past decade.

The question now isn’t just who will stand with Somalia. It’s whether Somalia’s leaders will stand with their own people. Because if no one’s left at the table, everyone pays the price.

———

Abdirahman Jeylani Mohamed is a journalist and the Director of Arlaadi Media Network. You can reach him on X (Twitter) @JaylaaniJr.

The post Somalia’s Sudden Break with Donor Community: Hassan Sheikh’s Flight from Accountability appeared first on Kaab TV.

These accusations are primarily directed at the United Arab Emirates, a former strategic partner now cast by the current administration as a geopolitical adversary.

But here’s the crux of the issue: no evidence has been presented. Not a single document, bank transfer, or verifiable link. Just a barrage of insinuations, false scapegoat and politically convenient soundbites.

For a government that claims to defend Somalia’s sovereignty, this kind of reckless, baseless rhetoric exposes more about its own insecurities than it does about its opponents. These are not principled warnings—they are political distractions.

This isn’t about foreign influence. It’s about domestic pressure. Opposition leaders—many of them former officials, civil servants, and grassroots mobilizers—have returned to Mogadishu to form a united front.

Their timing is no accident. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s government is now past the halfway point of its term, and public patience is wearing thin.

The opposition isn’t calling for revolution. They’re calling for inclusion, transparency, and a credible roadmap toward elections in 2026—something Villa Somalia has so far failed to provide.

Instead of engaging with these demands, federal officials have reverted to a tired strategy: label your critics as foreign agents. Manufacture fear. Weaponize patriotism. But in the absence of facts, these tactics fall flat.

UAE as a Convenient Target

The government’s diplomatic rift with the UAE has been quietly growing for over a year, especially as Mogadishu leans more heavily on Turkey and Qatar.

The Emirates—once seen as key allies—are now portrayed in official messaging as meddlers, despite their continued humanitarian and development footprint in Somalia.

Let’s be honest: every administration in Villa Somalia, including Hassan Sheikh’s, has relied on external partners. Military support, budgetary aid, and diplomatic backing all come from abroad including but not limited, to UAE.

So why is foreign engagement only problematic when it doesn’t pass through the gates of Villa Somalia? This selective outrage is not about sovereignty—it’s about power.

What the Opposition Really Represents

Contrary to the government’s narrative, this growing opposition bloc isn’t foreign-funded—it’s publicly fueled. It reflects the frustrations of ordinary Somalis tired of political theater and eager for real accountability. It channels calls for meaningful decentralization, clarity on federalism, and an electoral process free of manipulation.

Labeling such calls as externally driven is not only dishonest—it’s dangerous. It undermines trust in democratic processes and sends a chilling message: dissent equals betrayal.

But Somalis are not naïve. They’ve lived through decades of manipulation and conflict. They can spot political projection when they see it. What the Opposition Really Represents

Contrary to the government’s narrative, this growing opposition bloc isn’t foreign-funded—it’s publicly fueled. It reflects the frustrations of ordinary Somalis tired of political theater and eager for real accountability. It channels calls for meaningful decentralization, clarity on federalism, and an electoral process free of manipulation.

Labeling such calls as externally driven is not only dishonest—it’s dangerous. It undermines trust in democratic processes and sends a chilling message: dissent equals betrayal.

But Somalis are not naïve. They’ve lived through decades of manipulation and conflict. They can spot political projection when they see it.

A Government Losing Its Moral Ground

In accusing its opponents without proof, the federal government is not defending national unity—it is eroding institutional credibility.

You cannot build a democracy by silencing opposition, stoking fear, and calling every critic a traitor. If the administration truly believes in its mandate, it should welcome political competition—not criminalize it.

If it fears the opposition, it should ask itself why. Because when you attack without evidence, people start to wonder what you’re trying to hide.

Final Word: A Fight for Somalia’s Future

This moment is bigger than party politics. It’s about whether Somalia chooses a path of open democracy—or a closed loop of paranoia and power consolidation.

The government’s latest smear campaign is a sign of weakness, not strength. It knows it cannot win on merit, so it resorts to dirty tricks. The opposition must remain steadfast, and the Somali people must see through these tactics.

The road to 2026 will be fraught with government-backed disinformation and intimidation. The 2026 election will not only test candidates—it will test whether Villa Somalia is willing to let the people decide.

The opposition’s movement must be rooted in the national interest, not foreign agendas—and no amount of propaganda will change that. If the opposition stays united and the public remains vigilant, Somalia may yet see a democratic transition—as demanded by its own citizens.

The clock is ticking. And smokescreens won’t stop the reckoning.

_

Abdirahman Jeylani Mohamed is a journalist and the Director of Arlaadi Media Network. You can reach him on X (Twitter) @JaylaaniJr.

The post Fear of Defeat: Why Somalia’s Government Is Targeting the Opposition with Foreign Agenda Claims appeared first on Kaab TV.

His rallying cry, “Somalia at peace with itself and abroad,” promised a decisive break from years of transitional dysfunction and regional isolation.

Today, as his administration crosses the halfway point, that promise lies heavily burdened by deep internal fractures, diplomatic blunders, massive corruption that brought the country to its knees and an insurgency that remains both relentless and adaptive.

The very pillars upon which Hassan Sheikh anchored his second presidency—reconciliation, constitutional clarity, international alignment, and security—are now in crisis.

An Electoral Minefield and the Constitution in Limbo

One of the clearest indictments of the current administration is the persistent deadlock over Somalia’s electoral framework. Far from achieving a unified model, the country has become more fragmented. Tensions between the federal government and Federal Member States (FMS), especially Puntland and Jubaland, have intensified, eroding trust and threatening the fragile balance of federalism.

The federal government’s push for a controversial one-person, one-vote system without first seeking consensus has raised alarm bells, not because of the principle itself, but due to its unilateral rollout.

Opposition groups argue that it lacks legal clarity, institutional readiness, and most crucially—political inclusivity.

Meanwhile, the constitutional review process—once expected to anchor long-term stability—has stalled. Draft amendments presented in Mogadishu have sparked suspicion among the federal member states, with many viewing them as attempts to centralize power under the guise of reform. Instead of healing Somalia’s political wounds, the process has opened new ones.

Against all odds, the President has pressured three federal member state leaders—Galmudug, Hirshabelle, and Southwest—to join his unilateral political party – Justice and Solidarity Party. This party officials also include the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, Deputy Speaker, and nearly all government ministers, signaling a shift toward authoritarian rule reminiscent of regimes in Djibouti and Turkey.

The once diverse National Consultative Council (NCC) is now effectively defunct, its remnants absorbed into a single-party structure.

Foreign Policy Flip-Flops and Lost Leverage

Under President Hassan Sheikh’s watch, Somalia’s foreign relations have swerved unpredictably, damaging trust with key allies.

The fallout with Ethiopia over its controversial Red Sea agreement with Somaliland plunged Horn diplomacy into crisis. The agreement—widely seen as a threat to Somalia’s territorial integrity—forced the government to seek urgent regional support.

But Mogadishu’s initial diplomatic missteps and emotive responses left observers questioning its strategic depth.

Elsewhere, relations with the United Arab Emirates have been strained over security cooperation and political influence. Even traditional allies like the United States, who re-established military presence in Somalia, have reportedly grown concerned about inconsistencies in Mogadishu’s foreign policy orientation.

The administration’s habit of issuing sweeping nationalist declarations without policy depth has undercut Somalia’s image as a stable partner on the international stage.

Security Gains Overshadowed by Strategic Gaps

The government declared “total war” on Al-Shabaab in 2022, and early gains—especially in central Somalia with the help of clan militia groups—were celebrated. Local communities were mobilized, and Somali National Army (SNA) offensives backed by clan militias achieved symbolic victories.

However, the momentum proved difficult to sustain. Retaken territories often lacked follow-up governance or services, allowing Al-Shabaab to regroup. In some areas, the insurgents have returned stronger, emboldened by local resentment toward federal neglect.

Today, the militant group controls most parts of Middle Shabelle, Hiiraan, and Lower Shabelle as it advances toward Mogadishu.

The slow and uncertain transition from ATMIS to the Somali-led AUSSOM mission raises growing concerns. With donor fatigue setting in and Somali forces overstretched, questions about the long-term sustainability of security remain unanswered, and the African Union mission stands on the brink of collapse.

A Presidency at Odds With Its Own Slogan

President Hassan’s supporters insist progress is underway—pointing to debt relief milestones, returning diaspora investment, and symbolic state-building moves like the Mogadishu Development Corporation.

Yet these isolated wins cannot mask the broader sense of disillusionment. Political legitimacy is waning, and accusations of exclusionary governance are growing louder.

Far from being at peace with itself and the world, Somalia under Hassan Sheikh has become more polarized at home and more unpredictable abroad. The credibility gap between government rhetoric and lived reality is widening, feeding public cynicism and energizing opposition.

With just under two years left in office, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud faces a defining choice: continue down the current path of selective engagement and top-down governance—or recalibrate toward true national consensus.

That would mean reopening electoral talks with all stakeholders, including opposition figures and skeptical federal member states. It requires transparency in foreign affairs, measured rhetoric, and investment in post-liberation governance—not just military bravado.

Hassan Sheikh’s second term was meant to restore diplomacy and inclusive governance. Instead, it has exposed the fragility of Somalia’s progress. This requires the humility to accept that slogans are no substitute for real leadership.

If he really wants to salvage his legacy and fulfill his promise of peace, the time to change course is now. The clock is ticking—and history won’t be kind to those who chose rhetoric over results.

——

The Author is the Director of Arlaadi Media Network, Foreign Policy journalist and communications specialist. You can reach out him in X (Twitter) @JaylaaniJr

The post OP-ED: Three Years On – How Hassan Sheikh Betrayed Somalia’s Fragile Federalism appeared first on Kaab TV.

In effect, this is a practice that has become a means of funding urban modernization and development, creating a new class of oligarchs while it displaces vulnerable communities and erodes public trust in government institutions.

As opposition leaders, lawmakers, and citizens raise alarm, the international community must take note: Somalia’s fragile recovery is at risk of being derailed by corruption, inequality, and the unchecked privatization of public assets.

Somalia has some of the largest expanses of uninhabited land in the Horn of Africa. These include public lands that were once military camps, agricultural fields, and areas reserved for community development-a treasure for a country trying to get up after so many years of war.

However, all these lands were being sold to a handful of rich people, often referred to as “oligarchs,” in non-transparent deals without accountability.

The government argues that the proceeds of these sales would go to finance modernization of cities and covering infrastructure projects. Yet, there is scant evidence to support this assertion.

Opposition leaders, including former President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, former Prime Minister Hassan Ali Khaire, and MP Abdirahman Abdishakur Warsame, accused the administration of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud of violating Somalia’s constitution and legal framework by auctioning public property without oversight.

In a joint statement issued in early January, they warned that the uncontrolled sale of public lands risks entrenching corruption, exacerbating inequality, and undermining the rule of law.

Forced Evictions and Displacement

The human cost of these land sales is already becoming apparent. In many cases, these public lands have been home to civilians for years and sometimes generations. Now they are being forcibly evicted without compensation or alternative housing. The evictions are carried out with little warning and no due process.

These acts are a serious breach of public confidence for a country that is just struggling to regain its footing from war and abject poverty.

Displacement of vulnerable communities is not only a humanitarian issue but also a source of social unrest. As more and more people get displaced and their livelihoods affected, so does the threat of protests, violence, and further instability rise.

But even more disturbingly so in a country where the government’s legitimacy has already been weakened, and a region where an extremist group, Al-Qaeda-affiliated Al-Shabaab, is still out to wreak its terror.

A Financial Crisis in the Making

Equally damaging, the land sales have highlighted severe flaws in Somalia’s financial sector. There are reports that several Somali banks face collapse after being lent depositors’ money to buy public lands which the government is selling off.

This reckless act, termed “unlawful” by more than 100 federal lawmakers, jeopardizes not just the savings of ordinary citizens but also testifies to the lack of supervision and control within the country’s banking system. If these banks fail, it would be catastrophic.

The results of a breakdown in financial institutions would be to further destabilize the economy of Somalia, which already remains nascent after years of conflict.

This will also further entrench public distrust in the government and the financial sector, thereby making the attraction of much-needed investment for long-term recovery and development even more difficult.

A Controversial Election Funding Plan

Accusations that the government intends to use money generated by the land sales to finance a controversial one-person, one-vote election add to the controversy.

The political consensus on this issue has not been achieved yet, and there are many questions about the practicality of this initiative, reportedly leading international donors to refuse support for it.

Critics say such an approach in election financing sets a very dangerous precedent, as large tracts of public land get privatized to serve a political interest. In fact, the approach is detrimental to principles of transparency and accountability and runs a risk of increasing political polarization.

And to think this would be occurring in a country where confidence in the government institutions was already at an all-time low. Perceived funding of elections through selling public lands can’t help but reduce further what little confidence citizens currently have in a democratic process.

Government Denials and Public Distrust

Government officials, however, denied these claims and described them as “unfounded and politically motivated.” These land sales are part of an overall economic strategy, they explained.

Yet, the opacity of the transactions has only increased public skepticism. Without transparent mechanisms to ensure that funds are utilized for their intended purpose, the potential for embezzlement and mismanagement will remain high.

While declining to engage all these issues, the government reaction has only allowed the crisis to worsen. Unless the current administration provides a reasonable and credible explanation of its actions, it risks alienating not just its compatriots but also the very international partners whose assistance is essential for Somalia’s recovery.

This means the international community is responsible for this crisis. The donor countries and organizations should push the government of Somalia to freeze the sale of public lands until such time as an appropriate and transparent system is set up.

This means making sure land deals are conducted within the rule of law, adequate compensation to the concerned communities, and money obtained from them used for projects that have value for its people.

Equally significant would be the commitment on the part of international partners to technical and financial support for strengthening the financial sector in Somalia, along with enhancing oversight mechanisms, which would hopefully prevent the type of irresponsible behavior that put Somali banks at risk and jeopardized ordinary citizens’ savings.

A Frightening Crossroads for Somalia

Somalia is at a crossroads. The choices made today will determine the course of the country for the next several decades. In prioritizing short-term gains over long-term stability, the government risks squandering a rare opportunity to rebuild a nation that has endured so much.

Selling off public lands may appear an easy solution, but it is a perilous gamble that could widen inequality, undermine public trust, and pave the way for oligarchic rule anew.

The time to act is now. Somalia’s leaders must put the interests of their citizens above the ambitions of a favored few. The international community must hold them accountable.

This means Somalians need to keep demanding for transparency, justice, and their rightful share in all their country’s resources. Only then can Somalia have any real hope of true stability and prosperity.

–

Abdirahman Jeylani Mohamed, Foreign Policy Journalist and Communications Specialist

The post The Peril of Unchecked Public Land Auctions and the Rise of Oligarchs in Somalia appeared first on Kaab TV.

Among the most affected is Somalia, a nation where nearly 70% of its annual budget is funded by donor contributions.

With a 2025 budget of $1.3 billion, Somalia’s dependence on external aid underscores the fragility of its economic and political systems.

The U.S. has been a cornerstone of Somalia’s recovery efforts, providing billions in humanitarian and security assistance over the past two decades.

Trump’s decision, therefore, raises critical questions about the future of Somalia’s stability, the broader geopolitical implications, and the moral responsibility of global powers in addressing humanitarian crises.

A History of U.S. Involvement in Somalia

Since 2006, the United States has contributed $1.5 billion in humanitarian assistance to Somalia, addressing dire issues such as drought, famine, and the displacement of millions of refugees.

This aid has been a lifeline for a country that has struggled to rebuild after decades of civil war, political instability, and the persistent threat of terrorism.

Beyond humanitarian relief, the U.S. has also invested $240 million in development assistance since 2011, targeting economic growth, political stability, and social services.

These efforts aim to establish a formal economy, improve access to basic services, and foster legitimate governance.

In the security sector, U.S. involvement has been even more pronounced. Between 2010 and 2020, the U.S. provided over $500 million in direct security assistance to Somali forces, including the elite Danab Brigade, a special operations unit trained and mentored by American forces.

The Danab Brigade has emerged as one of the most effective combat units in the Somali army, a testament to the success of U.S. investment in building local capacity.

Additionally, the U.S. has contributed $2.5 billion to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and its successor, the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), which have played a pivotal role in countering the Islamist militant group al-Shabaab.

Somalia is also the largest beneficiary of the State Department’s Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) program, receiving $1.395 billion between 2016 and 2021.

These funds have supported the operations of troop-contributing countries and helped maintain a fragile peace in a region plagued by violence. U.S. military involvement has extended beyond financial support, with American forces engaging in active hostilities alongside Somali troops, including airstrikes targeting al-Shabaab.

However, these operations have not been without controversy, as civilian casualties have provided propaganda fodder for militant groups.

The Impact of Cutting Aid

The decision to freeze USAID contributions threatens to unravel years of progress in Somalia. Humanitarian organizations warn that the suspension of aid could exacerbate food insecurity, displacement, and health crises, particularly in a country where millions rely on international assistance for survival.

The timing could not be worse, as Somalia continues to grapple with the lingering effects of climate change, political instability, and the COVID-19 pandemic.

In the security sector, the loss of U.S. funding could undermine efforts to combat ISIL and Al-Qaeda’s branch in East Africa, al-Shabaab, which remains a potent threat to regional stability. The Danab Brigade and other Somali forces depend on American support for training, equipment, and operational capacity.

A reduction in aid could weaken these units, creating a security vacuum that al-Shabaab would be eager to exploit. Moreover, the freeze could strain Somalia’s relationship with the U.S., a key ally in its fight against terrorism.

Geopolitical Ramifications

Beyond the immediate humanitarian and security concerns, Trump’s decision carries significant geopolitical implications. By withdrawing support, the U.S. risks ceding influence in Somalia to other global powers, particularly China and Russia. Both nations have been expanding their presence in Africa, leveraging economic and military partnerships to gain strategic footholds.

For China, Somalia’s location along vital maritime trade routes makes it an attractive partner for its Belt and Road Initiative. Russia, meanwhile, has sought to strengthen ties with African nations as part of its broader strategy to counter Western influence.

The U.S. has long viewed Somalia through the lens of counterterrorism, but its involvement has also been a means of projecting soft power and fostering stability in a volatile region.

By stepping back, the U.S. not only jeopardizes its own strategic interests but also creates opportunities for rivals to fill the void. This shift could have far-reaching consequences for U.S. influence in Africa and beyond.

A Wake-Up Call or a Misstep?

Within Somalia, reactions to Trump’s decision have been mixed. Some view the freeze as a wake-up call for Somali leaders to reduce their dependence on foreign aid and take greater ownership of their country’s future.

Critics argue that decades of donor funding have fostered a culture of dependency, stifling local innovation and accountability. They contend that Somalia must prioritize economic self-sufficiency, good governance, and domestic resource mobilization to achieve lasting stability.

Others, however, see the move as a betrayal of Somalia’s progress and a failure of U.S. leadership. They argue that cutting aid at this critical juncture could reverse hard-won gains and plunge the country back into chaos.

Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has expressed hope that the Trump administration will reconsider its decision, particularly in light of the ongoing fight against terrorism.

Yet, without official confirmation from the U.S. government, the future of American support remains uncertain.

A Moral and Strategic Imperative

The debate over U.S. aid to Somalia is not merely a question of dollars and cents; it is a test of America’s commitment to global stability and humanitarian values. Somalia’s challenges are immense, but they are not insurmountable.

With sustained support, the country has the potential to emerge from decades of conflict and build a more prosperous future for its people. Abandoning Somalia now would not only undermine these efforts but also tarnish America’s reputation as a leader in the fight against poverty and terrorism.

As the international community grapples with the implications of Trump’s decision, one thing is clear: the stakes are high for Somalia, the region, and the world.

The U.S. must weigh the short-term costs of aid against the long-term benefits of a stable and secure Somalia. In doing so, it must also consider the broader geopolitical landscape and the moral imperative to stand by a nation in need. The path forward is fraught with challenges, but the consequences of inaction are too great to ignore.

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Abdirahman Jeylani Mohamed, Foreign Policy Journalist and Communications Specialist

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