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	<description>Somalia and Somaliland Daily News Update</description>
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	<title>Abdi Guled, Author at Kaab TV</title>
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		<title>America&#8217;s Somalia Bet Is Changing &#8211; Without Saying So</title>
		<link>https://en.kaabtv.com/americas-somalia-bet-is-changing-without-saying-so/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Abdi Guled]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 02 Aug 2026 20:45:49 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Conflict & Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[U.S Somalia Relations]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>By any official measure, the United States has not abandoned Somalia&#8217;s Federal Government. American diplomats continue to affirm support for the country&#8217;s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and internationally recognized federal institutions. Publicly, Washington remains committed to the &#8220;One Somalia&#8221; policy that has underpinned its diplomacy for more than three decades. Yet diplomacy is often defined less [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/americas-somalia-bet-is-changing-without-saying-so/">America&#8217;s Somalia Bet Is Changing &#8211; Without Saying So</a> appeared first on <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com">Kaab TV</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p id="ember73" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">By any official measure, the United States has not abandoned Somalia&#8217;s Federal Government. American diplomats continue to <strong><a class="XQidInOZdUqrHGlQkkUpVUZDTyqjTPrnrE " tabindex="0" href="https://2021-2025.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-somalia/" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">affirm</a></strong> support for the country&#8217;s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and internationally recognized federal institutions.</p>
<p id="ember74" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Publicly, Washington remains committed to the &#8220;<strong><a class="XQidInOZdUqrHGlQkkUpVUZDTyqjTPrnrE " tabindex="0" href="https://worldview.stratfor.com/situation-report/somaliland-us-us-reaffirms-one-somalia-policy-eyes-further-cooperation-somaliland" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">One Somalia</a></strong>&#8221; policy that has underpinned its diplomacy for more than three decades.</p>
<p id="ember75" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Yet diplomacy is often defined less by declarations than by patterns of behavior.</p>
<p id="ember76" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Across Somalia, a quieter but strategically significant transformation is unfolding. The shift is subtle but increasingly discernible.</p>
<p id="ember77" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">American military officers are spending more time in <strong><a class="XQidInOZdUqrHGlQkkUpVUZDTyqjTPrnrE " tabindex="0" href="https://www.somaliguardian.com/news/somalia-news/somalia-us-regions/" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">Garowe and Kismayo</a></strong>, where regional authorities have become indispensable security partners.</p>
<p id="ember78" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Congressional engagement with <strong><a class="XQidInOZdUqrHGlQkkUpVUZDTyqjTPrnrE " tabindex="0" href="https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/news/press-releases/mccaul-smith-lead-bipartisan-letter-increased-engagement-with-somaliland" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">Somaliland</a> </strong>has steadily grown, economic diplomacy is extending beyond the federal capital, and counterterrorism planning is becoming progressively more responsive to local centers of power than to the formal architecture of Somalia&#8217;s federal system alone.</p>
<p id="ember79" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Taken individually, none of these developments amounts to a dramatic policy reversal. Together, however, they suggest that Washington is gradually recalibrating how it pursues its interests in Somalia, accepting that influence may have to flow through multiple political centers rather than exclusively through the federal capital.</p>
<p id="ember80" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">It reflects neither a departure from Somalia&#8217;s territorial integrity nor an embrace of fragmentation, but an adaptation to realities on the ground.</p>
<p id="ember81" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">For much of the past decade, American policy was guided by a central premise: that strengthening <strong><a class="XQidInOZdUqrHGlQkkUpVUZDTyqjTPrnrE " tabindex="0" href="https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF10170.web.html" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">federal institutions</a></strong> in Mogadishu would gradually produce a more cohesive Somali state, one capable of containing al-Shabaab, managing relations with its regions and projecting authority across its territory and coastline.</p>
<p id="ember82" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Increasingly, that premise has come under strain.</p>
<figure id="attachment_20830" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-20830" style="width: 2560px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img fetchpriority="high" decoding="async" class="wp-image-20830 size-full" title="President of Somaliland, Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi (Cirro), today held a strategic meeting with Major General Claude K. Tudor Jr." src="https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/Somaliland-iyo-Mareykanka-scaled.jpeg" alt="President of Somaliland, Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi (Cirro), today held a strategic meeting with Major General Claude K. Tudor Jr." width="2560" height="1707" srcset="https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/Somaliland-iyo-Mareykanka-scaled.jpeg 2560w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/Somaliland-iyo-Mareykanka-300x200.jpeg 300w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/Somaliland-iyo-Mareykanka-1024x683.jpeg 1024w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/Somaliland-iyo-Mareykanka-768x512.jpeg 768w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/Somaliland-iyo-Mareykanka-1536x1024.jpeg 1536w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/Somaliland-iyo-Mareykanka-2048x1366.jpeg 2048w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/Somaliland-iyo-Mareykanka-630x420.jpeg 630w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/Somaliland-iyo-Mareykanka-150x100.jpeg 150w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/Somaliland-iyo-Mareykanka-696x464.jpeg 696w" sizes="(max-width: 2560px) 100vw, 2560px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-20830" class="wp-caption-text">President of Somaliland, Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi (Cirro), today held a strategic meeting with Major General Claude K. Tudor Jr.</figcaption></figure>
<p id="ember83" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Political disputes between the federal govenment and several Federal Member States have evolved from temporary disagreements into <strong><a class="XQidInOZdUqrHGlQkkUpVUZDTyqjTPrnrE " tabindex="0" href="https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/SOM" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">structural competition</a> </strong>over constitutional authority, resource distribution, elections, and security control.</p>
<p id="ember84" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Puntland <strong><a class="XQidInOZdUqrHGlQkkUpVUZDTyqjTPrnrE " tabindex="0" href="https://www.jurist.org/news/2024/04/somalia-state-of-puntland-rejects-constitutional-amendments-and-withdraws-from-federal-government/" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">no longer recognizes</a></strong> key federal constitutional changes. Relations with Jubaland remain deeply strained. Political opposition has increasingly framed constitutional reforms as unilateral rather than consensual.</p>
<p id="ember85" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Meanwhile, Somalia&#8217;s security landscape has become considerably more complex.</p>
<p id="ember86" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong><a class="XQidInOZdUqrHGlQkkUpVUZDTyqjTPrnrE " tabindex="0" href="https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/751/materials/summaries/entity/al-shabaab" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">Al-Shabaab</a>,</strong> despite sustained military pressure over nearly two decades, has demonstrated a persistent capacity to <a class="XQidInOZdUqrHGlQkkUpVUZDTyqjTPrnrE " tabindex="0" href="https://www.africansecurityanalysis.com/reports/al-shabaab-resurgence-in-somalia-strategic-shifts-and-implications" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link=""><strong>adapt, regroup and retain</strong></a> influence across large parts of rural Somalia.</p>
<p id="ember87" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong><a class="XQidInOZdUqrHGlQkkUpVUZDTyqjTPrnrE " tabindex="0" href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/u-s-military-strikes-islamic-state-operatives-in-somalia-for-the-first-time-in-trumps-new-term" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">ISIS-Somalia</a>,</strong> while considerably smaller in size, has steadily expanded its operational footprint in <strong><a class="XQidInOZdUqrHGlQkkUpVUZDTyqjTPrnrE " tabindex="0" href="https://www.africansecurityanalysis.com/updates/u-s-airstrike-targets-isis-militants-in-somalia-s-puntland-region" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">Puntland&#8217;s mountainous interior</a></strong>, attracting growing attention from American intelligence and special operations planners.</p>
<p id="ember88" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">At the same time, northern Somalia’s strategic relevance has been reshaped by a broader geopolitical contest unfolding across the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, where maritime security, commercial corridors and great-power competition are increasingly intertwined.</p>
<p id="ember89" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">For Washington, this creates a complex policy challenge: its security objectives increasingly intersect with regions that operate through their own political structures, sources of legitimacy and security institutions rather than solely through the federal framework in Mogadishu.</p>
<p id="ember90" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">American policymakers therefore face a difficult balancing act.</p>
<p id="ember91" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Counterterrorism imperatives cannot simply be deferred until Somalia’s unresolved constitutional and political disputes are settled, yet security cooperation in contested political environments carries its own diplomatic risks.</p>
<p id="ember92" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">If regional authorities possess the intelligence networks, terrain familiarity, and security partnerships necessary to disrupt militant organizations, military planners are unlikely to sacrifice operational effectiveness for diplomatic symmetry.</p>
<p id="ember93" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">From an international security perspective, Security institutions naturally gravitate toward whoever can produce results. That logic increasingly explains American engagement.</p>
<h3 id="ember94" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong>The Dual Track Legacy</strong></h3>
<p id="ember95" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The current evolution of U.S. engagement with Somalia’s subnational actors has deeper roots than recent geopolitical shifts might suggest.</p>
<p id="ember96" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">American security cooperation with regional authorities dates back to the early post-transition period, including the development of specialized security capabilities in Puntland beginning in the early 2000=2022 and subsequent engagement with regional security structures in Jubaland following the formation of the state in 2014,</p>
<p id="ember97" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">For more than two decades, U.S. policymakers have sought to navigate a delicate balance: leveraging the effectiveness of regional security actors in counterterrorism and stabilization efforts while maintaining political support for a strong central government in Mogadishu.</p>
<p id="ember98" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">This balancing approach became more visible during the “<a class="XQidInOZdUqrHGlQkkUpVUZDTyqjTPrnrE " tabindex="0" href="https://www.csis.org/events/state-department-dual-track-approach-somalia" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link=""><strong>Dual Track</strong></a>” period, when Washington expanded direct engagement beyond the federal center while continuing to publicly emphasize Somalia’s national institutions.</p>
<p id="ember99" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The emergence and consolidation of Somalia’s Federal Member States further institutionalized this multi-layered engagement model.</p>
<p id="ember100" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">While public U.S. policy messaging has consistently prioritized support for the Federal Government and the principle of a unified Somali state, operational realities have often required engagement with regional actors possessing territorial control, security capacity, and local legitimacy.</p>
<p id="ember101" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">What appears different in the current period is not the existence of these relationships, which have longstanding origins, but the degree to which regional partnerships are becoming more strategically prominent within a changing security environment.</p>
<h3 id="ember102" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong>The New Geography of Counterterrorism</strong></h3>
<p id="ember103" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The shift is perhaps best understood not as decentralization by design but decentralization by necessity.</p>
<figure id="attachment_20829" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-20829" style="width: 2048px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img decoding="async" class="President Deni meeting with Africom Operations Comander. wp-image-20829 size-full" title="President Deni meeting with Africom Operations Comander." src="https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/Deni-meeting-with-Africom.jpg" alt="President Deni meeting with Africom Operations Comander." width="2048" height="1546" srcset="https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/Deni-meeting-with-Africom.jpg 2048w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/Deni-meeting-with-Africom-300x226.jpg 300w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/Deni-meeting-with-Africom-1024x773.jpg 1024w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/Deni-meeting-with-Africom-768x580.jpg 768w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/Deni-meeting-with-Africom-1536x1160.jpg 1536w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/Deni-meeting-with-Africom-556x420.jpg 556w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/Deni-meeting-with-Africom-80x60.jpg 80w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/Deni-meeting-with-Africom-150x113.jpg 150w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/Deni-meeting-with-Africom-696x525.jpg 696w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/Deni-meeting-with-Africom-1068x806.jpg 1068w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/Deni-meeting-with-Africom-1920x1449.jpg 1920w" sizes="(max-width: 2048px) 100vw, 2048px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-20829" class="wp-caption-text">President Deni meeting with AFRICOM Operations Commander.</figcaption></figure>
<p id="ember104" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Moving beyond the traditional framework centered on Mogadishu, the U.S military in Africa known as AFRICOM’s <strong><a class="XQidInOZdUqrHGlQkkUpVUZDTyqjTPrnrE " tabindex="0" href="https://www.africom.mil/topic/somalia" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">operational requirements</a> </strong>increasingly call for engagement with a wider range of actors across Somalia’s security landscape.</p>
<p id="ember105" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Intelligence gathering, strike coordination, logistical support, maritime monitoring and force protection often depend on cooperation with authorities that exercise practical control and operational influence on the ground, even when their political status does not fully align with Somalia’s constitutional arrangements.</p>
<p id="ember106" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">In practice, this creates what officials rarely describe publicly: a dual-track policy.</p>
<p id="ember107" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Diplomatically, Washington continues recognizing the Federal Government. Operationally, it increasingly works directly with regional administrations whenever strategic objectives require it.</p>
<p id="ember108" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The distinction matters. Recognition determines legal policy. Engagement determines actual influence.</p>
<p id="ember109" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Recent American outreach illustrates this evolution.</p>
<p id="ember110" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">High-level engagements involving congressional staff, diplomats, and military officials have increasingly included <strong><a class="XQidInOZdUqrHGlQkkUpVUZDTyqjTPrnrE " tabindex="0" href="https://www.somaliguardian.com/news/somalia-news/somalia-us-regions/" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">Garowe and Kismayo</a> </strong>alongside Mogadishu rather than treating them merely as subordinate administrative stops. Such visits send important political signals irrespective of official messaging.</p>
<p id="ember111" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Regional leaders interpret them as acknowledgment of their growing strategic importance. Officials in Mogadishu often interpret them as diplomatic bypass.</p>
<p id="ember112" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Both interpretations contain elements of truth.</p>
<p id="ember113" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The broader geopolitical environment further reinforces this recalibration.</p>
<p id="ember114" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The Red Sea has emerged as one of the world&#8217;s most strategically contested waterways. Maritime disruptions, great-power competition, commercial shipping vulnerabilities, and, according to a former AU diplomat based in Nairobi, the expanding Chinese military influence have fundamentally altered how Washington views the Horn of Africa.</p>
<p id="ember115" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">In this environment, <strong><a class="XQidInOZdUqrHGlQkkUpVUZDTyqjTPrnrE " tabindex="0" href="https://addisstandard.com/red-sea-security-berbera-access-geopolitical-realities-propelling-somaliland-recognition/" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">Berbera</a> </strong>assumes significance extending well beyond Somaliland&#8217;s political status.</p>
<p id="ember116" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Its deep-water port, expanding infrastructure, and location along <strong><a class="XQidInOZdUqrHGlQkkUpVUZDTyqjTPrnrE " tabindex="0" href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2026/2/8/somalia-is-the-missing-pillar-of-red-sea-and-gulf-of-aden-stability" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">critical maritime corridors</a></strong> make it attractive to policymakers thinking less about Somali constitutional arrangements than about Indo-Pacific logistics, Middle Eastern deterrence, and maritime resilience.</p>
<p id="ember117" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">For American strategists, geography often remains a decisive factor in shaping policy choices, sometimes moving faster than diplomatic frameworks can adapt. Strategic infrastructure is rarely viewed as merely physical space; it becomes part of a broader calculus of access, influence and resilience.</p>
<p id="ember118" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Ports can provide maritime reach and logistical leverage, while airfields can preserve operational flexibility in regions where political conditions remain fluid.</p>
<p id="ember119" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">None of this necessarily implies imminent American recognition of Somaliland.</p>
<p id="ember120" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Recognition carries legal, diplomatic, and regional consequences extending far beyond bilateral relations.</p>
<p id="ember121" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Yet Washington no longer appears willing to allow unresolved sovereignty questions to prevent practical cooperation where mutual interests converge.</p>
<p id="ember122" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The <strong><a class="XQidInOZdUqrHGlQkkUpVUZDTyqjTPrnrE " tabindex="0" href="https://www.geeska.com/en/kampala-summit-seeks-funding-lifeline-somalia-peace-mission" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">Kampala summit</a> </strong>at the end of July offered another illustration of this changing dynamic.</p>
<p id="ember123" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">During discussions surrounding the future of the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), regional leaders reportedly sought language encouraging an inclusive Somali political conference involving Federal Member States and opposition actors.</p>
<p id="ember124" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud <strong><a class="XQidInOZdUqrHGlQkkUpVUZDTyqjTPrnrE " tabindex="0" href="https://www.somaliguardian.com/news/somalia-news/somalia-president-forces-uganda-soften-aussom-communique/" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">forcefully rejected the proposal,</a></strong> arguing that Somalia&#8217;s internal political affairs should not be internationalized. The disputed language was ultimately removed from the final communiqué.</p>
<p id="ember125" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">From Mogadishu&#8217;s perspective, this represented a defense of national sovereignty. From Washington&#8217;s perspective, however, sovereignty alone no longer appears sufficient.</p>
<p id="ember126" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">American officials increasingly view Somalia&#8217;s political fragmentation not merely as a domestic governance issue but as a direct national security concern affecting military investments, stabilization efforts, and counterterrorism outcomes.</p>
<p id="ember127" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">That linkage has become progressively more explicit.</p>
<p id="ember128" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Recent American <strong><a class="XQidInOZdUqrHGlQkkUpVUZDTyqjTPrnrE " tabindex="0" href="https://www.facebook.com/US2Somalia/videos/the-united-states-has-not-turned-its-back-on-somaliaafricom-commanders-exclusive/3298549883687007/" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">statements</a> </strong>have suggested growing impatience with political deadlock, emphasizing that enduring security gains cannot be separated from political consensus.</p>
<p id="ember129" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Behind closed doors, and increasingly in public, American officials have conveyed that continued international support cannot indefinitely compensate for unresolved constitutional disputes and institutional paralysis.</p>
<p id="ember130" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">This represents an important evolution.</p>
<p id="ember131" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">For years, counterterrorism cooperation in Somalia largely operated in a separate lane from the country’s internal political disputes, with security priorities often insulated from broader questions of governance and institutional reform.</p>
<p id="ember132" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">That separation has become increasingly difficult to maintain.</p>
<p id="ember133" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Military assistance is now shaped not only by operational needs but also by political considerations; financial support is increasingly linked to governance benchmarks and institutional performance; and security partnerships increasingly depend on the ability of Somalia’s political system to function effectively.</p>
<p id="ember134" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The result is a more complex relationship in which security objectives and political realities are no longer parallel tracks, but increasingly interconnected elements of the same strategic equation.</p>
<p id="ember135" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The decision to <strong><a class="XQidInOZdUqrHGlQkkUpVUZDTyqjTPrnrE " tabindex="0" href="https://acleddata.com/expert-comment/what-does-us-funding-exit-unsos-mean-somalias-stability" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">end U.S. support</a> </strong>for the United Nations Support Office in Somalia after 2026 further reinforces that message.</p>
<p id="ember136" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Although primarily framed through broader budgetary and burden-sharing considerations, the move also signals that Washington expects Somali institutions and international partners to assume greater responsibility for sustaining security architecture.</p>
<p id="ember137" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The era of open-ended logistical underwriting appears to be ending.</p>
<p id="ember138" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Whether Somalia is prepared for that transition remains uncertain. The implications extend beyond Somalia itself.</p>
<p id="ember139" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Neighboring states increasingly evaluate Somalia through the lens of regional stability rather than state-building orthodoxy. Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, and other troop-contributing countries face immediate security consequences should Somalia&#8217;s internal political disputes undermine counterinsurgency operations.</p>
<p id="ember140" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Their growing interest in facilitating political compromise reflects security calculations more than diplomatic activism.</p>
<p id="ember141" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">For Washington, the same calculation increasingly applies.</p>
<p id="ember142" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">American strategy appears to be moving away from asking whether Somalia should possess a strong federal center and toward a more pragmatic question:</p>
<p id="ember143" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Which institutions, national or regional, are presently capable of advancing shared security interests?</p>
<p id="ember144" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">That question does not produce ideologically satisfying answers. But it reflects how foreign policy often evolves.</p>
<p id="ember145" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Governments rarely announce strategic pivots at the moment they occur.</p>
<p id="ember146" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Instead, priorities shift incrementally through funding decisions, military deployments, diplomatic itineraries, congressional attention, and operational partnerships until, eventually, a new policy has emerged without ever being formally declared.</p>
<p id="ember147" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Somalia may now be approaching such a moment. Washington has not abandoned Mogadishu. Nor has it embraced fragmentation.</p>
<p id="ember148" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Rather, it appears to be adapting to a political landscape in which authority is increasingly dispersed, security is locally anchored, and strategic competition leaves little room for waiting until Somalia resolves debates that have persisted for decades.</p>
<p id="ember149" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Whether this recalibration ultimately strengthens Somalia&#8217;s federal system or inadvertently accelerates its decentralization will depend less on Washington than on Somali political leaders themselves.</p>
<p id="ember150" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The United States can adjust its partnerships.</p>
<p id="ember151" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Only Somalis can decide whether those partnerships ultimately reinforce one state, or several enduring centers of power operating beneath a single flag.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/americas-somalia-bet-is-changing-without-saying-so/">America&#8217;s Somalia Bet Is Changing &#8211; Without Saying So</a> appeared first on <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com">Kaab TV</a>.</p>
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			<media:title type="html">Somaliland iyo Mareykanka</media:title>
			<media:description type="html">President of Somaliland, Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi (Cirro), today held a strategic meeting with Major General Claude K. Tudor Jr.</media:description>
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			<media:title type="html">Deni meeting with Africom</media:title>
			<media:description type="html">President Deni meeting with Africom Operations Comander.</media:description>
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		<title>Somalia’s Counterterrorism Consensus Is Giving Way to Geopolitics</title>
		<link>https://en.kaabtv.com/somalias-counterterrorism-consensus-is-giving-way-to-geopolitics/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Abdi Guled]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 27 Jul 2026 15:14:52 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Conflict & Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Opinion]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AUSSOM]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Somalia counter terror security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Turkey in Somalia]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://en.kaabtv.com/?p=20697</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>For much of the post-2006 period, Somalia occupied an unusual place in international diplomacy. Despite disagreements over governance, federalism and competing national interests, foreign governments, regional powers and Somali political actors shared one overarching assumption: whatever their differences, the campaign against al-Shabaab had to remain the first priority. That understanding became the invisible architecture supporting [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/somalias-counterterrorism-consensus-is-giving-way-to-geopolitics/">Somalia’s Counterterrorism Consensus Is Giving Way to Geopolitics</a> appeared first on <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com">Kaab TV</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p id="ember74" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">For much of the post-2006 period, Somalia occupied an unusual place in international diplomacy.</p>
<p id="ember75" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Despite disagreements over governance, federalism and competing national interests, foreign governments, regional powers and Somali political actors shared one overarching assumption: whatever their differences, the campaign against al-Shabaab had to remain <a class="tBFjffeGIQFLpveCPjltPbGBTBmBprvDA " tabindex="0" href="https://fic.tufts.edu/wp-content/uploads/state-building-somalia.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">the first priority.</a></p>
<p id="ember76" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">That understanding became the invisible architecture supporting Somalia&#8217;s modern state-building <a class="tBFjffeGIQFLpveCPjltPbGBTBmBprvDA " tabindex="0" href="https://www.politicalsettlements.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/PSRP-RVI-Report-7-Stabilization-Extraversion-and-Political-Settlements-in-Somalia-Tobias-Hagmann-2016.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">project</a>.</p>
<p id="ember77" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">African Union peacekeepers deployed under successive <a class="tBFjffeGIQFLpveCPjltPbGBTBmBprvDA " tabindex="0" href="https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc-report-on-somalia-en.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">mandates</a>. Western governments financed military operations while investing in <a class="tBFjffeGIQFLpveCPjltPbGBTBmBprvDA " tabindex="0" href="https://icct.nl/sites/default/files/import/publication/Hogendoorn-The-Good-Governance-Gap-in-EU-Policy-for-Somalia-Dec2017.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">institution-building</a>. The United Nations sustained the logistical infrastructure that enabled those missions to function.</p>
<p id="ember78" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Political crises routinely emerged between Mogadishu and federal member states, but international mediation was largely guided by a single objective &#8211; preventing those disputes from undermining the <a class="tBFjffeGIQFLpveCPjltPbGBTBmBprvDA " tabindex="0" href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv.7614.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">counterinsurgency campaign.</a></p>
<p id="ember79" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">For nearly twenty years, counterterrorism did more than shape military policy. It defined diplomatic priorities, determined aid allocations and provided a common language through which external powers justified their <a class="tBFjffeGIQFLpveCPjltPbGBTBmBprvDA " tabindex="0" href="https://media.odi.org/documents/7646.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">engagement</a> with Somalia.</p>
<p id="ember80" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Today, that strategic framework is quietly dissolving.</p>
<p id="ember81" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Not because the al-Qaeda-linked extremist group of al-Shabaab has diminished as a security threat. If anything, the radical group has demonstrated an extraordinary capacity to <a class="tBFjffeGIQFLpveCPjltPbGBTBmBprvDA " tabindex="0" href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/23311886.2025.2576151" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">adapt</a>, recovering territory after setbacks, exploiting governance failures, infiltrating state institutions and expanding influence in areas where government authority has weakened.</p>
<p id="ember82" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Rather, the insurgency is no longer the central lens through which Somalia is viewed.</p>
<p id="ember83" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Counterterrorism has become one priority among several competing strategic interests, and increasingly it is not the one driving regional <a class="tBFjffeGIQFLpveCPjltPbGBTBmBprvDA " tabindex="0" href="https://rsdi.ae/en/publications/egypts-growing-role-in-somalia-implications-for-red-sea-security-and-regional-balance" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">decision-making.</a></p>
<p id="ember84" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The transformation has been gradual enough to escape dramatic headlines.</p>
<h3 id="ember85" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong>The Rise of Competitive Geopolitics</strong></h3>
<p id="ember86" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">There was no conference announcing the end of the counterterrorism era. No formal declaration that international priorities had shifted. Instead, a succession of political crises steadily redirected diplomatic attention toward new disputes that often carried greater strategic urgency for the actors involved.</p>
<p id="ember87" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The catalyst was not a battlefield development but geopolitics.</p>
<p id="ember88" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Ethiopia&#8217;s controversial maritime <a class="tBFjffeGIQFLpveCPjltPbGBTBmBprvDA " tabindex="0" href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/qna/africa/ethiopia/stakes-ethiopia-somaliland-deal" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">memorandum of understanding</a>with Somaliland transformed Somalia&#8217;s sovereignty into a regional fault line, fundamentally reshaping relations between Addis Ababa and Mogadishu.</p>
<p id="ember89" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Egypt, viewing Ethiopia primarily through the prism of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam dispute, expanded its <a class="tBFjffeGIQFLpveCPjltPbGBTBmBprvDA " tabindex="0" href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/377703241_The_Grand_Ethiopian_Renaissance_Dam_GERD_Geopolitical_Implications" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">military partnership</a> with Somalia, turning the country into another arena within a much broader contest for regional influence.</p>
<p id="ember90" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Turkey simultaneously <a class="tBFjffeGIQFLpveCPjltPbGBTBmBprvDA " tabindex="0" href="https://dergipark.org.tr/en/download/article-file/5055444" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">evolved</a> beyond its long-standing role as Somalia&#8217;s principal security partner. Ankara increasingly positioned itself as both mediator and strategic stakeholder, balancing security cooperation with expanding maritime and economic interests.</p>
<figure id="attachment_20699" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-20699" style="width: 1035px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="Turkey military officials in Mogadishu. Photo/handout. wp-image-20699 size-full" title="Turkey military officials in Mogadishu. Photo/handout." src="https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Xasan-iyo-Turkey.jpg" alt="Turkey military officials in Mogadishu. Photo/handout." width="1035" height="932" srcset="https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Xasan-iyo-Turkey.jpg 1035w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Xasan-iyo-Turkey-300x270.jpg 300w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Xasan-iyo-Turkey-1024x922.jpg 1024w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Xasan-iyo-Turkey-768x692.jpg 768w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Xasan-iyo-Turkey-466x420.jpg 466w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Xasan-iyo-Turkey-150x135.jpg 150w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Xasan-iyo-Turkey-696x627.jpg 696w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1035px) 100vw, 1035px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-20699" class="wp-caption-text">Turkey military officials in Mogadishu. Photo/handout.</figcaption></figure>
<p id="ember91" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Elsewhere, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and other Gulf powers continued pursuing commercial, logistical and political <a class="tBFjffeGIQFLpveCPjltPbGBTBmBprvDA " tabindex="0" href="https://www.policycenter.ma/sites/default/files/PB_20-02_Aidi.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">influence</a> through ports, infrastructure investments and bilateral partnerships, reinforcing a broader regional competition that extended well beyond counterterrorism.</p>
<h3 id="ember92" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong>The Fragmentation of Somalia’s Security Coalition</strong></h3>
<p id="ember93" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Somalia itself was changing as well.</p>
<p id="ember94" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Domestic politics increasingly eclipsed the security consensus that had previously united competing political actors.</p>
<p id="ember95" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Constitutional amendments advanced by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud reopened fundamental questions about federalism, elections and the distribution of power.</p>
<p id="ember96" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Puntland, the semiautonomous federal state in northern Somalia suspended <a class="tBFjffeGIQFLpveCPjltPbGBTBmBprvDA " tabindex="0" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitutional_crisis_in_Somalia#:~:text=Part%20of%20the%20Somali%20Civil%20War%20(2009%E2%80%93present),after%20regional%20administration%20ends%20recognition%20of%20FGS." target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">recognition</a> of key federal institutions. Relations with Jubaland <a class="tBFjffeGIQFLpveCPjltPbGBTBmBprvDA " tabindex="0" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitutional_crisis_in_Somalia#:~:text=Part%20of%20the%20Somali%20Civil%20War%20(2009%E2%80%93present),after%20regional%20administration%20ends%20recognition%20of%20FGS." target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">deteriorated</a>. Political debates that had once been temporarily contained in the name of fighting al-Shabab instead became defining struggles over the future structure of the Somali state.</p>
<p id="ember97" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The consequence was subtle but profound.</p>
<p id="ember98" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Political capital that had previously been devoted to sustaining military coordination was redirected toward constitutional disputes, electoral competition and negotiations over authority between Mogadishu and regional administrations.</p>
<p id="ember99" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The effects gradually became visible on the battlefield.</p>
<p id="ember100" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The nationwide offensive launched in 2022 represented perhaps the closest Somalia had come to a genuinely <a class="tBFjffeGIQFLpveCPjltPbGBTBmBprvDA " tabindex="0" href="https://thesoufancenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/TSC-Insight_Operation-Black-Lion.pdf#:~:text=Following%20a%20series%20of%20clan%20uprisings%20against,Macawiisley%2C%20launched%20an%20offensive%20against%20the%20group." target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">integrated counterinsurgency</a>strategy in more than a decade.</p>
<p id="ember101" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The Somali National Army, local Ma&#8217;awisley militias and international partners combined military pressure with unprecedented community mobilization. Government forces recaptured dozens of towns across central Somalia, while local resistance demonstrated that al-Shabab could be challenged not only through conventional military operations but through <a class="tBFjffeGIQFLpveCPjltPbGBTBmBprvDA " tabindex="0" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022_Central_Somalia_offensive#:~:text=Ma%27awisley%20in%20Hiraan%20had%20organized%20in%202018,Ethiopia%2C%20triggering%20a%20strong%20Ethiopian%20military%20response." target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">popular rejection</a> of the austere insurgent rule.</p>
<p id="ember102" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">For a moment, the campaign appeared to alter the strategic balance. Yet counterinsurgency victories require political cohesion as much as military momentum.</p>
<p id="ember103" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">As relations between the federal government and regional administrations deteriorated, operational coordination <a class="tBFjffeGIQFLpveCPjltPbGBTBmBprvDA " tabindex="0" href="https://adf-magazine.com/2025/08/al-shabaab-surges-as-somali-states-squabble/" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">inevitably suffered</a>. Intelligence sharing became more difficult. Trust weakened. Forces trained for counterinsurgency were increasingly reassigned to manage domestic political confrontations and security crises unrelated to the insurgency itself.</p>
<p id="ember104" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Al-Shabab, by contrast, demonstrated the <a class="tBFjffeGIQFLpveCPjltPbGBTBmBprvDA " tabindex="0" href="https://africacenter.org/publication/asb45en-somalia-risk-jihadist-state/" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">patience</a> that has long distinguished successful insurgent organizations.</p>
<p id="ember105" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Rather than seeking decisive conventional battles, it absorbed military setbacks, dispersed its forces and waited for political fragmentation to erode the coherence of the coalition confronting it.</p>
<p id="ember106" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Its greatest advantage was not superior firepower but strategic consistency. International support was evolving in parallel as well.</p>
<h3 id="ember107" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong>The New Strategic Order in the Horn of Africa</strong></h3>
<p id="ember108" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The transition from the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) to the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) reflected more than an institutional <a class="tBFjffeGIQFLpveCPjltPbGBTBmBprvDA " tabindex="0" href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/the-new-au-somalia-mission-aussom-is-atmis-by-another-name-but-with-more-problems/" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">rebranding</a>. It revealed the changing political environment surrounding international engagement.</p>
<p id="ember109" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">European governments redirected attention and resources toward Russia&#8217;s war against Ukraine, instability across the Middle East and security pressures closer to Europe&#8217;s <a class="tBFjffeGIQFLpveCPjltPbGBTBmBprvDA " tabindex="0" href="https://www.diis.dk/en/research/the-african-union-stabilization-mission" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">borders</a>.</p>
<figure id="attachment_20640" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-20640" style="width: 1041px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="wp-image-20640 size-full" src="https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Ethiopias-Shadow-administration.png" alt="Explainer: Why Al-Shabaab's Shadow Administration Matters to Ethiopia" width="1041" height="606" srcset="https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Ethiopias-Shadow-administration.png 1041w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Ethiopias-Shadow-administration-300x175.png 300w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Ethiopias-Shadow-administration-1024x596.png 1024w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Ethiopias-Shadow-administration-768x447.png 768w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Ethiopias-Shadow-administration-721x420.png 721w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Ethiopias-Shadow-administration-150x87.png 150w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Ethiopias-Shadow-administration-696x405.png 696w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1041px) 100vw, 1041px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-20640" class="wp-caption-text">Ethiopian AU soldiers in Somalia. | Photo: AU/UN.</figcaption></figure>
<p id="ember110" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The United Nations confronted growing financial <a class="tBFjffeGIQFLpveCPjltPbGBTBmBprvDA " tabindex="0" href="https://unsos.unmissions.org/en/about/mandate" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">constraints</a> affecting peace operations globally. Washington increasingly <a class="tBFjffeGIQFLpveCPjltPbGBTBmBprvDA " tabindex="0" href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/visual-explainers/us-containment-strategy-somalia" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">emphasized</a> targeted counterterrorism capabilities, including intelligence support, air operations and specialized partnerships, rather than the expansive state-building ambitions that had characterized earlier phases of engagement.</p>
<p id="ember111" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Support for Somalia did not disappear. It became narrower.</p>
<h3 id="ember112" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong>The End of the Counterterrorism Era</strong></h3>
<p id="ember113" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The international coalition that once pursued broad political stabilization alongside security assistance increasingly shifted toward more selective, transactional forms of cooperation tailored to <a class="tBFjffeGIQFLpveCPjltPbGBTBmBprvDA " tabindex="0" href="https://www.diis.dk/en/research/the-african-union-stabilization-mission" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">individual</a> national interests.</p>
<p id="ember114" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">What emerged in its place was a broader strategic agenda driven less by traditional alliances than by maritime security, bilateral defense partnerships, infrastructure competition and shifting regional balances of power.</p>
<p id="ember115" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">A collective approach gradually gave way to a landscape of overlapping national interests, reflecting a wider transformation in international politics.</p>
<p id="ember116" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Across strategic regions, shared security frameworks have increasingly been replaced by more transactional arrangements shaped by competition, influence and access.</p>
<p id="ember117" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The post-9/11 era had elevated counterterrorism into the <a class="tBFjffeGIQFLpveCPjltPbGBTBmBprvDA " tabindex="0" href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-changing-character-of-terrorism-and-u-s-counterterrorism/" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">organizing principle</a> of foreign policy across much of Africa and the Middle East. Security assistance, diplomatic engagement and development programs were often structured around a singular objective: weakening extremist organizations before advancing broader political, economic and institutional goals.</p>
<p id="ember118" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">That hierarchy no longer dominates strategic thinking. Today&#8217;s international environment is increasingly multipolar.</p>
<p id="ember119" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Middle powers exercise <a class="tBFjffeGIQFLpveCPjltPbGBTBmBprvDA " tabindex="0" href="https://www.economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/The-Great-Fragmentation-web.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">greater influence</a>. Competition over trade corridors, critical infrastructure, energy resources and maritime access now shapes foreign policy calculations as much as ideological conflicts once did.</p>
<p id="ember120" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The Horn of Africa has become one of the clearest expressions of that shift.</p>
<p id="ember121" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Ports are strategic assets. Shipping lanes are geopolitical leverage. Military partnerships increasingly intersect with commercial investment, energy exploration and access to the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. Security policy has become inseparable from <a class="tBFjffeGIQFLpveCPjltPbGBTBmBprvDA " tabindex="0" href="https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-902454" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">economic geography.</a></p>
<p id="ember122" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Within that environment, al-Shabaab occupies a paradoxical position.</p>
<p id="ember123" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The group remains one of Africa&#8217;s most capable insurgent movements, yet it is no longer the <a class="tBFjffeGIQFLpveCPjltPbGBTBmBprvDA " tabindex="0" href="https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/SOM#:~:text=In%202012%2C%20al%2DShabaab%20successively%20lost%20control%20of,of%20the%20southern%20and%20central%20Somali%20countryside." target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">principal factor</a> shaping how major regional and international actors engage with Somalia.</p>
<p id="ember124" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Its threat persists. The strategic consensus surrounding that threat does not.</p>
<p id="ember125" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">History suggests that insurgencies rarely prevail because they overpower stronger states militarily. More often, they endure because the political coalitions confronting them gradually lose coherence. Competing priorities emerge. External partners diverge. Domestic political disputes overshadow shared security objectives.</p>
<p id="ember126" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Somalia increasingly <a class="tBFjffeGIQFLpveCPjltPbGBTBmBprvDA " tabindex="0" href="https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/SOM#:~:text=Al%2DShabaab%20maintained%20control%20over%20vast%20rural%20areas,southern%20Somalia%2C%20resulting%20in%20hundreds%20of%20deaths." target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">exhibits</a> those dynamics.</p>
<p id="ember127" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Federal institutions, regional administrations and foreign partners continue to pursue overlapping security goals, but they no longer operate within a unified strategic framework. Each actor is increasingly guided by distinct political calculations, bilateral interests and regional rivalries.</p>
<p id="ember128" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Al-Shabaab has not needed to transform itself nearly as <a class="tBFjffeGIQFLpveCPjltPbGBTBmBprvDA " tabindex="0" href="https://hornreview.org/2026/07/16/somalias-red-sea-balancing-act-and-the-houthi-spillover-risk/#:~:text=The%20Africa%20Center%20for%20Strategic%20Studies%20reported,Houthi%20proxy%20for%20the%20relationship%20to%20matter." target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">dramatically</a>.</p>
<p id="ember129" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">It has remained focused on a singular objective: preserving organizational resilience while expanding influence wherever state authority fragments.</p>
<p id="ember130" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The implications extend beyond Somalia.</p>
<p id="ember131" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The quiet erosion of the counterterrorism consensus marks a broader strategic transition across the Horn of Africa. The region is no longer primarily organized around defeating violent extremism. It is increasingly defined by contests over sovereignty, maritime access, infrastructure, commercial corridors and the ambitions of competing regional and middle powers.</p>
<p id="ember132" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Counterterrorism has not disappeared. It has simply been displaced from the center of the strategic map.</p>
<p id="ember133" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">For nearly two decades, defeating al-Shabab was widely treated as the prerequisite for political progress in Somalia. Today, political fragmentation increasingly defines the conditions under which that fight is conducted.</p>
<p id="ember134" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">That reversal may prove to be one of the most consequential, and least appreciated strategic transformations the Horn of Africa has experienced since al-Shabab first <a class="tBFjffeGIQFLpveCPjltPbGBTBmBprvDA " tabindex="0" href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounders/al-shabaab" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">emerged</a> as a regional insurgency.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/somalias-counterterrorism-consensus-is-giving-way-to-geopolitics/">Somalia’s Counterterrorism Consensus Is Giving Way to Geopolitics</a> appeared first on <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com">Kaab TV</a>.</p>
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			<media:description type="html">Explainer: Why Al-Shabaab&#039;s Shadow Administration Matters to Ethiopia</media:description>
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		<title>Beyond Piracy: How the Horn of Africa Reinvented Itself</title>
		<link>https://en.kaabtv.com/beyond-piracy-how-the-horn-of-africa-reinvented-itself/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Abdi Guled]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 15 Jul 2026 11:34:29 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[News]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Opinion]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Piracy in the horn of Africa]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Somalia pirates]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://en.kaabtv.com/?p=20361</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>At first light, the Port of Mogadishu moves to the rhythm of a national economy. Cargo ships discharge food, fuel and manufactured goods destined for cities across Somalia as customs officers process manifests and truck convoys head inland. Several hundred kilometers to the northwest, the Port of Berbera begins a different day. There, container vessels, [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/beyond-piracy-how-the-horn-of-africa-reinvented-itself/">Beyond Piracy: How the Horn of Africa Reinvented Itself</a> appeared first on <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com">Kaab TV</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p id="ember74" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">At first light, the Port of Mogadishu moves to the rhythm of a national economy. Cargo ships discharge food, fuel and manufactured goods destined for cities across Somalia as customs officers process manifests and truck convoys head inland.</p>
<p id="ember75" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Several hundred kilometers to the northwest, the <a class="nnFuRRoHPXobuvhnNQKLVHTCAHHBMHsMruzUf " tabindex="0" href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Red-Sea-Rivalries-The-Gulf-The-Horn-and-the-New-Geopolitics-of-the-Red-Sea-1.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">Port of Berbera</a> begins a different day.</p>
<p id="ember76" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">There, container vessels, logistics companies and foreign investors focus less on supplying a single country than on connecting an expanding trade corridor stretching into landlocked Ethiopia and beyond.</p>
<p id="ember77" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The two ports serve different markets, answer to different political authorities and embody competing visions of the Horn of Africa. Together, they reveal how a coastline once synonymous with piracy has become one of the world&#8217;s most consequential geopolitical frontiers.</p>
<p id="ember78" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Today they form parts of the same geopolitical story in the region.</p>
<p id="ember79" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">For much of the early twenty-first century, the Horn of Africa occupied a narrow place in the international imagination. The region was viewed primarily through the lens of piracy, famine, terrorism and fragile states. International engagement reflected that perception.</p>
<p id="ember80" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Foreign navies escorted merchant ships through the Gulf of Aden, humanitarian agencies responded to recurring crises and diplomats concentrated on containing instability before it spilled into international commerce.</p>
<p id="ember81" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">That framework increasingly belongs to another era.</p>
<p id="ember82" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The Horn has undergone one of the most significant <a class="nnFuRRoHPXobuvhnNQKLVHTCAHHBMHsMruzUf " tabindex="0" href="https://worldpeacefoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Pax-Africana-or-Middle-East-Security-Alliance-final.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">strategic transformations</a> in contemporary international politics. The central question is no longer how to suppress pirates operating from isolated coastlines. It is who will shape the political and economic architecture surrounding one of the world&#8217;s most consequential maritime corridors.</p>
<p id="ember83" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Ports, logistics corridors, naval facilities, energy exploration, submarine cables and diplomatic recognition have become the region&#8217;s new strategic currency, highlighted by the geopolitical maneuvers surrounding the controversial <a class="nnFuRRoHPXobuvhnNQKLVHTCAHHBMHsMruzUf " tabindex="0" href="https://riftvalley.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Red-Sea-Politics_FINAL.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">Ethiopia-Somaliland Port Deal.</a></p>
<p id="ember84" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">What has changed is not simply the Horn itself. It is the geography of global power.</p>
<figure id="attachment_20362" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-20362" style="width: 2442px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="Armed Somali military man standing near the coast of Marka town. | Photo/AU /UN. wp-image-20362 size-full" title="Armed Somali military man standing near the coast of Marka town. | Photo/AU /UN." src="https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Marka-beach-Somalia.png" alt="Armed Somali military man standing near the coast of Marka town. | Photo/AU /UN." width="2442" height="1630" srcset="https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Marka-beach-Somalia.png 2442w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Marka-beach-Somalia-300x200.png 300w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Marka-beach-Somalia-1024x684.png 1024w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Marka-beach-Somalia-768x513.png 768w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Marka-beach-Somalia-1536x1025.png 1536w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Marka-beach-Somalia-2048x1367.png 2048w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Marka-beach-Somalia-629x420.png 629w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Marka-beach-Somalia-150x100.png 150w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Marka-beach-Somalia-696x465.png 696w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Marka-beach-Somalia-1068x713.png 1068w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Marka-beach-Somalia-1920x1282.png 1920w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 2442px) 100vw, 2442px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-20362" class="wp-caption-text">Armed Somali military man standing near the coast of Marka town. | Photo/AU /UN.</figcaption></figure>
<p id="ember85" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">For generations, policymakers treated the Red Sea as a boundary separating two distinct strategic systems. The Middle East occupied one side; the Horn of Africa occupied the other.</p>
<p id="ember86" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Although conflicts occasionally crossed the water, each region largely maintained its own political logic, but today, Gulf states and African littoral countries are forming an interconnected <a class="nnFuRRoHPXobuvhnNQKLVHTCAHHBMHsMruzUf " tabindex="0" href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Red-Sea-Forum-English-Web.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">Red Sea Arena</a> where their security and economic fates are deeply intertwined.</p>
<p id="ember87" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">That distinction has steadily eroded.</p>
<p id="ember88" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The disruption of commercial shipping by Yemen&#8217;s Houthi movement demonstrated that instability on one shoreline could rapidly reshape political calculations on the other.</p>
<p id="ember89" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Insurance costs rose, shipping companies diverted vessels around southern Africa, Suez Canal revenues declined sharply and governments throughout the region were forced to reconsider long-held assumptions about maritime security.</p>
<p id="ember90" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">&#8220;The Bab el-Mandeb Strait is no longer a peripheral commercial highway separating two distinct continents,&#8221; observes Kaan Devecioğlu, a regional geopolitics specialist at ORSAM.</p>
<p id="ember91" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">&#8220;It has become a <a class="nnFuRRoHPXobuvhnNQKLVHTCAHHBMHsMruzUf " tabindex="0" href="https://gsd.msu.edu.tr/Content/sayilar/dokuman/GSD_WIS_OS/GSD_WIS_OS_Art_3_122024.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">highly integrated security continuum</a> where land, maritime and energy politics are completely inseparable.&#8221;</p>
<p id="ember92" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The water separating Arabia from Africa has become less a frontier than a shared strategic space.</p>
<p id="ember93" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">That transformation has fundamentally altered how regional governments perceive themselves.</p>
<p id="ember94" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Few events illustrated this shift more dramatically than Ethiopia&#8217;s memorandum of understanding with Somaliland in early 2024.</p>
<p id="ember95" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">By pursuing guaranteed maritime access through Somaliland in exchange for the prospect of diplomatic recognition, Addis Ababa challenged long-standing assumptions surrounding <a class="nnFuRRoHPXobuvhnNQKLVHTCAHHBMHsMruzUf " tabindex="0" href="https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2193&amp;context=auilr" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">sovereignty, access to the sea and regional diplomacy.</a></p>
<p id="ember96" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">For Ethiopia, home to well over 120 million people yet lacking direct maritime access, the agreement reflected a strategic imperative. For Somalia, it represented an unacceptable challenge to territorial integrity.</p>
<p id="ember97" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">What might once have remained a bilateral dispute rapidly acquired regional dimensions.</p>
<p id="ember98" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Egypt, already locked in a prolonged confrontation with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, deepened its strategic engagement with Somalia. Military cooperation between Cairo and Mogadishu increasingly reflected broader calculations extending far beyond Somali territory.</p>
<p id="ember99" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The Nile and the Red Sea, once treated as separate strategic questions, have become increasingly interconnected.</p>
<p id="ember100" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Turkey&#8217;s mediation efforts demonstrated another emerging reality.</p>
<p id="ember101" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Unlike many outside powers, Ankara has cultivated substantial political, economic and security relationships with both Somalia and Ethiopia. Rather than choosing between competing partners, it has attempted to preserve influence across both capitals.</p>
<p id="ember102" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The resulting diplomacy has often emphasized managing disagreements rather than definitively resolving them.</p>
<p id="ember103" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">That preference for ambiguity reflects a wider characteristic of contemporary geopolitics.</p>
<p id="ember104" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Increasingly, governments seek flexibility instead of fixed alliances.</p>
<p id="ember105" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Perhaps the clearest illustration can be found in Djibouti.</p>
<p id="ember106" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Over the past decade the small state has transformed strategic geography into national leverage by hosting military facilities belonging to countries that <a class="nnFuRRoHPXobuvhnNQKLVHTCAHHBMHsMruzUf " tabindex="0" href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/FP_20200615_china_djibouti_vertin.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">compete globally</a>, including the United States, China, France and Japan.</p>
<p id="ember107" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Rather than viewing those relationships as contradictory, Djibouti has converted competing interests into mutually reinforcing sources of <a class="nnFuRRoHPXobuvhnNQKLVHTCAHHBMHsMruzUf " tabindex="0" href="https://d-nb.info/1097381390/34" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">political and economic relevance.</a></p>
<p id="ember108" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The arrangement reflects a broader regional strategy that might best be described as distributed dependency.</p>
<p id="ember109" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Instead of aligning exclusively with a single external patron, governments increasingly cultivate <a class="nnFuRRoHPXobuvhnNQKLVHTCAHHBMHsMruzUf " tabindex="0" href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25765949.2024.2340332" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">overlapping partnerships,</a> diversifying investment, security cooperation and diplomatic engagement while avoiding complete dependence on any one power.</p>
<p id="ember110" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Cold War notions of choosing sides have become progressively less useful here. The competition itself has become more fluid.</p>
<p id="ember111" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Somaliland, the self-governingbreakaway territory in northern Somalia, offers perhaps the clearest example of this evolving approach.</p>
<p id="ember112" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Rather than relying solely on traditional diplomatic recognition through international institutions, it has increasingly sought to convert strategic geography into political influence.</p>
<p id="ember113" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Access to coastline, ports and logistics infrastructure has become an <a class="nnFuRRoHPXobuvhnNQKLVHTCAHHBMHsMruzUf " tabindex="0" href="https://riftvalley.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Red-Sea-Politics_FINAL.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">instrument</a> through which an unrecognized territory seeks greater international engagement.</p>
<p id="ember114" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Whether that strategy ultimately succeeds remains uncertain. Its significance lies elsewhere.</p>
<p id="ember115" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">It suggests that geography itself is becoming a negotiable political asset in an era when maritime access carries growing strategic value.</p>
<p id="ember116" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Recognition, in this sense, is no longer shaped exclusively through diplomatic declarations. It is increasingly influenced by infrastructure, logistics and commercial calculation.</p>
<p id="ember117" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The implications extend well beyond the Horn.</p>
<p id="ember118" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Western engagement has historically emphasized counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance and stabilization.</p>
<p id="ember119" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Those priorities remain important. Yet they now compete with a broader agenda centered on supply chains, critical minerals, energy exploration, digital connectivity, military logistics and competition among middle powers seeking greater regional influence.</p>
<p id="ember120" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The region has become a crossroads where African politics, Gulf security, Mediterranean strategy and Indo-Pacific commerce <a class="nnFuRRoHPXobuvhnNQKLVHTCAHHBMHsMruzUf " tabindex="0" href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Red-Sea-Forum-English-Web.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">increasingly converge.</a></p>
<p id="ember121" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">This evolution also requires rethinking piracy itself.</p>
<p id="ember122" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Piracy has not disappeared. Isolated incidents continue to occur, particularly during periods of wider maritime insecurity. But the phenomenon no longer defines the strategic landscape.</p>
<p id="ember123" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Statecraft has replaced criminality as the principal driver of geopolitical change.</p>
<p id="ember124" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The greater danger today is not that armed men in small boats interrupt global commerce. It is that <a class="nnFuRRoHPXobuvhnNQKLVHTCAHHBMHsMruzUf " tabindex="0" href="https://www.oiip.ac.at/cms/media/policy-analysis-geopolitical-formation-wider-horn-of-africa.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">overlapping rivalries</a> involving Ethiopia, Somalia, Egypt, the Gulf states, Turkey and Israel create pathways through which localized disputes could escalate into wider regional confrontations.</p>
<p id="ember125" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The Horn now sits at the intersection of several overlapping strategic competitions simultaneously.</p>
<p id="ember126" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">That convergence explains why governments once only marginally engaged in the region now devote increasing diplomatic, military and economic attention to it.</p>
<p id="ember127" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The reinvention of the Horn of Africa has occurred gradually, almost quietly.</p>
<p id="ember128" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">There was no singular turning point announcing the transition from peripheral crisis zone to geopolitical centerpiece. Instead, a succession of events, the Red Sea shipping crisis, Ethiopia&#8217;s maritime ambitions, renewed competition among Gulf powers, Turkish mediation, Egypt&#8217;s expanding military role and the growing importance of strategic ports, collectively altered the region&#8217;s place within the international system.</p>
<p id="ember129" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">History rarely announces such transformations while they are unfolding. Yet one conclusion is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore.</p>
<p id="ember130" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The era when the world looked toward the Horn of Africa and saw principally piracy has passed.</p>
<p id="ember131" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Today, governments, investors and military planners see something fundamentally different: a maritime crossroads where the future balance of power linking Africa, the Middle East and the wider Indo-Pacific may increasingly be shaped.</p>
<hr class="reader-divider-block__horizontal-rule" />
<p id="ember132" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong>Abdi Guled</strong><em> is a Horn of Africa analyst and journalist focusing on political risk, armed groups and geostrategic competition in the region.</em></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/beyond-piracy-how-the-horn-of-africa-reinvented-itself/">Beyond Piracy: How the Horn of Africa Reinvented Itself</a> appeared first on <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com">Kaab TV</a>.</p>
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			<media:title type="html">Marka beach Somalia</media:title>
			<media:description type="html">Armed Somali military man standing near the coast of Marka town. &#124; Photo/AU /UN.</media:description>
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		<title>The Blue Economy Battle: How a Fishing Deal Tested Somalia&#8217;s Federal Experiment</title>
		<link>https://en.kaabtv.com/the-blue-economy-battle-how-a-fishing-deal-tested-somalias-federal-experiment/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Abdi Guled]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 08 Jul 2026 11:44:29 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Opinion]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Somalia Blue Economy Dispute]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://en.kaabtv.com/?p=20192</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>For more than a decade, Somalia&#8217;s federal system has rested on a fragile political compromise: that disputes over sovereignty could be postponed while the state itself was rebuilt. That assumption is now under unprecedented strain, not over elections or constitutional amendments alone, but over tuna, territorial waters and who has the authority to monetize one [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/the-blue-economy-battle-how-a-fishing-deal-tested-somalias-federal-experiment/">The Blue Economy Battle: How a Fishing Deal Tested Somalia&#8217;s Federal Experiment</a> appeared first on <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com">Kaab TV</a>.</p>
]]></description>
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<p id="ember74" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">For more than a decade, Somalia&#8217;s federal <a class="rbJlXBzRbySbuPCWQzjoswVAGlGBFmEhY " tabindex="0" href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23311886.2026.2640641" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">system</a> has rested on a fragile political compromise: that disputes over sovereignty could be postponed while the state itself was rebuilt.</p>
<p id="ember75" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">That assumption is now under unprecedented strain, not over elections or constitutional amendments alone, but over tuna, territorial waters and who has the authority to monetize one of East Africa&#8217;s richest maritime frontiers.</p>
<p id="ember76" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">A sharply worded <a class="rbJlXBzRbySbuPCWQzjoswVAGlGBFmEhY " tabindex="0" href="https://www.somaliguardian.com/news/somalia-news/somalia-puntland-bans-turkish-fishing-firm-somturk/" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">declaration</a> issued by Puntland on July 5 banning the Turkish-backed fishing company SOMTURK from operating along its coastline may appear, at first glance, to concern fisheries management. In reality, it reflects a much deeper struggle over the distribution of political authority inside <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a> and the future architecture of the federal state.</p>
<p id="ember77" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The dispute illustrates how the country&#8217;s <a class="rbJlXBzRbySbuPCWQzjoswVAGlGBFmEhY " tabindex="0" href="https://enact-africa.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/pages/1769157325550-2026-01-20-ENACT-IUUfishing-Somalia-paper2.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">blue economy</a> has become the latest arena in which unresolved constitutional questions are colliding with expanding foreign strategic interests.</p>
<p id="ember78" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">More significantly, the declaration represents one of Puntland&#8217;s clearest assertions yet of its interpretation of federalism. While the move is consequential, it is not entirely surprising given the <a class="rbJlXBzRbySbuPCWQzjoswVAGlGBFmEhY " tabindex="0" href="https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/SOM" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">steady deterioration</a>in relations between Garowe and Mogadishu.</p>
<p id="ember79" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">By explicitly rejecting federal mandates and &#8216;unilateral&#8217; agreements such as SOMTURK, Puntland is drawing a clear constitutional line in the sand, signaling that it will not allow decisions affecting its maritime domain and natural resources to be imposed without its consent. In doing so,</p>
<p id="ember80" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Garowe is reaffirming what it considers its constitutional authority over maritime governance and resource management within its jurisdiction.</p>
<p id="ember81" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">SOMTURK, established in late 2025 as part of the broader defense and economic <a class="rbJlXBzRbySbuPCWQzjoswVAGlGBFmEhY " tabindex="0" href="https://hornreview.org/2026/04/02/somalias-blue-economy-deal-with-turkey/" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">partnership</a>between Mogadishu and Ankara, was designed to serve as both a commercial enterprise and a regulatory mechanism.</p>
<p id="ember82" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Operating through a partnership involving Turkey&#8217;s military-affiliated <a class="rbJlXBzRbySbuPCWQzjoswVAGlGBFmEhY " tabindex="0" href="https://www.dailysabah.com/business/economy/turkiye-somalia-sign-deal-to-cooperate-in-fisheries-sector" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">pension fund, OYAK</a>, and Somalia&#8217;s Ministry of Fisheries and Blue Economy, the company represents far more than a fishing venture. It embodies Mogadishu&#8217;s effort to centralize authority over the country&#8217;s Exclusive Economic Zone, regulate foreign fishing licenses, combat illegal fishing and channel maritime revenues toward rebuilding national naval capabilities.</p>
<p id="ember83" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">From the perspective of the Federal Government, such centralization is an expression of sovereign statehood. A country fragmented by decades of conflict cannot, officials argue, afford competing systems of maritime governance if it hopes to protect one of Africa&#8217;s longest coastlines from illegal exploitation.</p>

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<h3 id="ember84" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong>The Competing Visions of Sovereignty</strong></h3>
<p id="ember85" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Puntland sees an entirely different picture.</p>
<p id="ember86" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">To authorities in Garowe, SOMTURK represents the latest attempt by the federal government to absorb powers that remain constitutionally unresolved.</p>
<p id="ember87" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Their argument rests not simply on political disagreement but on their interpretation of Somalia&#8217;s 2012 Provisional Federal <a class="rbJlXBzRbySbuPCWQzjoswVAGlGBFmEhY " tabindex="0" href="https://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/legislation/details/14305" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">Constitution</a>, particularly provisions concerning natural resources and the preservation of pre-existing state authorities until a final constitutional settlement is reached.</p>
<p id="ember88" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Because Somalia&#8217;s federal constitutional framework remains incomplete, Puntland argues that unilateral agreements involving strategic natural resources require negotiated consent rather than executive decisions from Mogadishu.</p>
<p id="ember89" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The <a class="rbJlXBzRbySbuPCWQzjoswVAGlGBFmEhY " tabindex="0" href="https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1Cm6g9aAmt/" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">declaration</a> goes further by questioning the legitimacy of the current federal administration&#8217;s mandate to conclude long-term international concessions.</p>
<p id="ember90" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">That legal disagreement is not merely academic.</p>
<p id="ember91" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">It strikes at the central question that has shadowed Somalia&#8217;s reconstruction since 2012: where does federal authority end and regional sovereignty begin?</p>
<h3 id="ember92" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong>From Legal Dispute to Political Strategy</strong></h3>
<p id="ember93" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The fishing dispute also arrives after months of steadily <a class="rbJlXBzRbySbuPCWQzjoswVAGlGBFmEhY " tabindex="0" href="https://www.garoweonline.com/en/news/somalia/somalia-puntland-accuses-president-hassan-sheikh-of-fueling-piracy-and-undermining-federalism" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">worsening relations</a> between President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud&#8217;s administration and Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni.</p>
<p id="ember94" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Political tensions accelerated earlier this year following disputes surrounding federal consultative meetings, disagreements over aviation access and growing accusations from Puntland that Mogadishu was <a class="rbJlXBzRbySbuPCWQzjoswVAGlGBFmEhY " tabindex="0" href="https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/SOM" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">interfering</a>in regional political affairs.</p>
<p id="ember95" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Subsequent restrictions imposed by Puntland on federal security recruitment, coupled with allegations that the federal government was supporting rival local actors inside the state, deepened mutual distrust.</p>
<p id="ember96" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Against that backdrop, the maritime confrontation appears less like an isolated disagreement than another stage in an increasingly comprehensive political rupture. It also raises broader questions about Puntland&#8217;s political trajectory.</p>
<p id="ember97" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The increasingly assertive posture adopted by Garowe may suggest that President Said Abdullahi Deni is prioritizing the consolidation of his domestic political base and institutional authority within Puntland rather than positioning himself for a bid for the federal presidency in the coming electoral cycle.</p>
<p id="ember98" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">While such an interpretation remains necessarily speculative, experts say, the timing and substance of Puntland&#8217;s latest actions point toward a leadership increasingly focused on strengthening regional autonomy amid an intensifying constitutional confrontation with Mogadishu.</p>
<p id="ember99" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong>Turkey&#8217;s Expanding Maritime Footprint</strong></p>
<p id="ember100" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The timing is equally significant.</p>
<p id="ember101" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Only days before Puntland&#8217;s announcement, Mogadishu expanded its <a class="rbJlXBzRbySbuPCWQzjoswVAGlGBFmEhY " tabindex="0" href="https://eafricaninstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Turkiye-Africa-Ties-Paper-1.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">maritime cooperation</a> with Turkish institutions through additional legal and educational agreements. Rather than reassuring regional administrations, those agreements reinforced perceptions within Puntland that Turkey&#8217;s growing role extends beyond capacity-building into the political consolidation of federal authority.</p>
<p id="ember102" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">That perception matters because foreign partnerships inside <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a> rarely remain purely technical. Infrastructure projects, military training missions and economic investments often acquire symbolic significance within domestic political competition.</p>
<p id="ember103" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">For supporters of the federal government, Turkish involvement represents one of the few <a class="rbJlXBzRbySbuPCWQzjoswVAGlGBFmEhY " tabindex="0" href="https://www.policycenter.ma/publications/turkiye-emerging-middle-power-africa" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">consistent international partnerships</a> that has strengthened Somali institutions after years of state collapse.</p>
<figure id="attachment_20200" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-20200" style="width: 1789px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="wp-image-20200 size-full" title="The fishing dispute also arrives after months of steadily worsening relations between President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's administration and Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni." src="https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Hassan-Sheikh-vs-Said-Deni.png" alt="The fishing dispute also arrives after months of steadily worsening relations between President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's administration and Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni." width="1789" height="970" srcset="https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Hassan-Sheikh-vs-Said-Deni.png 1789w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Hassan-Sheikh-vs-Said-Deni-300x163.png 300w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Hassan-Sheikh-vs-Said-Deni-1024x555.png 1024w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Hassan-Sheikh-vs-Said-Deni-768x416.png 768w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Hassan-Sheikh-vs-Said-Deni-1536x833.png 1536w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Hassan-Sheikh-vs-Said-Deni-775x420.png 775w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Hassan-Sheikh-vs-Said-Deni-150x81.png 150w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Hassan-Sheikh-vs-Said-Deni-696x377.png 696w, https://en.kaabtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Hassan-Sheikh-vs-Said-Deni-1068x580.png 1068w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1789px) 100vw, 1789px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-20200" class="wp-caption-text">The fishing dispute also arrives after months of steadily worsening relations between President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud&#8217;s administration and Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni.</figcaption></figure>
<p id="ember104" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">For many critics including some based in Puntland, however, Ankara increasingly appears less as a neutral development partner than as a strategic enabler of centralized authority in Mogadishu.</p>
<p id="ember105" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Whether that perception accurately reflects Turkish policy is almost secondary to its political consequences.</p>
<p id="ember106" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Perhaps the most consequential aspect of Puntland&#8217;s declaration lies in its language regarding enforcement.</p>
<p id="ember107" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">By warning that unauthorized vessels operating under federal licenses could face inspection and law enforcement measures, Puntland signaled its willingness to move beyond constitutional objections toward operational implementation.</p>
<p id="ember108" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">That introduces an entirely new layer of risk.</p>
<p id="ember109" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Unlike many regional administrations elsewhere, Puntland possesses a relatively established maritime security capability through the Puntland Maritime Police Force, originally developed with substantial international support to combat piracy.</p>
<p id="ember110" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">If regional authorities attempt to enforce their own interpretation of maritime jurisdiction against vessels operating under federal authorization, experts warn that competing claims of legal authority could quickly escalate from a constitutional dispute into a potential confrontation at sea.</p>
<p id="ember111" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Such a scenario would place external partners, including Turkey, in an exceptionally delicate position, potentially forcing them to navigate conflicting assertions of authority between Somalia&#8217;s internationally recognized federal government and one of its most institutionally capable federal member states.</p>
<h3 id="ember112" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong>A Test for Somalia&#8217;s Federal Future</strong></h3>
<p id="ember113" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">More broadly, the dispute underscores a recurring lesson in Somali politics: institutional ambiguity rarely remains confined to legal debate.</p>
<p id="ember114" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Over time, unresolved constitutional questions tend to migrate into disputes over territory, security and economic resources.</p>
<p id="ember115" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The country&#8217;s offshore fisheries, estimated to be among the <a class="rbJlXBzRbySbuPCWQzjoswVAGlGBFmEhY " tabindex="0" href="https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/somalia-fisheries-and-blue-economy" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">most valuable</a> in the western Indian Ocean, have therefore become more than an economic asset. They are now a test of whether Somalia&#8217;s federal system can accommodate competing centers of political authority without descending into parallel governance.</p>
<p id="ember116" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The immediate implications extend well beyond the fisheries sector.</p>
<p id="ember117" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">International investors may increasingly find themselves navigating competing licensing frameworks, while economists warn that uncertainty over regulatory authority could complicate commercial decisions. At the same time, security cooperation risks becoming entangled in Somalia’s unresolved constitutional disputes, further blurring the line between institutional partnership and domestic political competition.</p>
<p id="ember118" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Foreign governments operating through agreements with Mogadishu may find those arrangements challenged by regional administrations asserting their own constitutional legitimacy.</p>
<p id="ember119" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">For <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a>, the episode reveals that the country&#8217;s deepest political contest is no longer confined to electoral timelines or constitutional drafting committees. It has expanded into questions of who governs strategic resources, who speaks for the state internationally and who ultimately exercises authority over one of Africa&#8217;s largest maritime domains.</p>
<p id="ember120" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The struggle over Somalia&#8217;s blue economy is therefore not simply about fishing rights.</p>
<p id="ember121" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">It is about whether the federal project itself can reconcile competing visions of sovereignty before constitutional disagreement hardens into permanent political separation.</p>
<p id="ember122" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">If that accommodation fails, the country&#8217;s coastline may become not the foundation of national economic renewal but the newest frontier in Somalia&#8217;s unfinished state-building project.</p>
<hr class="reader-divider-block__horizontal-rule" />
<p id="ember123" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong>Abdi Guled</strong><em> is a Horn of Africa analyst and journalist focusing on political risk, armed groups and geostrategic competition in the region.</em></p>
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<p>The post <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/the-blue-economy-battle-how-a-fishing-deal-tested-somalias-federal-experiment/">The Blue Economy Battle: How a Fishing Deal Tested Somalia&#8217;s Federal Experiment</a> appeared first on <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com">Kaab TV</a>.</p>
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			<media:title type="html">Hassan Sheikh vs Said Deni</media:title>
			<media:description type="html">The fishing dispute also arrives after months of steadily worsening relations between President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud&#039;s administration and Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni.</media:description>
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		<title>The End of the Blank Check? America&#8217;s Somalia Pivot Signals a New Era for the Horn</title>
		<link>https://en.kaabtv.com/the-end-of-the-blank-check-americas-somalia-pivot-signals-a-new-era-for-the-horn/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Abdi Guled]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 05 Jul 2026 11:21:45 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Conflict & Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Opinion]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://en.kaabtv.com/?p=20121</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>For nearly two decades, the architecture of international security in Somalia rested on an assumption so deeply embedded that it rarely required articulation: whatever political disagreements emerged among international partners, the United States would remain the indispensable financial anchor of the mission. That assumption is beginning to unravel. The diplomatic note Washington delivered to the [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/the-end-of-the-blank-check-americas-somalia-pivot-signals-a-new-era-for-the-horn/">The End of the Blank Check? America&#8217;s Somalia Pivot Signals a New Era for the Horn</a> appeared first on <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com">Kaab TV</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p id="ember73" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">For nearly two decades, the architecture of international security in <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a> rested on an assumption so deeply embedded that it rarely required articulation: whatever political disagreements emerged among international partners, the United States would remain the indispensable financial anchor of the mission.</p>
<p id="ember74" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">That assumption is beginning to unravel.</p>
<p id="ember75" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The <a class="rbJlXBzRbySbuPCWQzjoswVAGlGBFmEhY " tabindex="0" href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalia-peacekeeping-mission-risk-us-blocks-un-support-sources-say-2026-07-02/" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">diplomatic note</a> Washington delivered to the African Union on July 1, announcing its intention to <a class="rbJlXBzRbySbuPCWQzjoswVAGlGBFmEhY " tabindex="0" href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/the-us-plan-to-unplug-the-un-support-office-in-somalia-the-last-straw-that-may-break-the-african-unions-peace-operation/" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">terminate</a> support for the United Nations Support Office in <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a> (UNSOS) by the end of 2026, is more than another dispute over U.N. budgets.</p>
<p id="ember76" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">It signals one of the most consequential shifts in the international approach to <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a> since African Union peacekeepers first arrived in Mogadishu in <a class="rbJlXBzRbySbuPCWQzjoswVAGlGBFmEhY " tabindex="0" href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2007/3/1/first-au-peacekeepers-in-somalia-2" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">2007</a>.</p>
<p id="ember77" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Its significance extends well beyond accounting.</p>
<p id="ember78" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Behind the language of fiscal responsibility lies a broader reassessment of how the United States views protracted stabilization missions, the limits of externally financed state-building and the changing priorities of American foreign policy in an increasingly competitive geopolitical environment.</p>
<p id="ember79" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The message is unmistakable.</p>
<p id="ember80" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Washington no longer appears willing to underwrite an open-ended multilateral security architecture whose costs have continued to grow while Somalia&#8217;s political institutions remain fragile and its security gains uneven.</p>
<p id="ember81" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Instead, experts say, U.S. policymakers appear to be testing a different proposition: that financial pressure could achieve what years of diplomatic engagement have struggled to deliver by encouraging Somali political actors to compromise, prompting regional partners to assume greater responsibility and accelerating a transition from externally supported security arrangements toward greater Somali ownership.</p>
<p id="ember82" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Whether those objectives prove compatible is another matter. The American argument is, on its own terms, difficult to dismiss.</p>
<p id="ember83" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Since 2007, the United States has invested <a class="rbJlXBzRbySbuPCWQzjoswVAGlGBFmEhY " tabindex="0" href="https://2021-2025.state.gov/countries-areas/somalia/" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">billions of dollars</a>in <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a> through assessed United Nations contributions, bilateral military assistance, humanitarian relief and sustained counterterrorism operations.</p>
<p id="ember84" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">American support has enabled African peacekeepers to <a class="rbJlXBzRbySbuPCWQzjoswVAGlGBFmEhY " tabindex="0" href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalia-peacekeeping-mission-risk-us-blocks-un-support-sources-say-2026-07-02/" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">remain deployed,</a> strengthened elite Somali security units and helped prevent the federal government from suffering military collapse during periods of acute instability.</p>
<p id="ember85" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Yet the underlying strategic picture has changed remarkably little.</p>
<p id="ember86" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The al-Qaeda-linked al-Shabab group continues to demonstrate <a class="rbJlXBzRbySbuPCWQzjoswVAGlGBFmEhY " tabindex="0" href="https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/ASB-45-EN-Somalia-at-Risk-of-Becoming-a-Jihadist-State.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">operational resilience,</a>mounting major offensives and recovering previously lost territory.</p>
<p id="ember87" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Somali security institutions remain dependent on foreign logistics and external financing. Political disputes between Mogadishu and the Federal Member States repeatedly disrupt efforts to build unified national institutions. Tactical victories have accumulated, but they have not yet produced an enduring political settlement.</p>
<p id="ember88" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">From Washington&#8217;s perspective, <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a> increasingly resembles a challenge that has confronted the United States elsewhere &#8211; from Afghanistan to parts of the Sahel, where years of substantial financial investment yielded measurable security improvements without resolving the political conditions that sustained conflict.</p>
<p id="ember89" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">At a moment when American policymakers are balancing rising fiscal pressures with strategic competition against major powers, expensive stabilization missions have become increasingly difficult to defend.</p>
<p id="ember90" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">This shift is reflected in broader policy changes under the <a class="rbJlXBzRbySbuPCWQzjoswVAGlGBFmEhY " tabindex="0" href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/advance-article/doi/10.1093/afraf/adag021/8704472?login=false" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">U.S. National Security Strategy</a> and budget recalibrations prioritizing direct, interest-driven engagements.</p>
<p id="ember91" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">That does not necessarily imply disengagement.</p>
<p id="ember92" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The July 1 communication makes clear that Washington intends to preserve bilateral security cooperation even as it withdraws support for UNSOS.</p>
<p id="ember93" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The distinction is revealing.</p>
<p id="ember94" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Rather than financing the broad logistical infrastructure that sustains multinational peace operations, the United States appears to favor a narrower model built around direct partnerships with <a class="rbJlXBzRbySbuPCWQzjoswVAGlGBFmEhY " tabindex="0" href="https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2025-04/Brief_2025-9_Somalia_rev.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">capable Somali units</a>, intelligence cooperation, precision counterterrorism operations and targeted military assistance.</p>
<h4 id="ember95" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong>Washington’s Calculus vs Mogadishu’s Reality</strong></h4>
<p id="ember96" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Rather than signaling a retreat from <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a>, the move appears to reflect a recalibration of how Washington seeks to exercise its influence.</p>
<p id="ember97" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The challenge, however, is that strategies designed in Washington rarely unfold according to the political logic of Mogadishu.</p>
<p id="ember98" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">American officials have long identified Somalia&#8217;s internal fragmentation as the central obstacle to durable security.</p>
<p id="ember99" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Constitutional disputes remain unresolved. Relations between the federal government and several Federal Member States continue to oscillate between uneasy cooperation and open confrontation. Questions surrounding elections, revenue-sharing and authority over security institutions remain politically explosive.</p>
<p id="ember100" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Washington&#8217;s apparent calculation is that reducing external financial guarantees will increase the incentives for compromise.</p>
<p id="ember101" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Somalia&#8217;s political history offers little assurance that such pressure will produce the intended outcome.</p>
<p id="ember102" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Security sector reform is rarely a purely administrative exercise. It redistributes authority among clans, reshapes local balances of power and alters long-standing calculations about communal protection. Decisions concerning force integration, command structures or military deployments inevitably carry political consequences that extend well beyond military effectiveness.</p>
<p id="ember103" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">What international policy papers often describe as institutional reform is frequently understood within <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a> as a <a class="rbJlXBzRbySbuPCWQzjoswVAGlGBFmEhY " tabindex="0" href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/the-us-plan-to-unplug-the-un-support-office-in-somalia-the-last-straw-that-may-break-the-african-unions-peace-operation/" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">negotiation over political survival.</a></p>
<p id="ember104" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Compressed timelines and shrinking financial support could therefore encourage agreements that appear functional on paper while remaining contested in practice. Rather than reinforcing national cohesion, hurried political settlements risk deepening mistrust between federal authorities and regional administrations precisely when military coordination against al-Shabaab remains essential.</p>
<p id="ember105" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The operational consequences would extend beyond Somalia&#8217;s borders.</p>
<p id="ember106" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a> (AUSSOM) depends fundamentally on the logistical backbone provided through UNSOS.</p>
<p id="ember107" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Fuel, engineering support, transportation, medical evacuation and supply chains are not secondary administrative functions; they are <a class="rbJlXBzRbySbuPCWQzjoswVAGlGBFmEhY " tabindex="0" href="https://africa.businessinsider.com/local/markets/us-pulls-support-for-somalia-peacekeeping-mission-raising-fears-over-fight-against-al/1lme654" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">the critical infrastructure</a> that enables thousands of regional troops to remain operational across some of the country&#8217;s most contested territory.</p>
<p id="ember108" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">For troop-contributing countries including Kenya, Uganda, and Ethiopia, replacing those capabilities independently would be extraordinarily difficult.</p>
<p id="ember109" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Each faces mounting fiscal constraints at home, competing domestic security priorities, and increasing political scrutiny over prolonged overseas deployments. Should international financing diminish substantially, <a class="rbJlXBzRbySbuPCWQzjoswVAGlGBFmEhY " tabindex="0" href="https://www.diis.dk/en/research/the-african-union-stabilization-mission" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">mounting deficits</a> may force troop-contributing countries to withdraw forces or scale back operations unilaterally.</p>
<p id="ember110" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The greater danger is unlikely to be an abrupt collective withdrawal. History suggests a more gradual and potentially more destabilizing scenario.</p>
<p id="ember111" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Individual governments may begin adjusting deployments according to domestic political and financial calculations rather than a coordinated regional strategy.</p>
<p id="ember112" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Such staggered reductions could create uneven security vacuums across central and southern <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a>, presenting al-Shabaab with opportunities to exploit gaps created not by battlefield defeat but by shifting political priorities among its opponents.</p>
<h4 id="ember113" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong>A Shifting Regional Balance</strong></h4>
<p id="ember114" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Beyond the immediate military implications lies an equally significant geopolitical transition.</p>
<p id="ember115" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Strategic vacuums seldom remain empty.</p>
<p id="ember116" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">As the United States narrows its commitment to financing multilateral stabilization, other regional powers are likely to assume greater prominence.</p>
<p id="ember117" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Saudi Arabia’s approach to the Horn is increasingly shaped by Red Sea security considerations. The United Arab Emirates has expanded its regional footprint through ports, logistics infrastructure, and security partnerships. Turkey, meanwhile, has deepened its engagement through military training, defense cooperation, and longer-term institutional ties with Somali security forces.</p>
<p id="ember118" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Their approaches differ, but each possesses both the resources and the strategic incentive to expand influence should Western financing contract.</p>
<p id="ember119" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">For <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a>, this evolution presents both opportunity and risk.</p>
<p id="ember120" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Alternative partnerships may ease immediate funding pressures, yet external assistance rarely arrives detached from wider strategic interests.</p>
<p id="ember121" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Security cooperation increasingly intersects with maritime infrastructure, commercial investment, defense agreements and diplomatic alignment across the Red Sea basin.</p>
<p id="ember122" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The Horn of Africa is becoming part of a wider geopolitical theater that stretches from the Gulf to the eastern Mediterranean, where competition is shaped as much by trade routes and maritime access as by counterterrorism.</p>
<p id="ember123" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Washington&#8217;s decision may accelerate that transition rather than slow it.</p>
<p id="ember124" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Seen in that context, the American demarche represents more than a budgetary adjustment.</p>
<p id="ember125" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">It reflects a deeper evolution in American strategic thinking about the nature of long-term interventions. The era in which the United States routinely served as the unquestioned financial guarantor of expansive multilateral stabilization missions appears to be giving way to a more selective model centered on bilateral partnerships, fiscal restraint and narrowly defined security objectives.</p>
<p id="ember126" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Whether that shift ultimately encourages greater Somali self-reliance or instead contributes to renewed fragmentation will depend less on the scale of the funding reduction than on the political choices made in Mogadishu, the cohesion of African partners and the willingness of emerging regional powers to shape the security order that follows.</p>
<p id="ember127" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The larger question is therefore not whether the United States is leaving <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a>.</p>
<p id="ember128" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">It is whether the rules governing international engagement in <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a> are being rewritten.</p>
<p id="ember129" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">If they are, the coming years may be remembered not as the moment international attention receded from the Horn of Africa, but as the point at which competition over its future entered an entirely new phase, one in which influence is measured less by who finances peacekeeping than by who defines the region&#8217;s strategic architecture after it.</p>
<hr class="reader-divider-block__horizontal-rule" />
<p id="ember130" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong>Abdi Guled</strong><em> is a Horn of Africa analyst and journalist focusing on political risk, armed groups and geostrategic competition in the region.</em></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/the-end-of-the-blank-check-americas-somalia-pivot-signals-a-new-era-for-the-horn/">The End of the Blank Check? America&#8217;s Somalia Pivot Signals a New Era for the Horn</a> appeared first on <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com">Kaab TV</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
		
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		<item>
		<title>In the Horn, the Climate Emergency Is Now a Governance Crisis</title>
		<link>https://en.kaabtv.com/in-the-horn-the-climate-emergency-is-now-a-governance-crisis/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Abdi Guled]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 13 Jun 2026 11:26:06 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Climate Crisis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[News]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Climate Emergency Horn of Africa]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://en.kaabtv.com/?p=19603</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Mogadishu, Somalia &#8212; The old rhythms no longer hold. For generations, pastoralists across the Horn of Africa could read the sky with remarkable precision. They knew when the rains would arrive, when grasslands would recover and when it was time to move. Mobility was not disorder. It was a sophisticated survival system, refined over centuries [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/in-the-horn-the-climate-emergency-is-now-a-governance-crisis/">In the Horn, the Climate Emergency Is Now a Governance Crisis</a> appeared first on <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com">Kaab TV</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p id="ember62" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong>Mogadishu, <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a></strong> — The old rhythms no longer hold.</p>
<p id="ember63" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">For generations, pastoralists across the Horn of Africa could read the sky with remarkable precision. They knew when the rains would arrive, when grasslands would recover and when it was time to move.</p>
<p id="ember64" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Mobility was not disorder. It was a <a class="qmmOMGKOQSiSahrGeOyHMhYnajraiMcBPXPQ " tabindex="0" href="https://www.frontierspartnerships.org/journals/pastoralism-research-policy-and-practice/articles/10.3389/past.2026.15665/full" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">sophisticated survival system</a>, refined over centuries in one of the world&#8217;s most unforgiving environments.</p>
<p id="ember65" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Today, those rhythms are breaking down.</p>
<p id="ember66" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Across <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a>, Ethiopia, Kenya and parts of Djibouti, communities that once adapted to climatic uncertainty are confronting something fundamentally different: not a single drought, not a single flood, but a persistent state of environmental disruption in which <a class="qmmOMGKOQSiSahrGeOyHMhYnajraiMcBPXPQ " tabindex="0" href="https://www.frontierspartnerships.org/journals/pastoralism-research-policy-and-practice/articles/10.3389/past.2025.14001/full" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">recovery periods are becoming</a> shorter, shocks more frequent and livelihoods increasingly fragile.</p>
<p id="ember67" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The Horn of Africa has always lived at the mercy of climatic extremes. Drought and flood are woven into its history.</p>
<p id="ember68" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">What is unprecedented is the speed with which these shocks now arrive, their growing intensity and the inability of societies to recover before the next crisis begins.</p>
<p id="ember69" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Multiple compounding weather extremes have triggered a <a class="qmmOMGKOQSiSahrGeOyHMhYnajraiMcBPXPQ " tabindex="0" href="https://journals.plos.org/climate/article?id=10.1371/journal.pclm.0000594" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">massive regional crisis</a> of <a class="qmmOMGKOQSiSahrGeOyHMhYnajraiMcBPXPQ " tabindex="0" href="https://journals.plos.org/climate/article?id=10.1371/journal.pclm.0000594" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">climate-induced</a> displacement, decimating livestock and stripping communities of their primary means of economic independence.</p>
<p id="ember70" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Environmental emergencies that once appeared as episodic disasters have become permanent features of political life.</p>
<p id="ember71" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Recent studies show that deeply entrenched power dynamics and institutional failures <a class="qmmOMGKOQSiSahrGeOyHMhYnajraiMcBPXPQ " tabindex="0" href="https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/sustainable-food-systems/articles/10.3389/fsufs.2026.1701624/full" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">frequently override technical gains</a>, as state interventions often restrict traditional pastoralist mobility rather than protecting it.</p>
<p id="ember72" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Climate change, in other words, is no longer simply an environmental story. It is a story about governance.</p>
<h3 id="ember73" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong>The Collapse of Old Rhythms</strong></h3>
<p id="ember74" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">As governments prepare for another uncertain June-to-September season, meteorological agencies have warned of <a class="qmmOMGKOQSiSahrGeOyHMhYnajraiMcBPXPQ " tabindex="0" href="https://openknowledge.fao.org/bitstreams/a1a2466c-29dc-41d4-8d53-42b01038c2e6/download" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">below-average rainfall</a> across significant parts of the Greater Horn. Such forecasts once concerned farmers, pastoralists and aid organizations.</p>
<p id="ember75" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Today they provoke anxiety in presidential palaces, finance ministries and military headquarters.</p>
<p id="ember76" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Because another failed rainy season no longer means only smaller harvests. It means fresh waves of displacement into already crowded urban centers. It means new competition over shrinking water sources and grazing corridors. It means another test of whether governments can persuade citizens that the state remains capable of protecting them.</p>
<p id="ember77" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The scale of the challenge is staggering.</p>
<p id="ember78" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">According to assessments by the Food Security Information Network and the Global Network Against Food Crises, more than <a class="qmmOMGKOQSiSahrGeOyHMhYnajraiMcBPXPQ " tabindex="0" href="https://openknowledge.fao.org/handle/20.500.14283/cd9424en" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">96 million people</a> across crisis-affected regions face acute food insecurity.</p>
<p id="ember79" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">That figure is not merely humanitarian. It is political.</p>
<p id="ember80" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">It represents millions of citizens measuring the promises of the state against the realities of survival.</p>
<p id="ember81" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Across East Africa, temperatures have risen significantly <a class="qmmOMGKOQSiSahrGeOyHMhYnajraiMcBPXPQ " tabindex="0" href="https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0328105" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">above historical averages.</a> Rainfall patterns have become increasingly erratic. Longer dry periods exhaust crops and livestock before sudden cloudbursts unleash destructive floods that wash away homes, roads and fertile topsoil.</p>
<p id="ember82" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Even years of &#8220;normal&#8221; rainfall can conceal disaster. The problem is no longer simply how much rain falls. It is when it falls, where it falls and whether communities have the resilience to absorb its consequences.</p>
<p id="ember83" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The result is not a cycle of disaster and recovery.</p>
<p id="ember84" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">It is a cycle of attrition. The traditional distinction between drought and flood has itself begun to collapse. Communities increasingly experience both. Often within the same year.</p>
<p id="ember85" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Scientists describe these events as compound <a class="qmmOMGKOQSiSahrGeOyHMhYnajraiMcBPXPQ " tabindex="0" href="http://gpi.savba.sk/GPIweb/ogg/ikohut/CGG/53/3/Salah-et-al_CGG-53-3_web.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">climate extremes</a>. Citizens experience them more simply.</p>
<p id="ember86" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">First the rains fail. Then they destroy. Few groups understand this transformation more intimately than pastoralists.</p>
<p id="ember87" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">For centuries, mobility functioned as a form of insurance. Families moved livestock across vast territories according to negotiated social arrangements that distributed risk and protected communities during difficult seasons. Flexibility was resilience.</p>
<p id="ember88" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">But shrinking pasturelands, declining vegetation cover and accelerating desertification have steadily eroded those <a class="qmmOMGKOQSiSahrGeOyHMhYnajraiMcBPXPQ " tabindex="0" href="https://fic.tufts.edu/wp-content/uploads/Desk_Study1_Pastoralist_Perspectives.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">traditional systems</a>.</p>
<p id="ember89" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The devastating drought that gripped much of the Horn between 2020 and 2022 exposed just how fragile they <a class="qmmOMGKOQSiSahrGeOyHMhYnajraiMcBPXPQ " tabindex="0" href="https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC12739860/" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">had become.</a></p>
<p id="ember90" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Entire herds vanished.</p>
<p id="ember91" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">For pastoral households, livestock are not merely economic assets. They are savings accounts, social status, marriage prospects, inheritance and future security combined into one.</p>
<p id="ember92" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">When herds disappear, livelihoods disappear with them. And when livelihoods disappear repeatedly, people stop migrating seasonally. They relocate permanently.</p>
<p id="ember93" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The Horn&#8217;s cities have become repositories for environmental distress.</p>
<h3 id="ember94" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong>When Environmental Stress Becomes Political</strong></h3>
<p id="ember95" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Mogadishu. Baidoa. Addis Ababa. Nairobi, are increasingly absorbing populations displaced not by a single catastrophe but by the cumulative collapse of rural livelihoods.</p>
<p id="ember96" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Urban growth has accelerated faster than infrastructure can keep pace. Water systems strain under rising demand. Schools become overcrowded. Health services weaken.</p>
<p id="ember97" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Informal settlements spread outward faster than roads, drainage systems or municipal authorities can reach them.</p>
<p id="ember98" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">These neighborhoods are not devoid of governance. But governance there is often improvised. Clan elders mediate disputes. Religious leaders coordinate assistance. Community committees organize security.</p>
<p id="ember99" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">In some areas particularly in <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a>, non-state actors provide services and protection that governments struggle to deliver.</p>
<p id="ember100" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The state&#8217;s retreat is rarely dramatic. More often, it is <a class="qmmOMGKOQSiSahrGeOyHMhYnajraiMcBPXPQ " tabindex="0" href="https://unhabitat.org/sites/default/files/2024/11/pea_final_compressed.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">administrative</a>. It becomes visible through quiet substitution. People increasingly rely on alternative structures not because they reject the state, but because those structures function when formal institutions do not.</p>
<p id="ember101" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">That reality points toward the <a class="qmmOMGKOQSiSahrGeOyHMhYnajraiMcBPXPQ " tabindex="0" href="https://masharikirpc.org/climate-induced-violence-a-threat-to-future-stability-in-greater-eastern-africa/" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">deeper challenge</a> confronting governments across the region.</p>
<p id="ember102" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The crisis is not simply environmental. It is one of legitimacy. Political authority ultimately depends upon practical performance.</p>
<p id="ember103" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Citizens may disagree with governments, criticize leaders or contest policies. But states derive legitimacy from their ability to provide a minimum level of security, predictability and economic opportunity.</p>
<p id="ember104" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Climate shocks undermine all three.</p>
<p id="ember105" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Repeated crop failures weaken economic confidence. Competition over resources strains social cohesion. Displacement complicates service delivery and political representation. Every failed response widens the gap between state promises and lived reality.</p>
<p id="ember106" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Research increasingly suggests that climate change alone does not <a class="qmmOMGKOQSiSahrGeOyHMhYnajraiMcBPXPQ " tabindex="0" href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/sites/default/files/2025-01/316-fighting-climate-change-somalia_0.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">determine political outcomes.</a> Countries with stronger institutions, more responsive governance systems and sustained investment in agriculture and infrastructure tend to absorb environmental shocks more effectively.</p>
<h3 id="ember107" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong>The Future of Power in a Warming Horn</strong></h3>
<p id="ember108" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The implication is straightforward.</p>
<p id="ember109" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Climate change does not <a class="qmmOMGKOQSiSahrGeOyHMhYnajraiMcBPXPQ " tabindex="0" href="https://rais.education/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/0234.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">automatically produce instability</a>. Poor governance does.</p>
<p id="ember110" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">A farmer whose harvest fails repeatedly begins asking what citizenship guarantees. A pastoralist <a class="qmmOMGKOQSiSahrGeOyHMhYnajraiMcBPXPQ " tabindex="0" href="https://cgspace.cgiar.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/12f43867-fb02-4f3a-ae4e-1599ef6d713b/content" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">denied access</a> to water through formal mechanisms turns toward kinship networks instead. Communities under pressure narrow their <a class="qmmOMGKOQSiSahrGeOyHMhYnajraiMcBPXPQ " tabindex="0" href="https://parj.africa/ajpubadm_bureaucracy/article/view/climate-security-in-the-horn-of-africa-environmental-stress-gove" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">circles of trust.</a></p>
<p id="ember111" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Local loyalties become more important than national institutions. The social contract frays from the margins inward. For decades, humanitarian assistance helped cushion these pressures.</p>
<p id="ember112" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Aid evolved beyond emergency relief. In many fragile states, such as <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a> &#8211; it effectively became an <a class="qmmOMGKOQSiSahrGeOyHMhYnajraiMcBPXPQ " tabindex="0" href="https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/778551468344943140/pdf/928730PUB0Box3021030709781464803079.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">external subsidy for governance systems</a> unable to meet rising demands.</p>
<p id="ember113" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Food distributions prevented famine. Cash-transfer programs <a class="qmmOMGKOQSiSahrGeOyHMhYnajraiMcBPXPQ " tabindex="0" href="https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.com/bitstreams/774f7f6c-2ffa-411f-82f8-7fa0b524aa83/download" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">sustained vulnerable households.</a></p>
<p id="ember114" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Donor financing filled gaps that governments could not. That model is now under strain.</p>
<p id="ember115" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Global crises have multiplied. International aid budgets face <a class="qmmOMGKOQSiSahrGeOyHMhYnajraiMcBPXPQ " tabindex="0" href="https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC13213520/" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">increasing pressure</a>. Donor fatigue has become increasingly <a class="qmmOMGKOQSiSahrGeOyHMhYnajraiMcBPXPQ " tabindex="0" href="https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC13213520/" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">visible</a>.</p>
<p id="ember116" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Meanwhile, climate disruption has ceased to be temporary.</p>
<p id="ember117" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Safety-net systems designed for occasional emergencies are confronting populations living through <a class="qmmOMGKOQSiSahrGeOyHMhYnajraiMcBPXPQ " tabindex="0" href="https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.com/bitstreams/774f7f6c-2ffa-411f-82f8-7fa0b524aa83/download" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">continuous uncertainty.</a></p>
<p id="ember118" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">With millions of people facing structural, protracted crises globally, hyper-prioritization has forced a restrictive retreat toward only the narrowest definitions of &#8220;life-saving&#8221; aid, leaving millions exposed to <a class="qmmOMGKOQSiSahrGeOyHMhYnajraiMcBPXPQ " tabindex="0" href="https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.com/bitstreams/774f7f6c-2ffa-411f-82f8-7fa0b524aa83/download" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">continuous instability</a></p>
<p id="ember119" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The gap between need and capacity continues to widen. As formal support weakens, alternative economies emerge. Charcoal production expands across increasingly fragile landscapes.</p>
<p id="ember120" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Control over productive wells acquires strategic value, experts say. Scarcity becomes monetized. Environmental stress becomes revenue. Water itself becomes power.</p>
<p id="ember121" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Yet much of the region&#8217;s security architecture remains organized around traditional threats.</p>
<h3 id="ember122" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong>Counterterrorism in a Warming World</strong></h3>
<p id="ember123" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Counterterrorism continues to dominate policy discussions, security budgets and diplomatic engagement.</p>
<p id="ember124" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Those concerns remain important. But the emerging threat landscape is broader. The frameworks designed to govern war were never built to govern environmental collapse.</p>
<p id="ember125" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Military operations can disrupt insurgent networks. They cannot restore rainfall. They cannot regenerate pasturelands. They cannot rebuild trust when citizens conclude that institutions are unable to shield them from preventable suffering.</p>
<p id="ember126" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The Horn of Africa is therefore not experiencing an endless succession of unrelated emergencies. It is entering a new political era.</p>
<p id="ember127" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">From the devastating floods of 2019 that contributed to locust infestations, to the record-breaking drought between 2020 and 2022, to the El Niño floods that followed, and now renewed warnings of rainfall deficits, each crisis has <a class="qmmOMGKOQSiSahrGeOyHMhYnajraiMcBPXPQ " tabindex="0" href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/open-session-on-climate-peace-and-security/" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">layered upon the last.</a></p>
<p id="ember128" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The cumulative effect is transforming the relationship between citizens and the state. Disaster has ceased to be exceptional. It has become structural.</p>
<p id="ember129" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The central question confronting governments across the Horn is no longer how to survive the next <a class="qmmOMGKOQSiSahrGeOyHMhYnajraiMcBPXPQ " tabindex="0" href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/open-session-on-climate-peace-and-security/" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">climate emergency.</a></p>
<p id="ember130" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">It is whether they can govern societies increasingly shaped by the certainty that another one is always approaching.</p>
<p id="ember131" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">In the Horn of Africa, the climate crisis is becoming a crisis of political authority itself.</p>
<p id="ember132" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">And in the decades ahead, the legitimacy of governments may depend less on the wars they wage than on whether they can help their citizens endure the weather.</p>
<hr class="reader-divider-block__horizontal-rule" />
<p id="ember133" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong>Abdi Guled</strong><em> is a Horn of Africa analyst and journalist focusing on political risk, armed groups and geostrategic competition in the region.</em></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/in-the-horn-the-climate-emergency-is-now-a-governance-crisis/">In the Horn, the Climate Emergency Is Now a Governance Crisis</a> appeared first on <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com">Kaab TV</a>.</p>
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		<title>The Clan Ceiling: Why Somalia’s Counterterrorism War Keeps Reproducing Itself</title>
		<link>https://en.kaabtv.com/the-clan-ceiling-why-somalias-counterterrorism-war-keeps-reproducing-itself/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Abdi Guled]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 18 May 2026 11:31:12 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Conflict & Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Opinion]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Special Report]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Somalia Security Analysis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[The Somalia’s Counterterrorism War]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://en.kaabtv.com/?p=18914</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Mogadishu, Somalia &#8212;By 2026, the most revealing measure of Somalia&#8217;s counterterrorism crisis was no longer the number of airstrikes conducted or villages recaptured from the extremist group, al-Shabab. It was the widening gap between military advances and political control. The federal government in Mogadishu could clear roads, retake towns and deploy soldiers into formerly militant-held [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/the-clan-ceiling-why-somalias-counterterrorism-war-keeps-reproducing-itself/">The Clan Ceiling: Why Somalia’s Counterterrorism War Keeps Reproducing Itself</a> appeared first on <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com">Kaab TV</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p id="ember61" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong>Mogadishu, <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a> </strong>—By 2026, the most revealing measure of Somalia’s counterterrorism crisis was no longer the number of airstrikes conducted or villages recaptured from the extremist group, <a class="xRPuXKfUpBkIORjMpZxQAvTEeNvfshyBJs " tabindex="0" href="https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/ASB-45-EN-Somalia-at-Risk-of-Becoming-a-Jihadist-State.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link=""><strong>al-Shabab</strong></a>. It was the widening gap between military advances and political control.</p>
<p id="ember62" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The federal government in Mogadishu could clear roads, retake towns and deploy soldiers into formerly militant-held districts. But across large parts of central and southern <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a>, it still <a class="xRPuXKfUpBkIORjMpZxQAvTEeNvfshyBJs " tabindex="0" href="https://humanitarianoutcomes.org/sites/default/files/publications/ho_ukhih_somalia_1023_2.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link=""><strong>struggled to convince</strong></a> local communities that state authority would endure after the security operations ended.</p>
<p id="ember63" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">That contradiction increasingly sits at the center of Somalia’s war against insurgency.</p>
<p id="ember64" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">For years, international strategy toward <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a> followed a familiar formula: <strong><a class="xRPuXKfUpBkIORjMpZxQAvTEeNvfshyBJs " tabindex="0" href="https://www.gcerf.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Country-Profile_Somalia_January-2026.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">strengthen</a> </strong>the Somali National Army, expand intelligence coordination with foreign partners and gradually extend state authority into rural areas dominated by al-Shabab.</p>
<p id="ember65" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The model appeared to gain momentum during the 2022 and 2023 offensives, when clan militias known as <a class="xRPuXKfUpBkIORjMpZxQAvTEeNvfshyBJs " tabindex="0" href="https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/ASB-45-EN-Somalia-at-Risk-of-Becoming-a-Jihadist-State.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link=""><strong>Macawisley</strong></a>, backed by federal troops and international support, pushed militants from significant territory in central <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a>.</p>
<p id="ember66" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Somali officials described the campaign as a historic turning point, while Western diplomats cautiously spoke of renewed optimism.</p>
<p id="ember67" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">But the advances concealed deeper <strong><a class="xRPuXKfUpBkIORjMpZxQAvTEeNvfshyBJs " tabindex="0" href="https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC12781686/" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">structural weaknesses</a> </strong>that became increasingly visible through 2024, 2025 and into 2026.</p>
<p id="ember68" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The Somali state expanded militarily faster than it reconciled politically.</p>
<p id="ember69" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong>Reciprocal Fragility and Layered Sovereignty</strong></p>
<p id="ember70" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">In many districts, neither the federal government nor the al-Qaeda affiliate group achieved decisive authority.</p>
<p id="ember71" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Instead, <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a> drifted into what some Somali analysts described as “reciprocal fragility”, a condition in which competing actors retain enough coercive power to block stabilization without fully controlling the political landscape.</p>
<p id="ember72" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The result was layered sovereignty.</p>
<p id="ember73" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Government officials administered district headquarters by day. Militants collected <strong><a class="xRPuXKfUpBkIORjMpZxQAvTEeNvfshyBJs " tabindex="0" href="https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/ASB-45-EN-Somalia-at-Risk-of-Becoming-a-Jihadist-State.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">taxes</a> </strong>at night. Clan elders mediated disputes outside both systems. Businesses paid multiple authorities <strong><a class="xRPuXKfUpBkIORjMpZxQAvTEeNvfshyBJs " tabindex="0" href="https://humanitarianoutcomes.org/sites/default/files/publications/ho_ukhih_somalia_1023_2.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">simultaneously</a> </strong>to ensure protection and commercial access.</p>
<p id="ember74" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Increasingly, international analysts warned that the insurgency was feeding less on military weakness than on political fragmentation.</p>
<p id="ember75" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Matt Bryden, a senior regional analyst and co-founder of the Sahan Research think tank, argued in late-2025 <strong><a class="xRPuXKfUpBkIORjMpZxQAvTEeNvfshyBJs " tabindex="0" href="https://africacenter.org/publication/asb45en-somalia-risk-jihadist-state/" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">assessments</a> </strong>that deteriorating relations between Mogadishu and Somalia’s federal member states were creating openings al-Shabab could exploit more effectively than direct battlefield confrontation.</p>
<p id="ember76" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Resistance to meaningful power-sharing, he warned, risked pushing <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a> toward a dangerous tipping point.</p>
<p id="ember77" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The broader concern emerging among researchers and diplomats was that Somalia’s conflict was becoming increasingly regionalized.</p>
<p id="ember78" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Federal authorities, regional administrations, <a class="xRPuXKfUpBkIORjMpZxQAvTEeNvfshyBJs " tabindex="0" href="https://www.gcerf.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Country-Profile_Somalia_January-2026.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link=""><strong>Gulf-backed actors</strong></a>, clan networks and local militias were operating according to separate political and security calculations rather than a unified national strategy.</p>
<p id="ember79" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">That fragmentation became especially visible in the government’s dependence on <strong><a class="xRPuXKfUpBkIORjMpZxQAvTEeNvfshyBJs " tabindex="0" href="https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/ASB-45-EN-Somalia-at-Risk-of-Becoming-a-Jihadist-State.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">Macawisley</a> </strong>militias.</p>
<p id="ember80" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The clan-based fighters became indispensable during the anti militants offensives because they possessed something the regular army often lacked: local legitimacy, clan trust networks and detailed territorial knowledge.</p>
<p id="ember81" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">But by 2026, many of those same militias had become entangled in unresolved <a class="xRPuXKfUpBkIORjMpZxQAvTEeNvfshyBJs " tabindex="0" href="https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/unhcr-somalia-protection-and-solutions-monitoring-network-flash-alert-11-march-2026-inter-clan-conflict-displaces-over-1500-individuals-mudug-region" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link=""><strong>land disputes</strong></a>, revenge killings and inter-clan competition.</p>
<p id="ember82" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Analysts at the <a class="xRPuXKfUpBkIORjMpZxQAvTEeNvfshyBJs " tabindex="0" href="https://riftvalley.net/publication/the-shaping-of-the-somali-national-security-architecture/" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link=""><strong>Rift Valley Institute</strong></a> described the Macawisley phenomenon as a “<a class="xRPuXKfUpBkIORjMpZxQAvTEeNvfshyBJs " tabindex="0" href="https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/SOM" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link=""><strong>double-edged sword.</strong></a>” The militias emerged organically from local <strong><a class="xRPuXKfUpBkIORjMpZxQAvTEeNvfshyBJs " tabindex="0" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ma%27awisley" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">frustration</a> </strong>with al-Shabab taxation, extortion and forced recruitment.</p>
<p id="ember83" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Yet the same clan structures that made them effective against militants also risked deepening local fragmentation once communities became rearmed.</p>
<p id="ember84" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">In Somali political culture, disarmament is rarely viewed simply as a security issue. It is tied directly to <a class="xRPuXKfUpBkIORjMpZxQAvTEeNvfshyBJs " tabindex="0" href="https://www.qeh.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/pdf_docs/qehwps100.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link=""><strong>communal survival.</strong></a></p>
<p id="ember85" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Across much of rural <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a>, the state is often perceived not as a neutral institution but as an <strong><a class="xRPuXKfUpBkIORjMpZxQAvTEeNvfshyBJs " tabindex="0" href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23311886.2026.2640641" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">extension</a> </strong>of whichever clan or sub-clan dominates local administration. The appointment of a district commissioner, deployment of a military commander or establishment of a checkpoint can quickly alter <a class="xRPuXKfUpBkIORjMpZxQAvTEeNvfshyBJs " tabindex="0" href="https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/295081599810868734/pdf/Subnational-Governance-and-Conflict-The-Merits-of-Subnational-Governance-as-a-Catalyst-for-Peace.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link=""><strong>local power balances.</strong></a></p>
<p id="ember86" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">When one community feels excluded, al-Shabab has repeatedly shown an ability to exploit the resulting <a class="xRPuXKfUpBkIORjMpZxQAvTEeNvfshyBJs " tabindex="0" href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23311886.2025.2576151" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link=""><strong>grievances</strong></a>.</p>
<p id="ember87" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The group’s resilience has long depended on more than ideology alone.</p>
<p id="ember88" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">In many areas, it functions as an <strong><a class="xRPuXKfUpBkIORjMpZxQAvTEeNvfshyBJs " tabindex="0" href="https://clubelisboa.pt/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/ClubeLisboa_Brief-2-2025-%E2%80%93-Reclaiming-Orthodoxy-FINAL-1.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">alternative</a> </strong>governance structure capable of arbitrating disputes, regulating transport routes and enforcing commercial agreements across clan boundaries.</p>
<p id="ember89" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">That reality increasingly led analysts to frame Somalia’s conflict less as a conventional counterterrorism campaign than as a competition over who could provide predictable order.</p>
<p id="ember90" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">For traders moving goods through insecure territory, predictability often outweighs ideology.</p>
<p id="ember91" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">That helps explain why many businesses in Mogadishu and the sprawling Bakara Market continue operating within a system of <a class="xRPuXKfUpBkIORjMpZxQAvTEeNvfshyBJs " tabindex="0" href="https://www.euaa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/2025-10/2025_CG_Somalia.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link=""><strong>dual taxation</strong></a>, paying official state taxes while also transferring “<a class="xRPuXKfUpBkIORjMpZxQAvTEeNvfshyBJs " tabindex="0" href="https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/ASB-45-EN-Somalia-at-Risk-of-Becoming-a-Jihadist-State.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link=""><strong>security fees</strong></a>” to al-Shabab networks controlling rural corridors.</p>
<p id="ember92" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Among Somali transporters and traders, frustration over the arrangement has become increasingly visible in public debate. Yet the system also highlights a broader reality: many commercial actors do not necessarily support al-Shabab politically. They simply regard it as an <a class="xRPuXKfUpBkIORjMpZxQAvTEeNvfshyBJs " tabindex="0" href="https://humanitarianoutcomes.org/sites/default/files/publications/ho_ukhih_somalia_1023_2.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link=""><strong>unavoidable coercive authority.</strong></a></p>
<p id="ember93" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">This is not always ideological loyalty. Often, it is economic adaptation.</p>
<p id="ember94" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The same logic shapes local <a class="xRPuXKfUpBkIORjMpZxQAvTEeNvfshyBJs " tabindex="0" href="https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/unhcr-somalia-protection-and-solutions-monitoring-network-flash-alert-11-march-2026-inter-clan-conflict-displaces-over-1500-individuals-mudug-region" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link=""><strong>neutrality arrangements</strong></a> in rural districts, where communities sometimes negotiate informal understandings with militants to protect grazing access, water points or transport routes.</p>
<p id="ember95" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Certain counterterrorism frameworks frequently interpret such arrangements as collaboration with insurgents. Many Somali communities instead see them as <strong><a class="xRPuXKfUpBkIORjMpZxQAvTEeNvfshyBJs " tabindex="0" href="https://www.qeh.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/pdf_docs/qehwps100.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">pragmatic survival strategies</a> </strong>in an environment where state protection remains inconsistent.</p>
<p id="ember96" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The gap between those interpretations has become one of the central weaknesses in international policy.</p>
<p id="ember97" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The <strong><a class="xRPuXKfUpBkIORjMpZxQAvTEeNvfshyBJs " tabindex="0" href="https://www.stimson.org/2024/atmis-transition-and-post-atmis-security-arrangements-in-somalia/?utm" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">transition</a> </strong>from the African Union Transition Mission in <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a> to the newer African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a> framework exposed those vulnerabilities further.</p>
<p id="ember98" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">As African Union forces reduced their <strong><a class="xRPuXKfUpBkIORjMpZxQAvTEeNvfshyBJs " tabindex="0" href="https://www.stimson.org/2024/atmis-transition-and-post-atmis-security-arrangements-in-somalia/?utm" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">footprint</a> </strong>during 2024 and 2025, Al-Shabab adapted strategically rather than confronting stronger military positions directly.</p>
<p id="ember99" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Regional analysts increasingly described the shift as a “<a class="xRPuXKfUpBkIORjMpZxQAvTEeNvfshyBJs " tabindex="0" href="https://www.africansecurityanalysis.org/reports/transition-tensions-and-al-shabaab-resilience-in-somalia-march-2025?utm" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link=""><strong>wait-and-bleed</strong></a>” strategy.</p>
<p id="ember100" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Instead of focusing primarily on territorial battles, militants <strong><a class="xRPuXKfUpBkIORjMpZxQAvTEeNvfshyBJs " tabindex="0" href="https://www.africansecurityanalysis.org/reports/transition-tensions-and-al-shabaab-resilience-in-somalia-march-2025?utm" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">intensified</a> </strong>assassinations, intimidation campaigns and targeted killings aimed at clan elders, mediators and local officials aligned with the federal government.</p>
<p id="ember101" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The objective was less about immediate territorial conquest than about weakening trust inside the political alliances supporting the <strong><a class="xRPuXKfUpBkIORjMpZxQAvTEeNvfshyBJs " tabindex="0" href="https://www.stimson.org/2024/atmis-transition-and-post-atmis-security-arrangements-in-somalia/?utm" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">counterinsurgency</a> </strong>campaign.</p>
<p id="ember102" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The message delivered to communities was simple: governments may withdraw, but clans remain.</p>
<p id="ember103" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Versions of that sentiment spread widely across Somali social media during 2025 and 2026.</p>
<p id="ember104" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">One phrase captured the skepticism especially clearly: “Dowladdu waa ku-meel-gaar, laakiin beeluhu waa weligood”, meaning that while the government is seen as temporary, the clan remains enduring and permanent.</p>
<p id="ember105" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The phrase reflected more than cynicism. It reflected political memory shaped by decades of state collapse and insecurity.</p>
<p id="ember106" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Since 1991, many Somali communities have relied on lineage networks, compensation systems and clan protection mechanisms more consistently than formal state institutions.</p>
<p id="ember107" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">This is where counterterrorism operations often collide with older grievance structures.</p>
<p id="ember108" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">When civilians from one clan are killed during operations associated with forces linked to another clan, the violence can quickly become absorbed into cycles of revenge and retaliation that predate the insurgency itself.</p>
<p id="ember109" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Several confrontations in parts of Hiraan, Gedo and Lower Shabelle during 2025 and early 2026 illustrated that dynamic, as disputes over checkpoints, territory and political influence increasingly blurred the line between counterinsurgency and clan competition.</p>
<p id="ember110" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Researchers at the Institute for Security Studies warned repeatedly that “<a class="xRPuXKfUpBkIORjMpZxQAvTEeNvfshyBJs " tabindex="0" href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/disunity-in-somalia-is-al-shabaab-s-greatest-weapon" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link=""><strong>disunity is Al-Shabaab’s greatest weapon</strong></a>.” Their argument was that military gains repeatedly eroded whenever Somali political actors shifted attention toward election disputes and internal rivalries.</p>
<p id="ember111" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The fragmentation also deepened tensions within Somalia’s federal structure.</p>
<p id="ember112" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong><a class="xRPuXKfUpBkIORjMpZxQAvTEeNvfshyBJs " tabindex="0" href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-small-autonomous-region-of-puntland-found-success-in-battling-islamic-state-in-somalia-251775" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">Operations</a> </strong>conducted by Puntland Security Forces against Islamic State <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a> Province between late 2024 and 2025 demonstrated that regional administrations could sometimes conduct more coherent campaigns than the federal center.</p>
<p id="ember113" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">But the operations also reinforced a more uncomfortable reality: Somalia’s security architecture was gradually evolving into <a class="xRPuXKfUpBkIORjMpZxQAvTEeNvfshyBJs " tabindex="0" href="https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/SOM" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link=""><strong>parallel regional systems</strong></a> with varying loyalties and levels of coordination.</p>
<p id="ember114" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Analysts at the Hiraal Institute described the trend as the “<a class="xRPuXKfUpBkIORjMpZxQAvTEeNvfshyBJs " tabindex="0" href="https://hiraalinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/2022-Somalia-Security-in-Review.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link=""><strong>federalization of security</strong></a>.”</p>
<p id="ember115" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">That development poses difficult questions for the future cohesion of the Somali state.</p>
<p id="ember116" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Because Somalia’s central challenge is no longer simply about military capability. It is about legitimacy.</p>
<p id="ember117" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">International partners have often treated legitimacy as something derived from constitutions, elections and formal institutions. In much of <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a>, legitimacy is still negotiated through clan balance, mediation systems and the management of coexistence between rival communities.</p>
<p id="ember118" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Al-Shabaab understands that reality well.</p>
<p id="ember119" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Its intelligence wing, the Amniyat, increasingly operates not only as a clandestine security apparatus but also as a political pressure network capable of exploiting local disputes over land, water and clan representation.</p>
<p id="ember120" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The danger for Mogadishu is that military operations conducted without parallel reconciliation efforts risk reproducing the instability they are intended to eliminate.</p>
<p id="ember121" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">A state that enters territory without resolving local grievances can easily appear less like a national authority than another armed actor competing within clan space.</p>
<p id="ember122" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The lesson emerging from Somalia’s conflict by 2026 is not that military pressure is unnecessary. Al-Shabab remains capable of major attacks, extortion and coercion across large areas of the country.</p>
<p id="ember123" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">But force alone cannot resolve a conflict whose roots are political and social before they are ideological.</p>
<p id="ember124" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">In <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a>, the battlefield is increasingly defined not simply by who controls territory, but by who communities believe will still remain after the next withdrawal, the next election and the next clan dispute.</p>
<hr class="reader-divider-block__horizontal-rule" />
<p id="ember125" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong>Abdi Guled</strong><em> is a Horn of Africa analyst and journalist focusing on political risk, armed groups and geostrategic competition in the region.</em></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/the-clan-ceiling-why-somalias-counterterrorism-war-keeps-reproducing-itself/">The Clan Ceiling: Why Somalia’s Counterterrorism War Keeps Reproducing Itself</a> appeared first on <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com">Kaab TV</a>.</p>
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		<title>Drifting Towns, Drifting People: How Al-Shabab’s Raids Unmake Central Somalia</title>
		<link>https://en.kaabtv.com/drifting-towns-drifting-people-how-al-shababs-raids-unmake-central-somalia/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Abdi Guled]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 17 Oct 2025 16:02:42 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Conflict & Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[News]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Trending]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[#Conflict Resolution somalia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Aid and Humanitarian Somalia]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://en.kaabtv.com/?p=15655</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Mogadishu and Beledweyne &#8212; In central and southern Somalia, the front lines are moving backward. Despite years of military offensives and foreign support, Al-Shabab&#8217;s renewed raids have triggered one of the country&#8217;s worst waves of displacement in recent memory, exposing the limits of government control and the growing fragility of rural life in the heart [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/drifting-towns-drifting-people-how-al-shababs-raids-unmake-central-somalia/">Drifting Towns, Drifting People: How Al-Shabab’s Raids Unmake Central Somalia</a> appeared first on <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com">Kaab TV</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p id="ember61" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong>Mogadishu and Beledweyne </strong>— In central and southern <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a>, the front lines are moving backward. Despite years of military offensives and foreign support, Al-Shabab’s renewed raids have triggered one of the country’s worst waves of <a class="pwHwmXBqmofSClxsctVkNQQzvNIASaSVkFYLg " tabindex="0" href="https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/conflict-lower-shabelle-sends-families-fleeing-desolate-camps-mogadishu?utm" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">displacement</a> in recent memory, exposing the limits of government control and the growing fragility of rural life in the heart of the conflict.</p>
<p id="ember62" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Among the thousands who fled is 42-year-old Halima Ahmed, who now sits under a patchwork tent on the outskirts of Beledweyne, clutching a tattered identity card and her youngest child.</p>
<p id="ember63" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">“We run, we return, we run again,” she says. “Each time we lose something &#8211; a house, a relative, a piece of ourselves.”</p>
<p id="ember64" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Her story has become a familiar refrain across the river valleys of Middle and Lower Shabelle and the plains of Hiiraan. In this region, the heartland of Somalia’s struggle against Al-Shabab &#8211; entire communities are living in cycles of displacement, driven by a conflict that grinds on with devastating predictability.</p>
<h3 id="ember65" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong>A Crisis Renewed</strong></h3>
<p id="ember66" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">According to new data from the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) and other humanitarian monitors, nearly 700,000 people have been <a class="pwHwmXBqmofSClxsctVkNQQzvNIASaSVkFYLg " tabindex="0" href="https://euaa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/2025-06/2025_05_EUAA_COI_Report_Somalia_Security_Situation.pdf?utm" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">newly displaced</a> across central <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a> this year alone.</p>
<p id="ember67" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Many fled after a series of Al-Shabab offensives that overran or encircled towns once thought secure under federal or regional control.</p>
<p id="ember68" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Between April 2023 and March 2025, the UNHCR’s Protection and Return Monitoring Network (PRMN) <a class="pwHwmXBqmofSClxsctVkNQQzvNIASaSVkFYLg " tabindex="0" href="https://euaa.europa.eu/coi/somalia/2025/security-situation/14-recent-overall-security-trends/142-conflict-related-displacement?utm" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">reported</a> that conflict and insecurity were responsible for displacing roughly 600,000 people, part of a total of approximately 2.79 million newly displaced during that period.</p>
<p id="ember69" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Humanitarian access has <a class="pwHwmXBqmofSClxsctVkNQQzvNIASaSVkFYLg " tabindex="0" href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/un-says-humanitarian-access-incidents-in-somalia-fell-q1-5005614" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">collapsed</a>in many of these areas. Aid convoys risk ambush; clinics have shuttered for lack of supplies.</p>
<p id="ember70" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">“We can no longer tell whether we are moving forward or backward,” a senior aid coordinator in Mogadishu said.</p>
<p id="ember71" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">“Every time we stabilize one district, the conflict shifts to another.”</p>
<p id="ember72" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Al-Shabab’s strategy, analysts say, has evolved.</p>
<p id="ember73" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Rather than holding territory, the group now seeks to punish local resistance and exhaust the population, creating a state of perpetual insecurity that undermines government authority even without direct control.</p>
<p id="ember74" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Humanitarian agencies face serious challenges delivering aid due to conflict, targeted attacks on aid workers, restrictions imposed by warring parties, including arbitrary taxation and bureaucratic hurdles, and <a class="pwHwmXBqmofSClxsctVkNQQzvNIASaSVkFYLg " tabindex="0" href="https://unsom.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/s_2024_426-en.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link=""><strong>physical constraints</strong></a>.</p>
<h3 id="ember75" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong>The Vanishing Towns</strong></h3>
<p id="ember76" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Images shared with agencies show concentric rings of destruction in rural Hiiraan, burnt croplands, collapsed homes, and expanding IDP settlements along riverbanks, according to a senior aid coordinator based in Mogadishu who had accessed the images.</p>
<p id="ember77" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Approximately 3.7 million people are currently <a class="pwHwmXBqmofSClxsctVkNQQzvNIASaSVkFYLg " tabindex="0" href="https://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/somalia/?utm" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">internally displaced</a> in <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a>, with worsening food insecurity closely linked to ongoing displacement patterns.</p>
<p id="ember78" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">In Mahaas, once a trading hub linking Beledweyne and Mahas, schools have been closed, and some repurposed as makeshift barracks; classrooms now bear bullet scars.</p>
<p id="ember79" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Government forces, supported by clan militias, have retaken some positions, but without the resources to hold them.</p>
<p id="ember80" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The result is a slow, silent depopulation.</p>
<p id="ember81" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Towns empty out not in single mass exoduses but in waves, a few families at a time as fear outweighs the hope of rebuilding.</p>
<h3 id="ember82" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong>Humanitarian Gaps and Political Fault Lines</strong></h3>
<p id="ember83" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The displacement crisis is not only a humanitarian disaster but also a political one.</p>
<p id="ember84" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Relief agencies <a class="pwHwmXBqmofSClxsctVkNQQzvNIASaSVkFYLg " tabindex="0" href="https://www.acaps.org/fileadmin/Data_Product/Main_media/20250319_ACAPS_Crisis_Impact_of_clan_conflicts_in_Somalia.pdf?utm" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">warn</a> that federal-state rivalries, overlapping jurisdictions, and inconsistent security coordination have left many displaced communities stranded between administrations.</p>
<p id="ember85" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Local officials in Hirshabelle, and Galmudug accuse Mogadishu of neglect; federal ministries blame donors for shrinking aid budgets.</p>
<p id="ember86" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Meanwhile, Al-Shabab continues to exploit the vacuum, <a class="pwHwmXBqmofSClxsctVkNQQzvNIASaSVkFYLg " tabindex="0" href="https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Country_Reports_on_Terrorism_2022-v3.pdf" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">levying “taxes</a>” on trade routes and offering rudimentary justice in areas where formal courts no longer function.</p>
<p id="ember87" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">A senior regional officer in Beledweyne described the situation bluntly:</p>
<p id="ember88" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">“We are fighting an enemy that does not need to win, it just needs us to fail.”</p>
<h3 id="ember89" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong>Lives in Limbo</strong></h3>
<p id="ember90" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">In Beledweyne’s sprawling displacement camp known as Xaawo Taako, tents stretch beyond sight. Children with dust-coated faces chase each other between rows of water jerrycans.</p>
<p id="ember91" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Aid workers estimate that nearly 30,000 new arrivals have settled here since July.</p>
<p id="ember92" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Halima, the mother from Buq-Aqable, receives a small ration every two weeks, a sack of flour, some oil, and sometimes beans. Her husband remains missing, last seen when the militants attacked their village.</p>
<p id="ember93" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">“They say peace will come,” she says softly. “But peace never stays.”</p>
<p id="ember94" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">For many, the cycle of return and flight has eroded the very idea of home. The line between refugee and resident blurs.</p>
<p id="ember95" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">“We are not moving toward anything,” said one local elder.</p>
<p id="ember96" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">“We are only moving away.”</p>
<p id="ember97" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Somalia’s military campaign, once buoyed by international backing and domestic enthusiasm, is <a class="pwHwmXBqmofSClxsctVkNQQzvNIASaSVkFYLg " tabindex="0" href="https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/euaa-country-origin-information-report-somalia-country-focus-may-2025?utm" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">straining</a>.</p>
<p id="ember98" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The drawdown of the African Union Transition Mission (ATMIS), now replaced by the under-resourced AUSSOM force, has left security <a class="pwHwmXBqmofSClxsctVkNQQzvNIASaSVkFYLg " tabindex="0" href="https://www.ecoi.net/en/countries/somalia/?utm" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">vacuums</a>in critical corridors.</p>
<p id="ember99" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Meanwhile, the Somali National Army remains underpaid and overstretched.</p>
<p id="ember100" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Analysts warn that without sustained funding and coordination, recent territorial gains could unravel. “Security progress in <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a> is like a sandcastle,” said a foreign diplomat familiar with the region.</p>
<p id="ember101" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">“Every tide of violence reshapes it.”</p>
<p id="ember102" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The government in Mogadishu insists it remains committed to stabilization, pointing to new local reconciliation initiatives and drone-assisted counterterrorism operations. But on the ground, such victories feel distant.</p>
<h3 id="ember103" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong>Prospects and Pitfalls Ahead</strong></h3>
<p id="ember104" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">As dusk falls over Beledweyne, the displaced begin lighting small fires to cook what little food they have. The horizon glows orange, from both the setting sun and the flames of distant skirmishes.</p>
<p id="ember105" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Somalia’s war has entered a phase where victory is measured not in captured territory, but in human <a class="pwHwmXBqmofSClxsctVkNQQzvNIASaSVkFYLg " tabindex="0" href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2025/country-chapters/somalia?utm" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">endurance</a>, the ability of families to rebuild, flee again, and somehow continue existing amid endless disruption.</p>
<p id="ember106" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">For Halima and thousands like her, the question is no longer when they will return home, but whether home, as they once knew it, still exists.</p>
<p id="ember107" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">— <em>A local reporter in Beledweyne has contributed to this report</em></p>
<hr class="reader-divider-block__horizontal-rule" />
<p id="ember108" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong>Abdi Guled </strong>is a Horn of Africa analyst and journalist with a focus on political risk, armed groups, and geostrategic competition in fragile states.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/drifting-towns-drifting-people-how-al-shababs-raids-unmake-central-somalia/">Drifting Towns, Drifting People: How Al-Shabab’s Raids Unmake Central Somalia</a> appeared first on <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com">Kaab TV</a>.</p>
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		<title>A Light Footprint, Heavy Challenges: The Limits of Somalia’s Security Transition</title>
		<link>https://en.kaabtv.com/a-light-footprint-heavy-challenges-the-limits-of-somalias-security-transition/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Abdi Guled]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 09 Oct 2025 10:45:01 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Conflict & Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Opinion]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Trending]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Jubaland]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Somali Army]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Somalia’s Security Transition]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://en.kaabtv.com/?p=15432</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>MOGADISHU, Somalia &#8212; Earlier this year, the parade ground at AU&#8217;s Halane military compound in Mogadishu took on a decidedly ceremonial air &#8212; Somali flags fluttering beneath the scorching coastal sun, AU officers standing to attention as brass bands played to mark what many described as a new chapter in Somalia&#8217;s protracted conflict. After nearly [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/a-light-footprint-heavy-challenges-the-limits-of-somalias-security-transition/">A Light Footprint, Heavy Challenges: The Limits of Somalia’s Security Transition</a> appeared first on <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com">Kaab TV</a>.</p>
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<p id="ember61" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong>MOGADISHU, <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a> </strong>— Earlier this year, the parade ground at AU&#8217;s Halane military compound in Mogadishu took on a decidedly ceremonial air — Somali flags fluttering beneath the scorching coastal sun, AU officers standing to attention as brass bands played to mark what many described as a new chapter in Somalia’s protracted conflict.</p>
<p id="ember62" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">After nearly two decades of African Union peacekeeping, the last contingents of the African Union Transition Mission in <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a> (ATMIS) lowered their flags and prepared to leave.</p>
<p id="ember63" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">In their place stood <a class="DjsrsjVHZJuBmYIlGeNPKHRUuogdgiHPtQE " tabindex="0" href="https://english.news.cn/africa/20250101/95e5ce78db214082b7e889daa5a309ee/c.html?utm" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link=""><strong>a new banner</strong></a>: AUSSOM — the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a>.</p>
<p id="ember64" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">On paper, it marked the beginning of Somalia’s long-promised self-reliance in security affairs. In practice, the transition has exposed the uneasy truth at the heart of Somalia’s recovery: the country’s ability to sustain peace may depend less on the number of troops and more on whether it has built a state worth defending.</p>
<h3 id="ember65" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong>A Transition of Necessity, Not Triumph</strong></h3>
<p id="ember66" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">ATMIS — and its predecessor, AMISOM — had for years served as both shield and scaffolding.</p>
<p id="ember67" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Its African troops, funded largely by the European Union and the United States, absorbed the shock of al-Shabab’s insurgency and helped keep Mogadishu’s fragile institutions upright. But donor fatigue and shifting global priorities — from Ukraine to the Sahel — forced an inevitable question: how long could foreign troops fight a Somali war?</p>
<p id="ember68" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">In 2024, that question found its answer. <strong><a class="DjsrsjVHZJuBmYIlGeNPKHRUuogdgiHPtQE " tabindex="0" href="https://au-ssom.org/aussom-mandate/?utm" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">AUSSOM’s</a> </strong>creation, designed as a leaner and politically lighter successor to ATMIS, was less a choice than a necessity.</p>
<p id="ember69" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The new mission’s mandate is advisory, not combat-driven, its footprint far smaller, and its emphasis on stabilisation rather than direct confrontation.</p>
<p id="ember70" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">“It’s a handover with a stopwatch,” said a senior international security advisor in Nairobi, requesting anonymity to speak candidly.</p>
<p id="ember71" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">“AUSSOM was created to exit gracefully, not to fight indefinitely.”</p>
<h3 id="ember72" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong>An Army in Search of a State</strong></h3>
<p id="ember73" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">For Somalia’s government, the shift from ATMIS to AUSSOM is both an <a class="DjsrsjVHZJuBmYIlGeNPKHRUuogdgiHPtQE " tabindex="0" href="https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/IPI-E-RPT-ATMIS-Transition-final.pdf?utm" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link=""><strong>opportunity and a risk</strong></a>.</p>
<p id="ember74" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Officials in Mogadishu portray it as a milestone of sovereignty — proof that the country can now lead its own security. Yet across much of rural <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a>, reality tells a harsher story.</p>
<p id="ember75" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The Somali National Army (SNA) has improved markedly since the chaotic 2010s, when clan loyalties and payroll corruption hollowed out its ranks.</p>
<p id="ember76" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Training programs led by Turkey and the United States have produced elite units like the Gorgor and Danab commandos, while Washington has reinstated drone strikes and special operations support, and regional partners have strengthened the country’s logistical backbone.</p>
<p id="ember77" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Still, the army remains fragmented, under-equipped, and politically entangled.</p>
<p id="ember78" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Salaries often arrive late. Local militias — nominally under federal command — answer to regional presidents or clan elders. Officers in federal states complain privately that orders from Mogadishu are often ignored or filtered through patronage networks.</p>
<p id="ember79" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">“The SNA fights bravely,” said a retired Somali colonel in Mogadishu.</p>
<p id="ember80" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">“But bravery doesn’t win long wars — structure does. And that’s what we still lack.”</p>
<h3 id="ember81" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong>The Vacuum Problem</strong></h3>
<p id="ember82" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">AUSSOM’s creation coincided with a series of territorial reversals that exposed the fragility of Somalia’s gains.</p>
<p id="ember83" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">In the months leading up to the transition, al-Shabab retook <a class="DjsrsjVHZJuBmYIlGeNPKHRUuogdgiHPtQE " tabindex="0" href="https://acleddata.com/update/al-shabaab-regains-lost-territories-amid-run-state-elections-somalia-march-2024?utm" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link=""><strong>pockets of territory</strong></a> in Galmudug and Hirshabelle. Analysts attribute these losses to a premature drawdown of ATMIS troops, leaving untested Somali forces overstretched and poorly supplied.</p>
<p id="ember84" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The new mission’s “light footprint” approach — focused on mentoring and political support — was meant to empower Somali institutions. Instead, it has revealed their <a class="DjsrsjVHZJuBmYIlGeNPKHRUuogdgiHPtQE " tabindex="0" href="https://eurafrica.info/2025/06/02/somalia-at-a-crossroads-resurgent-insurgents-fragmented-politics-and-the-uncertain-future-of-aussom/?utm" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link=""><strong>limits</strong></a>.</p>
<p id="ember85" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">AUSSOM lacks <a class="DjsrsjVHZJuBmYIlGeNPKHRUuogdgiHPtQE " tabindex="0" href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/funding-for-somalia-s-new-au-peace-mission-hangs-in-the-balance?utm" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link=""><strong>funds</strong></a>, the robust logistical chains, airlift capacity, and unified command that once defined ATMIS.</p>
<p id="ember86" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Coordination between AUSSOM and Somali units remains ad-hoc, dependent on donor-funded contractors and bilateral relationships rather than a cohesive national plan.</p>
<p id="ember87" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">“The symbolism of transition outpaced the substance,” said a Horn of Africa analyst based in Nairobi.</p>
<p id="ember88" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">“Somalia got sovereignty on paper before it got capacity on the ground.”</p>
<h3 id="ember89" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong>Politics Behind the Frontlines</strong></h3>
<p id="ember90" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Every battle in <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a> is also a political negotiation.</p>
<p id="ember91" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The country’s federal system — a patchwork of autonomous regions — means no military success is purely national.</p>
<p id="ember92" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">In Jubaland, local forces maintain their own command chain. In Puntland, tensions with Mogadishu over resource control have repeatedly stalled joint operations.</p>
<p id="ember93" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">That <strong><a class="DjsrsjVHZJuBmYIlGeNPKHRUuogdgiHPtQE " tabindex="0" href="https://gga.org/federal-feud-escalating-tensions-between-somalias-federal-government-and-jubaland/?utm" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link="">fragmentation</a> </strong>weakens not just the fight against al-Shabab but the very legitimacy of the federal state. AUSSOM’s mandate, though military in form, is deeply political in function — to broker cooperation where mistrust <a class="DjsrsjVHZJuBmYIlGeNPKHRUuogdgiHPtQE " tabindex="0" href="https://www.hiiraan.com/op4/2025/Aug/202546/somalia_s_broken_federalism_why_decentralisation_became_fragmentation.aspx?utm" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link=""><strong>runs deep.</strong></a></p>
<p id="ember94" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">“It’s a security mission trapped in a political puzzle,” said a senior AU official involved in the transition.</p>
<p id="ember95" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">“You can train soldiers all you want, but if the politics doesn’t hold, they’re fighting for nothing.”</p>
<h3 id="ember96" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong>The Al-Shabab Factor</strong></h3>
<p id="ember97" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Despite sustained airstrikes and local offensives, the al-Qaeda linked extremist group, al-Shabab remains far more organized in much of rural <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a> than the state. It operates courts, collects taxes, and provides a crude form of governance in areas where the state is absent.</p>
<p id="ember98" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Intelligence reports indicate that the group has diversified its tactics — expanding into <a class="DjsrsjVHZJuBmYIlGeNPKHRUuogdgiHPtQE " tabindex="0" href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1499?utm" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link=""><strong>financial crime</strong></a>, cyber operations, and cross-border <a class="DjsrsjVHZJuBmYIlGeNPKHRUuogdgiHPtQE " tabindex="0" href="https://www.hiiraan.com/news4/2025/Oct/203144/report_al_shabaab_earns_200_million_yearly_funds_somalia_insurgency.aspx?utm" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link=""><strong>smuggling</strong></a>. Its resilience underscores a grim paradox: as foreign missions scale down, al-Shabab’s staying power grows not by strength of arms, but by the weakness of governance.</p>
<p id="ember99" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The militants have learned to avoid <a class="DjsrsjVHZJuBmYIlGeNPKHRUuogdgiHPtQE " tabindex="0" href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/somalia-country-policy-and-information-notes/country-policy-and-information-note-mogadishu-al-shabab-and-the-security-situation-somalia-july-2025-accessible?utm" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link=""><strong>costly confrontations</strong></a>, instead using targeted <a class="DjsrsjVHZJuBmYIlGeNPKHRUuogdgiHPtQE " tabindex="0" href="https://www.intechopen.com/chapters/1155027?utm" target="_self" data-test-app-aware-link=""><strong>assassinations</strong></a>, ambushes, and propaganda to exploit political divisions. In a recent statement, the group mocked the AUSSOM transition as “the changing of uniforms, not reality.”</p>
<h3 id="ember100" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong>Metrics of Success — or Failure</strong></h3>
<p id="ember101" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Diplomats in Mogadishu say the coming 18 months will be decisive. The benchmarks are clear but unforgiving:</p>
<p id="ember102" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Can Somali forces independently secure key population centers for at least six consecutive months?</p>
<p id="ember103" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Are defense salaries being paid transparently, without donor oversight?</p>
<p id="ember104" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Can AUSSOM operate effectively without emergency funding from the EU or the U.S.?</p>
<p id="ember105" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Most crucially, can local administrations deliver basic services faster than al-Shabab can re-infiltrate?</p>
<p id="ember106" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">If the answer to most of these remains “no,” the transition risks becoming a managed retreat rather than a step toward sovereignty.</p>
<h3 id="ember107" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong>Regional and Strategic Ripples</strong></h3>
<p id="ember108" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Somalia’s experiment with AUSSOM is being watched closely across the Horn.</p>
<p id="ember109" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">The withdrawal of large foreign forces also reorders power dynamics within Somalia’s elite. With fewer international boots on the ground, foreign policy leverage shifts — from military partners to financial ones.</p>
<p id="ember110" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">Turkey, the UAE, and Qatar are positioning themselves as primary security and infrastructure patrons, each with distinct agendas that blur the line between assistance and influence.</p>
<p id="ember111" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph">As one diplomat put it: “AUSSOM is not just a military mission. It’s a geopolitical mirror reflecting who still believes in <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/search-across-states-u-s-hunts-somali-born-citizen-for-fraud/">Somalia</a> — and who is quietly giving up.”</p>
<hr class="reader-divider-block__horizontal-rule" />
<p id="ember112" class="ember-view reader-text-block__paragraph"><strong>Abdi Guled</strong><em> is a Horn of Africa analyst and journalist with a focus on political risk, armed groups, and geostrategic competition in fragile states.</em></p>
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<p>The post <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/a-light-footprint-heavy-challenges-the-limits-of-somalias-security-transition/">A Light Footprint, Heavy Challenges: The Limits of Somalia’s Security Transition</a> appeared first on <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com">Kaab TV</a>.</p>
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		<title>Gunfire in Mogadishu Turns Evictions Into a Political Battleground</title>
		<link>https://en.kaabtv.com/gunfire-in-mogadishu-turns-evictions-into-a-political-battleground/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Abdi Guled]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 25 Sep 2025 20:30:04 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Conflict & Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Opinion]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mogadishu]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://en.kaabtv.com/?p=15108</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>MOGADISHU (Kaab TV) &#8212; The streets of Mogadishu reverberated with gunfire on Wednesday, as opposition leaders and their armed escorts confronted Somali police outside the Warta Nabadda district station. The clash, sparked by viral footage of police assaulting two elderly civilians during forced evictions in nearby neighborhoods, left one person dead and injured members of [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/gunfire-in-mogadishu-turns-evictions-into-a-political-battleground/">Gunfire in Mogadishu Turns Evictions Into a Political Battleground</a> appeared first on <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com">Kaab TV</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p data-pm-slice="0 0 []">MOGADISHU (Kaab TV) — The streets of Mogadishu reverberated with gunfire on Wednesday, as opposition leaders and their armed escorts confronted Somali police outside the Warta Nabadda district station.</p>
<p>The clash, sparked by viral footage of police assaulting two elderly civilians during forced evictions in nearby neighborhoods, left one person dead and injured members of both the security forces and the opposition’s armed escorts, though the exact casualty toll remains disputed.</p>
<p>What began as a reaction to visible abuses quickly escalated into a stark demonstration of Somalia’s intertwined humanitarian and political crises.</p>
<p>Opposition leaders, including former President <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/how-somalias-nisa-planted-spies-inside-opposition-circles/">Sharif Sheikh Ahmed</a> and former Prime Minister <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/how-somalias-nisa-planted-spies-inside-opposition-circles/">Hassan Ali Khaire</a>, mobilized to protect residents from police operations they characterized as heavy-handed and illegal.</p>
<p>Government officials, in turn, framed the confrontation as an attempt to seize a state facility, asserting the primacy of law and order.</p>
<h2>The Immediate Trigger</h2>
<p>Local reporting indicates that the confrontation was sparked by widespread outrage over forced evictions in the Sinay and Warta Nabadda neighborhoods.</p>
<p>Videos circulated online showing police bulldozing shelters and assaulting residents. Opposition leaders responded by traveling to the area with armed escorts, confronting police outside the Warta Nabadda station.</p>
<p>Witnesses described attempts by opposition guards to enter the station, leading to exchanges of small-arms fire that struck detention cells and endangered civilians.</p>
<p>“The viral video galvanized public sentiment,” said a Mogadishu-based analyst.</p>
<p>“It created both a political opening for the opposition and a flashpoint for conflict.”</p>
<h2>Political Stakes and Strategic Calculus</h2>
<p>For the opposition, the confrontation offered a high-risk, high-reward opportunity.</p>
<p>By intervening visibly in the streets, leaders reinforced their narrative as defenders of the dispossessed, mobilizing urban constituencies and generating media attention. But bringing armed escorts into densely populated areas carries the risk of civilian casualties, which could delegitimize the opposition’s moral claim.</p>
<p>The government, by contrast, framed its response as a defense of state authority. By portraying the incident as an attempted seizure of a police station, the administration reinforced the perception that it maintains control over the monopoly of force — a critical legitimacy marker in a city already strained by insurgent activity and weak governance.</p>
<p>Yet the very operations that sparked the clash — mass evictions and aggressive policing — erode public trust and provide fodder for opposition narratives.</p>
<p>Both sides also signaled strength to international observers.</p>
<p>The opposition demonstrated its capacity to project force in response to grievances, while the government signaled its ability to enforce order. These competing messages are likely to shape donor and diplomatic assessments of Mogadishu’s stability.</p>
<p>In response to the clashes, a visibly angry Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre denounced the opposition’s actions as a “<strong><a href="https://www.facebook.com/reel/1992675511505659" target="_blank" rel="noopener">coup attempt</a></strong>.”.</p>
<p>Raising the stakes further, former president <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/how-somalias-nisa-planted-spies-inside-opposition-circles/">Sharif Sheikh Ahmed</a>, who heads the opposition alliance, announced plans for rallies at three separate venues in Mogadishu this coming Saturday.</p>
<h2>Security and Humanitarian Implications</h2>
<p>Warta Nabadda sits in a densely populated district near commercial corridors and government offices, making any confrontation highly visible and dangerous.</p>
<p>Small-unit exchanges between opposition guards and police complicate attribution of the “first shot,” and stray bullets put civilians and detainees at risk.</p>
<p>The timing compounds the risk. Somalia’s security forces are already stretched by renewed al-Shabab offensives and a string of urban attacks.</p>
<p>Analysts warn that confrontations between political actors and police can create openings for insurgents, who thrive on state weakness and fractured urban authority.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, forced evictions themselves are a humanitarian crisis.</p>
<p>Aid agencies report that more than 140,000 people have been displaced in 2025 alone, many of them from informal settlements with limited access to basic services. The destruction of homes, schools, and water points exacerbates vulnerability and feeds the cycle of grievance that drives political mobilization.</p>
<h2>A Test for Somalia’s Political System</h2>
<p>The incident illustrates a broader pattern in Somali politics, where urban grievances — whether evictions, political marginalization, or security abuses — rapidly become political flashpoints. If either side escalates, clashes could spread to other districts, dividing security forces along political or clan lines and further undermining state authority.</p>
<p>The opposition’s strategy hinges on public sympathy for evicted residents, while the government’s approach relies on demonstrating that it can maintain order without capitulating to armed pressure. Both strategies carry risks: overreach by either side could destabilize Mogadishu and provide strategic advantage to al-Shabab.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, analysts suggest the crisis could take one of two paths.</p>
<p>In the short term, mediation efforts by elders, religious figures, or international partners could ease tensions.</p>
<p>Opposition legal complaints over police abuses may offer a formal channel for grievances, but they are unlikely to address the deeper conflict between the state’s drive to assert authority and the need to safeguard vulnerable communities.</p>
<p>Longer-term, the confrontation underscores the fragility of Somalia’s urban political order.</p>
<p>The streets of Mogadishu are no longer just a stage for policing and politics — they are a frontline where grievances, political ambitions, and insurgent threats collide.</p>
<p>How leaders navigate this complex environment will determine whether the capital remains a fragile equilibrium or descends further into political violence and instability.</p>
<p>For residents caught in the middle, the calculus is simple and immediate: homes, families, and personal safety remain at risk, as political power struggles play out in the streets.</p>
<p>&#8211;</p>
<h6><em>Abdi Guled is a Horn of Africa analyst and journalist with a focus on political risk, armed groups, and geostrategic competition in fragile states.</em></h6>
<p>The post <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com/gunfire-in-mogadishu-turns-evictions-into-a-political-battleground/">Gunfire in Mogadishu Turns Evictions Into a Political Battleground</a> appeared first on <a href="https://en.kaabtv.com">Kaab TV</a>.</p>
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